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Abstract	
	From	 its	 inception,	 the	 French	 Wars	 of	 Religion	 was	 a	 European	phenomenon.	 The	 internationality	 of	 the	 conflict	 is	 most	 clearly	illustrated	by	 the	Protestant	princes	who	engaged	militarily	 in	France	between	 1567	 and	 1569.	 Due	 to	 the	 historiographical	 convention	 of	approaching	 the	 French	Wars	 of	 Religion	 as	 a	 national	 event,	 studied	almost	 entirely	 separate	 from	 the	history	of	 the	German	Reformation,	its	transnational	dimension	has	largely	been	ignored	or	misinterpreted.		Using	ten	German	Protestant	princes	as	a	case	study,	this	thesis	investigates	the	variety	of	 factors	that	shaped	German	understandings	of	the	French	Wars	of	Religion	and	by	extension	German	involvement	in	France.	The	princes’	rich	and	international	network	of	correspondence	together	with	the	many	German-language	pamphlets	about	the	Wars	in	France	 provide	 an	 insight	 into	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 conflict	 was	explained,	debated,	and	interpreted.	Applying	 a	 transnational	 interpretive	 framework,	 this	 thesis	unravels	 the	 complex	 interplay	 between	 the	 personal,	 local,	 national,	and	 international	 influences	 that	 together	 formed	 an	 individual’s	understanding	 of	 the	 Wars	 of	 Religion.	 These	 interpretations	 were	rooted	 in	 the	 longstanding	personal	and	cultural	connections	between	France	and	the	Rhineland	and	strongly	influenced	by	French	diplomacy	and	 propaganda.	 Moreover,	 they	 were	 conditioned	 by	 one’s	 precise	position	 in	 a	 number	 of	 key	 religious	 debates,	 most	 notably	 the	question	 of	 Lutheran-Reformed	 relations.	 These	 understandings	changed	as	a	result	of	a	number	pivotal	European	events	that	took	place	in	 1566	 and	 1567	 and	 the	 conspiracy	 theories	 they	 inspired.	 This	combination	 of	 influences	 created	 a	 spectrum	 of	 individual	interpretations	of	the	French	Wars	of	Religion.	The	military	campaigns	of	the	years	1567-69,	far	from	being	motivated	by	political	or	financial	opportunism,	were	the	product	of	these	individual	interpretations.	
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Introduction		In	 March	 1568	 the	 Elector	 Palatine	 Friedrich	 III	 sent	 a	 letter	 to	 his	fellow	Protestant	Prince	Elector	August	of	Saxony	in	which	he	wrote	of	the	 religious	 conflict	 that	 had	 once	 again	 broken	 out	 in	 France.	 He	reminded	 August	 that	 the	 violence	 had	 erupted	 ‘not	 only	 in	 the	Kingdom	of	France	but	also	in	the	Netherlands,	Italy,	and	other	places’	and	feared	that	it	would	also	engulf	‘our	beloved	fatherland’	of	the	Holy	Roman	 Empire.1	Nine	months	 later	 the	 Cardinal	 of	 Lorraine	 wrote	 to	Philip	 II	of	 the	dangers	 facing	 the	Catholics	 in	France.	 In	his	 letter	 the	Cardinal	drew	Philip’s	attention	to	the	fact	‘that	all	the	German	princes	of	 the	 opposite	 religion	 have	 not	 only	 formed	 a	 league	 together	 but	have	 also	 armed	 themselves	 against	 us	…	On	 the	 other	 side,	 sire,	 the	Queen	 of	 England	…	 is	 said	 to	 give	 aid	 to	 our	 rebels	with	munitions,	artillery,	money,	and	men	…	Thus,	your	majesty	will	permit	me	to	say	to	you	that	it	is	necessary	that	we	prepare	a	good	and	great	effort’	to	end	the	war.2	These	two	 interpretations	of	 the	religious	conflict	 that	raged	in	 France	 are	 characteristic	 of	 a	 mood	 that	 swept	 across	 Western	Europe	between	1567	and	1569.	During	the	last	years	of	the	1560s	the	idea	 that	events	 in	France	were	part	of	a	 larger	 international	 struggle	dominated	 public	 and	 private	 discourse.	 This	 mood	 was	 the	culmination	of	a	decade	of	debates	and	discussions	about	the	nature	of	the	turmoil	 in	France.	These	debates	were	informed	by	a	complex	mix	of	 factors,	ranging	 from	the	theoretical	understanding	of	 the	nature	of																																																									1	‘in	der	cron	Frankreich	sonder	auch	in	den	Nederlanden,	Italien	und	andern	orten	…	ins	 geliebten	 vaterland’	 Friedrich	 III	 to	 August	 of	 Saxony,	 26	 March	 1568,	 A.	Kluckhohn	 (ed.),	 Briefe	 Friedrich	 des	 Frommen,	 Kurfürsten	 von	 der	 Pfalz,	 mit	
Verwandten	 Schriftstücken,	 Volume	 II	 (Braunschweig:	 C.	 A.	 Schwetschte	 und	 Sohn,	1870):	pp.	203-204.		2	‘tous	 les	 princes	 d’Allemaigne	 de	 contraire	 religion	 non	 seullement	 se	 liguent	ensamble	 mais	 aussi	 s’arment	 contre	 nous	 …	 D’aultre	 consté,	 sire,	 la	 Royne	d’Angleterre	 est	 …	 declaré	 car	 elle	 donne	 secours	 à	 noz	 rebelles	 de	 munitions,	d’artillerie,	d’argent	et	de	gens	…	Ainsi,	vostre	magesté	me	permettre	de	luy	dire	qu’il	est	 besoing	 que	 nous	 faicions	 ung	 bon	 et	 grant	 effort	 …’	 Phillip	 II	 to	 Charles	 de	Lorraine,	 13	 January	 1569,	 D.	 Cuisat,	 Lettres	 du	 Cardinal	 Charles	 de	 Lorraine,	 1525-
1574,	(Geneva:	Droz,	1998):	p.	590.	
		 11	
transnational	 and	 inter-confessional	 relations	 to	 the	 concrete	 events	that	 unfolded	 around	 Europe	 during	 the	 1560s.	 Though	 the	consequences	 of	 these	 debates,	 most	 notably	 German	 military	intervention	 in	France,	have	been	discussed	 in	 the	historiography,	 the	beliefs	underpinning	these	consequences	have	largely	been	ignored.	The	series	of	events	commonly	referred	to	as	the	French	Wars	of	Religion	was	 from	 its	 inception	 a	 profoundly	 European	 phenomenon.	The	 internationality	 of	 the	 conflict	 manifested	 itself	 in	 a	 variety	 of	different	ways.	The	outbreak	of	violence	in	1562	was	closely	 linked	to	events	 in	 Scotland,	 where	 Protestants	 overthrew	 the	 French	 Catholic	regency	 of	 Marie	 de	 Guise.	 The	 turbulence	 and	 chaos	 of	 protracted	conflict	in	France	also	served	as	an	incubator	for	new	and	often	radical	political,	social,	and	religious	ideas.	Though	to	a	large	extent	developed	in	 response	 to	 the	 problems	 inside	 France,	 these	 ideas	 were	 not	 the	product	 of	 an	 exclusively	 French	 intellectual	 climate,	 nor	 were	 they	confined	by	France’s	borders.	Rather,	 they	were	produced	 in	dialogue	with	 ideas	developed	throughout	Europe	and	disseminated	to	the	rest	of	 the	 continent	 via	 printed	 works	 and	 private	 correspondence.	 The	Wars	 of	Religion	 also	had	 a	 deep	 impact	 on	 the	 social	 composition	of	communities	 inside	 France	 and	 beyond.	 The	 success	 of	 Reformed	Protestantism,	 the	 exclusivist	 nature	 of	 Reformed	 doctrine,	 and	 the	often	violent	Catholic	backlash	led	to	the	collapse	of	French	civil	society	and	 the	 formation	 of	 communities	 of	 Huguenots	 separated	 or	 even	isolated	from	their	Catholic	neighbours.	These	communities	were	often	forced	 to	 uproot	 and	 to	 find	 safe	 havens	 in	 neighbouring	 countries.	There	they	had	a	transformative	effect	on	the	religion,	social	structure,	and	economies	of	their	host	communities.		The	 internationality	 of	 the	French	Wars	of	Religion	manifested	itself	 most	 clearly	 in	 the	 crucial	 role	 played	 by	 foreign	 actors.	 The	magnitude	 of	 the	 conflict,	 the	 direct	 relevance	 of	 its	 causes	 to	 wider	European	 issues,	 and	 the	 importance	of	 the	Kingdom	of	France	 in	 the	European	political	landscape	ensured	that	there	were	persistent	efforts	by	 foreign	 potentates	 to	 influence	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 Wars.	 A	particularly	 noteworthy	 group	 of	 foreign	 actors	 are	 the	 Protestant	
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princes	 of	 the	 Holy	 Roman	 Empire	 who	 between	 1567	 and	 1569	intervened	militarily	in	the	Wars	in	France.	Though	the	majority	of	the	Protestant	 German	 princes	 came	 to	 the	 aid	 of	 the	Huguenots,	 a	 small	number,	including	Johann	Wilhelm	of	Saxe-Weimar,	Philibert	of	Baden,	and	Jean-Phillipe	of	Salm,	served	the	royalists.	The	German	campaigns	had	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 the	 course	 of	 the	 Wars.	 Crucially,	 they	represent	the	culmination	of	an	ongoing	German	engagement	in	French	affaires;	dating	back	before	 the	outbreak	of	war	 in	1562	they	reveal	a	more	 profound	 relationship	 than	 diplomatic	 events	 suggest.	 The	 ties	between	the	French	and	German	aristocracies	were	not	 limited	by	the	existence	 of	 borders,	 which	 were	 porous	 in	 the	 pre-modern	 period.	Moreover,	 the	 cosmopolitanism	 of	 the	 border	 region	 between	 France	and	the	Empire	ensured	frequent	contact	between	people	and	exchange	of	 ideas.	 It	 is	 this	process	of	 intellectual,	 cultural,	 social,	 and	 religious	exchange	between	France	and	Germany,	 as	well	 as	 the	ways	 in	which	the	 French	 Wars	 of	 Religion	 were	 explained,	 understood,	 and	interpreted	 in	 Germany	 that	 will	 be	 the	 focus	 of	 this	 thesis.	 The	correspondence	of	Protestant	princes	of	the	Empire	has	left	us	a	unique	insight	into	the	ways	in	which	France	was	discussed	abroad,	will	serve	as	 a	 case	 study	 through	 which	 I	 will	 investigate	 the	 transnational	impact	of	the	French	Wars	of	Religion.		
Historiography		This	 thesis	 will	 engage	 with	 and	 contribute	 to	 a	 number	 of	 different	historiographical	 debates	 and	 traditions.	 The	 transnational	 nature	 of	the	 project	 together	 with	 the	 ambition	 to	 present	 a	 comprehensive	analysis	of	 all	 the	different	 factors	 shaping	German	understandings	of	the	Wars	of	Religion	forces	me	to	engage	with	an	unusually	wide	range	of	historiographies	in	a	number	of	different	languages.	I	will	first	give	a	brief	 overview	of	 the	most	 important	 of	 these,	 summarising	 the	main	trends	and	indicating	how	I	intend	to	contribute,	before	discussing	the	aims	and	structure	of	the	thesis	in	more	detail.		
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The	French	Wars	of	Religion:	national	or	international	story?		 	Firstly,	 and	most	 importantly,	my	research	contributes	directly	 to	our	understanding	 of	 the	 international	 dimension	 of	 the	 French	 Wars	 of	Religion,	both	its	international	resonance	and	the	way	in	which	foreign	players	impacted	on	the	course	of	the	conflict.	Traditionally,	the	French	Wars	 of	 Religion	 have	 been	 regarded	 as	 a	 quintessentially	 national	conflict.	 The	 narrative	 of	 the	 Wars	 has	 been	 shaped	 heavily	 by	 the	distortion	 of	 nineteenth-century	 and	 early	 twentieth-century	nationalism,	 as	 well	 as	 (until	 recently)	 by	 a	 highly	 confessionalised	historiography.	In	these	contexts,	history	served	polemical	purposes.	A	pertinent	 example	 is	 Gaston	 Zeller’s	 1933	 article	 ‘La	 Monarchie	d’Ancien	Régime	et	 les	Frontières	Naturelles’,	which	uses	 the	example	of	 German	 intervention	 during	 the	 French	 Wars	 of	 Religion	 to	demonstrate	that	the	Rhine	was	essential	to	French	national	security.3	Even	 after	 nationalistic	 and	 confessionally-driven	 readings	 of	history	 came	 under	 attack,	 the	 tendency	 to	 read	 the	Wars	 solely	 as	 a	French	 story	 persisted.	 This	 was	 reinforced	 by	 the	 practicalities	 of	conducting	 historical	 research,	 which	 ensured	 that	 it	 was	 easier	 to	concentrate	on	the	French	story	alone,	especially	given	the	complexity	of	 the	 domestic	 political	 scene.	 When	 designing	 research	 projects,	modern	national	borders	are	often	used	as	a	convenient	way	of	limiting	the	 project’s	 scope,	 not	 least	 because	 the	 infrastructure	 of	 research,	such	as	the	Bibliothèque	and	Archives	Nationales,	readily	lends	itself	to	such	 an	 approach.	 Writing	 national	 histories	 has	 long	 been	 seen	 as	unproblematic,	 with	 borders	 presented	 as	 seemingly	 fixed	 and	 non-arbitrary	 tools	 for	demarcating	 the	 limits	of	 research.	Moreover,	 from	the	 1970s,	 the	 regional	 and	 local	 impact	 of	 the	 Wars	 was	 re-emphasised. 4 	The	 wealth	 of	 sources	 housed	 in	 local	 archives	 has																																																									3	G.	Zeller,	‘La	monarchie	d’Ancien	Régime	et	les	frontières	naturelles’,	Revue	d’Histoire	
Moderne,	8	(1933):	305-333.		4	See	 for	 instance,	 the	 work	 carried	 out	 by	 Anglo-American	 scholars:	 P.	 Benedict,	
Rouen	during	the	Wars	of	Religion,	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1980);	B.	Diefendorf,	 Beneath	 the	 Cross:	 Catholics	 and	 Huguenots	 in	 Sixteenth-Century	 Paris	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1991);	D.	Potter,	War	and	Government	in	the	French	
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allowed	historians	to	paint	vivid	and	detailed	pictures	of	the	workings	of	 religious	 conflict	 in	 the	 community.	 Studying	 the	 transnational	dimension,	 however,	 naturally	 poses	 some	 tricky	 methodological	questions.	How	can	one	best	limit	the	scope	of	a	project	or	best	conduct	comprehensive	 research	within	 the	 time	 constraints	when	 the	 source	base	 is	 heavily	 broken	 up	 and	 spread	 out	 over	 a	 large	 geographical	area?	The	problems	of	accessing	historiographies	and	primary	sources	in	multiple	languages,	in	this	case	English,	French,	German,	Dutch,	and	Latin,	 has	 deterred	 historians	 from	 pursuing	 projects	 that	 are	 truly	transnational.	All	 this	 has	 ensured	 that	 the	 transnational	 dimension	 of	 the	conflict	 has	 largely	 been	 neglected.	 Consideration	 of	 the	 place	 of	 the	Wars	in	a	European	context	has	for	the	most	part	been	confined	to	the	international	 rather	 than	 the	 transnational;	 that	 is	 the	 interaction	between	 nations	 or	 states	 rather	 than	 developments	 transcending	borders.	 There	 has	 been	 ample	 interest	 in	 the	 interaction	 between	states,	 for	 instance	 through	 diplomacy.	 The	 most	 influential	 and	extensive	work	dealing	with	the	international	politics	and	diplomacy	of	the	French	Wars	of	Religion	 is	 Lucien	Romier’s	Les	Origines	Politiques	
des	Guerres	des	Religion,	 first	published	 in	1913.5	Besides	 focussing	on	internal	 political	 manoeuvring,	 for	 instance	 by	 influential	 aristocratic	families,	Romier	discusses	at	length	the	effect	of	French	fortunes	in	the	wars	 with	 the	 Habsburgs,	 the	 role	 of	 the	 Fuorusciti	 (disaffected	 and	wealthy	 Italian	 political	 exiles),	 and	 Henry	 II’s	 sometimes	 awkward	relationship	with	the	German	Protestant	princes.	As	the	name	suggests,	the	 Origins	 Politiques	 explains	 the	 causes	 of	 the	 Wars	 in	 exclusively	(high)-political	terms.	It	almost	exclusively	attributes	influence	over	the	course	 of	 the	 Wars	 to	 those	 holding	 significant	 political	 power	 and	downplays	 the	 role	 of	 religious	 ideas	 and	 sentiments	 or	 societal	pressures.																																																																																																																																														
Provinces,	 Picardy	 1470-1560	 (Cambridge:	 Cambridge	 University	 Press,	 1993);	 S.	Carroll,	 Noble	 Power	 during	 the	 French	 Wars	 of	 Religion,	 the	 Guise	 Affinity	 and	 the	
Catholic	Cause	in	Normandy	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1998).		5 L.	 Romier,	 Les	 Origins	 Politiques	 des	 Guerres	 des	 Religion,	 (Geneva:	 Slatkine-Megariotis	Reprints,	1974).	
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Romier’s	 work	 remained	 the	 latest	 word	 on	 the	 international	dimension	 of	 the	 Wars	 of	 Religion	 until	 the	 publication	 of	 Nicola	Sutherland’s	The	Massacre	of	St	Bartholomew	and	the	European	Conflict,	
1559-1572	 in	 1973. 6 	Despite	 the	 transformation	 in	 much	 of	 the	historiography	of	the	French	Wars	of	Religion	by	the	1970s,	Sutherland	presents	a	series	of	arguments	that	would	have	sounded	very	 familiar	to	Romier.	Although	Sutherland,	contrary	to	Romier,	puts	religion	at	the	heart	 of	 the	 story,	 she	 also	 restates	 the	 classic	 interpretation	 of	 the	origins	 of	 the	 conflict,	 focussing	 on	 the	 weakness	 of	 the	 French	monarchy,	the	incessant	political	manoeuvring	of	Catherine	de’	Medici,	and	 the	ruthless	political	and	religious	ambitions	of	 the	Guise	and	 the	other	 ‘ultra-Catholics’.	 In	 the	 international	 arena,	 the	 focus	 is	 strongly	on	 the	 connection	 between	 Philip	 II	 and	 the	 French	 Catholics,	 the	relationship	between	events	in	France	and	the	Netherlands,	and	on	the	arduous	 process	 of	 creating	 an	 international	 Protestant	 alliance.	Another	work	that	has	to	be	mentioned	is	De	Lamar	Jensen’s	Diplomacy	
and	Dogmatism:	Bernardino	de	Mendoza	and	the	French	Catholic	League,	which	 provides	 a	 detailed	 account	 of	 the	 workings	 of	 Spanish	diplomatic	 influence	 in	 France.7 	His	 more	 broadly	 focussed	 article	‘French	 diplomacy	 and	 the	 Wars	 of	 Religion’	 helpfully	 demonstrates	how	international	diplomatic	practice	survived	the	turmoil	of	religious	conflict.8	This	 focus	on	high	politics	and	 international	diplomacy,	 though	an	important	part	of	the	story,	has	meant	that	the	historiography	of	the	French	Wars	 of	 Religion	 in	 a	 European	 context	 has	 become	 divorced	from	 the	work	of	 historians	 concentrating	on	 the	Wars	 inside	France.	For	 instance,	 pioneering	 scholarship	 by	 historians	 working	 on	 for	instance	 the	 societal	 and	 local	 impact	 of	 the	 conflict,	 the	 variety	 of	religious	 experiences,	 and	 the	 history	 of	 ideas	 has	 not	 been																																																									6	N.	M.	 Sutherland,	The	Massacre	of	St	Bartholomew	and	the	European	Conflict,	1559-
1572	(London:	Macmillan,	1973).		7	D.	Jensen,	Diplomacy	and	Dogmatism:	Bernardino	de	Mendoza	and	the	French	Catholic	
League,	(Cambridge	MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	1964).		8	D.	 L.	 Jensen,	 ‘French	 diplomacy	 and	 the	 Wars	 of	 Religion’,	 The	 Sixteenth	 Century	
Journal,	5	(1974):	23-46.	
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incorporated	 in	 the	 abovementioned	 historiography.	 Furthermore,	although	comparative	studies	placing	France	in	a	wider	context,	such	as	a	 collection	 of	 essays	 entitled	 Reformation,	 Revolt	 and	 Civil	 in	 France	
and	the	Netherlands	1555-1585,	do	deal	with	topics	such	as	the	political	and	religious	middle	ground	and	Calvinist	political	thought,	they	do	not	go	further	than	the	placing	of	two	separate	historiographical	traditions	next	to	each	other.9	There	 is,	 thus,	a	clear	gap	in	our	understanding	of	the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 religious,	 social,	 cultural,	 and	 intellectual	tensions	that	underpinned	the	Wars	of	Religion	transcended	the	porous	and	permeable	borders	of	sixteenth	century	France.	This	thesis	will	aim	to	make	a	direct	contribution	to	our	understanding	of	the	transnational	cultural,	religious,	and	intellectual	exchange	that	formed	the	foundation	of	German	involvement	in	the	Wars	in	France.		
Germany	and	the	French	Wars	of	Religion		A	 similar	 analysis	 can	 be	 made	 of	 the	 historiography	 of	 German	intervention	 in	 the	 French	Wars	 of	 Religion,	 to	which	 this	 thesis	will	directly	also	be	contributing.	Historical	study	of	German	involvement	in	the	 French	Wars	 of	 Religion	 can	 be	 divided	 into	 two	 distinct	 phases.	The	 first	 phase,	 between	 roughly	 1850	 and	 1930,	 saw	 the	 most	persistent	 interest	 in	 Franco-German	 relations	 and	 reflects	 the	 great	power	 rivalry	 between	 the	 two	 nations.	 This	 first	 flurry	 of	 interest	 is	characterised	by	hefty	volumes	in	which	both	the	diplomatic	traffic	and	the	 course	 of	 German-led	 military	 campaigns	 are	 carefully	 mapped.	Making	extensive	use	of	large	bodies	of	primary	sources,	works	such	as	Friedrich	 Barthold’s	 Deutschland	 und	 die	 Hugenotten,	 Karl	 Hahn’s	
Herzog	 Johann	 Wilhelm	 von	 Weimar	 und	 Seine	 Beziehungen	 zu	
Frankreich,	 and	 Pieter	 van	 Herweden’s	 Het	 Verblijf	 van	 Lodewijk	 van																																																									9	P.	Benedict,	G.	Marnef,	H.	van	Nierop,	and	M.	Venard	(eds.),	Reformation,	Revolt	and	
Civil	 in	 France	and	 the	Netherlands	1555-1585,	 (Amsterdam:	 Royal	 Academy	 of	 Arts	and	Sciences,	1999).	Another	example	of	such	a	comparative	study	 is	H.	van	Nierop,	‘Similar	problems,	different	outcomes:	The	Revolt	of	the	Netherlands	and	the	Wars	of	Religion	in	France’,	 in	K.	Davids	and	J.	Lucassen	(eds.),	A	Miracle	Mirrored,	The	Dutch	
Republic	in	European	Perspective,	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1995):	pp.	26-56.	
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Nassau	in	Frankrijk,	laid	the	groundwork	for	our	understanding	of	these	campaigns.10 	Though	 invaluable	 as	 a	 source	 for	 understanding	 the	workings	 of	 international	 diplomacy	 and	 military	 intervention,	 these	works	 of	 course	 predate	 many	 of	 the	 developments	 that	 have	transformed	the	historiography	of	the	French	Wars	of	Religion	since	the	1960s.	 The	 second	 phase	 is	 much	more	 incomplete	 and	 patchy,	 with	interest	in	German	involvement	in	France	often	only	an	aside.	A	pair	of	essays	by	the	Alsatian	historian	Bernard	Vogler:	 ‘Le	rôle	des	Électeurs	Palatins	 dans	 les	 Guerres	 de	 Religion	 en	 France’	 and	 ‘Huguenots	 et	Protestants	 Allemands	 vers	 1572’	 provide	 the	 most	 prominent	contribution.11 	These	 articles	 root	 German	 involvement	 during	 the	Wars	 in	 a	 longer	 tradition	 of	 Franco-German	 aristocratic	 contact,	 but	lack	a	proper	investigation	of	the	reception	of	French	justifications	in	a	German	context,	leading	Vogler	to	draw	dubious	conclusions	about	the	motives	behind	these	campaigns.12	Besides	this,	 there	have	been	some	rather	 basic	 accounts	 of	 German	 campaigns	 in	 local	 history	 journals,	such	as	Gregor	Richter’s	 ‘Württemberg	und	die	Kriegszug	des	Herzogs	Johann	 Wilhelm	 von	 Sachsen	 nach	 Frankreich	 im	 Jahr	 1568’.13	This																																																									10 	F.	 W.	 Barthold,	 Deutschland	 und	 die	 Hugenotten,	 Geschichte	 des	 Einflusses	 der	
Deutschen	 auf	 Frankreichs	 Kirkliche	 und	 Bürgerliche	 Verhältnisse	 von	 der	 Zeit	 des	
Schmalkaldischen	Bundes	bis	zum	Geseze	von	Nantes,	1531-1598,	 (Bremen:	Verlag	von	Franz	 Schlodtmann,	 1848);	 K.	 Hahn,	Herzog	 Johann	Wilhelm	 von	Weimar	 und	 Seine	
Beziehungen	 zu	 Frankreich,	 (Jena:	 Gustav	 Fischer,	 1907);	 P.	 J.	 van	 Herweden,	 Het	
Verblijf	 van	 Lodewijk	 van	 Nassau	 in	 Frankrijk,	 Hugenoten	 en	 Geuzen,	 1568-1572,	(Assen:	 Van	 Gorcum,	 1932).	 Other	 examples	 of	 works	 from	 this	 period	 are	 J.	 Ney,	‘Pfalzgraf	Wolfgang,	Herzog	von	Zweibrücken	und	Neuburg’,	Schriften	des	Vereins	ƒür	
Reformationsgeschichte,	 29	 (1911):	 pp.	 1-124;	 W.	 Platzhoff,	 Frankreich	 und	 die	
Deutschen	 Protestanten	 in	 den	 Jahren	 1570-1573,	 (Munich:	 Oldenburg,	 1912);	 G.	Baguenault	 de	 Puchesse,	 ‘Le	 duc	 de	Wurtemberg,	 les	 Guise	 et	 Catherine	 de	Médicis	(1561-1563)’,	Bulletin	Philologique	et	Historique	du	Comité	des	Travaux	Historiques	et	
Scientifiques,	(1915):	173-197.		11	B.	 Vogler,	 ‘Le	 rôle	 des	 Électeurs	 Palatins	 dans	 les	 Guerres	 de	 Religion	 en	 France	(1559-1592)’,	 Cahiers	 d’Histoire,	 10	 (1965):	 51-85;	 B.	 Vogler,	 ‘Huguenots	 et	Protestants	allemands	vers	1572’	in	L’Amiral	de	Coligny	et	son	Temps,	Paris,	Société	de	l’Histoire	du	Protestantisme	Français,	1974:	pp.	175-189.		12	See	Chapter	VI.		13	G.	 Richter,	 ‘Württemberg	 und	 die	 Kriegszug	 des	 Herzogs	 Johann	 Wilhelm	 von	Sachsen	 nach	 Frankreich	 im	 Jahr	 1568’,	 Zeitschrift	 für	 Württembirgische	
Landesgeschichte,	 26	 (1967):	 252-265.	 Another	 example	 is	 K.	 Malisch,	 ‘Pfalzgraf	Wolfgang	von	Zweibrücken	und	Neuburg	und	die	französischen	Hugenotten’,	France-
Bayern:	 Bayern-Frankreich:	 Wege	 und	 Begegnungen,	 1000	 Jahre	 Bayerischen-
Französische	 Beziehungen,	 France-Bavière;	 Allers	 et	 Retours,	 1000	 Ans	 des	 Relations	
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relative	 lack	 of	 interest	 in	 the	 transnational	 activities	 of	 the	 German	princes	 is	 illustrated	most	 clearly	 in	 Matthias	 Langsteiner’s	 Für	 Land	
und	 Luthertum:	 die	 Politik	 Herzog	 Christoph	 von	 Württemberg,	 an	extensively-researched	 and	 detailed	 analysis	 of	 Christoph’s	 political	career,	which,	despite	its	depth	of	research,	hardly	mentions	France.14		The	most	recent	work	that	must	be	discussed	 in	 this	context	 is	Hugues	 Daussy’s	 Le	 Parti	 Huguenot,	 Chronique	 d’une	 Désillusion	 from	2014.15	This	account	of	the	fate	of	the	Huguenot	party	during	the	early	Wars	of	Religion	 is	 thorough	 in	 its	 treatment	of	 their	 efforts	 to	 solicit	support	in	Germany.	Daussy’s	focus,	however,	is	strongly	on	the	French	side	of	the	story.	The	German	princes	are	only	mentioned	where	their	paths	 directly	 cross	 those	 of	 the	 Huguenots,	 ignoring	 the	 very	important	 process	 of	 interpretation	 and	 the	 internal	 debates	 that	underpinned	 German	 involvement	 in	 France.	 The	 last	 150	 years	 of	scholarship	 has	 thus	 primarily	 touched	 upon	 the	 anatomy	 of	 German	diplomatic	and	military	 involvement	 in	France.	What	 is	 still	 lacking	 in	the	existing	historiography,	 therefore,	 is	 a	 thorough	 investigation	 into	the	 German	 religious,	 political,	 and	 intellectual	 context	 in	 which	 the	Wars	of	Religion	were	interpreted	and	in	which	German	policy	towards	France	 was	 formed.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 this	 neglect,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	motivations	 behind	 the	 German	 military	 campaigns	 have	 been	misunderstood.	 By	 looking	 beyond	 the	 moments	 of	 direct	 German	involvement	 in	 France	 I	 will	 address	 this	 gap	 and	 present	 a	 new	assessment	 of	 the	 intellectual	 and	 religious	 underpinnings	 of	 these	campaigns.	
	
	
																																																																																																																																														
Franco-Bavaroises,	 (Paris:	 Biro,	 2006):	 pp.	 110-115;	 and	 A.	 Wirsching,	‘Konfessionalisierung	 der	 Aussenpolitik:	 Die	 Kurpfalz	 und	 der	 Beginn	 der	Französischen	 Religionskriege	 (1559-1562)’,	Historische	 Jahrbuch,	 106	 (1986):	 333-360.		14 	M.	 Langsteiner,	 Für	 Land	 und	 Luthertum:	 die	 Politik	 Herzog	 Christoph	 von	
Württemberg	(1550-1568),	(Cologne:	Böhlau	Verlag,	2008).		15	H.	 Daussy,	 Le	 Parti	 Huguenot,	 Chronique	 d’une	 Désillusion	 (1557-1572),	 (Geneva:	Droz,	2014).	
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Transnational	history		The	 field	 of	 transnational	 history	 is	 very	 young.	 Though	 the	 adjective	‘transnational’	has	 increasingly	been	used	since	the	1970s,	 it	was	only	after	 the	end	of	 the	Cold	War	 that	historians	started	systematically	 to	revise	 the	 central	 position	 of	 nation	 states	 as	 dominant	 categories	 of	historical	 investigation. 16 	Despite	 the	 ascendency	 of	 transnational	history,	 which	 is	 reflected	 in	 many	 recent	 publications	 and	 in	 its	institutionalisation	 in	 research	 institutes	 and	 programmes,	 its	theoretical	 foundation	 remains	 somewhat	 difficult	 to	 pin	 down.17	The	first	important	observation	to	make	is	that	transnational	history	differs	fundamentally	 from	international	history.	Whereas	the	former	aims	to	study	 the	 past	 through	 an	 interpretive	 framework	 that	 transcends	nations,	 international	 history	 still	 relies	 on	 the	 nation-state	 as	 the	foundation	 of	 analysis,	 meaning	 that	 international	 research	 projects	‘often	 consisted	 of	 scholars	 of	 different	 nations’	 histories	 comparing	their	 notes.’ 18 	It	 is	 the	 realisation	 that	 social,	 economic,	 cultural,	political,	 intellectual,	 and	 religious	 developments	 are	 not	 unique	 for	each	 nation,	 nor	 contained	 by	 the	 borders	 of	 states	 that	 drives	transnational	history.	However,	 it	 is	the	relation	between	national	and	transnational	histories	that	makes	the	field	complex.	Akira	Iriye,	one	of	the	 pioneers	 of	 transnational	 history,	 has	 described	 this	 relationship	aptly:		 The	 transnational	 approach	 to	 the	 study	 of	 history	…	 does	 not	 deny	the	 existence	 of	 nations	 and	 the	 roles	 they	 play	 in	 contributing	 to	defining	 the	 world	 at	 a	 given	 moment	 in	 time.	 The	 intricate	interrelationship	 between	 nations	 and	 transnational	 existences,	between	 national	 preoccupations	 and	 transnational	 agendas,	 or																																																									16 A.	 Iriye,	 Global	 and	 Transnational	 History,	 The	 Past,	 Present,	 and	 Future,	(Basingstoke:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2013):	p.	12.		17	For	instance	the	Centre	for	Transnational	History	at	University	College	London,	the	Institute	for	Transnational	&	Spatial	History	at	the	University	of	St	Andrews,	and	the	‘Collective	 identities	 and	 transnational	 networks	 in	 medieval	 and	 early	 modern	Europe’	research	programme	at	Universiteit	Leiden.		18	Iriye,	Global	and	Transnational	History,	p.	8.	
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between	 national	 interests	 and	 transnational	 concerns	 is	 of	fundamental	 importance	 to	 the	 study	 of	 transnational	 history	 …	Transnational	 history	 …	 focuses	 on	 cross-national	 connections,	whether	 through	 individuals	 …	 or	 in	 terms	 of	 objectives	 shared	 by	people	and	communities	regardless	of	their	nationality.19		Though	Iriye’s	modern	focus	colours	his	interpretation	of	the	field,	this	definition	is	still	useful	for	Reformation	history.	Despite	the	fluidity	and	ambiguities	of	sixteenth-century	states	and	nations	(see	Chapter	I),	the	Reformation	was	a	phenomenon	per	excellence	in	which	local,	national,	and	transnational	factors	interacted	and	intersected.	Therefore,	it	is	not	surprising	 that	 transnational	approaches	have	recently	 left	 their	mark	on	the	study	of	the	Reformation.	Though	a	truly	transnational	approach	to	 the	 Wars	 of	 Religion	 as	 a	 whole	 is	 lacking,	 this	 interest	 in	 the	transnationality	 of	 the	 Reformation	 has	 been	 growing.	 Two	 popular	avenues	 of	 investigation	 are	 particularly	 relevant	 for	 this	 thesis:	 the	international	 dimension	 of	 Calvinism,	 especially	 Reformed	 exiles	 and	refugees,	 and	 the	 spread	 of	 ideas,	 news,	 and	 rumours	 throughout	Europe	through	print	culture.		 The	 Reformed	 sense	 of	 connectedness	 to	 coreligionists	throughout	Europe	has	been	a	feature	of	a	number	of	publications.	Ole	Grell,	 for	 instance,	 has	 shown	 the	 important	 role	 played	 by	ministers	and	 merchants	 in	 the	 formation	 of	 ties	 between	 German	 Reformed	Protestants	 and	 the	 Huguenots. 20 Research	 into	 Calvinist	internationalism	 has	 ranged	 from	 the	 intellectual	 and	 theological	background	 of	 this	 outlook,	 for	 example	 in	 Charles	 Parker’s	 article	‘French	Calvinists	as	children	of	Israel’,	to	the	role	of	individuals	in	the	creation	 and	 maintenance	 of	 cross-border	 Reformed	 ties,	 such	 as	
																																																								19	Ibid,	p.	19.		20	M.	Prestwich,	International	Calvinism,	1541-1715,	 (Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1985);	O.	P.	Grell,	‘Merchants	and	Ministers:	the	Foundation	of	International	Calvinism’,	in	A.	Pettegree,	 A.	 Duke,	 G.	 Lewis	 (eds.),	 Calvinism	 in	 Europe,	 1540-1620,	 (Cambridge:	Cambridge	 University	 Press,	 1994):	 pp.	 254-273;	 Antoher	 example	 is	 G.	 Murdock,	
Beyond	 Calvin,	 The	 Intellectual,	 Political	 and	 Cultural	 World	 of	 Europe’s	 Reformed	
Churches,	c.	1540-1620,	(Houndmills:	Palgrave,	2004).		
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Donald	 Kelley’s	 biography	 of	 François	 Hotman.21	This	 research	 is	 by	nature	 transnational.	 Despite	 the	 richness	 of	 the	 historiography	 of	Calvinist	internationalism,	and	in	particular,	on	the	role	of	exiles	in	the	creation	of	transnational	networks,	more	work	remains	to	be	done.	This	thesis	will	also	explore	the	tensions	between	Lutherans	and	Calvinists.	Differences	 over	 the	 Eucharist	 and	 the	 relationship	 between	 Church	and	 state	were	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 debates	 about	 German	 involvement	 in	France	and	are	at	the	heart	of	this	thesis.		 The	 second	 relevant	 category	 of	 transnational	 history	 is	 the	study	of	 information	 flow	across	borders.	The	 logistics	of	 information	dissemination	strongly	 impacted	 the	way	 the	French	Wars	of	Religion	were	 interpreted	 and	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 shaping	 German	participation	in	the	conflict.	Andrew	Pettegree’s	recent	monograph	The	
Invention	 of	 News	 serves	 as	 a	 comprehensive	 overview	 of	 the	 rise	 of	transnational	news	culture,	giving	ample	attention	 to	 the	Reformation	as	 ‘Europe’s	 first	 mass	 media	 event’. 22 	Together	 with	 his	 book	
Reformation	 and	 the	 Culture	 of	 Persuasion,	 this	 study	 lays	 the	groundwork	for	understanding	the	role	of	information,	misinformation,	and	 a	 lack	 of	 information	 in	 creating	 ideas	 and	 informing	 action.23	Pettegree’s	work	is	built	upon	by	more	narrowly	focussed	studies	of	the	process	 of	 transnational	 information	 transfer	 during	 the	Reformation.	The	 work	 of	 Cornel	 Zwierlein	 has	 contributed	 greatly	 to	 our	understanding	 of	 the	way	 in	which	 information	 about	 the	 events	 and	ideas	 of	 the	 French	Wars	 of	Religion	was	 disseminated	 in	Germany.24																																																									21	C.	 H.	 Parker,	 ‘French	 Calvinists	 as	 the	 Children	 of	 Israel:	 An	 Old	 Testament	 Self-Consciousness	in	Jean	Crespin’s	Histoire	des	Martyrs	before	the	Wars	of	Religion’,	The	
Sixteenth	 Century	 Journal,	 24	 (1993):	 227-248;	 D.	 R.	 Kelley,	 François	 Hotman,	 a	
Revolutionary’s	Ordeal,	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	1973).		22	A.	Pettegree,	The	Invention	of	News,	How	the	World	Came	to	Know	About	Itself,	(New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	2014).		23	A.	 Pettegree,	 Reformation	 and	 the	 Culture	 of	 Persuasion,	 (Cambridge:	 Cambridge	University	Press,	2005).		24 	C.	 Zwierlein,	 Discorso	 und	 Lex	 Dei,	 Die	 Entstehung	 neuer	 Denkrahmen	 in	 16.	
Jahrhundert	und	der	Französische	Religionskriege	in	Italien	und	Deutschland,	Göttingen,	Vandenhoeck	 &	 Ruprecht,	 2003;	 Zwierlein,	 C.,	 ‘Une	 propaganda	 huguenote	international:	le	début	des	guerres	de	religion	en	France	perçues	en	Allemagne,	1560-1563’,	 in	 J.	 Foa	 and	 P.	 Mellet	 (eds.),	 Le	 Bruit	 des	 Armes.	 Mises	 en	 Formes	 et	
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His	 research,	 focussing	 on	 the	 dissemination	 rather	 than	 the	interpretation	of	news,	 forms	a	 great	platform	 from	which	 to	develop	studies	 of	 the	 consequences	 of	 the	 presence	 of	 this	 information	 in	Germany.	 I	 will	 both	 be	 relying	 on,	 and	 contributing	 to,	 this	 body	 of	scholarship,	investigating	how	German	interpretations	of	the	conflict	in	France	 were	 conditioned	 by	 the	 kind	 of	 information	 flowing	 from	France	to	the	Empire.		
Confessionalisation		German	 interpretations	 of	 events	 in	 France	were	 not	 only	 shaped	 by	news	and	propaganda	from	France,	but	also	by	the	political,	intellectual,	and	 religious	 climate	 inside	 the	Empire.	Rooting	German	 involvement	in	France	in	the	Imperial	as	well	as	the	French	context	has	been	lacking	in	 the	 existing	 historiography.	 In	 trying	 to	 rectify	 this,	 I	 will	 engage	rigorously	 with	 the	 history	 of	 confessionalisation,	 a	 historiographical	tradition	that	has	dominated	the	study	of	the	Reformation	in	Germany	since	 the	mid-1980s.	The	 confessionalisation	 thesis	was	developed	by	Heinz	Schilling	and	Wolfgang	Reinhard.25	Based	on	the	assertion	that	in	early	 modern	 society,	 ‘state	 and	 church	 were	 structurally	 linked	together’,	the	thesis	presents	a	model	that	explains	the	process	of	state	formation	that	took	place	in	the	Empire	between	the	Peace	of	Augsburg	and	the	Thirty	Years’	War.26	Schilling	and	Reinhard	place	religion	at	the	centre	 of	 this	 process,	 arguing	 that	 ‘confessional	 homogenisation’	‘enabled	 states	 and	 societies	 to	 integrate	more	 tightly’.	 Consequently,	the	 study	 of	 confessionalisation	 often	 consists	 of	 looking	 at	 the	instruments	used	 for	creating	cohesion,	homogeneity,	and	 integration;	including	 theological	 texts,	 printing,	 propaganda	 and	 censorship,																																																																																																																																														
Désinformations	 en	 Europe	 pendant	 les	 Guerres	 de	 Religion	 (1560-1610),	 (Paris:	Champion,	2012):	pp.	397-415.		25	H.	 Schilling,	 Religion,	 Political	 Culture	 and	 the	 Emergence	 of	 Early	Modern	 Society,	(Leiden:	Brill,	1992).		26	J.	 Deventer,	 ‘”Confessionalisation”	 –	 a	 useful	 theoretical	 concept	 for	 the	 study	 of	religion,	politics,	and	society	in	early	modern	East-Central	Europe?,	European	Review	
of	History:	Revue	Européenne	d’Histoire,	11	(2004):	403-435,	on	p.	407.		
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education,	 catechising,	 and	moral	 discipline.27	Moreover,	 although	 the	thesis	 was	 developed	 in	 a	 German	 context,	 Schilling	 and	 Reinhard	argued	 that	 the	 model	 is	 applicable	 to	 the	 whole	 of	 European	Reformation	 history.28	The	 confessionalisation	 thesis	 has	 proven	 very	influential,	 inspiring	a	 large	corpus	of	scholarship	 including	numerous	PhD	 theses.	 A	 lot	 of	work	 has	 been	 done	 on	 untangling	 the	workings	and	 impact	 of	 the	 process	 in	 individual	 states	 or	 cities,	 focussing	 on	education,	 religious	discipline,	 and	 the	 reshaping	of	 society	 as	well	 as	on	the	political	side	of	the	story.29		Despite	this	success,	the	confessionalisation	thesis	has	over	the	last	two	decades	come	under	attack	from	a	variety	of	angles.	It	has	been	criticised	for	 its	overly	strong	focus	on	the	role	of	confessions	in	early	modern	 society,	 for	 its	 teleological	 character,	 for	 indiscriminately	applying	the	same	concept	to	different	confessional	groups,	for	its	top-down	 approach,	 and	 for	 its	 inapplicability	 to	 Europe’s	 many	 multi-confessional	 environments. 30 I	 will	 demonstrate	 that	 the	confessionalisation	 thesis	 suffers	 from	another	weakness,	namely	 that	the	 strong	 focus	 on	 the	 homogeneity	 of	 confessional	 groups	overshadows	 seemingly	 trivial	 doctrinal	 differences,	 which	 could	nonetheless	 have	 a	 significant	 impact.	 	 This	 is	 not	 a	 question	 of	 the	success	 or	 failure	 of	 confessionalisation,	 but	 rather	 an	 assertion	 that	even	 among	 those	 most	 exposed	 to	 the	 influences	 of	 the	 process	 a	significant	 level	 of	 individuality	 of	 belief	 could	 be	 found.	 This	
																																																								27 	Deventer,	 ‘”Confessionalisation”,	 p.	 408;	 U.	 Lotz-Heumann,	 ‘The	 concept	 of	“confessionalization”:	a	historiographical	paradigm	in	dispute’,	Memoria	y	Civilización,	4	(2001):	93-114,	on	p.	99.		28	Lotz-Heumann,	‘The	concept	of	“confessionalization”,	p.	98.		29	See	for	instance	B.	Thompson,	‘The	Palatine	Church	Order	of	1563’,	Church	History,	23	(1954):	pp.	339-354;	J.	M.	Estes,	‘Johannes	Brenz	and	the	Institutionalization	of	the	Reformation	 in	Württemberg’,	Central	European	History,	6	 (1973):	44-59;	G.	Strauss,	‘Success	and	Failure	in	the	German	Reformation’,	Past	&	Present,	67	(1975):	30-63;	C.	Methuen,	 ‘Securing	 the	 Reformation	 through	 Education:	 The	 Duke’s	 Scholarship	System	of	Sixteenth-Century	Wurttemberg’,	The	Sixteenth	Century	Journal,	25	(1994):	841-851.		30	Lotz-Heumann,	‘The	concept	of	“confessionalization”,	pp.	103-112.		
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individuality	 contradicts	 the	 homogeneity	 or	 uniformity	 supposed	 by	Reinhard	and	Schilling	and	could	have	far-reaching	consequences.		
Religion	and	politics		A	central	theme	in	the	historiography	of	the	French	Wars	of	Religion	is	the	question	of	causes	and	motives.	What	moved	the	warring	parties	to	allow	 France	 to	 descend	 into	 such	 a	 long	 period	 of	 chaos	 and	bloodshed?	Key	to	this	debate	has	been	the	question	of	the	relationship	between	religious	and	political	motives.	The	debate	has	moved	through	three	distinct	phases.	After	 centuries	 in	which	highly	 confessionalised	accounts	of	the	Wars	dominated,	a	generation	of	historians	at	the	start	of	 the	 twentieth	 century	 moved	 away	 from	 this	 focus	 on	 religion.31	Romier’s	 Les	 Origines	 Politiques	 is	 one	 of	 a	 number	 of	 influential	monographs	written	in	the	first	half	of	the	twentieth	century	that	depict	the	 Wars	 as	 an	 exclusively	 political	 struggle.32	The	 use	 of	 religious	language	by	the	warring	parties,	they	argue,	was	nothing	more	than	an	attempt	 to	 cover	 up	 their	 true	 motives:	 the	 pursuit	 of	 the	 political	betterment	of	faction	or	family.	The	third	phase	began	when	a	number	of	 pioneering	 historians	 broke	 through	 the	 rigid	 divide	 between	religion	 and	 politics	 by	 interrogating	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 religion	operates	both	within	society	and	in	the	lives	of	individuals.33	Borrowing	techniques	from	sociology	and	anthropology,	historians	such	as	Natalie	Davis	 have	 carefully	 dissected	 the	 many	 manifestations	 of	 religious	identities	 and	 demonstrated	 how	 these	 became	 intertwined	 with	concerns	 about	 ideas	 such	 as	 the	 purity	 of	 society.34	The	 creation	 of	clear	 distinctions	 between	 religious	 and	political	motives	 in	 historical	analysis	 is	 thus	 artificial	 at	 best.	 Despite	 its	 influence	 on	 the																																																									31	M.	P.	Holt,	‘Putting	religion	back	into	the	Wars	of	Religion’,	French	Historical	Studies,	18	(1993):	524-551.		32	Romier,	Les	Origins	Politiques;	Holt,	‘Putting	religion	back	into	the	Wars	of	Religion’.		33	Holt,	‘Putting	religion	back	into	the	Wars	of	Religion’.		34	N.	 Zemon	Davis,	 ‘The	 rites	of	 violence:	Religious	 riot	 in	 sixteenth-century	France’,	
Past	and	Present	59	(1973),	51-91.		
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historiography	of	 the	 French	Wars	 of	Religion,	 this	 interpretation	has	been	almost	entirely	ignored	in	recent	studies	of	the	role	of	Germans	in	the	 conflict.	 In	 the	 analysis	 of	 their	 motives,	 a	 Romierian	 opposition	between	 religion	 and	 politics	 still	 dominates.	 The	 argument	 that	German	(military)	involvement	in	France	was	exclusively	the	product	of	political	 expediency,	 cold	 calculation,	 and	 private	 ambition	 remains	influential.	 Forty	 years	 after	 the	 pioneering	 work	 of	 Davis	 and	 her	colleagues,	this	interpretation	of	the	motives	of	the	German	participants	in	 the	 Wars	 of	 Religion	 is	 in	 urgent	 need	 of	 revision.	 By	 carefully	mapping	the	precise	set	of	beliefs	held	by	individual	German	princes	I	will	 demonstrate	 that	 religion	 did	 play	 a	 major	 role	 in	 shaping	 their	attitudes	 to	 the	 French	Wars	 of	 Religion.	 Moreover,	 I	 will	 show	 that,	despite	the	fact	that	Lutherans	fought	on	both	sides	in	the	conflict,	their	actions	were	entirely	compatible	with	these	beliefs.		
History	of	ideas		The	 last	 major	 historiographical	 tradition	 that	 this	 thesis	 will	contribute	to	is	the	history	of	ideas.	The	traumatic	breakdown	of	social	harmony	and	royal	and	noble	control	during	the	Wars	of	Religion	led	to	the	 formation	of	new	ideas	about	political	power	and	sovereignty	and	about	the	role	of	religion	in	society.35	Though	the	emphasis	of	historical	
																																																								35	A	good	general	overview	is	Q.	Skinner,	The	Foundations	of	Modern	Political	Thought,	(Cambridge:	 Cambridge	 University	 Press,	 1978).	 For	 sixteenth-century	 resistance	theory	see	K.	W.	MacArthur,	‘The	Vindicae	Contra	Tyrannos:	A	Chapter	in	the	Struggle	for	 Religious	 Freedom	 in	 France’,	 Church	 History,	 9	 (1940):	 285-298;	 C.	 G.	Shoenberger,	 ‘Luther	 and	 the	 Justification	 of	 Resistance	 to	 Legitimate	 Authority’,	
Journal	 of	 the	 History	 of	 Ideas,	 40	 (1979):	 3-20;	 R.	 M.	 Kingdon,	 ‘Calvinism	 and	resistance	 theory,	1550-1580’,	 in	 J.	H.	Burns	 (ed.),	The	Cambridge	History	of	Political	
Thought,	1450-1700,	 (Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1991):	193-218;	K.	A.	Parrow,	‘From	Defense	to	Resistance:	Justification	of	Violence	during	the	French	Wars	of	Religion’,	Transactions	of	the	American	Philosophical	Society,	83	(1993):	1-79;	R.	V.	Friedeburg,	 ‘In	Defense	of	Patria:	Resisting	Magistrates	and	 the	Duties	of	Patriots	 in	the	 Empire	 from	 the	 1530s	 to	 the	 1640s’,	The	Sixteenth	Century	 Journal,	 32	 (2001):	357-382;	D.	VanDrunen,	‘The	Use	of	Natural	Law	in	Early	Calvinist	Resistance	Theory’,	
Journal	of	Law	and	Religion,	21	(2005/2006):	143-167.	For	studies	on	the	concept	of	tolerance	see	H.	Butterfield,	‘Toleration	in	Early	Modern	Times’,	Journal	of	the	History	
of	Ideas,	28	(1977):	573-584;	M.	Turchetti,	 ‘Religious	concord	and	political	 tolerance	in	 sixteenth-	 and	 seventeenth-century	 France’,	 The	 Sixteenth	 Century	 Journal,	 22	(1991):	 15-25;	 O.	 P.	 Grell	 and	 B.	 Scribner	 (eds.),	 Tolerance	 and	 Intolerance	 in	 the	
European	Reformation,	 (Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1996);	B.	 J.	Kaplan,	
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enquiry	 has	 been	 on	 the	 thinkers	 and	 theologians	 who	 most	 clearly	formulated	these	ideas,	the	debates	that	shaped	them	were	participated	in	 by	 a	 much	 wider	 group	 of	 people.	 Moreover,	 these	 debates	transcended	 borders.	 In	 addition,	 such	 discussions	 were	 not	 merely	academic,	 but	 had	 the	 power	 directly	 to	 inform	 actions	 and	 policy.	Among	 the	 German	 princes,	 the	 concepts	 of	 tolerance,	 freedom	 of	conscience,	 religious	 reconciliation,	 as	well	 as	 ideas	 about	 the	 role	 of	secular	government	in	presiding	over	religious	reform,	were	discussed	with	 direct	 reference	 to	 France.	 This	 was	 very	 much	 a	 transnational	conversation,	 taking	 place	 in	 correspondence	 and	 in	 person,	 for	instance	 between	 François	 Hotman	 and	 his	 host	 the	 Elector	 Palatine.	The	 role	of	 the	German	princes	 in	 the	development	of	 ideas	has	been	entirely	ignored	in	the	existing	historiography	and	will	be	addressed	in	this	thesis.		
Aims	and	methodology		
Questions		The	starting	point	of	this	research	project	is	the	well-recorded	German	military	involvement	in	France	during	the	Second	and	Third	Wars.	Due	to	 the	 overwhelming	 focus	 of	 the	 existing	 historiography	 on	 the	logistics	of	intervention,	a	number	of	fundamental	questions	have	been	left	unanswered.	These	questions	relate	to	three	important	themes.		The	 first	 theme	 pertains	 to	 the	 origins	 of	 German	 interest	 in	France.	Why	were	 the	 German	 princes	 interested	 in	 French	 events	 in	the	first	place?	How	did	they	come	to	know	about	what	was	unfolding	in	France?	Why	did	they	feel	entitled	to	meddle	in	French	affairs?	Why	did	 the	warring	parties	 in	France	 feel	 the	need	 to	engage	 the	German	princes	and	to	bring	them	into	the	conflict?		The	second	set	of	questions	relates	to	German	understandings	of	the	 nature	 of	 the	 conflict.	 How	 did	 German	 audiences	 interpret	 the																																																																																																																																														
Divided	 by	 Faith,	 Religious	 Conflict	 and	 the	 Practice	 of	 Toleration	 in	 Early	 Modern	
Europe,	(Cambridge	MA:	The	Balknap	Press,	2007).	
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contrasting	narratives	about	the	nature	of	the	Wars	presented	to	them	by	 Huguenots	 and	 French	 Catholics?	 How	 did	 Huguenot	 resistance	theory	 measure	 up	 to	 German	 understandings	 of	 the	 justifiability	 of	opposing	royal	authority?	What	did	the	Germans	make	of	the	incessant	accusations	 of	 hidden	 agendas	 and	 secret	 political	 ambitions	 thrown	back	and	forth	by	Huguenot	and	Catholic	diplomats?	How	did	their	own	experience	 of	 religious	 conflict	 inside	 the	 Empire	 inform	 their	interpretations	of	the	Wars	of	Religion	in	France?	How	did	the	Lutheran	princes	 regard	 the	 role	 of	 the	 Reformed	 Huguenots?	What	 was	 their	perspective	on	the	Catholic-Reformed	conflict	that	was	unfolding	across	the	border?		The	 third	and	 final	 category	of	questions	relates	 to	discussions	and	ideas	about	how	to	resolve	the	conflict.	What	strategies	were	used	by	 the	Germans	 to	 exercise	 influence	on	French	 affairs?	What	did	 the	German	 captains	 hope	 to	 achieve	 by	 their	 military	 action	 in	 France?	What	did	 they	 imagine	France	would	 look	 like	after	 the	restoration	of	peace	and	tranquillity?	How	much	were	the	debates	about	the	future	of	France	shaped	by	the	experience	of	creating	the	Peace	of	Augsburg?		 The	tendency	to	study	the	French	Wars	of	Religion	as	a	national	history	has	meant	that	such	questions	have	never	been	asked	let	alone	answered	 in	 the	 existing	 historiography.	 By	 answering	 these	 I	 will	establish	 a	 comprehensive	 picture	 of	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 German	understandings	of	the	conflict	in	France	and	its	possible	solutions	were	shaped.	This	will	firmly	root	the	French	Wars	of	Religion	in	a	European	context	 and	 illuminate	 the	 complex	 interplay	 between	 local,	 national,	and	transnational	factors	in	shaping	these	understandings.	Moreover,	I	will	highlight	how	the	conceptual	underpinnings	-	informed	by	theology	and	political	thought	-	interacted	with	the	experience	of	real-life	events	of	the	1560s	to	change	German	attitudes	towards	the	conflict	in	France.	Finally,	 the	 answering	of	 these	questions	will	 lead	 to	 some	 surprising	conclusions	about	 the	 importance	of	 the	 individuality	of	belief	 and	 its	role	in	conditioning	the	effect	of	French	propaganda.				
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Methodology		In	 order	 to	 answer	 all	 these	 questions,	 the	 aim	 of	 this	 thesis	 will	 be	systematically	 to	 study	 all	 the	 ties	 between	France	 and	Germany	 that	underpinned	German	involvement	in	the	Wars	of	Religion.	Besides	the	obvious	 diplomatic	 connections,	 these	 links	 included	 family	 and	patronage	 ties,	 a	 shared	 noble	 identity,	 cultural	 exchange,	 feelings	 of	religious	 connectedness,	 and	 a	 sense	 of	 a	 shared	 predicament.	 The	focus	 will	 be	 transnational	 rather	 than	 international.	 In	 other	 words,	the	 transfer	 of	 ideas	 across	 the	 French	 border	 and	 their	 reception	 in	Germany	as	opposed	to	the	relations	between	France	and	Germany	will	be	investigated.	The	 study	 of	 the	 role	 of	 Germany	 in	 general,	 and	 the	 Imperial	princes	in	particular,	during	the	French	Wars	of	Religion	is	complex,	not	only	 crossing	 national	 and	 linguistic	 borders,	 but	 also	 the	 boundaries	between	 different	 historiographical	 traditions.	 In	 order	 to	 be	 able	 to	deal	successfully	with	this	complexity,	the	scope	of	the	research	project	has	to	be	highly	focussed.	Therefore,	this	thesis	will	concentrate	on	the	role	 of	 ten	 individuals	 over	 the	 period	 of	 two	 decades.	 Through	 the	study	of	these	individuals	I	will	be	able	to	come	to	broader	conclusions	about	the	workings	of	transnational	information	transfer	and	the	role	of	local	 and	national	 contexts	 in	 shaping	 interpretation	 of	 these	 reports.	These	 ten	 princes,	 all	 Protestants,	 have	 been	 chosen	 for	 a	 number	 of	reasons.	Firstly,	they	are	among	the	most	actively	involved	in	the	affairs	of	France,	whether	through	diplomacy,	military	intervention,	or	simply	through	 participation	 in	 the	 debates	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 conflict.	Secondly,	 they	 represent	 a	 range	 of	 different	 perspectives	 on	 France,	from	ardent	supporters	to	fierce	critics	of	the	Huguenot	cause.	Finally,	they	 have	 left	 plenty	 of	 correspondence.	 This	 correspondence	will	 be	used	not	only	 to	 study	Franco-German	 interaction	during	 the	Wars	of	Religion,	but	also	to	untangle	the	debates	and	discussions	about	France	among	the	princes	of	the	Empire.			 German	perspectives	on	the	Wars	of	Religion	were	formed	over	a	prolonged	period	of	time,	building	on	ties	established	long	before	the	
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violence	broke	out	in	1562.	To	reflect	this,	and	also	to	investigate	how	Franco-German	 ties	changed	as	a	consequence	of	 the	Wars,	 this	 study	will	 focus	 on	 the	 years	 1552-1572.	 In	 1552,	 the	 epicentre	 of	 the	Habsburg-Valois	 conflict	 shifted	 to	 the	 border	 region	 between	 France	and	the	Empire.	This	shift	intensified	German	interest	in	French	affairs	and	led	to	the	formation	of	an	alliance	between	Henry	II	and	a	number	of	 German	 Protestant	 princes.	 Just	 like	 1552,	 1572	 was	 a	transformative	 moment.	 The	 St	 Bartholomew’s	 Day	 Massacre	 of	 24	August	 1572	 sent	 shockwaves	 across	 Europe,	 severely	 damaging	 the	reputation	 of	 the	 French	 crown	 amongst	 Protestant	 throughout	 the	continent.	 The	 study	 of	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 Massacre	 on	 European	perspectives	on	the	Wars	of	Religion	in	itself	warrants	the	full	attention	of	an	entire	research	project	and	is	too	big	to	do	justice	to	in	this	thesis.	Therefore,	I	have	chosen	to	use	1572	as	a	cut-off	point,	focussing	on	the	decades	 leading	up	to	 the	German	campaigns	of	 the	Second	and	Third	Wars.		
Sources		This	 thesis	 relies	 heavily	 on	 the	 correspondence	 of	 ten	 German	Protestant	 princes.	 Validated	 by	 a	 humanist	 interest	 in	 epistolary	culture	and	the	prominence	of	the	New	Testament,	the	Reformation	era	saw	a	flourishing	of	the	practice	of	letter	writing.36	As	Mark	Greengrass	has	demonstrated,	informal	epistolary	networks	could	serve	to	foster	a	sense	of	connectedness,	common	purpose,	and	belonging,	even	among	geographically	 dispersed	 groups. 37 	The	 extraordinarily	 rich	 and	informal	 networks	 of	 correspondence	 left	 by	 the	 ten	 princes	 served	similar	 functions.	 It	 placed	 the	 princes	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 a	 large	transnational	 social	 network	 of	 peers	 and	 coreligionists	 and	encouraged	 a	 sense	 of	 connectedness	 to	 people,	 places,	 and	 events																																																									36	M.	Greengrass,	‘Informal	networks	in	sixteenth-century	French	Protestantism’	in	R.	A.	Mentzer	and	A.	Spicer	(eds.),	Society	and	Culture	in	the	Huguenot	World.	1559-1685,	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2002):	pp.	78-97,	on	pp.	80-81.		37	Ibid,	p.	97.		
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outside	their	own	territories.	Moreover,	these	networks	also	served	as	important	policy	 tools	 and	were	used	 frequently	 to	 exercise	 influence	over	 events	 in	 France.	 Consequently,	 examining	 this	 body	 of	correspondence	 provides	 an	 insight	 into	 the	 princes’	 identities	 and	their	 place	 on	 the	 European	 stage	 as	 well	 as	 their	 responses	 to	 the	French	Wars	of	Religion.	 In	contrast	to	other	studies	of	the	role	of	the	German	princes	in	the	French	Wars	of	Religion,	I	will	not	only	make	use	of	 the	 letters	 between	 the	 princes	 and	 France,	 but	 also	 of	 the	correspondence	between	the	‘Princes	of	the	Augsburg	Confession.’	It	is	this	 internal	correspondence	that	provides	an	 insight	 into	the	German	debates	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 conflict,	 the	 crucial	 middle	 stage	between	French	diplomacy	and	propaganda	and	German	 intervention.	Helpfully,	a	significant	proportion	of	this	correspondence	has	appeared	in	 printed	 form.	 August	 Kluckhohn’s	 two-volume	 edition	 of	 Friedrich	III’s	 correspondence	 contains	 over	 a	 thousand	 letters,	many	 of	which	deal	 with	 the	 question	 of	 France. 38 	Large	 proportions	 of	 the	correspondence	of	William	of	Orange,	Louis	of	Nassau,	and	Christoph	of	Württemberg	have	also	appeared	in	print.39	The	archives	of	Germany	and	France	house	large	numbers	of	yet	unpublished	 letters	 relevant	 to	 this	 thesis.	 The	 Hauptstaatsarchiv	Stuttgart	contains	a	substantial	body	of	unpublished	letters	to	and	from	the	 Duke	 of	 Württemberg,	 including	 correspondence	 with	 his	 close	associate	Wolfgang	of	Zweibrücken	as	well	as	with	important	players	in	France,	 such	 as	 the	 Guise	 brothers.	 The	 Hessische	 Staatsarchiv	Marburg,	 similarly,	 contains	 the	 correspondence	 of	 the	 Landgraves	 of	Hesse,	 including	 a	 lengthy	 exchange	 of	 letters	 between	 Philip	 and	
																																																								38	A.	 Kluckhohn	 (ed.),	 Briefe	 Friedrich	 des	 Frommen,	 Kurfürsten	 von	 der	 Pfalz,	 mit	
Verwandten	 Schriftstücken,	 Volume	 I	 (Braunschweig,	 C.A.	 Schwetschte	 und	 Sohn,	1868/1870),	two	volumes.		39	G.	 Groen	 van	 Prinsteren	 (ed.),	 Archives	 ou	 Correspondance	 Inédite	 de	 la	 Maison	
d’Orange-Nassau,	 (Leiden:	Luchtmans,	1835/1836),	volume	two	and	three	used;	P.	 J.	Blok	 (ed.),	 Correspondentie	 van	 en	 betreffende	 Lodewijk	 van	 Nassau	 en	 andere	
Onuitgegeven	Documenten,	 (Utrecht:	 Kemink,	 1887);	 V.	 Ernst	 (ed.),	Briefwechsel	 des	
Herzogs	Christoph	von	Wirtemberg,	 (Stuttgart:	Verlag	 von	Kohlhammer,	 1899-1907),	four	 volumes;	 N.	 Japikse	 (ed.),	 Correspondentie	 van	 Willem	 den	 Eerste,	 Prins	 van	
Oranje,	(The	Hague:	Martinus	Nijhoff,	1934).		
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Heinrich	 Bullinger	 about	 religious	 questions.	 The	 Bibliothèque	Nationale	in	Paris	houses	a	 large	body	of	evidence	concerning	Franco-German	 relations	 during	 the	 French	 Wars	 of	 Religion.	 Among	 these	letters	we	find	the	German	princes’	proposed	solutions	for	the	violence	in	France	as	well	as	the	papers	of	French	royal	diplomats	active	in	the	Empire.	 The	 reports	 that	 these	 diplomats	 sent	 to	 Charles	 IX	 and	Catherine	de’	Medici	give	a	good	insight	into	the	debates	taking	place	at	the	courts	of	the	Imperial	princes.	To	provide	context,	I	will	also	make	use	 of	 the	 correspondence	 of	 number	 of	 other	 key	 players,	 including	Catherine	de’	Medici,	Charles	de	Lorraine,	and	Phillip	II.		 To	place	the	debates	among	the	princes	in	a	wider	context,	I	also	studied	around	fifty	German-language	publications	about	France,	which	appeared	between	1552	and	1572.	They	range	from	short	pamphlets	to	publications	of	more	than	a	hundred	pages	long.	Though	they	are	not	of	course	 necessarily	 representative	 of	 the	 mood	 amongst	 the	 wider	population	 in	 the	Empire,	 these	 often	 anonymously	 printed	polemical	texts	give	an	insight	into	the	ways	in	which	the	situation	in	France	was	discussed	in	the	public	sphere.	
	
Chapters		The	first	chapter	examines	the	many	different	connections	between	the	princes	 of	 the	 Holy	 Roman	 Empire	 and	 France	 that	 existed	 or	 were	created	during	 the	1550s.	 These	 connections,	which	 sometimes	dated	back	 generations,	 included	 family	 ties,	 cross-border	 landownership,	patronage	networks,	and	shared	educational	experiences	and	led	to	the	formation	 of	 a	 common	 cultural	 identity.	 The	 chapter	 also	 questions	what	 the	 terms	 ‘German’	 or	 ‘French’	 meant	 in	 the	 mid-sixteenth	century,	 how	 people	 saw	 the	 border	 between	 the	 two	 countries,	 and	how	 ideas	 of	 foreignness	 shaped	 understandings	 of	 the	 relation	between	 the	 various	 countries	 and	 regions	 of	 Europe.	 These	connections,	 as	 well	 as	 a	 conceptual	 understanding	 of	 the	 nature	 of	national	 identity,	 served	 as	 a	 foundation	 on	which	 all	 further	 debates	about	the	conflict	in	France	were	built.	
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	 Chapter	 II	 examines	 the	 religious	 context	 in	 which	 German	interpretations	 of	 the	Wars	 of	Religion	were	 formed.	The	 outbreak	 of	violence	 in	 France	 coincided	 with	 a	 period	 of	 confessional	 turmoil	inside	 the	 Empire.	 Within	 a	 decade	 of	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 Peace	 of	Augsburg	 in	 1555,	 the	 fragile	 peace	 was	 disturbed	 by	 the	 drawn-out	conflict	 between	 Gnesio-Lutherans	 and	 Philippists	 and	 by	 the	conversion	 of	 the	 Elector	 Palatine	 to	 Reformed	 Protestantism.	 Both	developments	 led	 to	 discussions	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 Lutheran	orthodoxy	 and	 the	 relation	 between	 the	 different	 forms	 of	Protestantism.	 The	 question	 of	 France	was	 directly	 incorporated	 into	these	discussions.	Lutheran	objections	against	Reformed	Protestantism	were	 not	 just	 theological.	 There	 was	 also	 a	 strong	 sense	 amongst	Lutherans	 that	 Reformed	 Protestantism	 was	 essentially	 seditious,	 an	idea	reinforced	by	French	Catholic	interpretations	of	the	origins	of	the	Wars.	 These	 debates	 and	 discussions,	 which	 were	 fought	 out	 in	correspondence	 and	 at	 a	 number	 of	 summits	 of	 the	 Imperial	 princes,	profoundly	 shaped	 German	 understandings	 of	 the	 French	 Wars	 of	Religion.		 The	 third	 chapter	 takes	 a	 closer	 look	 at	 the	 contrasting	narratives	 of	 the	 causes	 of	 the	Wars	of	Religion	presented	 to	German	audiences.	From	the	moment	violence	broke	out	in	France,	the	German	Protestant	 princes	 were	 targeted	 by	 both	 Huguenot	 and	 Catholic	diplomats.	 They	 presented	 radically	 different	 interpretations	 of	 the	nature	 of	 the	 conflict.	 Besides	 these	 diplomatic	 efforts,	 German	audiences	 also	 learned	 about	 events	 in	 France	 through	 the	 many	German-language	 pamphlets	 about	 the	 Wars	 circulating	 inside	 the	Empire.	 The	 tone	 of	many	 of	 these	 pamphlets	 again	 differed	 strongly	from	 the	 diplomatic	 messages,	 causing	 further	 confusion	 among	German	audiences.	The	disagreements	at	the	heart	of	these	contrasting	narratives	pertained	to	questions	about	the	permissibility	of	opposition	to	royal	authority.	The	compatibility	of	Huguenot	and	German	Lutheran	theories	of	resistance	will	therefore	also	be	discussed	in	detail.			 Chapter	IV	focuses	on	the	German	Protestant	princes’	visions	for	the	 future	 of	 France.	 In	 response	 to	 the	 incessant	 French	 diplomatic	
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efforts	and	the	debates	they	provoked,	the	German	princes	developed	a	number	 of	 distinct	 solutions	 for	 the	 violence	 in	 France.	 In	 the	development	 of	 these	 ideas,	 they	 built	 not	 only	 on	 their	 own	understandings	 of	 the	 relation	 between	 secular	 government	 and	religious	authority,	the	dangers	of	a	religiously	diverse	society,	and	the	role	 of	 ‘lesser	magistrates’,	 but	 also	 on	 their	 experiences	 of	 resolving	religious	 strife	 inside	 the	 Empire.	 Moreover,	 they	 attempted	 to	 tailor	these	ideas	to	the	specifics	of	the	French	situation.	However,	as	is	often	the	case	with	ideas,	a	number	of	these	solutions	collided	with	the	reality	of	the	conflict,	proving	impossible	to	implement	and	forcing	the	princes	to	tweak,	adapt,	or	reconsider.		 Chapter	 V	 explores	 how	 events	 in	 the	 Netherlands	 radically	changed	 the	 tone	 of	 German	 debates	 about	 France.	 The	 eruption	 of	public	unrest	in	the	Netherlands	during	the	summer	of	1566	coincided	with	the	increasing	popularity	of	the	theory	of	the	Catholic	Conspiracy.	Protestant	 circles	 throughout	 Europe	 reverberated	 with	 talk	 of	 an	elaborate	plot	designed	to	destroy	Protestantism	across	the	continent.	The	 backlash	 against	 the	Wonderjaar	 in	 the	 Netherlands,	 led	 by	 the	Duke	of	Alba,	seemed	to	confirm	the	theory	that	the	conflict	 in	France	was	but	one	stage	of	a	larger	Catholic	scheme.	Though	not	everyone	in	the	Empire	 bought	 into	 this	 narrative,	 it	 nonetheless	 transformed	 the	tone	 of	 the	 discussions	 about	 France,	 pushing	 intricate	 debates	 about	the	 nature	 of	 Lutheran-Reformed	 relations	 or	 the	 justifiability	 of	resistance	aside,	substituting	it	with	warnings	of	acute	danger	and	calls	for	the	making	of	common	cause	against	Catholicism.		 The	 final	 chapter	 investigates	 the	ways	 in	which	 all	 the	 above	debates	 shaped	 German	 involvement	 in	 the	 Wars	 of	 Religion,	 most	notably	 the	 five	 German	 military	 campaigns.	 It	 challenges	 the	assumption	made	by	a	number	of	historians	that	these	campaigns	were	primarily	 motivated	 by	 the	 pursuit	 of	 political	 and	 financial	 self-interest.	 Instead,	 it	 will	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 actions	 of	 the	 German	princes	 were	 entirely	 consistent	 with	 their	 positions	 in	 the	 debates	about	France	that	developed	in	the	decade	leading	up	to	the	campaigns.	
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	 Together	 these	 chapters	 form	 the	 first	 comprehensive	 study	of	all	the	different	factors	shaping	transnational	relations	during	the	early	French	 Wars	 of	 Religion.	 Though	 the	 international	 dimension	 of	 the	conflict	has	been	noted	before,	it	has	long	been	the	scholarly	practice	to	study	only	the	moments	at	which	foreign	influence	was	directly	felt	 in	France,	 such	 as	 through	diplomacy	or	military	 intervention.	However,	as	 I	 will	 demonstrate,	 they	 were	 the	 culmination	 of	 a	 much	 more	complex	 process	 of	 engagement.	 This	 process	 was	 essentially	transnational.	Returning	to	Iriye’s	definition	of	the	transnational,	which	emphasises	 the	 interplay	 between	 national	 and	 transnational	dimensions,	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	 realise	 that	 German	 understanding	 of	 the	French	Wars	of	Religion	were	formed	by	ideas,	events,	and	experiences	from	the	Empire,	France,	and	beyond.	Only	by	rooting	 these	events	 in	German	and	European	as	well	as	French	contexts	is	it	possible	truly	to	understand	 the	 underpinnings	 of	 German	 intervention	 in	 the	 French	Wars	of	Religion.		
The	German	princes		The	following	ten	princes	will	be	the	focus	of	this	thesis:		
Christoph	 of	 Württemberg	 (1515-1568)	 spent	most	 of	 his	 youth	 at	the	courts	of	the	Holy	Roman	Empire	and	the	King	of	France.	During	his	time	in	France,	Christoph	took	part	in	the	Franco-Habsburg	Wars.	After	succeeding	 his	 father	 Ulrich	 in	 1550	 he	 continued	 the	 conversion	 of	Württemberg	to	Lutheranism,	playing	a	leading	role	in	the	reform	of	the	Church	Order	and	the	school	system	in	Württemberg.40		
Friedrich	 III,	 Elector	 Palatine	 (1515-1576),	 also	known	as	 the	Pious	converted	twice,	first	from	Catholicism,	the	religion	of	his	upbringing,	to	Lutheranism	 and	 then	 in	 the	 early	 1560s	 to	 Reformed	 Protestantism.	The	 creation	 of	 a	 Reformed	 state	 in	 the	 Palatinate,	 including	 the																																																									40	Langsteiner,	Für	Land	und	Luthertum.		
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supervision	over	 the	 influential	Heidelberg	Catechism,	was	Friedrich’s	primary	concern	from	1563	until	his	death.41		
Johann	 Casimir	 of	 the	 Palatinate	 (1543-1592)	 was	 the	 second	surviving	 son	 of	 Friedrich	 the	 Pious	 and	 the	 only	 son	 to	 share	 his	Reformed	 convictions.	 Johann	 Casimir	 spent	 a	 large	 part	 of	 his	 life	embroiled	 in	 the	 religious	 conflicts	 of	 Europe,	 leading	 two	 military	campaigns	 in	 France	 and	 one	 in	 the	 Netherlands	 and	 maintaining	 a	large	 international	Protestant	network.	He	also	aimed	 to	 reinforce	his	strong	contacts	in	England	by	attempting	to	marry	Elizabeth	I.42		
Wolfgang	of	Zweibrücken	(1526-1569).	Like	Friedrich	and	Casimir	a	member	 of	 the	 Wittelsbach	 family,	 Wolfgang	 was	 also	 related	 to	 the	Landgraves	 of	Hesse	 through	his	mother.	Wolfgang	presided	over	 the	reformation	 of	 his	 territories	 of	 Zweibrücken	 and	 Neuburg,	 amongst	others	commissioning	a	new	Church	Order	and	hymnal.43	
	
Philip	 of	Hesse	 (1504-1567)	was	a	member	of	 the	 first	generation	of	Lutheran	 princes	 and	 one	 of	 the	 leaders	 of	 the	 Schmalkaldic	 League.	Philip	was	devoted	to	preventing	the	fracture	of	Protestantism	over	the	question	of	the	Eucharist	and	organised	the	1529	Marburg	Colloquy	to	resolve	it.44		
																																																								41	P.	Fuchs,	‘Friedrich	III.	der	Fromme’,	Neue	Deutsche	Biographie,	5	(1961):	530-532;	D.	 Visser,	 ‘Zacharias	 Ursinus	 and	 the	 Palatinate	 Reformation’,	 in	 D.	 Visser	 (ed.),	
Controversy	and	Conciliation,	The	Reformation	and	the	Palatinate,	1559-1583,	 (Allison	Park:	Pickwick	Publications,	1986):	pp.	1-20.		42	V.	 Press,	 ‘Johann	Casimir’,	Neue	Deutsche	Biographie,	 10	 (1974):	 510-513;	 J.	 Raitt,	‘The	 Elector	 John	 Casimir,	 Queen	 Elizabeth	 and	 the	 Protestant	 League’,	 in	 D.	 Visser	(ed.),	 Controversy	 and	 Conciliation,	 The	 Reformation	 and	 the	 Palatinate,	 1559-1583,	(Allison	Park:	Pickwick	Publications,	1986),	pp.	117-145.		43	Ney,	‘Pfalzgraf	Wolfgang,	Herzog	von	Zweibrücken	und	Neuburg’.		44	F.	Wolff,	‘Philipp	der	Großmütige’,	Neue	Deutsche	Biographie,	20	(2001):	376-379.		
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William	 of	 Hesse-Kassel	 (1532-1592).	 The	 oldest	 son	 of	 Philip	 of	Hesse,	William	inherited	his	father’s	commitment	to	Protestant	unity	as	well	as	a	quarter	of	his	possessions.45	
	
William	of	Orange	(1533-1584)	Son	of	William	of	Nassau-Dillenburg,	the	 head	 of	 a	 relatively	 minor	 German	 princely	 house,	 his	 status	increased	significantly	when	in	1544	he	inherited	the	lands	and	title	of	his	 cousin	René	de	Châlon,	prince	of	Orange.	 In	 response	 to	William’s	new	 status,	 Charles	 V	 compelled	 the	 young	 prince	 to	 move	 to	 the	Imperial	court	 in	Brussels	 to	be	raised	a	Catholic.	From	1568,	William	led	 the	 Revolt	 of	 the	 Dutch	 against	 the	 rule	 of	 Philip	 II,	 until	 he	was	assassinated	in	1584.	His	genuine	religious	convictions	are	notoriously	difficult	to	determine,	converting	from	Lutheran	to	Catholic	to	Calvinist	at	politically	expedient	moments.46		
Louis	 of	 Nassau	 (1538-1574)	 The	 younger	 brother	 of	 William	 of	Orange	 may	 have	 received	 a	 university	 education	 before	 joining	William	in	Brussels.	Louis’	career	is	characterised	by	his	service	to	his	brother’s	 cause,	 representing	 William	 as	 diplomat	 and	 military	commander,	 and	 by	 his	 efforts	 for	 the	 international	 Protestant	 cause,	spending	 a	 significant	 periods	 of	 time	 in	 the	 entourage	 of	 Jeanne	 de	Navarre	in	France.	Louis	fell	at	the	Battle	of	Mookerheyde	in	1574.47		
Johann	Wilhelm	of	Saxe-Weimar	(1530-1573)	was	one	of	three	sons	of	 the	 unfortunate	 Johann	 Friedrich	 of	 Saxony,	 who	 lost	 his	 title	 of	Elector	 in	 a	 dispute	 with	 the	 Emperor.	 After	 his	 father’s	 death,	 he	became	 embroiled	 in	 the	 conflict	 between	 his	 brothers	 and	 the	Emperor,	 allowing	 him	 to	 oust	 his	 brothers	 and	 reunite	 his	 father’s	patrimony.	 Another	 controversial	 moment	 was	 Johann	 Wilhelm’s																																																									45	W.	Ribbeck,	 ‘Wilhelm	IV.,	Landgraf	von	Hessen’,	Allgemeine	Deutsche	Biographie	43	(1898):	32-39.		46 	K.	 W.	 Swart,	 William	 of	 Orange	 and	 the	 Revolt	 of	 the	 Netherlands,	 1572-84,	(Aldershot:	Ashgate,	2003).		47	P.	J.	Blok,	Lodewijk	van	Nassau,	(The	Hague:	Martinus	Nijhoff,	1889).		
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campaign	in	service	of	Charles	IX	of	France,	causing	yet	another	conflict	with	the	Emperor	and	leading	to	a	substantial	 loss	of	territory.	Johann	Wilhelm	 was	 one	 of	 the	 most	 important	 proponents	 of	 Gnesio-Lutheranism,	 co-founding	 the	 University	 of	 Jena,	 which	 became	 an	important	bulwark	of	strict	Lutheran	orthodoxy.48		
Philibert	of	Baden	(1536-1569)	was	brought	up	a	Catholic	at	the	court	of	the	Duke	of	Bavaria,	but	converted	to	Lutheranism.	In	1569	he	joined	Johann	Wilhelm	 in	 his	 campaign	 to	 France,	 where	 he	 fell	 in	 Battle	 of	Moncontour.49	
																																																								48	Hahn,	Herzog	Johann	Wilhelm	von	Weimar.		49	A.	Krieger,	 ‘Philibert,	Markgraf	von	Baden-Baden’,	Allgemeine	Deutsche	Biographie,	25	(1887):	739-741.	
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	Figure	1:	Map	of	the	possessions	of	the	princes	studied	in	this	thesis.50	
	
																																																									50	This	map	is	hand	drawn	so	might	be	approximate	in	places.		
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Terminology	
	The	 absence	 of	 clear	 borders	 or	 well-defined	 ideas	 about	 national	identity	 makes	 using	 terms	 such	 as	 German,	 French,	 or	 Dutch	 very	problematic.	 For	 instance,	 in	 this	 thesis	 I	 count	 William	 of	 Orange	among	 the	German	princes.	Despite	 later	 being	 regarded	 as	 the	pater	
patriae	 of	 the	 Netherlands,	 a	 strong	 case	 can	 be	 made	 for	 placing	William,	 whose	 patrimonial	 heartlands	 bordered	 the	 principality	 of	Hesse	 and	 the	 Palatinate,	 amongst	 the	 likes	 of	 William	 of	 Hesse	 and	Friedrich	 III,	 especially	 in	 the	 1560s.	 The	 German-born,	 French-speaking	prince	of	Orange	is	a	good	example	of	the	cosmopolitanism	of	much	of	the	sixteenth	century	aristocracy.	For	the	sake	of	brevity	I	will	nonetheless	 use	 the	 terms	 ‘German’,	 ‘French’,	 and	 ‘Dutch’,	 albeit	with	the	caveat	that	these	terms	are	far	from	unproblematic.		Confessional	 labelling	 too	 should	 only	 be	 done	 with	 caution.	Many	of	the	terms	used	by	historians	to	describe	confessional	 identity	would	 have	 been	 deeply	 resented	 by	 those	 they	 are	 intended	 to	represent.	The	term	Huguenot	was	widely	used,	but	not	by	the	French	Protestants	 themselves.	 The	 terms	 Calvinist	 and	 Zwinglian	 were	exclusively	 used	 in	 a	 negative	 context	 and	 more	 importantly	 do	 not	reflect	 the	 variety	 of	 theological	 influences	 shaping	 the	 religion	 of	French,	Dutch,	and	Palatine	Protestants.	I	will,	therefore,	exclusively	use	the	more	neutral	term	Reformed	Protestantism.	The	term	Lutheran	was	also	 rarely	 used.	 The	 Lutheran	 princes	 instead	 tended	 to	 refer	 to	themselves	 as	 the	 princes	 of	 the	 Augsburg	 Confession.	 Despite	 the	resistance	of	some	Lutheran	princes,	such	as	Philip	of	Hesse,	to	the	use	of	 terminology	 that	 contributed	 to	 creating	 divisions	 within	Protestantism,	the	Augsburg	Confession	and	its	official	adoption	by	the	German	 princes	 makes	 the	 use	 of	 the	 term	 ‘Lutheran’	 much	 more	straightforward.	
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I.		 The	 Princes	 of	 the	 Holy	 Roman	 Empire	 on	 the	
International	Stage		
Wilhelmus	van	Nassouwe	
Ben	ick,	van	Duytschen	bloet;	
Den	Vaderlant	ghetrouwe	
Blijf	ick	tot	inden	doot;	
Een	prince	van	Oraengiën	
Ben	ick,	vrij	onverveert;	
Den	conick	van	Hispaengien	
Heb	ik	altijt	gheëert.1	
	William	of	Nassau	am	I,	of	German	blood;	Loyal	to	the	fatherland	I	remain	until	death	A	Prince	of	Orange	am	I,	free	and	fearless;	The	king	of	Spain	I	have	always	honoured.		These	 curious	 words	 of	 the	 first	 verse	 of	 the	 Dutch	 national	 anthem	frequently	raise	eyebrows.	The	fact	that	they	mention	Germany,	Spain,	and	Orange,	a	small	principality	in	the	south	of	France,	more	explicitly	than	 the	 Netherlands	 seems	 particularly	 odd.	 One	 has	 to	 explore	 the	historical	context	in	which	these	words	were	written	for	them	to	make	sense.	Published	in	the	1581	Geuzenliedboek,	the	Wilhelmus	was	part	of	an	 extensive	 propaganda	 campaign	 celebrating	 the	 struggle	 against	Habsburg	 rule	 in	 the	 Netherlands.2	The	 complete	 poem,	 an	 acrostic	forming	 the	 words	 ‘Willem	 van	 Nassov’,	 is	 essentially	 biographical.	Keeping	in	mind	the	propagandistic	nature	of	the	text,	and	the	fact	that	it	 was	 written	 at	 a	 time	 in	 which	 William	 of	 Orange’s	 reputation	 as	
Pater	Patriae	of	the	Netherlands	was	first	established,	it	is	nonetheless																																																									1	Anon.,	 Een	 Nieu	 Geusen	 Lieden	 Boecxken/	 Waerinne	 Begrepen	 is/	 den	 Ganstschen	
Handel	 der	 Nederlandtscher	 Gheschiedenissen/	 dees	 Voorleden	 Jaeren	 tot	 noch	 toe	
Ghedragen/	 Eensdeels	 Onderwylen	 in	 Druck	 Uitghegaen/	 Eensdeels	 nu	 nieu	 By-
ghevoecht	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1581),	f.	24	v.		2	K.	W.	Swart,	William	of	Orange	and	the	Revolt	of	the	Netherlands,	1572-84	(Aldershot:	Ashgate,	 2003):	 pp.	 29-102;	 A.	 Duke,	 Dissident	 Identities	 in	 the	 Early	 Modern	 Low	
Countries	(Farnham:	Ashgate,	2009):	pp.	57-76.		
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illustrative	of	 the	complex	mix	of	 loyalties	and	belongings	that	shaped	the	 identity	 of	 a	 member	 of	 the	 high	 nobility	 of	 the	 Holy	 Roman	Empire.3	In	 these	 eight	 short	 lines,	 Orange’s	 family	 ties	 (of	 German	blood),	the	lands	he	controlled	in	the	Netherlands	(fatherland),	and	his	dynastic	loyalties	(King	of	Spain)	are	mentioned.	Moreover,	his	claim	to	sovereignty	 is	also	emphasised	(Prince	of	Orange	…	free	and	fearless).		Although	 it	 has	 to	 be	 said	 that	 the	 position	 of	William	of	Orange	was	rather	unique,	it	can	be	argued	that	the	other	princes	of	the	Empire	to	a	greater	or	lesser	extent	shared	Orange’s	complex	international	identity.		 In	order	to	understand	the	princes’	actions	on	the	international	stage	 in	 the	 1560s,	 it	 is	 first	 important	 to	 consider	 the	 factors	 that	informed	their	perspective	on	political	and	religious	events	outside	the	Holy	 Roman	 Empire.	 	 Since	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 use	 the	 terms	‘international’	or	‘transnational’	without	understanding	what	‘national’	meant	 in	 a	 mid-sixteenth	 century	 context,	 I	 will	 first	 address	 the	connections	 between	 regionalism,	 national	 identity,	 and	 international	influences	in	the	Empire,	and	especially	the	Rhineland,	home	to	most	of	the	 princes	 studied	 in	 this	 thesis.	 Secondly,	 I	 will	 discuss	 the	 many	aspects	that	formed	the	Imperial	princes’	international	identity.	Finally,	I	 will	 consider	 the	 intensification	 of	 diplomatic	 relations	 between	France	 and	 the	 Protestant	 German	 princes	 after	 1552.	 The	 cultural,	social,	and	political	 internationalism	discussed	in	this	chapter	strongly	influenced	 the	 German	 princes’	 perspective	 on	 the	 French	 Wars	 of	Religion.	As	will	be	demonstrated,	 this	 internationalism	as	well	as	 the	lack	 of	 clear	 borders,	 the	 cosmopolitanism	 of	 the	 Rhineland,	 and	 the	relative	 unimportance	 of	 national	 sentiment	 ensured	 that	 events	 in	France	were	not	seen	as	foreign	or	distant.																																																													3	N.	M.	Sutherland,	Princes,	Politics	and	Religion,	1547-1589	(London:	The	Hambledon	Press,	1984):	pp.	207-236.		
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1.1	National	Identity	in	the	sixteenth-century	Rhineland		In	his	chapter	entitled	The	Elusive	Netherlands,	Alistair	Duke	lists	all	the	factors	that	contribute	to	the	construction	of	national	identity	and	one	by	 one	 demonstrates	 how	 they	 do	 not	 quite	 apply	 to	 the	 Low	Countries.4	The	 region	 lacked	 a	 common	 language,	 natural	 borders,	 a	shared	 dynastic	 history,	 political	 unity,	 or	 even	 a	 commonly	 accepted	name	for	 its	 inhabitants.	Religion,	which	as	 the	Dutch	Revolt	unfolded	became	an	increasingly	important	contributor	to	the	Dutch	self-image,	was	for	most	of	the	sixteenth	century	a	divisive	rather	than	a	unifying	factor.5	A	 similar	 argument	 can	 be	 made	 about	 the	 Rhineland,	 the	region	of	the	Holy	Roman	Empire	bordering	the	kingdom	of	France	and	the	ancestral	heartland	of	most	of	the	princes	studied	in	this	thesis.		 Geographically,	 the	 Rhineland	 was	 part	 of	 the	 Holy	 Roman	Empire.	 Although	 this	 entity	 in	 some	 ways	 resembled	 other	 early	modern	 states,	 the	 exact	 nature	 of	 the	 Empire	 defied	 definition.	Historically,	it	claimed	to	be	the	natural	successor	of	the	Roman	Empire	and	 the	 realm	 of	 Charlemagne.	 Accordingly,	 the	 Empire	 should	 have	had	 no	 boundaries	 and	 instead	 encompassed	 the	 entirety	 of	 Latin	Christendom.6	In	 practice,	 at	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 sixteenth	 century,	 the	shape	 of	 the	 Empire	 had	 become	 relatively	 fixed.	 During	 the	 last	decades	 of	 the	 fifteenth	 century,	 it	 had	 become	 common	 practice	 to	refer	 to	 the	 ‘Holy	Roman	Empire	of	 the	German	Nation’.7	This	 term	 is	somewhat	misleading.	It	not	clear	what	exactly	constituted	this	German	nationhood,	 although	 language	certainly	played	a	 role.	Although	some	form	 of	 German	was	 spoken	 throughout	most	 of	 the	 Empire,	 French,	
																																																								4	Duke,	Dissident	Identities,	pp.	9-56.		5	J.	 Pollmann,	Catholic	 Identity	and	 the	Revolt	of	 the	Netherlands,	1520-1635	 (Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2011):	pp.	44-67.		6	T.	 A.	 Brady,	 German	 Histories	 in	 the	 Age	 of	 Reformations,	 1400-1650	 (Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2009):	p.	12.		7	Ibid,	pp.	11-28.		
		43	
Italian,	and	various	Slavic	languages	were	also	spoken	in	certain	parts.8	The	Rhineland	was	 a	 particularly	multilingual	 region.	Dialects	 of	 Low	and	 Middle	 German	 were	 commonly	 spoken	 around	 and	 east	 of	 the	Rhine,	 but	 different	 forms	 of	 French,	 such	 as	 Lorrain	 and	 Franc-Comtois,	were	used	in	the	Duchy	of	Lorraine	and	of	the	Franche-Comté,	regions	of	 the	Empire	situated	 less	than	a	hundred	kilometres	west	of	the	Rhine.	 The	 Imperial	 city	 of	 Strasbourg,	 the	most	 important	 urban	centre	 in	 the	 Rhineland,	 was	 home	 to	 a	 significant	 Francophone	minority.9	The	ambiguity	of	the	Rhineland	is	most	clearly	illustrated	by	the	debate	 about	 borders.	 Rather	 than	 a	 sharp	 boundary,	 the	 Franco-Imperial	 border	 was	 unclear.	 There	 were	 continuous	 debates	 about	where	the	 ‘natural	border’	between	France	and	the	Empire	should	be.	Whereas	traditionally	the	Meuse	was	said	to	demarcate	the	edge	of	the	Kingdom	of	France,	the	argument	that	French	royal	authority	stretched	to	 the	 Rhine	 was	 increasingly	 voiced.10	The	 theoretical	 or	 historical	foundation	 of	 this	 debate	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	 partitioning	 of	Charlemagne’s	inheritance	into	three	parts	in	843.		Though	Charles	the	Bold	 and	 Louis	 the	 German	 inherited	 regions	 that	 can	 easily	 be	identified	 as	 France	 and	 Germany,	 Lothar	 I	 inherited	 the	 region	between	 Meuse	 and	 Rhine.	 Since	 his	 kingdom	 of	 Middle	 Francia	 had	long	 disappeared,	 theorists	 argued	 over	 whether	 this	 region	 was	naturally	a	part	of	France	or	Germany.	Not	surprisingly,	French	writers	such	as	Nicolas	Gilles	argued	that	this	land	was	‘a	part	of	France.’11		This	theory	became	policy	in	what	has	been	called	the	French	‘Rheinpolitik’.	Henry	 II’s	 campaign	 of	 1552	 was	 partly	 intended	 to	 realise	 this																																																									8	Ibid,	p.	14-15.		9	R.	 von	 Thadden,	 ‘Calvin	 und	 der	 Fortgang	 der	 Reformation	 im	 Reich’,	 Historische	
Zeitschrift,	208	(1969):	1-23.		10 	D.	 Potter,	 War	 and	 Government	 in	 the	 French	 Provinces,	 Picardy	 1470-1560	(Cambridge:	 Cambridge	 University	 Press,	 1993):	 p.	 266;	 R.	 Babel,	 Deutschland	 und	
Frankreich	 im	 Zeichen	 der	 Habsburgischen	 Universalmonarchie	 (1500-1648)	(Darmstadt:	Wissenschaftliche	Burchgesellschaft,	2005),	pp.	166-168.	
	11	‘une	portion	de	la	France’	Babel,	Deutschland	und	Frankreich,	p.	173.		
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ambition.	The	strip	of	land	between	the	two	rivers,	which	at	places	was	as	wide	as	250	kilometres,	was	thus	clearly	in	the	sphere	of	influence	of	both	 France	 and	 the	 Empire.12	This	 reality	 of	 the	 frontier	 as	 a	 zone	rather	 than	 a	 clear	 boundary	 can	 also	 be	 seen	 when	 looking	 at	 the	border	 between	 France	 and	 the	 Netherlands.13	Despite	 the	 fact	 that	throughout	the	early-sixteenth	century	French	and	Habsburg	diplomats	tried	to	hammer	out	clear	agreements	about	where	exactly	the	border	should	lie,	the	place	where	France	and	the	Low	Countries	met	was	more	
frontière	(a	border	region)	than	limites	(a	border	in	the	modern	sense	of	the	 term).14	In	 his	 study	 of	 the	 Pyrenees,	 the	 region	 that	 separated	France	from	Spain,	Peter	Sahlins	has	drawn	our	attention	to	‘the	rather	complex	interplay	of	two	notions	of	boundary	–	zonal	and	linear	–	and	two	 ideas	 of	 sovereignty	 –jurisdictional	 and	 territorial’.15	These	 ‘two	polarities’,	 Sahlins	 argues,	 ‘can	 be	 found	 at	 any	 given	moment	 in	 the	history	of	the	boundary’.16	A	similar	observation	can	be	made	about	the	Franco-Imperial	 frontier.	 However,	 despite	 the	 increasing	 importance	of	the	matter	of	natural	borders	(which	emphasised	the	linear	and	the	territorial),	 in	 this	 region	 the	 zonal	 and	 the	 jurisdictional	interpretations	dominated.	Debates	about	frontiers	were	characterised	by	disputes	over	legal	and	financial	jurisdictions	and	seigneurial	rights,	showing	that	France	was	still	very	much	thought	of	as	a	kingdom	rather	than	a	country,	let	alone	a	nation	state.17	
																																																								12	Ibid,	p.	169.		13	Potter,	War	and	Government	in	the	French	Provinces,	p.	267.		14	Ibid,	p.	268.		15	P.	 Sahlins,	Boundaries,	 the	Making	 of	 France	 and	 Spain	 in	 the	 Pyrenees,	 (Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	1989):	p.	7.		16	Ibid,	p.	7.		17	Ibid,	pp.	265-293.	
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	Figure	2:	Map	of	the	Holy	Roman	Empire	in	1555.18		Politically	the	Rhineland	was	also	unusually	diverse.	Broadly	speaking,	the	political	entities	that	formed	the	Empire	were	significantly	larger	in	the	east	 than	 in	 the	west	(see	Figure	2).	Around	the	Rhine	the	map	of	the	 Empire	 looked	 most	 fragmented.19	Some	 of	 the	 most	 important	Protestant	 entities,	 such	 as	Württemberg,	 Nassau,	 and	 the	 Palatinate,	were	 located	 in	 close	proximity	 to	 the	 seats	of	 the	 three	ecclesiastical	Electors:	 Trier,	 Mainz,	 and	 Cologne.	 Moreover,	 besides	 the	 many	duchies,	 counties,	 and	bishoprics,	 a	 string	 of	 Imperial	 free	 cities	 lined	the	 Rhine.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 this	 fragmentation,	 regionalism,	 rather	 than	nationalism,	 dominated	 life	 in	 the	 sixteenth-century	 Rhineland.	 In	 his	book	 Town,	 Country,	 and	 Regions	 in	 Reformation	 Germany,	 Tom	 Scott	
																																																								18	Though	 this	map	 to	 some	 extent	 reflects	 the	 fragmentation	 of	 the	 Empire,	 which	was	 particularly	 extreme	 in	 the	 west,	 it	 does	 not	 accurately	 reflect	 either	 the	ambiguity	of	borders,	or	 the	problem	of	 competing	 theories	about	 ‘natural	borders’.	Adapted	 from	 A.	 Kunz	 and	 R.	 Moeschl,	 ‘Deutschland,	 1555’,	 Leipniz	 Institut	 für	
Europäische	 Geschichte,	 accessed	 02	 October	 2015,	 http://www.ieg-maps.uni-mainz.de/mapsp/mapp555d.htm.		19	Brady,	German	Histories,	p.	18.	
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dissects	 this	regionalism.20	Although	 local	and	regional	 identities	were	created	 by	 the	 political	 reality,	 and	 reinforced	 by	 customs	 and	traditions,	Scott	argues,	they	did	not	prevent	the	formation	of	extensive	networks,	 which	 stretched	 far	 beyond	 the	 region.	 Trade,	 primarily	along	the	Rhine,	brought	goods,	people,	and	ideas	from	outside	the	area.	Reformed	 Protestantism,	 for	 instance,	 spread	 along	 the	 Rhine	 from	Zurich	to	Strasbourg	and	beyond.	Contact	with	the	Low	Countries	was	also	particularly	strong.21	Together	with	the	Netherlands	and	northern	Italy,	 the	 Rhineland	 was	 the	 most	 urbanised,	 densely	 populated,	 and	wealthy	region	of	the	Empire.	 	Besides	Cologne	and	Strasbourg,	which	ranked	 among	 the	 Empire’s	 largest	 cities,	 the	 Rhineland	 was	characterised	by	a	high	density	of	smaller	cities,	many	of	which	did	not	have	more	than	2000	inhabitants.22	A	number	of	these	cities,	including	Aachen,	 Worms,	 Speyer,	 Frankfurt,	 and	 Colmar,	 were	 Imperial	 free	cities.	 The	 region	 was	 also	 a	 centre	 for	 learning,	 with	 universities	 at	Cologne,	 Marburg,	 Mainz,	 Trier,	 Heidelberg,	 Tübingen,	 Freiburg,	 and	Basel	 and	 the	 first	 Lateinschulen	 in	 Frankfurt	 and	 Cologne.23	These	cities	 fostered	 both	 a	 sense	 of	 independence	 and	 civic	 pride,	 further	increasing	 both	 the	 fragmentation	 of	 the	 region,	 and,	 through	 their	universities	 and	 trade	 networks,	 a	 sense	 of	 internationalism	 and	cosmopolitanism.	Local	and	regional	rulers,	both	noble	and	civic,	had	a	stake	in	the	governance	of	the	Empire.24	Forming	part	of	the	Reichsstände,	they	had	the	 right	 to	 take	 part	 in	 Imperial	 Diets. 25 	To	 streamline	 Imperial																																																									20	T.	 Scott,	Town,	Country,	and	Regions	 in	Reformation	Germany	 (Leiden:	Brill,	 2005):	pp.	263-281.		21 	P.	 G.	 Wallace,	 Communities	 and	 Conflicts	 in	 Early	 Modern	 Colmar:	 1575-1730,	(Atlantic	Heights:	Humanities	Press	International,	1995):	p.	52.		22	H.	Rabe,	Reich	und	Glaubensspaltung:	Deutschland	1500-1600	(Munich:	Beck,	1989):	p.	28.		23	P.	 F.	 Grendler,	 The	Universities	 of	 the	 Renaissance	 and	Reformation’,	Renaissance	
Quarterly,	57	(2004):	1-42,	on	p.	5;	Babel,	Deutschland	und	Frankreich,	p.	108.		24	Wallace,	Communities	and	Conflicts,	p.	19.		25	Brady,	German	Histories,	p.	20.	
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politics,	 Reichskreisen,	 or	 Imperial	 Circles,	 provided	 a	 platform	 for	formal	deliberation	and	 cooperation	on	a	 smaller	 scale.	Adding	 to	 the	complexity	of	the	Rhineland,	the	region	was	in	1512	divided	into	three	
Kreisen	 (the	 Kurrheinischer-,	 Oberrheinischer-,	 and	 Burgundischer	
Reichskreisen).26	The	Kreisen	could	also	be	used	to	give	extra	weight	to	foreign	policy	initiatives.		 A	shared	and	distinct	religious	identity,	 the	Reformation’s	most	important	 contribution	 to	 the	 gradual	 process	 of	 nation	building,	was	by	no	means	present	 in	the	Rhineland.	Whereas	by	1552	Lutheranism	dominated	much	of	 the	Protestant	parts	of	 the	Empire,	 and	Reformed	Protestantism	 posed	 the	 only	 significant	 challenge	 to	 Catholicism	 in	France,	 the	 Rhineland	 was	 confessionally	 much	 more	 diverse.27	The	presence	 of	 the	 three	 ecclesiastical	 Electorates	 ensured	 that	Catholicism	 in	 the	 region	 was	 backed	 up	 by	 significant	 political	 and	military	 muscle.	 Similarly,	 Lutherans	 enjoyed	 the	 patronage	 of	 the	princes	of	Württemberg,	Hesse,	and	before	1560	the	Palatinate.	Despite	their	religious	differences,	the	Protestant	and	Catholic	potentates	of	the	region	 were	 forced	 to	 maintain	 close	 connections,	 both	 formally,	 for	instance	as	part	of	the	Reichskreisen,	and	informally.28	The	Rhineland’s	position	on	the	border	of	France	and	the	Empire	made	it	susceptible	to	religious	 influences	 from	 both	 countries.	 Moreover,	 the	 Rhineland’s	proximity	 to	 Zurich	 contributed	 to	 the	 success	 of	 Reformed	Protestantism.	 Strasbourg	 had	 established	 itself	 as	 one	 of	 the	 most	important	centres	of	the	early	Reformation	and,	though	predominantly	Lutheran,	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	 development	 of	 Reformed	
																																																								26	W.	Dotzauer,	Die	Deutschen	Reichskreise	(1383-1806),	(Stuttgart:	F.	Steiner,	1998).		27	Wallace,	Communities	and	Conflicts,	p.	24.		28	A	good	example	is	Friedrich	III’s	letter	to	the	Electors	of	Trier,	Mainz,	and	Cologne	about	the	threat	of	French	violence	spilling	over	into	their	territories:	Friedrich	III	to	the	Electors	of	Trier,	Mainz,	and	Cologne,	9	February	1569,	A.	Kluckhohn	(ed.),	Briefe	
Friedrich	 des	 Frommen,	 Kurfürsten	 von	 der	 Pfalz,	 mit	 Verwandten	 Schriftstücken,	
Volume	II	(Braunschweig:	C.A.	Schwetschte	und	Sohn,	1870):	p.	292.		
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Protestantism.29	When	 religious	 oppression	 intensified	 in	 France	 and	the	Low	Countries,	the	Rhineland	became	a	logical	place	to	seek	refuge.	Similarly,	many	of	the	Protestant	exiles	from	the	England	of	Mary	Tudor	spent	 time	 in	 the	Rhineland.30	Geographic	proximity	meant	 that	 inter-confessional	 interaction	 and	 even	 cooperation	 could	 not	 be	 avoided.	The	multi-confessional	 environment	 of	 the	Rhineland	 also	made	 it	 an	incubator	 for	 innovative	ways	of	dealing	with	religious	plurality.	 Jesse	Spohnholz,	 for	 instance,	has	demonstrated	how	the	 town	of	Wesel,	on	the	 banks	 of	 the	 Rhine,	 tried	 to	 reconcile	 its	 Catholic,	 Reformed,	 and	Lutheran	 communities	 by	 creating	 a	 multi-confessional	 Eucharistic	ceremony.31 	Despite	 such	 conciliatory	 efforts,	 the	 lack	 of	 religious	uniformity	contributed	to	the	fragmentation	of	the	Rhineland.		 Politically,	 the	 Holy	 Roman	 Empire	 lacked	 the	 uniformity	 and	centralisation	 of	 a	 modern	 nation	 state	 and	 its	 diversity	 was	 most	extreme	 at	 the	 Empire’s	 western	 edge.	32	Just	 like	 the	 Low	 Countries,	the	 part	 of	 the	 Empire	 bordering	 France	 lacked	 the	 conventional	building	 blocks	 for	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 uniform	 national	 or	 regional	identity.	 There	 was	 no	 uniformity	 of	 language,	 politics,	 or	 religion.	Moreover,	 the	 region	 was	 home	 to	 a	 relatively	 large	 and	 influential	population	 of	 immigrants.	 Therefore,	 the	 question	 is	 how,	 lacking	 the	characteristics	of	a	nation,	the	inhabitants	of	the	Empire	in	general,	and	the	Rhineland	in	particular,	regarded	their	own	identity.		 The	 history	 of	 the	 formation	 of	 nations	 and	 national	 identities	has	been	hotly	debated	in	recent	decades.	The	‘modernist	thesis’,	as	the	preeminent	 historian	 of	 nationalism	 Anthony	 D.	 Smith	 christened	 it,	downplayed	 the	 importance	 of	 nationhood	 as	 a	 source	 of	 identity																																																									29	D.	 MacCulloch,	Reformation,	 Europe’s	House	Divided,	 1490-1700	 (London:	 Penguin	Books,	 2004):	 pp.	 183-184;	 M.	 Greengrass,	 The	 French	 Reformation	 (Oxford:	 Basil	Blackwell,	1987):	p.	21.		30	O.	P.	Grell,	 ‘Merchants	and	ministers:	the	foundation	of	 international	Calvinism’,	 in	A.	Pettegree,	A.	Duke,	and	G.	Lewis	(eds.),	Calvinism	in	Europe,	1540-1620	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1994):	pp.	254-273.		31	J.	A.	Spohnholz,	‘Multiconfessional	celebration	of	the	Eucharist	in	sixteenth-century	Wesel’,	The	Sixteenth	Century	Journal,	39	(2008):	705-730.		32	Brady,	German	Histories,	pp.	27-28.		
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before	 the	 Enlightenment.33	Proponents	 of	 this	 position	 remind	 us	 of	the	dominance	of	 local	and	regional	 loyalties	 in	Early	Modern	Europe.	The	term	patria	 (fatherland),	 for	 instance,	was	rarely	used	to	describe	one’s	 country,	 but	 rather	 employed	 to	 refer	 to	 one’s	 hometown	 or	region.34	Similarly,	the	fact	that	the	map	of	Europe	was	to	a	large	extent	shaped	 by	 dynastic	 politics	 rather	 than	 by	 groups	 with	 a	 shared	cultural,	 linguistic,	or	religious	identity	adds	weight	to	the	argument.35	Smith	and	others	challenge	this	thesis.	They	point	towards	states	such	as	 the	 Dutch	 Republic,	 England,	 and	 Scotland	 to	 illustrate	 how	 the	terminology	of	nationalism,	often	attached	to	a	sense	of	divine	election,	was	employed	to	create	cohesion.	In	the	1550s,	however,	England	and	Scotland	 were	 still	 in	 the	 grip	 of	 internal	 religious	 turmoil	 and	 the	Dutch	 Republic	 had	 not	 yet	 been	 established.	 Nonetheless,	 there	 is	evidence	 that	 concepts	 of	 nationhood	 and	 patriotism	 were	 being	developed	in	the	mid-sixteenth	century.	As	the	ideal	of	Christendom,	or	
Corpus	Christianorum,	crumbled	as	a	result	of	the	Reformation,	various	thinkers	 started	 to	 reimagine	 the	 way	 in	 which	 Europe	 could	 be	ordered.36	Language	was	 identified,	 primarily	 by	 linguistically	minded	humanists,	 as	 a	 category	 along	 which	 Europe	 could	 be	 divided	 in	various	 nations.	 In	 France,	 the	 fourteenth	 and	 fifteenth	 centuries	 had	seen	the	slow	rise	of	French	(or	more	precisely,	 the	Langue	d’oïl)	as	a	language	 with	 great	 cultural	 significance.	 It	 was	 attributed	 a	 sacred	quality	 and	 was	 increasingly	 often	 regarded	 as	 both	 reflective	 of	 the	Kingdom	of	France’s	characteristics	and	as	a	 force	binding	 its	subjects	
																																																								33	A.	D.	 Smith,	 ‘Nationalism	 in	Early	Modern	Europe’,	History	and	Theory,	 44	 (2005):	404-415,	on	p.	404.		34	R.	 V.	 Friedeburg,	 ‘In	 defense	 of	 patria:	 resisting	 magistrates	 and	 the	 duties	 of	patriots	in	the	Empire	from	the	1530s	to	the	1640s’,	The	Sixteenth	Century	Journal,	32	(2001):	357-382,	on	p.	358.		35	J.	H.	Elliott,	‘A	Europe	of	composite	monarchies’,	Past	&	Present,	137	(1992):	48-71,	on	p.	51.		36	Duke,	Dissident	 Identities,	 pp.	 18-19;	 A.	 Hadfield,	 Literature,	 Politics,	 and	National	
Identity:	Reformation	to	Renaissance	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1994):	pp.	1-22.		
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together.37	In	reality	the	majority	of	the	Kingdom’s	inhabitants	did	not	speak	 this	particular	 form	of	French	and	there	was	no	move	 to	create	linguistic	uniformity.38	The	use	of	language	as	a	tool	for	defining	nations	was	thus	for	the	most	part	theory	rather	than	reality.	Two	influences	above	all	served	as	a	catalyst	for	the	formation	of	an	 early	 form	 of	 national	 or	 patriotic	 rhetoric.	 The	 first,	 humanism,	provided	new	material	for	discussions	about	the	origins	of	the	people	of	Germany.	 Tracing	 one’s	 national	 or	 dynastic	 history	 to	 the	Biblical	 or	classical	 past	 was	 already	 popular	 in	 the	Middle	 Ages.	 The	 people	 of	France,	 for	 instance,	 were	 said	 to	 descend	 from	 the	 Trojans,	 driven	away	 from	their	 city	after	 its	 fall.	There	was	 less	consensus	about	 the	history	of	 the	Germans.39	Debates	about	origins	were	reinvigorated	by	the	 increasing	 interest	 in	 the	history	of	antiquity,	which	encouraged	a	deeper	 awareness	 of	 the	 pre-Christian	 past	 of	 the	 various	 regions	 of	Europe.	 This	 provided	 a	 basis	 on	 which	 to	 build	 an	 ethnic	understanding	 of	 the	 peoples	 of	 Europe.	 Terms	 such	 as	 Gallia,	
Germania,	 and	 Gallia	 Belgica	 were	 already	 in	 use	 in	 the	 late	 Middle	Ages,	 but	 gained	 in	 popularity	 in	 the	 sixteenth	 century. 40 	In	 the	Netherlands,	the	myth	of	the	Batavi,	a	Germanic	tribe	that	resisted	the	Roman	Empire,	contributed	to	an	increased	feeling	of	cohesion	among	the	Dutch.41	In	Germany,	Tacitus’	Germania	not	only	provided	an	insight	into	the	ancient	history	of	the	Germans,	but	also	satisfied	the	insatiable	demand	 for	classical	 literature.42	It	was	 therefore	 frequently	reprinted																																																									37	C.	 Beaune,	 The	 Birth	 of	 an	 Ideology,	 Myths	 and	 Symbols	 in	 Late-Medieval	 France	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	1991):	p.	267.		38	Ibid,	p.	275.		39	A.	 G.	 Dickens,	 The	 German	 Nation	 and	 Martin	 Luther	 (London:	 Edward	 Arnold,	1974),	p.	23.		40	Duke,	Dissident	Identities,	p.	30.		41 	L.	 Cruz,	 ‘Turning	 Dutch:	 historical	 myths	 in	 Early	 Modern	 Netherlands’,	 The	
Sixteenth	Century	Journal,	39	(2008):	3-22,	on	p.	3;	 J.	 I.	 Israel,	The	Dutch	Republic,	Its	
Rise,	Greatness,	and	Fall	1477-1806	(Oxford:	Clarendon	press,	1995):	p.	57.		42 	H.	 Kloft,	 ‘Die	 Germania	 des	 Tacitus	 und	 das	 Problem	 eines	 deutschen	Nationalbewußtseins’,	Archiv	für	Kulturgeschichte,	72	(1990):	93-114.		
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in	Germany	in	the	late	fifteenth	and	early	sixteenth	centuries.	Moreover,	the	 contents	 of	Germania	 served	 the	 cause	of	 the	 second	 catalyst	 of	 a	German	 national	 consciousness	 -	 the	 Reformation	 -	 well.	 Tacitus’	intention	 when	 writing	 Germania	 was	 not	 so	 much	 to	 chronicle	 the	history	of	the	Germans,	but	rather	to	hold	a	mirror	up	to	the	inhabitants	of	Imperial	Rome.	For	this	purpose,	he	emphasised	the	stark	contrasts	between	the	Germanic	tribes,	who	he	described	as	simple	and	pure,	and	the	decadent	and	corrupt	Romans.43	This	argument	was	soon	exploited	by	 German	 Protestants,	 who	 too	 were	 keen	 to	 contrast	 the	 simple	purity	 of	 their	 Reformation,	 which	 had	 begun	 in	 a	 remote	 town	 in	Germany,	with	the	corruption	of	the	Catholic	hierarchy	based	in	Rome.	Humanism	 and	 the	 Protestant	 Reformation	 thus	 together	 fostered	 an	increased	 awareness	 of	 the	 shared	 characteristics	 of	 the	 German	people.	 It	 is	 important,	 however,	 not	 to	 overstate	 this	 development.	This	 national	 consciousness	 was	 still	 very	 far	 off	 nineteenth	 century	nationalism.	 The	 humanist	 interest	 in	 Tacitus	was	mainly	 confined	 to	the	scholarly	elite.	Moreover,	 there	was	no	clear	definition	of	who	the	Germans	exactly	were.	The	heirs	of	the	tribes	described	by	Tacitus	now	inhabited	 England,	 the	 Netherlands,	 and	 France	 as	 well	 as	 the	 Holy	Roman	Empire.	The	common	ancestry	of	the	French	and	the	Germans,	not	 only	 through	 the	 Germanic	 tribes	 but	 also	 through	 Charlemagne,	did	not	go	unnoticed	and	was	invoked	at	moments	when	their	interests	overlapped.44		 It	is	thus	questionable	to	what	extent	these	linguistic	and	ethnic	definitions	 of	 nationhood	 were	 in	 use	 outside	 intellectual	 circles.	Religion	 as	 a	 catalyst	 for	 the	 creation	 a	 sense	 of	 nationhood	 had	 the	potential	 to	 permeate	 much	 deeper	 throughout	 society.	 The	 biblical	trope	 of	 a	 chosen	 people,	 traditionally	 used	 to	 refer	 to	 the	 Israelites,	could	 easily	 be	 applied	 to	 newly	 Protestant	 populations	 throughout	
																																																								43	Dickens,	The	German	Nation,	p.	36.		44	Babel,	Deutschland	und	Frankreich,	pp.	146	and	150.		
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Europe.45	The	 fact	 that	 the	 renewed	 understanding	 of	 the	message	 of	Christ	originated	in	Germany,	rather	than	in	Rome	or	Jerusalem,	had	the	potential	 to	 increase	 the	 self-consciousness	 of	 the	 German-speaking	inhabitants	 of	 the	 Empire.	 Also	 the	 increased	 availability	 of	 Scripture	and	liturgies	in	the	vernacular	added	to	the	sense	that	one’s	own	nation	occupied	a	special	place	in	God’s	providence.		 Arguably	 the	 most	 powerful	 catalyst	 of	 national	 feeling	 was	negative	 rather	 than	 positive.	 Emphasising	 the	 foreignness	 of	opponents	and	enemies	was	a	commonly	employed	polemical	tool.	The	history	of	sixteenth	century	Europe	is	full	of	examples	of	this	practise.	In	Germany,	propagandists	of	the	Schmalkaldic	League	pointed	out	the	foreignness	of	the	Pope,	the	Emperor	Charles	V,	and	their	Flemish	and	Italian	 troops.46	In	 France,	 opponents	 of	 the	 Guise	 and	 their	 party	emphasised	 that	 the	 family	 was	 in	 fact	 from	 the	 Empire	 rather	 than	from	France,	which	was	made	visible	by	their	blond	hair.47	In	the	Low	Countries,	William	of	Orange,	in	opposition	to	the	influence	of	Cardinal	Granvelle,	complained	that	‘strangers’	should	not	meddle	in	‘affairs	that	concern	 this	 country	 [the	 Netherlands]’.48	This	 opposition	 to	 foreign	influences,	 and	 especially	 strong	 anti-Spanish	 sentiments,	 later	informed	 much	 of	 the	 propaganda	 of	 the	 Dutch	 Revolt. 49 	This	xenophobia,	 illustrated	 by	 these	 examples,	 could	 reinforce	 a	 sense	 of	national	identity.																																																									45	D.	Loades,	‘The	origins	of	English	Protestant	nationalism’,	in	S.	Mews	(ed.),	Religion	
and	 National	 Identity:	 Papers	 Read	 at	 the	 Nineteenth	 Summer	 Meeting	 and	 the	
Twentieth	Winter	Meeting	of	the	Ecclesiastical	History	Society	(Oxford:	Basil	Blackwell,	1982):	pp.	297-307.		46	G.	Haug-Moritz,	 ‘The	Holy	Roman	Empire,	 the	 Schmalkald	League,	 and	 the	 idea	of	confessional	 nation-building’,	 Proceedings	 of	 the	American	Philosophical	 Society,	 152	(2008):	427-439,	on	p.	435.		47	S.	 Carrroll,	 Martyrs	 and	 Murderers,	 The	 Guise	 Family	 and	 the	 Making	 of	 Europe	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2009):	p.	1.		48	‘les	estrangiers	…	quelque	chose	qui	concerne	ce	pais’	William	of	Orange	to	Louis	of	Nassau,	 1	 April	 1566,	 G.	 Groen	 van	 Prinsterer,	 Archives	 ou	 Correspondance	 Inédite	
d’Orange-Nassau,	Volume	II	(Leiden:	Luchtmans,	1835):	p.	75.		49	A.	 Jouanna,	 La	 Saint-Barthélemy,	 Les	Mystères	 d’un	 Crime	 d’État	 (Paris:	 Gallimard,	2007):	 p.	 34;	 B.	 J.	 Kaplan,	 Divided	 by	 Faith,	 Religious	 Conflict	 and	 the	 Practice	 of	
Toleration	in	Early	Modern	Europe	(Cambridge	MA,	The	Belknap	Press,	2007):	p.	108.	
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	 A	closer	look	at	the	use	of	nationalistic	vocabulary	gives	a	similar	impression	about	 the	ambiguities	of	early	modern	 ideas	of	 the	nation.	There	 was	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 use	 of	 terms	 such	 as	 ‘fatherland’	 and	‘patriot’.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 terms	 ‘Patria’	 and	 ‘Vatterlandt’	 denoting	local	 rather	 than	 national	 belonging,	 the	 terms	 ‘communis	patria’	 and	‘gemeinen	Vatterlandt’	 referred	 to	 the	 country	 as	 a	whole.50	Often,	 for	instance	in	France,	the	definition	of	the	communis	patria	was	linked	to	loyalty	to	the	monarch.51	The	language	of	patriotism	was	closely	related	to	these	notions	of	the	common	fatherland.	Amor	Patria,	or	love	for	the	fatherland,	 did	 not	 resemble	 modern	 nationalism	 or	 patriotism,	 but	rather	 denoted	 the	 set	 of	 ‘duties	 and	 virtues	 that	 were	 meant	 to	 be	indispensible	 to,	 and	nourished	by,	 civic	 life’.52	Lutheran	writers,	 such	as	Philip	Melanchthon,	added	the	duty	to	protect	the	true	religion	to	the	list	of	obligations	that	made	up	the	ideal	of	Amor	Patria.53		 In	conclusion,	 it	can	be	argued	that	a	wide	variety	of	influences	shaped	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 inhabitants	 of	 the	 Rhineland	 around	 1550.	Local	 and	 regional	 interests	 and	 loyalties	 were	 certainly	 very	important.	Politically,	the	most	dominant	power	brokers	were	regional	rulers	or,	 in	 large	urban	centres,	 the	city	government.	Much	economic	activity	was	also	regional,	although	the	Rhine	encouraged	national	and	international	trade.	Local	culture,	customs,	and	linguistic	diversity	also	disrupted	 any	 sense	 of	 national	 cohesion.	 The	 protection	 of	 local	 and	regional	rights	and	privileges	was	a	constant	concern.	The	proximity	to	France,	 the	 Swiss	 Cantons,	 and	 the	 Low	 Countries	 ensured	 the	 cross-border	 exchange	 of	 goods,	 people,	 and	 ideas.	 However,	 in	 contrast	 to	these	 previously	 mentioned	 influences,	 religious	 and	 intellectual																																																									50	A.	 Duke,	 ‘From	 king	 and	 country	 to	 king	 or	 country?	 Loyalty	 and	 treason	 in	 the	Revolt	of	the	Netherlands’,	Transactions	of	the	Royal	Historical	Society,	32	(1982):	113-135,	on	p.	125.		51	Duke,	‘From	king	and	country	to	king	or	country?,	p.	123.		52 	R.	 von	 Friedeburg,	 ‘”Lands”	 and	 “Fatherlands”.	 Changes	 in	 the	 plurality	 of	allegiances	 in	the	sixteenth-century	Holy	Roman	Empire’,	 in	R.	Stein	and	J.	Pollmann	(eds.),	Networks,	Regions	and	Nations,	Shaping	 Identities	 in	 the	Low	Countries	 ,	1300-
1650	(Leiden:	Brill,	2010):	pp.	263-282.		53	von	Friedeburg,	‘”Lands”	and	“Fatherlands”,	p.	272.	
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developments	encouraged	a	closer	association	with	one’s	 country	and	nation.	 A	 significant	 proportion	 of	 the	 Rhinelanders	 must	 have	 been	aware	of	being	an	 integral	part	of	 the	Holy	Roman	Empire	and	of	 the	German	 Nation.	 The	 reformation	 of	 religion	 not	 only	 caused	confessional	diversification	in	the	localities,	but	also	facilitated	a	feeling	of	 connection	 to	 coreligionists	 throughout	 the	 Empire	 and	 Europe.	However,	a	sense	of	attachment	to	the	German	nation	was	only	one	of	the	 many	 factors	 that	 formed	 the	 identity	 of	 a	 sixteenth	 century	Rhinelander.	
	
1.2	The	international	identity	of	the	high	nobility	
	As	 illustrated	 by	 the	 text	 of	 the	 Wilhelmus,	 the	 set	 of	 loyalties	 and	belongings	 that	 formed	 the	 identity	 of	 a	member	 of	 the	 high	 nobility	could	 be	 particularly	 complex.	 Besides	 their	 obvious	 attachment	 to	their	 own	 territories,	 and	 to	 the	 Empire,	 the	 German	 princes	 were	above	all	members	of	a	European	class.	As	will	be	demonstrated	here,	their	 social	 and	 familial	 ties,	 possessions,	 education,	 language	 skills,	cultural	 identity,	 and	 professional	 and	 political	 engagements	transcended	the	Empire’s	borders.		
1.2.1	Territories	and	family	connections		Although	the	majority	of	 the	princes	discussed	 in	 this	 thesis	primarily	possessed	 lands	 in	 the	 German	 speaking	 part	 of	 the	 Empire,	 the	territorial	 claims	 and	 ambitions	 of	 the	 aristocratic	 families	 of	 the	sixteenth	century	were	by	no	means	restricted	by	the	Empire’s	borders.	The	most	obvious	example	of	a	family	with	transnational	possessions	is	the	 House	 of	 Nassau.	 Although	 the	 family	 seat	 was	 situated	 in	Dillenburg,	 roughly	70	kilometres	northeast	 of	 the	Rhine,	 the	 family’s	most	 lucrative	 and	 important	 possessions	 were	 positioned	 in	 Dutch-	
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and	 French-speaking	 regions. 54 	The	 foundations	 of	 the	 family’s	prominence	 in	 the	 Low	 Countries	 and	 France	 were	 laid	 a	 generation	before	William	of	Orange	became	 the	head	of	 the	 family.	By	marrying	Claudia	 de	Chalon,	Heinrich	 III	 of	Nassau,	 uncle	 of	William	of	Orange,	acquired	significant	possessions	 in	France	and	 the	Francophone	areas	of	 the	 Empire,	 such	 as	 the	 Franche-Comté.55	When	 these	 possessions,	including	the	principality	of	Orange	in	the	south	of	France,	passed	to	the	young	 William	 of	 Nassau	 in	 1544,	 his	 lands	 included	 among	 others	Nassau	and	Katzelnbogen	on	 the	Rhine,	Breda	and	Vianen	 in	 the	Low	Countries,	 Chalon-Arlay	 and	 Besançon	 in	 the	 Franche-Comté,	 and	 the	principality	 of	 Orange	 in	 Provence.56	Moreover,	 the	 inheritance	 also	included	the	Hôtel	d’Orange	in	Paris.57		 The	 house	 of	Orange-Nassau	was	 not	 the	 only	 European	 noble	family	 with	 lands,	 influence,	 and	 interests	 that	 transcended	 borders.	The	houses	of	Lorraine,	Montmorency,	Croÿ,	Arenberg,	and	Egmont	are	only	 a	 few	 examples	 of	 aristocratic	 families	 that	 owned	 counties	 or	duchies	 in	 France	 and	 the	 Empire. 58 	Other	 noble	 houses,	 whose	dynastic	 heartlands	were	 located	 in	German	 speaking	 territories,	 also	had	possessions	in	the	Francophone	lands	bordering	France.	The	Dukes	of	Württemberg,	for	instance,	were	also	counts	of	Montbéliard,	a	county	situated	150	kilometres	east	of	Dijon.59	Many	families	who	did	not	own																																																									54	A.	 Duke,	 ‘From	 “loyal	 servant”	 to	 “irreconcilable	 opponent”	 of	 Spain:	 Koenraad	Swart’s	 interpretation	 of	 William	 of	 Orange,	 1533-72’,	 in	 K.	 W.	 Swart,	 William	 of	
Orange	and	the	Revolt	of	 the	Netherlands	 (Aldershot:	Ashgate,	 2003):	 pp.	 8-25,	 on	p.	13.		55	K.	Eiler,	‘Nassau,	Grafen’	Neue	Deutsche	Biography,	18	(1996):	738-740.		56	Duke,	‘From	“loyal	servant”	to	“irreconcilable	opponent”,	p.	13.		57 	Jean-Philippe	 of	 Salm	 to	 William	 of	 Orange,	 June	 1559,	 N.	 Japikse	 (ed.),	
Correspondentie	van	Willem	den	Eerste,	Prins	van	Oranje	(The	Hague:	Martinus	Nijhoff,	1934):	pp.	168-169.		58	G.	 Guillaume,	 ‘Philippe	 II	 de	 Croy’,	 in	 Biographie	 Nationale,	 Volume	 IV	 (Brussels:	Thiry,	 1878):	 pp.	 537-540;	 L.	 P.	 Gachard,	 ‘Jean	 de	 Ligne,	 Comte	 Arenberg’,	 in	
Biographie	 Nationale,	 Volume	 I	 (Brussels:	 Thiry,	 1866):	 pp.	 368-380;	 T.	 Jusse,	‘Lamoral,	 comte	 d’Egmont’,	 in	 Biographie	 Nationale,	 Volume	 VI	 (Brussels:	 Bruylant-Christope,	1878):	pp.	490-510.		59 	R.	 Uhland,	 ‘Christoph,	 Herzog	 von	 Württemberg’,	 Neue	 Deutsche	 Biography,	 3	(1957):	248-249.	
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territory	 outside	 the	 German	 speaking	 part	 of	 the	 Empire	 had	 either	done	 so	 in	 the	 past,	 or	 had	 the	 ambition	 to	 do	 so	 in	 the	 future.	 The	house	 of	 Wittelsbach,	 one	 of	 Germany’s	 most	 powerful	 aristocratic	families,	besides	providing	the	rulers	of	the	Palatinate	and	Bavaria,	had	also	previously	ruled	land	both	west	and	east	of	Germany,	including	the	counties	of	Holland,	Zeeland,	and	Hainaut,	and	 the	prince-bishopric	of	Liège.60	The	make-up	 of	 the	 possessions	 of	 an	 aristocratic	 family	was	ever	changing.	Marriages	often	led	to	territory	changing	hands	as	part	of	 the	 dowry.	 New	 titles	 and	 land	 could	 also	 be	 acquired	 through	service	 to	 a	 foreign	 monarch.	 Count	 Wilhelm	 of	 Fürstenberg,	 a	celebrated	mercenary	captain,	not	only	lost	his	possessions	in	Germany	as	a	result	of	his	service	 to	Francis	 I,	but	also	gained	 land	 in	France.61	Similarly,	 the	 Duke	 of	 Saxe-Weimar	 was	 promised	 the	 city	 and	seigneurie	of	Châtillon	as	a	reward	for	his	service	to	Henry	II.62		
1.2.2	Education	and	language	skills		The	 internationality	 of	 the	 German	 princes	 is	 also	 reflected	 in	 their	education.	 In	 the	 sixteenth	 century,	 significant	 changes	 were	 taking	place	 in	 the	way	young	noblemen	were	educated.	 In	 the	 late	 fifteenth	century,	 the	nobility	was	often	scorned	for	their	 ignorance	and	lack	of	learning.63	Changes	in	the	roles	noblemen	were	expected	to	fulfil,	which	increasingly	 included	 advisory,	 administrative,	 and	 diplomatic	 tasks,	made	 changes	 in	 the	 upbringing	 of	 young	 aristocrats	 necessary.	Although	 levels	 of	 education	 differed	 from	 nobleman	 to	 nobleman,	 a																																																									60 	C.	 Häutle,	 Genealogie	 des	 Erlauchten	 Stammhauses	 Wittelsbach	 von	 dessen	
Wiedereinsetzung	in	das	Herzogthum	Bayern	(11.	Sept.	1180)	bis	Herab	auf	Unsere	Tage	(Munich:	Hermann	Manzshe,	1870).		61	D.	 Potter,	 Renaissance	 France	 at	 War:	 Armies,	 Culture,	 and	 Society,	 c.	 1480-1560	(Woodbridge:	The	Boydell	Press,	2008):	p.	137.		62 	F.	 W.	 Barthold,	 Deutschland	 und	 die	 Hugenotten,	 Geschichte	 des	 Einflusses	 der	
Deutschen	 auf	 Frankreichs	 Kirkliche	 und	 Bürgerliche	 Verhältnisse	 von	 der	 Zeit	 des	
Schmalkaldischen	Bundes	bis	zum	Geseze	von	Nantes,	1531-1598	 (Bremen,	Verlag	von	Franz	Schlodtmann,	1848):	p.	232.		63	J.	 H.	 Hexter,	 ‘The	 education	 of	 the	 aristocracy	 in	 the	 Renaissance’,	The	 Journal	 of	
Modern	History,	22	(1950):	1-20.	
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general	 pattern	 can	 be	 identified.	 The	 upbringing	 of	 a	 German	 prince	characteristically	 consisted	 of	 an	 academic	 component	 and	 an	apprenticeship-like	 practical	 training.	 Despite	 the	 prevailing	 attitude	that	 book-learning	 was	 unbecoming	 of	 the	 nobility,	 who	 were	traditionally	responsible	for	the	martial	rather	than	the	organisational	and	administrative	side	of	ruling,	the	sons	of	the	German	princes	were	now	 taught	 the	 skills	 of	 a	 scholar	 either	 by	 a	 private	 tutor	 or	 at	university.64	An	increasing	appreciation	of	the	importance	of	education,	both	primary	and	higher,	and	the	rise	of	humanism	at	the	courts	of	the	Imperial	 princes	 contributed	 to	 this	 trend.	 The	 Elector	 Palatine	Friedrich	 III,	 Johann	 Wilhelm	 of	 Saxe-Weimar,	 and	 Philip	 of	 Hesse	founded	or	invested	heavily	in	the	universities	of	Heidelberg,	Jena,	and	Marburg	 respectively.65	Duke	 Christoph	 of	 Württemberg,	 recognising	the	use	of	education	for	religious	reform,	personally	involved	himself	in	the	 educational	 restructuring	 of	 his	 territories,	 creating	 a	 two-tiered	system	of	German	and	Latin	education	available	throughout	his	lands.66	Orange’s	father,	Wilhelm	of	Nassau,	influenced	by	Melanchthon’s	views	on	education,	also	founded	Latin	schools	in	his	county.67		 Enrolling	 in	 universities	 was	 becoming	 increasingly	 popular	among	 the	 nobility.	 The	 aim	 for	 these	 young	 aristocrats	 was	 not	 to	graduate,	 but	 rather	 to	 acquire	 academic	 knowledge	 informally.68	At	university,	 aristocrats	 became	 part	 of	 a	 quintessentially	 international	community.	 Although	 the	 foundation	 of	 a	 large	 number	 of	 new	universities	 in	 the	 late	 fifteenth	and	early	 sixteenth	centuries	ensured																																																									64	P.	 N.	 Siegel,	 ‘English	 humanism	 and	 the	 new	 Tudor	 aristocracy’,	 Journal	 of	 the	
History	of	Ideas,	13	(1952):	450-468,	on	p.	455.		65	W.	Rüegg	(ed.),	Geschichte	der	Universität	in	Europa,	Volume	II	 (Munich:	C.	H.	Beck,	1996):	p.	57.		66	C.	Methuen,	 ‘Securing	 the	Reformation	 through	 education:	 The	duke’s	 scholarship	system	of	sixteenth-century	Wurttemberg’,	The	Sixteenth	Century	Journal,	25	(1994):	841-451;	L.	C.	Green,	 ‘The	Bible	 in	 sixteenth-century	humanist	 education’,	Studies	 in	
the	Renaissance,	19	(1572):	112-134.		67	M.	E.	H.	N.	Mout,	‘Het	intellectuele	milieu	van	Willem	van	Oranje’,	BMGN,	99	(1984):	596-625,	on	p.	601.		68	Grendler,	The	universities	of	the	Renaissance,	p.	26.		
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the	availability	of	a	centre	of	education	nearby,	 it	was	still	common	to	pursue	 one’s	 higher	 education	 further	 afield.	 This	 was	 also	 true	 for	young	noblemen.	Despite	the	fact	that	the	newly	founded	university	of	Marburg	was	only	 forty	kilometres	away	from	their	ancestral	home	in	Dillenburg,	Orange	nonetheless	sent	his	brothers	to	the	universities	of	Leuven	and	Wittenberg.69	In	 the	Palatinate,	noble	 families	often	 chose	to	 send	 their	 sons	 to	 universities	 in	 France	 rather	 than	 to	 their	 own	university	 in	Heidelberg.70	Consequently,	 there	was	a	marked	 increase	in	the	numbers	of	German	students	at	French	universities.	Felix	Platter	from	 Basel	 was	 not	 only	 surprised	 by	 the	 number	 of	 other	 German	students	 he	 encountered	 at	 the	 university	 of	 Orléans	 –	 he	 counted	between	 two	 and	 three	 hundred	 –	 but	 also	 by	 the	 large	 number	 of	noblemen	among	them.71	The	prominent	presence	of	German	nobles	at	French	universities	is	illustrated	by	the	fact	that	the	German	Nation	at	Orléans	was	exempted	by	royal	proclamation	from	the	ban	on	carrying	a	 sword,	 the	 traditional	 hallmark	 of	 a	 nobleman.72	The	 attraction	 of	famous	 scholars	 was	 one	 part	 of	 the	 reasoning	 behind	 the	 choice	 to	study	abroad.	Orange,	 for	 instance,	 chose	Leuven	as	university	 for	his	son	 Philip	William	 because	 of	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 classicist	 Cornelius	Valerius.73	Another	 reason	 for	 choosing	universities	 further	afield	was	that	 it	 provided	 excellent	 opportunities	 for	 networking.	 The	 young	aristocrats	 from	 the	 Palatinate,	 for	 instance,	 at	 the	 universities	 of	France	 encountered	 members	 of	 the	 great	 French	 noble	 families.74	
																																																								69	Mout,	‘Het	intellectuele	milieu	van	Willem	van	Oranje’,	p.	603.		70	B.	 Vogler,	 ‘Le	 role	 des	 électeurs	 Palatins	 dans	 les	 Guerres	 de	 Religion	 en	 France	(1559-1592)’,	Cahiers	d’Histoire,	 10	 (1965):	 51-85,	 on	p.	 52;	B.	Vogler,	 ‘Les	 contacts	culturels	entre	Huguenots	français	et	Protestants	palatins	au	16e		siècle’,	Bulletin	de	la	
Société	de	l’Histoire	du	Protestantisme	Français,	115	(1969):	29-42,	on	p.	30.		71	Babel,	Deutschland	und	Frankreich,	p.	114.		72	Ibid,	p.	115.		73	Mout,	‘Het	intellectuele	milieu	van	Willem	van	Oranje’,	p.	603.		74	Hexter,	‘The	education	of	the	aristocracy’,	p.	10.		
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These	 contacts	 could	 be	 valuable	 building	 blocks	 of	 transnational	patronage	and	clientage	networks.		 An	 alternative	 to	 university	 education	was	 the	 employment	 of	private	 tutors. 75 	This	 was	 the	 alternative	 for	 those	 nobles	 who	preferred	 to	maintain	 a	 distance	 between	 the	 old	 aristocracy	 and	 the	gentlemen	and	clerics	who	made	up	most	of	the	student	body.	Private	tutors	also	taught	young	aristocrats	who	did	not	have	the	opportunity	to	 spend	 a	 prolonged	 period	 of	 time	 in	 a	 university	 city.	 This	 private	tuition	 was	 often	 combined	 with	 the	 second	 component	 of	 a	 noble’s	education;	a	practice	that	can	best	be	described	as	an	apprenticeship.	At	the	 court	 of	 a	 befriended	noble	 house,	 young	noblemen	 learned,	 both	through	 instruction	and	by	actively	 taking	part	 in	court	 life,	 the	social	and	 political	 skills	 expected	 from	 aristocrats.	 Moreover,	 the	 young	noblemen	 had	 the	 opportunity	 to	 establish	 close	 relationships	 with	their	 host	 families	 and	 others	 at	 court.	 The	 marriage	 of	 Philibert	 of	Baden	 and	 Mechthild,	 daughter	 of	 Wilhelm	 of	 Bavaria,	 with	 whom	Philibert	spent	a	part	of	his	childhood,	 is	 illustrative	of	 the	potentially	lasting	 nature	 of	 these	 contacts. 76 	These	 apprenticeships	 often	reinforced	the	international	connections	of	the	young	noblemen,	either	by	 bringing	 them	 into	 contact	 with	 peers	 from	 abroad,	 or	 by	 giving	them	 the	 opportunity	 to	 spend	 time	 abroad	 themselves.	 Christoph	 of	Württemberg	 spent	 a	 large	 part	 of	 his	 childhood	 first	 at	 the	 Imperial	court	in	Innsbruck,	then	travelling	throughout	Europe	in	the	entourage	of	 Charles	V,	 and	 finally	 at	 the	 court	 of	 France.77	In	 France,	 Christoph	behaved	 very	 much	 like	 a	 French	 courtier	 and	 even	 took	 part	 in	 a	number	of	French	military	campaigns,	serving	in	the	army	of	the	King.78	Elector	 Palatine	 Friedrich	 III	 too	 spent	 a	 significant	 part	 of	 his	 youth																																																									75	An	example	of	this	practice	is	the	private	tuition	given	to	Christoph	of	Württemberg	by	 Michael	 Tiffernus.	 M.	 Langsteiner,	 Für	 Land	 und	 Lutherum:	 die	 Politik	 Herzog	
Christophs	von	Württemberg	(1550-1568)	(Cologne:	Böhlau	Verlag,	2008):	p.	13.		76	A.	Krieger,	‘Philibert,	Markgraf	von	Baden-Baden’	in	Allgemeine	Deutsche	Biography,	
Volume	XXV	(Leipzig:	Duncker	&	Humblot,	1887):	pp.	739-741.		77	Langsteiner,	Für	Land	und	Lutherum,	pp.	13-14.		78	Ibid,	p.	14.		
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abroad,	 living	 at	 the	 French	 courts	 in	 Paris	 and	 Nancy	 and	 at	 the	Habsburg	court	in	Brussels.79	From	the	age	of	eleven,	William	of	Orange	was	raised	at	the	cosmopolitan	court	 in	Brussels,	 the	political	heart	of	Charles	 V’s	 large	 and	 extremely	 diverse	 domains.80	There	 he	 not	 only	built	 up	 a	 close	 relationship	 with	 the	 Emperor,	 but	 met	 aristocrats,	diplomats,	artists,	and	other	courtiers	from	all	corners	of	the	Habsburg	patrimony,	including	his	future	enemies	the	Duke	of	Alba	and	Cardinal	Granvelle.	 His	 father,	 recognising	 the	 value	 of	 connections	 at	 such	 an	important	 political	 centre,	 sent	 his	 third	 son,	 Louis,	 to	 live	 with	 his	older	 brother	 in	 Brussels. 81 	Spending	 time	 away	 from	 home	 was	common	 practice.	 Those	 who	 did	 not	 go	 to	 university,	 or	 lived	 at	 a	friendly	 ruler’s	 court,	 sometimes	 stayed	 with	 renowned	 academics.	Wilhelm,	the	eldest	son	of	Philipp	of	Hesse,	spent	time	at	the	Strasbourg	residence	of	Johann	Winter,	a	famous	scholar	of	medicine.82		 As	 a	 result	 of	 this	 educational	 practice,	 combining	 academic	learning	with	 the	acquisition	of	practical	experience	away	 from	home,	the	princes	of	the	Empire	were	on	the	whole	multilingual.	Since	the	late	Middle	 Ages,	 French	 had	 grown	 in	 importance	 as	 a	 language	 of	 the	German	 nobility.83	The	 type	 of	 French	 spoken	 by	 the	 aristocracy	 was	the	French	of	the	court	in	Paris	and	contrasted	strongly	with	the	many	regional	 and	 local	 dialects	 and	 languages	 that	 were	 spoken	 in	 most	parts	 of	 the	 country.	 The	 fact	 that	 the	 princes	 did	 not	 speak	 Low	German,	Alsatian,	or	Franc-Comtois	–	the	languages	of	the	regions	they	controlled	–	but	High	German	and	French	signified	their	belonging	to	an	international	 elite.	 Then,	 as	 now,	 French	 was	 regarded	 as	 a	 civilised	
																																																								79 	V.	 Press,	 Calvinismus	 und	 Territorialstaat,	 Regierung	 und	 Zentralbehörden	 der	
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language;	it	was	described	as	 ‘noble,	gracious,	elegant,	and	polished’.84	It	had	been	the	language	of	the	social	elite	of	England,	Germany,	and	the	Low	 Countries	 for	 centuries.85	Moreover,	 the	 princes	 mastered	 these	languages	to	be	able	to	function	in	an	international	environment,	not	to	converse	 with	 their	 subjects.	 The	 emphasis	 on	 learning	 multiple	languages	 is	best	 illustrated	 in	a	 letter	sent	by	 Jean	de	Ligne,	count	of	Arenberg,	 to	 Albrecht	 of	 Bayern,	 who	 had	 hosted	 Ligne’s	 son.	 Ligne	writes	that	since	his	son	‘only	knows	the	German	and	French	language’	and	since	‘the	royal	majesty	[the	king]	of	Spain,	my	most	gracious	lord,	rules	 and	 owns	 many	 and	 diverse	 realms	 and	 lands	 with	 different	languages,	such	as	Italy,	Spain,	and	more’	he	decided	‘to	sent	[his]	son	to	Italy	to	learn	the	language.’86	The	fact	that	it	is	suggested	here	that	mere	bilingualism	 is	 not	 enough	 is	 telling.	 A	 quick	 survey	 of	 the	 language	skills	 of	 the	 princes	 studied	 in	 this	 thesis	 reveals	 that	 knowledge	 of	three	 or	 more	 languages	 was	 indeed	 the	 norm.	 Christoph	 of	Württemberg,	besides	his	native	German,	learned	Latin	and	Greek	from	Michael	Tiffernus	at	Innsbruck	and	French	at	the	court	of	Francis	I	and	Henry	 II.87	Friedrich	 III	 also	 learned	 perfect	 French	 in	 Paris.	 Besides	French	and	German,	he	had	and	‘average’	command	of	Latin.88	William	of	Orange	spoke,	with	varying	degrees	of	fluency,	German,	French,	and	Latin,	and	possibly	also	Spanish,	Italian,	and	a	little	Dutch.89	Wilhelm	of	Hesse	 learned	 German,	 Latin,	 and	 Greek	 at	 home,	 and	 French	 in	Strasbourg.90	As	 Ligne	 suggests	 in	 his	 letter,	 his	 son	 was	 expected	 to																																																									84	Beaune,	The	Birth	of	an	Ideology,	p.	270.		85	Ibid,	271.		86	‘…	 kennen	 den	 allain	 teutscher	 und	 franzosischer	 sprachen…’	 ‘…	 den	 Ku.	Matt	 zu	Hispannien	meinen	allen	gnedigster	her	allerhande	und	viellerley	Reichen	und	landen	und	 diverssen	 sprachen,	 als	 italia,	 Hispania	 und	mehr	 andern	 herscht	 und	 besizt…’	‘Sohn	…	in	italia	die	sprache	…	zu	lernen	abzuferzigen	…’	Jean	de	Ligne	to	Albrecht	of	Bavaria,	28	April	1565,	Arenbergarchief,	Edingen.		87	Langsteiner,	Für	Land	und	Lutherum,	pp.	13-14.		88	‘mittelmäßig’	Press,	Calvinismus	und	Territorialstaat,	p.	223.		89	Mout,	‘Het	intellectuele	milieu	van	Willem	van	Oranje’,	pp.	601-602.		90	Ribbeck,	‘Wilhelm	IV’,	p.	32.	
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engage	 in	 a	 political	 and	 social	 world	 that	 was	 not	 confined	 by	 the	borders	 of	 the	 Low	 Countries,	 or	 even	 of	 the	 Empire.	 In	 order	 to	 act	successfully	 on	 this	 European	 stage,	 a	 good	 knowledge	 of	 a	 range	 of	languages	was	required.	It	is	also	worth	noting	that	proficiency	in	Latin,	the	 traditional	 lingua	 franca	 of	 Western	 Europe,	 was	 not	 deemed	sufficient.	 If	a	noble’s	 language	skills	were	primarily	 intended	to	serve	diplomatic	 purposes,	 Latin,	 also	 the	 language	 of	 official,	 legal	 and	diplomatic	documents,	would	have	sufficed.	However,	 as	we	shall	 see,	interaction	 with	 peers	 abroad,	 both	 in	 formal	 and	 informal	 settings,	formed	 an	 important	 part	 of	 an	 aristocrat’s	 network.	 The	 ability	 to	express	oneself	in	a	variety	of	languages,	ideally	with	elegance	and	wit,	significantly	improved	the	quality	of	such	interaction.		 	
1.2.3	International	networks	of	sociability		Networks	 of	 sociability	 were	 in	 the	 first	 place	 established	 and	reinforced	 at	 important	 events	 bringing	 together	 aristocrats	 from	 the	Empire	 and	 beyond.	 The	 Imperial	 Diets	 provided	 a	 formal	 context	 in	which	the	princes	could	meet	and	interact	politically,	but	also	socially.	The	 sixteenth	 century	 was	 an	 extraordinarily	 active	 period	 for	 such	events;	 there	 was	 on	 average	 a	 Diet	 every	 three	 years.	 Political	necessity	also	brought	aristocrats	together	at	conventions	and	colloquy	called	 to	 address	 specific	 problems.	 Such	 summit	 meetings	 were	 not	only	important	for	facilitating	formal	deliberation,	but	also	for	bringing	together	noblemen	in	the	same	location.	Behind	the	scenes,	connections	were	laid,	friendships	formed,	and	alliances	forged.		 The	 sixteenth	 century	 was	 a	 golden	 age	 for	 pageantry.	Spectacular	 and	 ostentatious	 displays	 of	 magnificence	 were	 at	 once	entertainment,	 self-promotion,	 and	politics	 statements.	 Taking	part	 in	tournaments,	 joyous	 entries,	 or	 similar	 spectacles	 was	 a	 way	 of	demonstrating	 or	 reaffirming	 one’s	 noble	 status	 and	 position	 in	 the	hierarchy	 of	 Europe’s	 elite.	 Disputes	 between	 aristocrats	 about	 the	order	of	processions	or	the	seating	arrangements	at	banquets	illustrate	
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the	 importance	 of	 such	 occasions.91	Early-modern	 pageantry	 invoked	both	 chivalric	 culture	 and	 a	 Renaissance	 obsession	 with	 Classical	antiquity.	 Tournaments,	 both	 the	 joust	 and	 melee,	 remained	 very	popular.92	A	 list	 of	 competitors	 in	 tournaments	 held	 at	 the	 Habsburg	courts	 reveals	 the	 cosmopolitanism	 of	 such	 events.93	The	 large-scale	mock-battles	 that	were	 frequently	 staged	 brought	 together	 noblemen	from	 the	 Low	 Countries,	 Germany,	 Spain,	 Italy,	 and	 France.	 As	 a	prominent	member	of	the	Brussels	court,	William	of	Orange	appears	on	the	list,	 leading	a	band	of	 ‘adventurers’	at	a	tournament	in	Antwerp	in	September	 1549.94	In	 the	 international	 setting	 of	 large	 tournaments,	German	 princes	 often	 took	 centre	 stage.	 In	 February	 1564,	 the	Rhinegrave	 Jean-Philippe	 of	 Salm	 was	 one	 of	 the	 central	 figures	 at	 a	tournament	at	Fontainebleau,	leading	one	of	the	two	competing	parties	of	knights.95	It	is	also	safe	to	assume	that	Christoph	of	Württemberg	and	Friedrich	III	would	have	taken	part	in	such	spectacles	during	their	time	at	the	French	court.	Baptisms,	weddings,	 and	 funerals	 too	were	 occasions	 at	which	the	 aristocracy	 came	 together.	 A	 particularly	 striking	 example	 is	 the	marriage	celebrations	of	Wilhelm	V	of	Bavaria	and	Renata,	the	daughter	of	 François	 de	 Lorraine	 and	 Christina	 of	 Denmark,	 in	 February	 1568,	which	 lasted	 eighteen	 days	 and	 in	 which	 dignitaries	 and	 aristocrats	from	 around	 Europe	 participated.	96	This	 event	 was	 more	 than	 just	 a	celebration	 in	 serving	 as	 an	 important	 occasion	 to	 make	 public	statements.	Through	a	combination	of	medieval	pageantry	and	heraldry																																																									91	R.	A.	Jackson,	‘Peers	of	France	and	Princes	of	the	Blood’,	French	Historical	Studies,	7	(1971):	27-46,	on	p.	36.		92	R.	J.	Knecht,	The	French	Renaissance	Court,	1483-1589	(New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	2008):	pp.	87-91.		93	B.	 Frieder,	Chivalry	and	 the	Perfect	Prince	 (Kirksvill	MO:	 Truman	 State	 University	Press,	2008),	pp.	187-212.		94	Ibid,	p.	205.		95	R.	 J.	 Knecht,	Hero	or	Tyrant?	Henry	 II,	King	of	France,	1574-89	 (Farnham:	Ashgate,	2014),	p.	15.		96	A.	 L.	 Thomas,	A	House	Divided,	Wittelsbach	Confessional	Court	Cultures	 in	 the	Holy	
Roman	Empire,	1550-1650	(Leiden:	Brill,	2010),	pp.	150-151.	
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and	 identifications	 with	 heroic	 characters	 from	 classical	 antiquity,	noble	houses	underlined	both	their	international	importance	and	their	political	 independence.	 The	 audience	 of	 these	 statements	 consisted	primarily	of	other	aristocrats,	princes,	and	monarchs.	These	occasions	thus	 served	 as	 moments	 at	 which	 the	 relationships	 between	 peers	could	be	established,	explicitly	and	 implicitly,	 formally	and	 informally.	They	 therefore	 lay	 at	 the	 foundation	 of	 international	 networks	 of	aristocratic	sociability.		 The	importance	and	longevity	of	these	networks	shines	through	in	 the	 correspondences	 of	 the	 high	 nobility.	 Letters	 contain	 evidence	both	of	 contact	 in	person	and	of	 the	maintenance	of	 social	 ties	over	a	long	 distance.	 Many	 noblemen	 and	 women	 spent	 a	 considerable	proportion	 of	 their	 lives	 on	 the	 road.	 Travelling	 between	 different	estates,	 the	 attendance	 of	 family	 events,	 and	 important	 political	gatherings	 all	 required	 them	 to	 spend	 time	 away	 from	 their	 primary	residences.97	This	 habit	 of	 travelling	 was	 so	 widespread	 among	 the	nobility	 that	 it	 became	 common	 practice	 to	 expect	 peers	 throughout	Europe	to	offer	bed	and	board,	even	when	arriving	unannounced.	Large	noble	 households	 ‘received	 noble	 guests	 on	 virtually	 a	 daily	 basis.’98	Travelling	 provided	 ample	 opportunity	 for	 the	 expansion	 and	maintenance	 of	 international	 social	 networks.	 William	 of	 Orange	 not	only	maintained	a	large	network	of	correspondence,	exchanging	letters	with	 the	high	nobility	 and	monarchs	of	 the	Empire,	 France,	Denmark,	Spain,	 and	 Italy,	 but	 also	 regularly	 made	 long	 journeys,	 including	 to	France	in	1559	and	to	the	German	part	of	the	Empire	in	1561.99	When	preparing	for	such	a	journey,	Orange	sometimes	planned	his	travels	in	such	a	way	 that	he	could	pass	 the	residences	of	a	number	of	different																																																									97	Juliana	of	Nassau	 to	William	of	Orange,	6	April	1560,	 Japikse,	Correspondentie	van	
Willem	den	Eerste,	pp.	350-351.		98	K.	 B.	 Neuschel,	 ‘Noble	 households	 in	 the	 sixteenth	 century:	 material	 settings	 and	human	communities’,	French	Historical	Studies,	15	(1988):	595-622,	on	p.	605.		99	William	of	Orange	to	William	of	Nassau,	2	September	1559,	Japikse,	Correspondentie	
van	Willem	 den	 Eerste,	 p.	 84;	 Eric	 of	 Brunswick-Calenberg	 to	 William	 of	 Orange,	 9	August	1561,	Ibid,	p.	276.		
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peers,	even	if	they	were	situated	fairly	far	apart.	In	the	summer	of	1561,	for	 instance,	 he	 made	 arrangements	 to	 pass	 both	 the	 Duke	 of	Brunswick-Calenberg	 in	 Hamelin	 and	 his	 ‘beloved	 and	 dear	 cousin’	Wilhelm,	 Duke	 of	 Jülich-Kleve,	 in	 Düsseldorf.100	Contacts	 established	during	 travels	 could	 be	 further	 developed	 in	 correspondence	 and	through	 gift	 giving.	 In	 a	 letter	 written	 in	 1552,	 for	 instance,	 Mary	 of	Hungary	remembered	 fondly	her	visit	of	 the	residence	of	Christoph	of	Württemberg,	 and	 especially	 his	 aviary.	 To	 thank	 Christoph	 for	 his	hospitality,	she	sent	the	duke	a	gift	of	three	birds	of	prey.101		 Mary’s	 choice	 of	 gift	 is	 significant.	 As	Natalie	 Zemon	Davis	 has	demonstrated,	 the	 practise	 of	 gift	 giving	 was	 used	 to	 establish	 and	reinforce	the	status	of	both	giver	and	recipient.102	Although	the	rhetoric	of	nobility	emphasised	the	permanence	and	exclusivity	of	the	class,	for	instance	 through	a	 focus	on	 the	ancient	 lineages	of	noble	 families,	 the	reality	was	different.	The	distinction	between	the	lower	echelons	of	the	nobility	 and	members	 of	 the	 third	 order	was	 very	 unclear.	 Old	 noble	families	 could	 disappear	 or	 lose	 their	 distinct	 position	 in	 society	 and	new	 families	 entered	 the	 ranks	of	 the	nobility,	 for	 instance	by	buying	titles	 or	 by	 being	 rewarded	 for	 service	 to	 a	 monarch.103	Also	 on	 the	battlefield,	 traditionally	 the	 place	 where	 a	 nobleman	 quite	 literally	could	win	his	spurs,	commoners	were	challenging	the	supremacy	of	the	aristocracy. 104 	In	 this	 fluid	 system,	 status	 constantly	 had	 to	 be	reinforced.105	The	 hunt	 was	 the	 noble	 sport	 par	 excellence.	 Hunting																																																									100	‘freundlichen	lieben	…	vetter’		Eric	of	Brunswick-Calenberg	to	William	of	Orange,	9	August	1561,	Ibid,	pp.	276-277.		101 	Mary	 of	 Hungary	 to	 Christoph	 of	 Württemberg,	 13	 October	 1552,	 V.	 Ernst,	
Briefwechsel	der	Herzogs	Christophs	von	Wirtemberg,	Volume	I	 (Stuttgart:	 Verlag	 von	Kohlhammer,	1899):	p.	825.		102	N.	 Zemon	 Davis,	 The	 Gift	 in	 Sixteenth-Century	 France	 (Oxford:	 Oxford	 University	Press,	2000):	pp.	56-72.		103	J.	 Dewald,	 The	 European	 Nobility,	 1400-1800	 (Cambridge:	 Cambridge	 University	Press,	1996):	pp.	15-59.		104	Potter,	Renaissance	France	at	War,	p.	88.		105 	H.	 van	 Nierop,	 The	 Nobility	 of	 Holland,	 from	 Knights	 to	 Regents,	 1500-1650	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2009):	p.	33;	E.	Schalk,	‘The	appearance	and	
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with	hounds	or	birds	of	prey	was	by	law	restricted	to	the	nobility.106	By	choosing	as	her	present	birds	of	prey,	Mary	of	Hungary	reinforced	the	noble	status	of	both	Christoph	of	Württemberg	and	of	herself.	Crucially,	the	characteristics	that	defined	nobility,	such	as	the	right	to	hunt,	were	universal.	This	explains	the	popularity	of	gifts	related	to	the	hunt	in	the	cross-border	 interaction	 between	 aristocrats. 107 	Examples	 of	 this	practise	are	the	 falcons	and	hounds	gifted	to	 the	Duke	of	Arenberg	by	the	 Duke	 of	 Guise	 and	 Duke	 of	 Jülich-Kleve	 respectively.108	European	nobles	 were	 thus	 members	 of	 an	 international	 class.	 The	 ‘continual	exchange	 of	 recognition’	 that	 was,	 according	 to	 Kristen	 Neuchel,	‘fundamental	 to	 a	 noble’s	 identity’	 also	 took	 place	 in	 a	 European	context.109		
1.2.4	The	exchange	of	news	and	information		In	 order	 to	 function	 on	 the	 international	 stage,	 the	 German	 princes	needed	to	remain	informed	about	events	outside	their	own	territories.	However,	 the	 acquisition	 of	 reliable	 information	 on	 a	 regular	 basis	about	 events	 throughout	Europe	 could	be	difficult.	 The	princes	 of	 the	Empire	 had	 a	 variety	 of	 sources	 from	 which	 to	 gather	 information.	Firstly,	printed	news	pamphlets	were	being	published	with	 increasing	frequency	throughout	the	Empire.110	They	did	not	only	report	on	events	in	Germany,	but	also	brought	news	of	 important	political	events,	 such																																																																																																																																														reality	of	nobility	in	France	during	the	Wars	of	Religion:	An	example	of	how	collective	attitudes	can	change’,	The	Journal	of	Modern	History,	48	(1976):	19-31.		106	van	Nierop,	The	Nobility	of	Holland,	p.	23;	Knecht,	The	French	Renaissance	Court,	p.	82.		107	Knecht,	The	French	Renaissance	Court,	p.	85.		108	Jean	de	Ligne	 to	 the	Duke	of	 Jülich-Kleve,	March	1560,	Arenbergarchief,	Edingen;	Jean	de	Ligne	 to	William	of	Orange,	 11	February	1560,	 Japikse,	Correspondentie	van	
Willem	den	Eerste,	pp.	318-319.		109	K.	 B.	 Neuschel,	 Word	 of	 Honor,	 Interpreting	 Noble	 Culture	 in	 Sixteenth-Century	
France	(Ithaca:	Cornell	University	Press,	1989):	p.	74.		110	A.	Pettegree,	The	Invention	of	News:	How	the	World	Came	to	Know	About	Itself	(New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	2014):	pp.	58-75.		
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as	 battles	 and	 peace	 treaties,	 from	 around	 Europe.	 For	 instance,	 the	struggle	against	the	Ottoman	Empire,	which	was	taking	place	east	of	the	Holy	 Roman	 Empire,	 dominated	 the	 pamphlets	 of	 the	 early	 1500s.111	The	Reformation,	Europe’s	‘first	mass-media	event’,	also	inspired	large	volumes	 of	 pamphlets,	 printed	 in	 the	 many	 printing	 workshops	 that	were	 being	 established	 in	 most	 large	 German	 cities.112	The	 titles	 of	many	 pamphlets	 emphasised	 that	 they	were	 ‘honest’	 and	 ‘current’.113	To	 add	 to	 their	 air	 of	 reliability,	 they	 included,	 or	 claimed	 to	 include,	translations	of	original	documents,	 such	as	 the	 texts	of	peace	 treaties,	royal	proclamations,	or	petitions.	However,	the	problem	was	that	these	news	 pamphlets	 were	 not	 as	 informative	 or	 reliable	 as	 the	 German	princes	 required.	 Before	 a	 pamphlet	 could	 appear	 on	 the	market,	 the	news	 had	 to	 reach	Germany,	 translated	 into	 a	 format	 suitable	 for	 the	market	 it	 was	 aimed	 at,	 printed,	 and	 distributed.	 Although	 the	production	process	sometimes	only	took	a	few	days,	the	dissemination	of	news	through	pamphlets	was	by	no	means	the	quickest.114	Moreover,	pamphlets	were	often	highly	polemical.	The	princes	must	have	known	this,	 since	 many	 of	 them	 used	 local	 printers	 to	 publish	 pamphlets	justifying	their	own	policies	and	actions.115	Moreover,	 the	 fact	 that	the	production	of	pamphlets	was	above	all	a	commercial	enterprise	meant	that	news	had	to	be	delivered	in	a	manner	that	was	attractive	for	a	large	audience.	The	rather	sensationalist	tone	of	many	pamphlets	could	stand	in	the	way	of	accurate	and	clear	reporting.	
																																																								111	Ibid,	p.	62.		112	Ibid,	 p.	 60;	 A.	 Pettegree,	 Reformation	 and	 the	 Culture	 of	 Persuasion	 (Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2005):	pp.	157-185.		113 	‘Warhaftigen’	 ‘Neuwe’,	 Anon.,	 Warhaftigen	 Neuwe	 Zeytung/	 von	 dem	
Großmächtigen	König	zu	Franckreich/	wie	seine	Königliche	Maiestat/	en	Parys/	im[m]	
Thurnier/	von	einem	Edelman[n]	und	Capitan	beschedigt	worden/	den	eylften	tage	des	
Hewmonats/	dieses	neun	un[d]	fünftzigsten	Jars/	durch	ein	züschlahend	tüdlich	Fieber/	
in	Gott	saliglich	verschyden	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1559),	f.	1	v.		114	Pettegree,	The	Invention	of	News,	p.	73.		115	Ibid,	pp.	76-95.		
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	 Travellers	passing	by	the	courts	of	Germany	served	as	a	second	source	 of	 news.	 As	 discussed	 before,	 princely	 courts	 received	 visitors	on	an	almost	daily	basis.	These	travellers	carried	news	and	gossip	from	the	places	they	had	previously	visited.	This	informal	way	of	information	dissemination	 provided	 the	most	 regular	 source	 of	 news.116	However,	the	very	nature	of	the	oral	transmission	of	information,	and	the	fact	that	a	 large	 proportion	 of	 the	 information	 carried	 by	 travellers	must	 have	been	based	on	hearsay,	meant	that	 this	was	also	not	 the	most	reliable	source	 of	 news.	 Moreover,	 there	 was	 no	 guarantee	 that	 travellers	passing	by	carried	the	particular	piece	news	the	princes	desired.	There	were	good	reasons	why	those	who	required	regular	and	reliable	news,	such	 as	 monarchs	 and	 merchants,	 developed	 their	 own	 formalised	systems	of	information	gathering.117		 The	princes	of	 the	Empire	 themselves	did	not	maintain	a	 large	and	 structured	 system	 for	 the	 acquisition	 of	 news.	 Diplomats	 were	sometimes	 despatched	 to	 foreign	 courts,	 but	 on	 the	 whole	 did	 not	maintain	 permanent	 embassies.	 Therefore,	 the	 princes’	 most	 reliable	source	 of	 news	 was	 their	 regular	 and	 extensive	 network	 of	correspondence	 with	 peers	 throughout	 Europe.	 It	 was	 customary	 to	include	in	most	letters	a	paragraph	or	two	with	news	that	had	recently	come	to	the	attention	of	the	writer.	In	this	manner,	news	of	important	events	 in	 France,	 such	 as	 the	 Death	 of	 Henry	 II	 of	 France	 and	 the	assassination	of	 the	Duke	of	Guise,	 spread	quickly	among	 the	German	princes. 118 	The	 formulaic	 manner	 in	 which	 news	 was	 presented	illustrates	the	regularity	with	which	it	was	included	in	correspondence.	Often	the	paragraph	containing	the	news	started	with	the	phrase	‘I	also	
																																																								116	Ibid,	pp.	17-39	and	49.		117	Ibid,	pp.	40-57.		118 	William	 of	 Orange	 to	 August	 of	 Saxony,	 25	 December	 1560,	 Japikse,	
Correspondentie	van	Willem	den	Eerste	…:	pp.	209-210;	Friedrich	III	to	Johann	Wilhelm	of	Saxe-Weimar,	14	December	1562,	A.	Kluckhohn	(ed.),	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen,	
Kurfürsten	von	der	Pfalz,	mit	Verwandten	Schriftstücken,	Volume	I	(Braunschweig,	C.A.	Schwetschte	und	Sohn,	1868):	pp.	362-364.		
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cannot	keep	hidden	 from	Your	Grace	 that	…’.119	Sometimes	 the	source	of	the	news	was	also	mentioned.	Urbain	Scharberger,	the	secretary	for	German	affairs	in	Brussels,	in	1560	wrote	to	Orange:	‘Here	there	is	not	much	news,	except	that	there	is	much	talk	among	merchants	about	the	French	execution	[during	 the	aftermath	of	 the	Tumult	of	Amboise].’120	Friedrich	 III	 gave	 extra	 credibility	 to	 talk	 of	 persecution	 in	 France	 by	adding	that	‘one	of	my	servants,	a	doctor,	from	France	…	has	reported’	this	 news.121	News	was	 also	 frequently	 passed	 down	 the	 networks	 of	correspondence.	For	instance,	Friedrich	III,	after	receiving	news	of	the	assassination	 of	 the	 Duke	 of	 Guise,	 wrote	 Johann	 Wilhelm	 of	 Saxe-Weimar	to	inform	him	about	the	event.122		 News,	 similarly	 to	 the	 gifts	 studied	 by	 Davis	 and	 the	 favours	discussed	 by	Neuschel,	 could	 serve	 as	 a	 commodity	 used	 to	 reinforce	relationships	 between	 peers	 and	 between	 clients	 and	 patrons.	 This	 is	clearly	 illustrated	 in	 a	 letter	 sent	 by	 Orange	 to	 August	 of	 Saxony	 in	January	 1561.	 Engaged	 in	 difficult	 negotiations	 concerning	 a	 possible	marriage	between	himself	and	August’s	niece,	Anna	of	Saxony,	Orange	hoped	 to	 soften	 August’s	 resolve	 by	 promising	 that	 ‘when	 something	takes	place	 in	France	…	and	 is	brought	 to	my	attention,	 I	 shall	always	confidently	 notify	 Your	 Grace	 of	 the	 same.’ 123 	Maintaining	 good	relations	with	peers	 throughout	 the	Empire	 and	beyond	 could	 ensure	the	availability	of	a	 reliable	source	of	news:	 the	bigger	one’s	network,	the	bigger	 the	pool	of	 information.	Orange’s	offer	 could	potentially	be																																																									119	Darbeneben	könden	E.	L.	wir	auch	…	nicht	pergen,	das	…’	Friedrich	III	to	August	of	Saxony,	17	May	1570,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	II,	p.	395.		120 	‘Alhie	 ist	 wenig	 neuer	 zeitungen;	 allein	 daz	 die	 kauffleuth	 vill	 …	 von	 der	frantzösische	 execution	 reden	 …’	 Urbain	 Scharenberg	 to	 William	 of	 Orange,	 23	November	1560,	Japikse,	Correspondentie	van	Willem	den	Eerste,	p.	305.		121	‘ayner	meyner	diener,	 ayn	doctor,	 alhie	 aus	Frankreych	…	mich	berichtet	 hatt	…’	Friedrich	III	to	Johann	Friedrich	of	Saxony,	5	March	1560,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	
des	Frommen	…	Volume	I,	p.	127.		122 	Friedrich	 III	 to	 Johann	 Wilhelm	 of	 Saxe-Weimar,	 14	 December	 1562,	 Briefe	
Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	I,	p.	364.		123	William	 of	 Orange	 to	 August	 of	 Saxony,	 8	 January	 1561,	 ‘…	 dan	 da	 sich	 etwas	sunders	in	Franckerig	odder	sunst	zutragen	und	mir	zu	wissen	gethan	wirt,	sollen	E.	C.	F.	G.	desselben	allezeit	vertraulich	verstendigen	werden.’	Japikse,	Correspondentie	van	
Willem	den	Eerste,	p.	218.	
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very	valuable	to	August.	Due	to	the	distance	between	the	French	border	and	 Saxony,	 roughly	 700	 kilometres,	 it	 took	 news	 from	 France	 some	time	 to	 reach	 August.	 Orange,	 who	was	 often	 present	 at	 the	 court	 of	Brussels,	 in	 possession	 of	 estates	 on	 the	 border	 of	 and	 inside	 the	kingdom	 of	 France,	 and	 well	 connected	 to	 the	 French	 nobility,	 was	much	more	likely	to	be	notified	quickly	and	reliably	of	events	in	France.	By	 creating	 extensive	 networks	 of	 correspondence,	 based	 on	 the	practice	of	sharing	information,	the	princes	of	the	Holy	Roman	Empire	were	generally	relatively	well	informed.	As	we	shall	see,	throughout	the	French	Wars	of	Religion,	they	were	fully	aware	of	most	battles,	sieges,	massacres,	 assassinations,	 peace	 edicts	 and	 other	 significant	 events	taking	place	in	France.		
1.2.5	Art	and	visual	culture		The	 traditional	 characteristics,	 virtues,	 and	 privileges	 of	 the	 nobility,	including	the	right	 to	display	a	coat	of	arms	and	the	duty	 to	serve	the	monarch	 on	 the	 battlefield,	 extended	 to	 a	 relatively	 diverse	 group	 of	people.	The	difference	in	wealth	and	power	between	a	local	knight	or	a	gentleman,	who	sometimes	was	not	easy	to	distinguish	from	a	wealthy	yeomen	 farmer,	 and	 a	 grand	 seigneur	 could	 be	 enormous.124 	It	 is	therefore	not	surprising	that,	besides	emphasising	their	membership	of	the	nobility,	the	Imperial	princes	also	sought	to	distinguish	themselves	in	 other	 ways.	 Culturally,	 most	 of	 the	 princes	 of	 the	 Empire	 seem	 to	have	 shared	 a	 desire	 above	 all	 to	 appear	 cosmopolitan.	 As	 patrons	 of	scholarship,	 literature	 and	 poetry,	 visual	 art,	 music,	 and	 architecture,	the	 princes	 of	 the	 Empire	 displayed	 a	 taste	 for	 Italian,	 French,	 and	Spanish	 rather	 than	 German,	 styles	 and	 fashions.	 Already	 in	 the	 late	fifteenth	 century,	 the	 Rhineland,	 and	 specifically	 the	 court	 of	 the	Electors	 Palatine,	was	 a	 centre	 for	 the	 promotion	 of	 the	 ideals	 of	 the	
																																																								124	van	Nierop,	The	Nobility	of	Holland,	p.	38.		
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Italian	 Renaissance	 in	 Germany.125	The	 Electors	 financed	 a	 circle	 of	humanists,	both	from	Germany	and	from	abroad,	who	aimed	directly	to	imitate	 their	 colleagues	 in	 Italy.	 In	 music,	 the	 Low	 Countries,	 rather	than	Italy,	was	the	centre	for	the	development	of	a	new	style.	During	the	late	 fifteenth-	 and	 early	 sixteenth	 centuries,	 the	 so-called	 Franco-Flemish	 school	 dominated	 music	 throughout	 Europe.	 The	 Electors	Palatine	 were	 again	 the	 first	 to	 promote	 the	 style	 in	 Germany,	employing	a	Dutchman,	Johannes	van	Soest,	as	their	court	composer.126	In	 Stuttgart,	 the	 music	 of	 the	 Franco-Flemish	 school	 could	 also	frequently	be	heard.	Even	after	Württemberg	became	Lutheran,	music	by	 famous	 Catholic	 composers	 such	 as	 Orlando	 di	 Lasso	 and	 Josquin	Des	Prez	remained	popular	at	court.127	The	Dukes	of	Württemberg	used	music	 to	 display	 their	 international	 significance	 and	 cultural	sophistication.	 They	 brought	musicians	 from	 their	 famous	Hofkapelle,	which	 rivalled	 the	 best	 ensembles	 in	 Europe,	 on	 diplomatic	 missions	‘and	even	loaned	them	out	to	other	courts.’128		 A	particularly	visible	statement	of	 taste	could	be	made	through	architecture.	 In	 the	 early	 and	 mid-sixteenth	 century,	 Renaissance	influences	 in	 architecture	 started	 spreading	 throughout	 Europe.	 The	German	princes	were	among	 the	 first	 to	promote	 this	 style.	The	most	striking	 example	 of	 this	 is	 the	 so-called	 Ottheinrichsbau	 inside	Heidelberg	Castle	(see	Figure	3).	Still	regularly	described	as	one	of	the	earliest	(or	even	the	first)	Renaissance	building	of	Northern	Europe,	the	building,	which	included	private	living	quarters	as	well	as	a	number	of	rooms	 for	 public	 functions,	 contrasts	 strongly	 with	 the	 surrounding	medieval	 architecture.	 Its	 architectural	 language,	 including	 Ionic	 and	Corinthian	columns	and	caryatids	 interspersed	with	niches	containing																																																									125	H.	J.	Cohn,	‘The	early	Renaissance	court	in	Heidelberg’,	European	History	Quarterly,	1	(1971):	295-322.		126	Cohn,	‘The	early	Renaissance	court	in	Heidelberg’,	p.	319.		127	K.	Marcus,	‘Music	patronage	of	the	Württemberg	Hofkapelle,	c.	1500-1650’,	German	
History,	13	(1995):	151-162,	on	p.	154.		128	Ibid,	p.	153.		
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statues	 of	 figures	 from	 classical	 antiquity,	 looks	 so	 quintessentially	Italian	 that	 it	 has	 often	 been	 (falsely)	 rumoured	 that	 Michelangelo	Buonarotti	 was	 its	 architect.129	The	 building	 project	 gave	 Ottheinrich,	father	 of	 Friedrich	 III,	 international	 renown.	 In	 1559,	 an	 English	ambassador	 in	 Germany,	 Dr	 Christopher	 Mont,	 described	 the	
Ottheinrichsbau	 as	 ‘a	 magnificent	 and	 sumptuous	 building,	 for	 which	[Ottheinrich]	 assembled	 from	 all	 parts	 the	 most	 renowned	 artists,	builder,	sculptors,	and	painters.’130			
	Figure	3:	Nineteenth-century	reconstruction	of	the	Ottheinrichsbau.131																																																									129	H.	 Hubach,	 ‘Kürfurst	 Ottheinrichs	 “neuer	 hofbaw”	 in	 Heidelberg:	 neue	 Aspekte	eines	 alten	 Themas’,	 in	 V.	 Rödel	 (ed.),	 Mettelalter.	 Schloß	 Heidelberg	 und	 die	
Pfalzgrafschaft	 bei	 Rhein	 bis	 zur	 Reformationszeit;	 Begleitpublikation	 zur	
Dauerausstellung	 der	 Staatlichen	 Schlösser	 und	 Gärten	 Baden-Württemberg	(Regensburg:	Schnell	&	Steiner,	2002):	pp.	191-203,	on	p.	202.		130	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	I,	pp.	82-83.		131	J.	 Hanschke	 and	 P.	 Thoma,	 ‘Das	 Heidelberger	 Schloss,	 die	 bauliche	 Gestalt	 der	Residenz	der	pfälzischen	Wittelsbacher	seit	1600’,	in	A.	Wieczorek,	B.	Schneidmüller,	A.	 Schubert,	 and	 S.	 Weinfurter	 (eds.),	Die	Wittelsbacher	 am	Rhein.	 Die	 Kurpfalz	 und	
Das Heidelberger Schloss 281
4  Ansicht des Ottheinrichsbaus, Rekonstruktion von Koch/Seitz 1891
20140306_Thoma_Hanschke_NZ_Korr.indd   281 06.03.2014   12:09:02
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	 Ottheinrich’s	building	project	at	Heidelberg	was	part	of	a	larger	trend.	 Other	 princes	 also	 commissioned	 construction	 work	 on	 their	residences.	 Christoph	 of	 Württemberg	 in	 1553	 started	 large-scale	building	 works	 on	 his	 castle	 in	 Stuttgart,	 adding	 a	 number	 of	Renaissance	 features,	 most	 notably	 a	 large	 courtyard	 with	 a	 three-tiered	column-lined	arcade,	 to	the	medieval	 fabric	(see	Figure	4).132	In	Baden,	 the	 residence	 of	 the	Marggrafen	 had	 in	 the	 fifteenth	 century	been	moved	from	a	medieval	castle	on	a	mountain	ridge	to	a	new	gothic	structure	 closer	 to	 the	 town	of	Baden.	Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	Neues	
Schloss	 was	 a	 relatively	 new	 building,	 the	 fashion	 for	 Italian	architecture	 inspired	 a	 series	 of	 building	 projects	 throughout	 the	sixteenth	century.133	The	visibility	of	these	architectural	statements	can	clearly	 be	 seen	 in	 a	 print	 of	 the	 city	 of	 Baden	 and	 surrounding	 from	1643	 (see	 Figure	 5).	 Despite	 appearing	 in	 the	 background,	 the	sixteenth-century	 Renaissance	 additions	 to	 the	 castle	 are	 very	obviously	 visible.	 The	 contrast	 with	 the	 medieval	 Altes	 Schloss	 is	particularly	striking.	Thus,	by	spending	large	sums	of	money	on	striking	alterations	to	their	residences,	the	princes	of	the	Empire	could	show	in	a	very	public	manner	that	they	were	members	of	the	European	cultural	elite.		
																																																																																																																																													
Europa	 (Regensburg:	Publikationen	der	Reiss-Eingelhorn-Museen	Mannheim,	2013):	pp.	272-284,	on	p.	281.			132	W.	 Fleischauer,	Renaissance	 im	Herzogtum	Württemberg	 (Stuttgart:	 Kohlhammer,	1971).		133	O.	Linde,	‘Das	Großherzogliche	Neue	Schloss	Baden	und	die	drei	Burgen	um	Baden-Baden’,	in	Badische	Heimat,	24	(1937):	pp.	175-196.		
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	Figure	4:	The	courtyard,	Altes	Schloss,	Stuttgart.134	
	Figure	 5:	 Matthäus	 Marian	 die	 Ältere,	 Baden-Baden,	 Ansicht	 von	 Westen	(fragment).135		 	Another	 way	 in	 which	 the	 German	 princes	 displayed	 their	cosmopolitanism	 was	 through	 portraiture.	 For	 instance,	 by	commissioning	 a	 portrait	 by	 an	 internationally	 renowned	 artist,	 a	statement	 could	 be	made	 emphasising	 one’s	 position	 among	Europe’s																																																									134	Landesmuseum	Württemberg,	http://www.landesmuseum-stuttgart.de/	(accessed	13-09-2014).		135	Matthäus	 Marian	 die	 Ältere,	 ‘Baden-Baden,	 Ansicht	 von	 Westen’,	 Topographiae	
Sueviae	(Frankfurt	am	Main,	Merian,	1643):	pp.	27-28.		
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elite.	 One	 striking	 example	 is	 Antonis	 Mor’s	 portrait	 of	 the	 young	William	of	Orange,	probably	painted	in	1554.136	The	choice	of	painter	is	significant.	Mor’s	 clientele	 includes	 a	 remarkable	 number	 of	 Europe’s	most	 important	 monarchs	 and	 aristocrats.137	By	 choosing	 the	 same	portraitist	as,	amongst	others,	Philip	II,	John	III	of	Portugal,	Alessandro	Farnese,	 and	Mary	Tudor,	 the	21-year-old	prince	of	Orange	presented	himself	as	a	nobleman	of	international	significance.		 Alternatively,	messages	could	also	be	conveyed	by	the	way	one	was	depicted	on	a	portrait.	The	choice	of	pose,	attributes,	and	especially	of	 clothing	 could	 all	 contribute	 to	 the	 impact	 of	 message.	 The	 most	famous	portrait	of	Christoph	of	Württemberg	was	made	by	Abraham	de	Hel,	 a	 painter	 who	 was	 not	 quite	 as	 famous	 as	 Mor,	 but	 also	 active	throughout	 Europe.138 	The	 portrait	 conveys	 a	 sense	 of	 confidence,	wisdom,	 constancy,	 and	worldly	 authority;	 all	 characteristics	 befitting	of	 a	 father	 of	 the	 German	 Reformation.	 Yet,	 the	 style	 of	 clothing	Christoph	 is	 wearing	 is	 recognisably	 Spanish,	 rather	 than	 German.	Considering	 that,	 as	 Ulinka	 Rublack	 has	 demonstrated,	 clothing	 was	increasingly	 viewed	 as	 reflective	 of	 a	 people’s	 moral	 fabric,	 and	 the	simplicity	 and	modesty	 of	 German	 fashion	was	 repeatedly	 contrasted	with	the	decadence	of	foreign	modes	of	dress,	this	choice	of	clothing	is	remarkable.139	It	 not	 only	 shows	 that	 Christoph	 was	 aware	 of	 the	fashionability	 of	 Spanish	 dress,	 but	 also	 that	 in	 this	 portrait	 he	consciously	decided	not	to	associate	himself	with	the	local	culture	of	his	own	lands.		 The	 German	 princes’	 apparent	 admiration	 of	 Spanish	 fashion,	Italian	 architecture,	 French	 education,	 and	 Flemish	music	 is	 above	 all	illustrative	of	 their	 international	orientation.	Commissioning	buildings																																																									136	A.	Mor,	Wilhelm	I.	von	Oranien-Nassau,	Staatlichen	Museen,	Kassel,	c.	1554.		137	H.	Hymaus,	‘Antoine	Mor’,	in	Biographie	Nationale,	Volume	XV	(Brussels:	Bruylant-Christophe,	1899):	pp.	228-234.		138 	K.	 Bosl	 (ed.),	 Bosls	 Bayerische	 Biographie,	 8000	 Persönlichkeiten	 aus	 15	
Jahrhunderten	(Regensburg:	Verlag	Friedrich	Pustet,	1982):	p.	327.		139	U.	 Rublack,	 Dressing	 Up:	 Cultural	 Identity	 in	 Renaissance	 Europe	 (Oxford:	 Oxford	University	Press,	2010):	pp.	125-176.		
		 76	
and	works	of	art,	dressing	in	the	finest	fabrics	and	furs,	and	employing	leading	 scholars	 and	 artists	 was	 expensive.	 Christopher	 Mont,	 after	having	expressed	his	delight	at	Ottheinrich’s	stylish	new	building,	also	remarked	 that	 his	 son,	 Friedrich	 III,	 was	 forced	 to	 tone	 down	 the	‘splendour	 and	 magnificence’	 of	 the	 Palatinate,	 dismissing	 ‘all	 the	musicians	 and	 above	200	 retainers	 from	 court,	 being	desirous	 to	 free	the	Palatinate	from	debt.’140	The	princes’	habit	to	spend	big	in	order	to	be	 among	 the	 first	 to	 promote	 new	 styles	 and	 fashions,	 besides	satisfying	their	personal	 tastes,	also	served	as	a	very	effective	method	of	 claiming	 membership	 of	 a	 very	 select	 group	 of	 leading	 European	aristocrats.		
1.2.6	Warfare,	captivity,	and	diplomacy		Military	conflicts	also	intensified	the	contacts	between	aristocrats	from	different	countries.	Taking	part	in	warfare	was	central	to	what	it	meant	to	 be	 a	 nobleman.	During	 the	 first	 half	 of	 the	 sixteenth	 century	 there	were	a	number	of	 large-scale	conflicts	 that	provided	opportunities	 for	the	nobility	of	the	Empire	to	show	off	their	military	prowess.	The	most	important	 of	 these	were	 the	 Italian	Wars	 that	 lasted	 on	 and	 off	 from	1494	 to	 1559	 and	 the	 civil	 wars	 that	 pitted	 Charles	 V	 against	 the	Protestant	 League	 of	 Schmalkalden	 between	 1546	 and	 1553.141	Both	wars	 brought	 together	 soldiers	 and	 commanders	 from	 a	 range	 of	different	 national	 backgrounds,	 both	 in	 the	 same	 army	 and	 opposing	each	 other	 on	 the	 battlefield.	 The	 Imperial	 high	 nobility	 played	 a	relatively	small	role	in	most	off	the	Italian	Wars,	in	which	Spanish	and	Italian	noblemen	dominated.	However,	 this	 changed	when	 the	 theatre	of	 war	 shifted	 from	 Italy	 to	 the	 Franco-Imperial	 border	 in	 1551.	Especially	 the	Nassau	 family	was	strongly	 represented	 in	 ranks	of	 the																																																									140	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	I,	p.	83.		141 	L.	 Romier,	 Les	 Origins	 Politiques	 des	 Guerres	 des	 Religion,	 Volume	 I	 (Geneva:	Slatkine-Megariotis	 Reprints,	 1974);	 D.	 L.	 Potter,	 ‘Foreign	 policy	 in	 the	 age	 of	 the	Reformation:	French	involvement	in	the	Schmalkaldic	War,	1544-1547’,	The	Historical	
Journal,	20	(1977):	525-544;	MacCulloch,	Reformation,	pp.	158-212.		
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Imperial	army.	Orange’s	uncle,	Henry	III	of	Nassau-Breda,	and	his	son,	René	of	Chalon,	who	fell	at	the	siege	of	St	Dizier,	were	two	of	the	most	important	Imperial	captains.	Following	the	family	tradition,	Orange	first	became	 a	 commander	 of	 a	 bande	 d’ordonnance,	 soon	 followed	 by	 his	promotion	 to	 Captain	 General	 at	 the	 age	 of	 22. 142 	Although	 the	Schmalkaldic	 Wars	 took	 place	 inside	 what	 we	 now	 call	 Germany,	commanders	 and	 troops	 from	 Spain,	 Italy,	 the	 Netherlands,	 Bohemia,	and	Hungary	as	well	as	Germany	all	engaged	in	the	conflict.		 Large	 military	 conflicts	 encouraged	 the	 establishment	 and	expansion	of	 transnational	 aristocratic	 contacts	 in	 three	ways.	 Firstly,	the	 need	 for	 military	 cooperation	 between	 captains	 from	 a	 range	 of	different	 backgrounds	 ensured	 the	 intensification	 of	 liaison	 between	nobles	 from	 different	 parts	 of	 Europe.	 A	 good	 example	 is	 the	 intense	correspondence	concerning	the	siege	of	Metz	in	1552	between	the	Duke	of	 Alba,	 an	 aristocrat	 whose	 dynastic	 heartlands	 were	 situated	 in	Castile,	 and	 the	Duke	 of	Arenberg,	who	 owned	 land	 in	 the	Rhineland,	the	Low	Countries,	and	France.143	During	 both	 the	 Italian	 and	 Schmalkaldic	 Wars,	 a	 number	 of	leading	 figures	 were	 captured	 in	 or	 during	 the	 aftermath	 of	 battles.	Time	 spent	 in	 captivity	 could	 facilitate	 the	 development	 of	 closer	familiarity	between	captive	and	captor.	After	the	battle	of	Saint	Quentin	in	 1557,	 Jacques	 d’Albon,	 Maréchal	 de	 Saint	 André,	 one	 of	 Henry	 II’s	leading	counsellors,	spent	almost	a	year	as	captive	 in	 the	castle	of	 the	prince	 of	 Orange	 in	 Breda.144	Similarly,	 Landgrave	 Philipp	 of	 Hesse,	after	 having	 been	 captured	 during	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 Schmalkaldic	Wars,	spent	no	less	than	five	years	in	the	Netherlands	as	a	captive	of	the	Habsburgs.	The	foundation	for	Philipp’s	strong	interest	in	events	in	the	Netherlands,	 and	 his	 extensive	 correspondence	 with	 noblemen	 from	that	region,	was	probably	laid	during	this	period.																																																									142	Japikse,	Correspondentie	van	Willem	den	Eerste,	p.	11.		143	Correspondence	between	 Jean	de	Ligne,	Duke	of	Arenberg,	and	 the	Duke	of	Alba,	Arenbergarchief,	Edingen.		144	Japikse,	Correspondentie	van	Willem	den	Eerste,	pp.	121-122.		
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Orange	and	St	André	met	again	during	the	negotiations	 leading	up	to	the	Peace	of	Cateau-Cambrésis.	In	the	absence	of	Philip	II,	Orange	was	 one	 of	 the	 principal	 negotiators	 for	 the	 Habsburg	 side.145	The	lengthy	negotiation	process	brought	together	envoys	from	Italy,	Spain,	and	England	as	well	as	from	France	and	the	Empire.146	In	this	context,	the	 establishment	 and	 expansion	 of	 relations	 between	 nobles	 from	different	parts	of	the	continent	was	particularly	easy.	For	example,	the	first	meeting	between	Orange	and	a	French	monarch,	in	this	case	Henry	II,	 took	 place	 in	 the	 margins	 of	 the	 signing	 of	 the	 Treaty	 of	 Cateau-Cambrésis.147	As	will	become	clear	 in	subsequent	chapters,	 the	French	Wars	of	Religion,	in	similar	ways	to	the	Italian	and	Schmalkaldic	Wars,	encouraged	an	intensification	of	the	contacts	between	the	French	high	nobility	and	the	princes	of	the	Holy	Roman	Empire.		
1.3	Franco-Imperial	relations	after	1552	
	Having	discussed	the	wide	variety	of	ways	 in	which	the	princes	of	 the	Holy	Roman	Empire	engaged	socially,	culturally,	and	politically,	on	the	international	stage,	I	will	now	focus	on	one	particular	development:	the	intensification	 of	 diplomatic	 relations	 between	 the	 French	 monarchy	and	the	Protestant	princes	of	the	Empire	during	the	early	1550s.		
1.3.1	The	constitutional	make-up	of	the	Holy	Roman	Empire		Before	proceeding	to	discuss	the	manner	in	which	the	close	diplomatic	relations	 between	 German	 princes	 and	 the	 King	 of	 France	 were	established,	 it	 is	 first	 important	 briefly	 to	 consider	 debates	 that	were	raging	 in	 the	 Empire	 concerning	 the	 sovereignty	 of	 the	 princes	 and	their	 duty	 of	 obedience	 to	 the	 Emperor.	 The	 history	 of	 the	 Empire	 is	characterised	 by	 a	 continuous	 process	 of	 establishing	 and	 re-																																																								145	Romier,	Les	Origins	Politiques	…	Volume	II,	pp.	297-347.		146	Ibid,	pp.	297-347.		147	Ibid,	pp.	297-347.	
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establishing	the	power	relations	between	local	and	regional	powers	and	the	 Emperor.	 Often,	 this	 balancing	 act	was	 not	 so	much	 expressed	 in	words,	but	in	ritual.	A	good	example	of	this	practice	is	the	Joyous	Entry,	a	civic	ceremony	in	which	a	regional	lord	entered	a	city	and	performed	a	 series	 of	 ceremonies,	 emphasising	 the	 rights	 and	 freedoms	 of	 the	city.148	Representatives	of	the	city	also	swore	oaths,	pledging	to	in	turn	protect	the	privileges	and	prerogatives	of	their	overlords.		 Regional	 rulers	 also	 had	 to	 balance	 their	 allegiance	 to	 the	Emperor,	their	monarch,	with	the	protection	of	their	own	sovereignty.	The	reality	of	Imperial	politics,	however,	did	not	match	the	rhetoric	of	Imperial	power	and	sovereignty.	The	political	landscape	in	the	Empire	was	fragmented.	Most	institutions	of	political	power	were	concentrated	in	the	cities	and	the	‘states’,	such	as	Württemberg,	Hesse,	and	Saxony.149	Successive	 Emperors,	 lacking	 a	 strong	 institutional	 power	 base,	struggled	to	dominate	the	politics	of	the	Empire.150	As	a	result,	political	theorists	began	to	reassess	the	relationship	between	the	Emperor	and	the	 princes	 of	 the	 Empire.	 These	 debates	 started	 in	 the	 late	 fifteenth	century.151	The	 crux	 of	 the	 question	 was:	 was	 the	 Emperor	 the	 sole	possessor	of	sovereign	power,	or	did	he	share	it	with	the	Reichsstände;	the	 princes	 and	 the	 Imperial	 cities?152	The	 question	was	 not	 resolved	until	 the	 seventeenth	 century.	 Not	 even	 the	 key	 terms	 of	 the	 debate,	such	as	sovereignty,	were	clearly	defined	by	the	1550s.153	Nonetheless,	
																																																								148	P.	Arnade,	Beggers,	Iconoclasts,	and	Civic	Patriots,	The	Political	Culture	of	the	Dutch	
Revolt	(Ithaca:	Cornell	University	Press,	2008):	p.	33.	149	Brady,	German	Histories,	p.	18.		150 	B.	 Scribner,	 ‘Germany’,	 in	 B.	 Scribner,	 R.	 Porter,	 and	 M.	 Teich	 (eds.),	 The	
Reformation	in	National	Context	 (Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1994):	pp.	5-6.		151	P.	 H.	 Wilson,	 ‘Still	 a	 monstrocity?	 Some	 reflections	 on	 Early	 Modern	 German	statehood’,	The	Historical	Journal,	49	(2006):	pp.	566-567.		152	Ibid,	565-576.		153	Those	using	the	term	‘sovereignty’	 in	the	context	of	this	debate	borrowed	heavily	from	 Jean	Bodin,	whose	Six	Livres	de	la	République,	 containing	his	 idea	of	 indivisible	sovereignty,	were	not	published	until	1576.		
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it	 was	 clear	 that	 the	 relation	 between	 the	 increasingly	 independent-minded	princes	and	the	Imperial	monarchy	had	become	problematic.	
	
1.3.2	German	mercenaries		A	particularly	 striking	example	of	 the	conflicting	 interests	of	Emperor	and	 German	 nobility	 was	 the	 role	 of	 German	 mercenary	 troops	 and	their	 aristocratic	 captains	 in	 various	 European	 conflicts.	 Throughout	the	 Italian	Wars	 and	 the	 French	Wars	 of	 Religion,	 German	 and	 Swiss	soldiers	 formed	 the	 backbone	 of	 virtually	 every	 major	 army.154	As	 a	result	of	 this	reliance	on	German	and	Swiss	mercenaries,	demand	was	high,	 sometimes	 even	 higher	 than	 supply,	 and	 therefore	 the	maintenance	of	close	contacts	with	those	who	controlled	the	mercenary	market	 could	 influence	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	 war.155	The	 French	 were	among	 the	 first	 to	 realise	 this,	 and	 thus	 it	 became	 a	 foreign	 policy	priority	 to	 establish	 good	 relations,	 formally	 and	 informally,	with	 the	Swiss	 Cantons	 and	 the	 German	 nobility.156 	The	 prominence	 of	 the	Rhineland	as	a	place	to	recruit	landsknechts	and	reiters	ensured	that	the	French	diplomatic	presence	was	particularly	strong	there.		Among	the	mercenary	colonels	were	some	of	the	most	important	princes	 of	 the	 Empire.	 Christoph	 of	 Württemberg,	 for	 instance,	commanded	 German	 mercenaries	 during	 his	 time	 at	 the	 French	court.157	The	 German	 princes	 had	 a	 variety	 of	 reasons	 for	 acting	 as	mercenary	 commanders.	 Firstly,	 it	 could	 help	 them	 to	 establish	 a	reputation	 for	military	prowess.	Since	an	active	role	on	 the	battlefield	was	 still	 considered	 central	 to	 a	 noble’s	 identity,	 service	 as	 a																																																									154	J.	B.	Wood,	 ‘The	royal	army	during	 the	early	wars	of	 religion’,	 in	M.	P.	Hold	 (ed.),	
Society	 and	 Institutions	 in	 Early	 Modern	 France	 (Athens,	 Georgia	 University	 Press,	1991):	pp.	1-35.		155	D.	 Potter,	 ‘The	 international	 mercenary	 market	 in	 the	 sixteenth-century:	 Anglo-French	competition	in	Germany,	1543-50’,	The	English	Historical	Review,	111	(1996):	24-58.		156	Greengrass,	The	French	Reformation,	p.	39.		157	Potter,	Renaissance	France	at	War,	p.	138.		
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commander	of	mercenary	 troops	could	provide	a	solution	when	other	opportunities	to	excel	in	battle	were	scarce.	Secondly,	serving	a	foreign	monarch	 on	 the	 battlefield	 could	 help	 establish	 a	 good	 relationship	between	monarch	 and	 prince	 and	 the	 possibility	 of	 future	military	 or	political	 alliances	 between	 the	 two.	 Finally,	 serving	 as	 a	 mercenary	captain	 could	 be	 financially	 attractive.	 Albrecht	 Bellator,	 Margrave	 of	Brandenburg-Kulmbach,	 built	 up	 a	 fearsome	 reputation	 as	 military	commander.	Building	on	 this	 reputation,	he	spent	a	 significant	part	of	his	career	on	campaign,	 fighting	 for	 the	Emperor,	 then	 for	 the	King	of	France,	and	again	for	the	Emperor.158	Due	to	his	formidable	reputation,	Albrecht	could	drive	a	hard	bargain	when	negotiating	with	Charles	V	or	Henry	II.	The	 example	 of	 Albrecht	 of	 Brandenburg-Kulmbach	 is	illustrative	 of	 two	 phenomena:	 Firstly,	 the	 King	 of	 France	 and	 the	Emperor	 depended	 on	 experienced	 mercenary	 soldiers	 and	 their	captains	 and	 were	 willing	 to	 spend	 heavily	 to	 secure	 their	 services.	Secondly,	 the	 employment	 of	 princes	 from	 the	 Empire	 by	 the	 King	 of	France,	 who	 was	 at	 war	 with	 the	 Emperor,	 raised	 some	 complicated	constitutional	questions.	If	the	Emperor	was	indeed	the	sole	possessor	of	sovereign	power	in	the	Empire,	serving	the	enemy	of	the	Emperor,	in	this	case	the	King	of	France,	necessarily	constituted	a	form	of	treason.	The	 aforementioned	 confiscation	 of	 the	 lands	 of	 Wilhelm	 of	Fürstenberg	 as	 a	 punishment	 for	 his	 service	 in	 France	 demonstrates	that	 the	 Emperor	 indeed	 regarded	 this	 service	 as	 treasonous.	Alternatively,	 if	 the	 German	 high	 nobility	 were	 sovereign	 princes	 in	their	 own	 right,	 the	 pursuit	 of	 their	 own	 foreign	 policy	 agenda	 was	entirely	permissible.	Even	though	scholarly	debates	about	the	nature	of	sovereignty	would	only	begin	in	earnest	in	the	late	1570s,	the	tensions	that	fuelled	these	debates	were	already	felt	in	the	1550s.	This	tension	is	reflected	 in	 an	 agreement	 made	 between	 Henry	 II	 of	 France	 and	 the	brothers	 Johann	 Friedrich	 of	 Saxony	 and	 Johann	 Wilhelm	 of	 Saxe-Weimar	 in	1558.	The	 two	dukes	were	promised	an	annual	pension	of																																																									158	E.	 von	 Guttenberg,	 ‘Albrecht	 Alkibiades’,	 Neue	 Deustche	 Biographie,	1	 (1953):	 p.	163.	
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30,000	 francs.	 In	 exchange,	 they	 were	 obliged	 to	 levy	 an	 army	 of	mercenary	soldiers	when	Henry	required	it,	albeit	‘with	the	assurance,	that	 they	 would	 not	 be	 used	 against	 the	 Empire	 or	 the	 German	princes.’159	The	 absence	 of	 the	 Emperor	 in	 this	 clause	 is	 striking.	 Yet,	this	 sense	 of	 obligation	 towards	 the	 Holy	 Roman	 Empire	 and	 the	Imperial	princes,	rather	than	to	the	Emperor,	is	not	uncharacteristic	of	the	attitudes	of	the	Protestant	German	princes.	Nonetheless,	 Johann	 Wilhelm,	 understanding	 that	 his	 actions	were	 likely	 to	 provoke	 controversy,	 felt	 the	 necessity	 to	 publish	 a	pamphlet	 explaining	 his	 decision	 to	 serve	 in	 the	 army	 of	 the	 King	 of	France.	The	pamphlet	claims	to	be	a	printed	version	of	a	letter	sent	to	‘a	number	of	princes	of	the	Holy	Roman	Empire’,	but	is	more	likely	to	be	a	consciously	 crafted	 public	 statement.	 Johann	 Wilhelm’s	 explanation	consists	 of	 two	 elements.	 First,	 it	 was	 categorically	 stated	 ‘that	 His	Grace	 [Johann	 Wilhelm]	 …	 does	 not	 intend,	 by	 his	 own	 [actions]	 or	those	 of	 his	 followers,	 to	 harm	 any	 of	 the	 States	 of	 the	 Holy	 Roman	Empire	 of	 the	 German	 Nation.’160	The	 second	 part	 of	 his	 arguments	reads	as	a	celebration	of	the	political	 independence	of	the	regions	and	cities	of	Germany.	Johann	Wilhelm	writes	that	he,	‘as	a	poor	young	and	
																																																								159	‘mit	der	Zusicherung,	ihn	nicht	gegen	das	deutsche	Reich	und	die	Reichsfürsten	zu	verwenden.’	 K.	 Hahn,	Herzog	 Johann	Wilhelm	von	Weimar	und	Seine	Beziehungen	 zu	
Frankreich	(Jena:	Gustav	Fischer,	1907):	p.	53.		160	‘Das	 S.	 F.	 G.	 …	 vorhaben	 nicht	 sey/	 einigen	 des	 heiligen	 Reich	 Deutscher	 Nation	einverleibten	 Standt/	 durch	 S.	 F.	 G.	 oder	 die	 Iren	 zubeschwere[n]	 …’	 Anon.,	
Warhaftiger	 Abdruck	 des	 Durchleuchten	 Hochgebornen	 Fürsten	 und	 Herrn/	 Herrn	
Johann	Wilhelm/	Herzogen	zu	Sachsen/	Landgraffen	in	Döringen/	und	Marggraffen	zu	
Meissern/	 ausgegangene	 Schreibens/	 am	 Dato	 im	 feltlager	 bey	 Amiens/	 den	 27.	
Septembris	negst	vorschinē/	an	etzliche	Chur	ūn		Fürsten	des	Heiligen	Reichs/	darinnen	
S.	F.	G.	ursachen	anzeigen/	Welcher	halben	 sie	 sich	 in	des	konigs	zu	Frankreich	kriegs	
und	dienstbestestellung	begeben/	und	sich	daneben	ausdrücklich	erkleren/	Das	S.	F.	G.	
gemüt	 und	 vorhaben	 nicht	 sey/	 einigen	 des	 heiligen	 Reich	 Deutscher	 Nation	
einverleibten	Standt/	durch	S.	F.	G.	oder	die	Iren	zubeschwerē/	noch	solchs	zuthun	den	
Iren	wissentlich	 zu	 gestatten.	Daraus	 dann	 zubefinden/	 das	 S.	 F.	 G.	 und	 den	 Iren/	mit	
dem	 ausgesprengtem	 geschrey/	 als	 solten	 S.	 F.	 G.	 in	 izigem	 vorstehenden	 Abzug/	 das	
geurlaubte	 französische	kriegsvolck	an	sich	ziehen/	und	damit	 inn	Deutschland/	Krieg	
und	unruhe	anrichten	wollen/	ungütlich	geschicht/	Und	das	sölchs	engweder	durch	S.	F.	
G.	missgünstige	oder	 sonst	unruhige	 leut/	die	zu	kriegs	entbörung	 lust	haben/	und	die	
Herrn	gerne	in	einander	herzen	wolten/	ausgebreitet	wirdt	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1558),	f.	5.	r.	
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oppressed	 prince,	 ...	 greatly	 desires	 to	 seek	 and	 win	 the	 German	Nation’s	ancient,	laudable,	and	princely	liberty	[and]	freedom.’161		
1.3.3	Henry	II,	protector	of	German	liberties		The	 trope	 of	 German	 liberty,	 which	 was	 so	 eloquently	 employed	 by	Johann	Wilhelm,	was	 very	 commonly	 used	 throughout	 the	 1540s	 and	50s.	The	celebration	of	the	traditional	liberties	of	the	Reichsstände	was	at	the	same	time	an	attack	on	the	Emperor,	who	was	widely	regarded	as	a	threat	to	these	liberties.	During	the	Schmalkaldic	Wars,	the	Protestant	princes’	 Imperium,	 or	 the	 freedom	 to	 govern	 their	 own	 territories	 as	they	 saw	 fit,	 was	 evoked	 to	 justify	 military	 opposition	 to	 the	Emperor.162	In	 1552,	 the	 trope	 was	 used	 to	 underpin	 the	 Treaty	 of	Chambord,	 an	 alliance	 between	 Henry	 II	 of	 France	 and	 a	 number	 of	Protestant	 princes. 163 	For	 the	 Protestant	 princes	 of	 the	 Empire,	association	with	the	King	of	France	could	bring	great	benefits.	Keen	to	maintain	 their	 political	 independence	 in	 the	 face	 of	 increasing	Habsburg	 influence,	 they	 deemed	 that	 a	 French	 victory	 would	 better	suit	 their	 interests.	 In	 their	 assessment,	 the	 Emperor	 was	 the	 bigger	threat	 than	 the	King	of	 France.164	Although	 the	 true	 foundation	of	 the	alliance	was	the	shared	animosity	to	the	Emperor,	by	adopting	the	title	‘Protector	 of	 German	 Liberties’,	 Henry	 II	 could	more	 easily	 justify	 his	military	expedition	crossing	the	Franco-Imperial	border.165	In	a	German	pamphlet,	 Henry	 explained	 his	 motives:	 The	 King	 claimed	 to	 act																																																									161	‘als	 ein	 armer	 junger	 und	 verdruckter	 fürst	 …	 der	 Deutschen	 Nation/	 alten/	löblichen/	 und	 fürstluchen	 Libertet/	 freiheit	 …	 gantz	 gerne	 suchen	 und	 gewinnen	wolte	…’	Warhaftiger	Abdruck	des	Durchleuchten	Hochgebornen	Fürsten	…,	f.	5	v.		162	Q.	 Skinner,	 The	 Foundations	 of	 Modern	 Political	 Thought,	 Volume	 II	 (Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1978):	pp.	189-238.		163	Barthold,	Deutschland	und	die	Hugenotten,	pp.	68-69.		164	J.	 Pariset,	 Les	 Relations	 entre	 la	 France	 et	 l’Allemagne	 au	 Milieu	 du	 XVIe	 Siècle	(Strasbourg:	Istra,	1981):	p.	131.		165	E.	 Armstrong,	 ‘The	 Italian	 Wars	 of	 Henry	 II’,	 The	 English	 Historical	 Review,	 30	(1916):	602-612;	F.	 J.	Baumgartner,	Henry	II,	King	of	France	1547-1559	 (Durham	NC:	Duke	University	Press,	1988):	pp.	146-159.		
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because	 he	 received	 ‘all	 sorts	 of	 grave	 complaints	 from	many	 Prince-electors,	princes,	and	other	distinguished	people	of	the	German	Nation,	who	complain	strongly	that	they	are	being	oppressed	by	an	unbearable	tyranny	and	servitude	by	the	Emperor	and	that	they	are	driven	into	an	eternal	 bondage	 and	 ruin	 …’166	Besides	 being	 driven	 by	 pity	 for	 the	German	people,	Henry	II	also	claimed	the	right	to	meddle	in	this	conflict	‘because	we	 [Henry]	 share	 a	 common	 origin	with	 the	 Germans,	 since	our	 ancestors	 were	 also	 German.’167	This	 is	 a	 particularly	 interesting	statement.	Echoing	humanist	debates	about	the	pre-Christian	origins	of	the	peoples	of	Europe,	Henry	claimed	a	close	affinity	with	the	German	princes	 on	 part	 of	 a	 shared	 ancestry.	 This	 added	 to	 the	 bond	 that	already	 existed	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 shared	 a	 common	 enemy.	During	the	military	campaign	that	followed,	Henry	II,	with	the	blessing	of	 the	 Protestant	 princes,	 captured	 ‘the	 three	 bishoprics’	 Toul,	 Metz,	and	Verdun,	all	francophone	cities	inside	the	Empire.168		 The	alliance	of	1552	 is	only	one	part	of	what	was	an	unusually	strong	 relationship.	 This	 amity	 between	 the	 King	 of	 France	 and	 the	German	 Protestant	 princes	 was	 mutually	 beneficial.	 The	 French	monarchy	benefitted	from	access	to	Landsknechts	and	Reiters	 from	the	Rhineland	 and	 beyond,	 providing	 the	 backbone	 of	 his	 army	 during	campaigns	 against	 the	 Habsburgs	 and	 England.	 The	 German	 princes	profited	 financially	 from	 service	 to	 the	 King,	 but	 also	 benefited	 from	their	political	association	to	one	of	Europe’s	most	powerful	monarchs,																																																									166	‘allerley	 schwere	 Klage	 für/	 vieler	 Churfürsten/	 fürsten	 und	 anderer	 trefflicher	Leuthe/	Teudscher	Nation/	die	sich	zum	höchsten	beklagen/	das	sie	mit	untraglicher	Tyranney	 un[d]	 Servitut	 von	 dem	 Keyser	 würden	 vertruckt/	 unnd	 inn	 ewige	dienstbarkeit	 und	 verderben	 …	 gefürt	 würden.’	 Anon.,	 Libertas	 Sendtschrifften	 des	
Königlichen	Maiestat	zu	Frankreich	etc.	An	die	Chur	und	Fürsten,	Stende	und	Stett	des	
Heiligen	Römischen	Reichs	Teutscher	Nation,	darinn	Sie	sich	irer	ytziger	Kriegsrüstung	
halben	uffs	Kürzest	Erkleret	(Fontainebleau:	s.	n.,	1552),	f.	3	v.		167	‘dieweil	 wir	 mit	 den	 Teudschen	 eine	 gemeinen	 Ursprung	 haben/	 dann	 es	 sein	unsere	fürfahren	auch	Teudsche[n]	gewesen’	Ibid,	f	3	r.		168	F.	 W.	 Barthold,	 Deutschland	 und	 die	 Hugenotten,	 Geschichte	 des	 Einflusses	 der	
Deutschen	 auf	 Frankreichs	 Kirkliche	 und	 Bürgerliche	 Verhältnisse	 von	 der	 Zeit	 des	
Schmalkaldischen	Bundes	bis	zum	Geseze	von	Nantes,	1531-1598	 (Bremen:	Verlag	von	Franz	Schlodtmann,	1848):	pp.	1-31;	Baumgartner,	Henry	II	…:	pp.	146-159;	K.	Brandi,	‘Karel	 V,	 Spanien	 und	 die	 Französische	 Rheinpolitik’,	 Historische	 Zeitschrift,	 167	(1943):	13-28.		
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helping	 them	 sustain	 their	 political	 autonomy	within	 the	Empire.	 The	strong	 relation	 between	 the	 French	 monarchy	 and	 the	 Protestant	princes,	 though	not	without	 strains,	 gave	an	extra	 impetus	 to	German	interest	 in	 events	 in	 France.	 Throughout	 the	 French	 Wars,	correspondence	between	German	nobles	and	 the	King	of	France	often	evoked	 their	 longstanding	 bond.169	The	 intensification	 of	 the	 German	princes’	interest	in	France	in	the	1550s	influenced	their	involvement	in	the	Wars	of	Religion	after	1562.		
1.4	Conclusion		The	realisation	that	identities	are	necessarily	multi-layered	has	become	well	 established	 in	 recent	 decades.	 The	 identity	 of	 the	 princes	 of	 the	Holy	Roman	Empire	was	particularly	complex.	First	and	foremost,	they	had	strong	ties	to	their	dynastic	heartlands,	with	which	they	were	most	directly	 identified	 through	 their	 titles.	 As	 rulers,	 their	 first	responsibility	was	to	these	regions.	Also,	their	primary	residences	were	located	 there.	 However,	 most	 princes	 owned	 a	 range	 of	 different	seigneuries,	 counties,	 and	 duchies	 besides	 their	 patrimonial	 lands.	Often	 these	 lands	 lay	 dispersed	 throughout	 the	 Empire	 and	 beyond;	sometimes	 they	 were	 hundreds	 of	 kilometres	 apart. 170 	Besides	responsibility	for	a	diverse	collection	of	family	possessions,	the	princes	also	had	a	stake	in	the	governance	of	the	Empire.	 In	the	Reichskreisen,	
Reichstag,	 and,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Counts	 Palatine	 and	 the	 Dukes	 of	Saxony,	 as	 Electors,	 the	 princes	 could	 project	 power	 throughout	 the	Empire.	 Also	 on	 the	 international	 political	 stage,	 the	 princes	 of	 the	Empire	 were	 players	 of	 significance,	 controlling	 access	 to	 some	 of																																																									169	Catherine	de’	Médici	to	Friedrich	III,	Johann	Wilhelm	of	Saxe-Weimar,	Christoph	of	Württemberg,	 Philipp	 of	 Hesse,	 and	 Philibert	 of	 Baden,	 November	 1566,	 H.	 de	 la	Ferrière	(ed.),	Lettres	de	Catherine	de	Médicis,	Volume	II:	1563-1566	(Paris:	Imprimerie	Nationale,	1885):	p.	397;	Wilhelm	of	Hesse	to	Charles	IX,	17	August	1568,	BNF,	15608:	f.	168;	Friedrich	III	to	the	Bishop	of	Rennes,	3	November	1567,	BNF,	15918:	f.	27-49.		170	For	 instance,	the	Duke	of	Württemberg’s	residence	in	Stuttgart	was	 just	over	200	kilometres	 away	 from	 the	 county	 of	 Montbéliard,	 one	 of	 his	 other	 territories.	 The	distance	between	Dillenburg	and	Orange,	both	owned	by	William	of	Orange,	was	more	than	800	kilometres.	
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Europe’s	 most	 sought-after	 mercenaries,	 engaging	 in	 military	campaigns,	 and	 establishing	 alliances	 with	 foreign	 monarchs.	 As	political	actors,	the	princes	thus	had	to	balance	their	local,	national,	and	international	interests.		 The	 cultural	 identity	 of	 the	 princes	 reflected	 the	multi-layered	nature	 of	 their	 political	 concerns	 and	 interests.	 The	 princes	 of	 the	Rhineland,	 such	 as	 the	 Landgraves	 of	 Hesse,	 Dukes	 of	 Württemberg,	Counts	 of	 Nassau,	 and	 Counts	 Palatine,	 were	 the	 dominant	 political	force	 in	 a	 region	 that	 was	 culturally,	 linguistically,	 and	 religiously	diverse.	 Although	 for	 the	 largest	 part	 their	 lands	were	 located	 in	 the	German-speaking	 part	 of	 the	 Empire,	 influences	 from	 France,	Switzerland,	 and	 the	 Low	 Countries	 had	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 the	culture,	 religion,	 and	politics	 of	 the	 region.	 The	 previously	mentioned	princes	 also	 showed	 a	 keen	 personal	 interest	 in	 France	 and	 the	 Low	Countries.	 They	 pursued	 their	 education	 at	 French	 universities,	 or	 at	the	court	of	the	King	of	France,	acquired	the	necessary	linguistic	skills	to	interact	with	the	French	and	Low	Countries	nobility,	and	maintained	correspondences	with	peers	across	 the	border.	They	were	 fully	aware	that	they	were	members	of	a	European	elite,	and	aimed	to	reinforce	this	status	 through	 the	 exchange	 of	 courtesies,	 news,	 and	 gifts	with	 peers	both	 inside	 and	 outside	 the	 Empire.	 The	 rise	 of	 humanism	 and	 the	popularity	 of	 its	 educational	 philosophy	 amongst	 Europe’s	 elite	contributed	 to	 the	 formation	 of	 a	 more	 homogenous	 international	aristocratic	 identity.	 Moreover,	 as	 patrons	 of	 art,	 architecture,	 and	scholarship,	 the	 German	 princes	 were	 among	 the	 first	 to	move	 away	from	 traditional	 German	 styles,	 instead	 commissioning	 buildings,	paintings,	 clothing,	 and	 music	 following	 the	 latest	 international	fashions.	 These	 visual	 statements	 helped	 to	 underline	 the	 princes’	cosmopolitanism.		 The	princes	of	the	Empire	were	nonetheless	also	aware	of	their	Germanness.	 When	 referring	 to	 themselves,	 they	 often	 spoke	 of	 ‘the	German	electors	and	princes’.171	Alternatively,	the	phrase	‘the	Estates	of																																																									171	‘die	Teutschen	Chur	und	fürsten’	HStASt,	A	71	Bü	920,	f.	56	a.		
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the	 Augsburg	 Confession’	 was	 also	 frequently	 used.172 	Although	 it	alludes	 to	 confessional	 rather	 than	 national	 identity,	 the	 Augsburg	Confession	was	nonetheless	a	quintessentially	German	creation.	Also	an	awareness	 of	 the	 history	 of	 the	 German	 peoples,	 both	 ancient	 and	recent,	 added	 to	 the	 growing	 importance	 of	 a	 German	 identity.	 The	popularity	 of	 Tacitus’	 Germania	 fostered	 the	 formation	 of	 national	sentiment.	The	appeals	 to	 the	 ‘German	Nation’s	ancient,	 laudable,	 and	princely	 liberty’	 that	 underpinned	 the	 princes’	 conflict	 with	 the	Emperor	are	illustrative	of	this	development.	As	will	become	apparent	in	 subsequent	 chapters,	 a	 concern	 for	 the	 safety	 and	 welfare	 of	 the	Empire,	 if	 not	 the	 Emperor,	 also	 informed	 the	 foreign	 policies	 of	 the	princes.		 Nonetheless,	it	should	be	concluded	that	the	permeable	Franco-Imperial	 border	 did	 by	 no	 means	 form	 a	 barrier	 creating	 a	 clear	distinction	between	‘French’	and	‘German’	concerns.	The	nobility	of	the	Rhineland	was	by	no	means	less	interested	in	events	in	Picardy	than	in	Pomerania	 simply	 because	 the	 latter	 was	 inside	 the	 Empire	 and	 the	former	was	not.	 In	fact,	religious	turmoil	 in	the	city	of	Troyes	was,	 for	instance,	much	more	likely	to	have	a	direct	effect	on	the	Rhineland	than	regional	 politics	 in	 Bohemia	 or	 Austria.	 Moreover,	 the	 intense	interaction	 between	 princes	 and	 nobles	 on	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 border	gave	 an	 extra	 dimension	 to	 German	 concerns	 about	 political	developments	 in	 France.	 At	 a	 time	 when	 national	 identity	 was	frequently	 defined	 in	 terms	 of	 loyalty	 to	 one’s	 monarch,	 the	 close	relation	between	the	King	of	France	and	the	German	Protestant	princes,	and	 their	 shared	hostility	 to	 the	Emperor,	 is	 illustrative	of	 the	French	orientation	of	the	princes.		 When	religious	turmoil	in	France	reached	boiling	point	in	1562,	the	strong	connection	between	the	German	Protestant	princes	and	the	French	nobility,	a	bond	that	intensified	during	the	1550s,	ensured	that	the	 troubles	 in	 France	 were	 not	 viewed	 as	 foreign	 events.	 Moreover,																																																																																																																																															172 	The	 envoys	 to	 the	 Imperial	 Diet	 to	 the	 Electors,	 15	 May	 1559,	 ‘die	 Stände	Augsburgischer	 Confession’	 Kluckhohn,	Briefe	 Friedrich	des	 Frommen	…	Volume	 I,	 p.	66.	
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due	 to	 the	 strong	 cultural	 and	 religious	 influence	 of	 France	 on	 the	Rhineland,	 there	 was	 a	 realisation	 that	 the	 violence	 could	 not	 be	expected	 to	 be	 contained	 by	 France’s	 borders.	 The	 interplay	 between	concerns	 for	 the	 advancement	 of	 dynastic	 interests,	 the	 protection	 of	their	 own	 lands	 and	 subjects	 as	 well	 as	 the	 Empire	 of	 the	 German	Nation,	 and	 their	 perceived	 role	 as	 players	 on	 the	 international	 stage	strongly	 informed	 the	 actions	 of	 the	 German	 Protestant	 princes	throughout	the	French	Wars	of	Religion.	
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II.		 Lutheran-Reformed	Relations		The	traditional	narrative	of	the	Reformation	in	general,	and	the	various	wars	 of	 religion	 in	 particular,	 places	 a	 strong	 emphasis	 on	 the	dichotomy	between	Catholics	 on	 the	 one	 side,	 and	Protestants	 on	 the	other.	 Encouraged	 by	 the	 intensification	 of	 constructive	 relations	between	 various	 Protestant	 movements	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 and	twentieth	 centuries,	 the	 lingering	 of	 strong	 anti-Catholic	 sentiments,	and	the	prominence	of	national	mythologies	that	emphasised	the	break	with	Rome	as	a	defining	moment	in	their	own	histories,	the	Protestant-Catholic	opposition	has	become	embedded	in	the	public	imagination	of	the	 Reformation.	 Even	 though	 historians	 are	 of	 course	 aware	 of	 the	different	denominations	that	are	collectively	referred	to	as	Protestants,	there	 still	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 tendency	 to	 regard	 Lutherans	 and	Reformed	Protestants	as	natural	allies	in	the	conflict	with	their	mutual	enemy,	the	Catholic	 powers	 of	 Europe.	 This	 perception	 has	 also	 shaped	understandings	of	the	involvement	of	German	Protestant	nobles	in	the	French	Wars	of	Religion.		 During	the	1560s,	the	most	intense	confessional	conflicts	taking	place	 in	 the	 German-speaking	 parts	 of	 the	 Holy	 Roman	 Empire	 were	fought	 between	 the	 various	 branches	 of	 Protestantism,	 rather	 than	between	Protestants	and	Catholics.	Fiery	disputes	between	Philippists	and	 Gnesio-Lutherans,	 the	 persecution	 of	 Anabaptists,	 and	 especially	the	doctrinal	disagreements	between	Lutherans	and	the	growing	group	of	Reformed	Protestants	all	had	a	damaging	effect	on	Protestant	unity.1	Because	 of	 the	 tradition	 of	 nationalist	 historiographies	 based	 on	modern	borders,	it	has	largely	been	missed	or	ignored	that	the	conflicts	between	 Lutherans	 and	 Reformed	 Protestants	 in	 the	 Empire	 reached	new	levels	of	intensity	at	almost	exactly	the	same	time	as	the	religious																																																									1 	B.	 Nischan,	 Lutherans	 and	 Calvinists	 in	 the	 Age	 of	 Confessionalism	 (Aldershot:	Ashgate,	1999):	pp.	142-158;	B.	Nischan,	 ‘Germany	after	1550’,	 in	A.	Pettegree	(ed.),	
The	Reformation	World	(London:	Routledge,	2000):	pp.	387-409.		
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wars	 erupted	 in	 France.	 The	 conversion	 of	 the	 Elector	 Palatine,	Friedrich	III,	which	led	to	the	publication	of	the	Heidelberg	catechism	in	1563,	 caused	 a	 profound	 crisis	 among	 the	 princes	 of	 the	 Augsburg	Confession.	 The	 political,	 legal,	 and	 doctrinal	 crisis	 provoked	 by	Friedrich’s	 conversion	 and	 the	 increasing	 popularity	 of	 Reformed	Protestantism	 in	 the	 Empire	 strongly	 influenced	 German	 attitudes	 to	the	Wars	of	Religion	 in	France.	Both	developments	 forced	the	German	Lutheran	 princes	 to	 reconsider	 their	 position	 in	 relation	 to	Reformed	Protestantism.	It	was	clear	that	there	were	differences	between	the	two	creeds,	but	were	they	insurmountable?	And,	considering	that	the	Peace	of	Augsburg	only	recognised	Catholicism	and	Lutheranism,	what	in	the	eyes	of	 the	princes	was	the	 legal	status	of	 the	Reformed	faith?	Finally,	and	most	importantly,	would	it	be	prudent,	or	even	morally	justifiable,	to	back	the	Reformed	Protestants	in	France?		 Only	 by	 approaching	 the	 topic	 of	 Lutheran-Reformed	 relations	from	 a	 transnational	 angle	 is	 it	 possible	 to	make	 sense	 of	 the	way	 in	which	 attitudes	 to	 and	 ideas	 about	 this	 relationship	 were	 formed.	Reinforced	 by	 the	 international	 outlook	 of	 the	 Empire’s	 aristocracy,	their	understanding	of	the	nature	of	the	confessional	landscape	was	as	much	 influenced	 by	 events	 and	 ideas	 from	 France	 as	 from	 Germany.	The	 princes,	 connected	 by	 a	 sense	 of	 a	 shared	 purpose,	 had	 a	 strong	tradition	of	cooperation	on	religious	issues.	This	tradition	ensured	that	the	 events	 of	 the	 1560s	 provoked	 a	 rich	 debate	 among	 the	 German	Protestant	 elite.	 Geographic	 separation	 in	 turn	made	 correspondence	the	most	 important	medium	 through	which	 these	 debates	were	 held.	This	correspondence	of	the	Protestant	princes	thus	provides	historians	with	 a	 unique	 insight	 into	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 inter-confessional	relations	 were	 debated.	 Moreover,	 their	 letters	 reveal	 how	 these	debates	changed	overtime,	even	if	these	changes	were	only	subtle.			This	chapter	will	first	briefly	review	the	recent	historiographical	developments	 that	 help	 to	 create	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 the	wide	range	 of	 different	 confessional	 positions	 and	 identities	 that	 existed	 in	France	and	the	Empire	in	the	mid-sixteenth	century.	Secondly,	the	state	of	 Lutheran-Reformed	 relations	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 1555	 Peace	 of	
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Augsburg	will	be	investigated.	Furthermore,	the	conversion	of	Friedrich	III	and	the	crisis	that	followed	will	be	discussed.	Finally,	the	effect	of	the	abovementioned	developments	on	German	Lutheran	understandings	of	the	 conflict	 in	 France,	 both	 among	 the	 princes	 and	 the	 wider	population,	 will	 be	 highlighted.	 It	 will	 be	 demonstrated	 that	 the	question	 of	 how	 to	 react	 to	 the	 growth	 of	 Reformed	 Protestantism	caused	 a	 rift	 amongst	 the	 German	 Lutheran	 princes.	 This	 rift	 had	significant	 consequences	 for	 German	 attitudes	 to	 the	 French	Wars	 of	Religion	 as	 it	 conditioned	 the	 possibility	 of	 intervention:	 an	 emphatic	rejection	of	 the	Reformed	religion	 in	effect	ruled	out	 the	possibility	of	cooperation	with	 the	Huguenots,	whereas	 recognition	 of	 the	 common	ground	shared	by	the	two	confessions	made	cooperation	possible.		
2.1	The	history	of	the	‘middle	parties’		During	 the	 last	 two	 decades,	 a	 number	 of	 historians	 have	 aimed	 to	break	down	the	traditionally	rigid	division	of	the	Christian	religion	into	the	monolithic	and	static	blocks	of	Catholics,	Lutherans,	and	Reformed	Protestants.	 Instead,	 they	 have	 zoomed	 in	 on	 a	 range	 of	 different	positions	that	can	collectively	be	described	as	the	‘middle	parties’.	This	term	was	 coined	by	Mario	Turchetti	 to	describe	 the	variety	of	French	groups	 that	 sought	 a	 via	media	 and	 to	 de-escalate	 the	 rising	 religious	tensions.2	The	 middle	 parties	 consisted	 of	 people	 with	 a	 range	 of	different	 attitudes	 towards	 the	 question	 of	 religious	 pluralism.	Although	 few	 advocated	 the	 formation	 of	 multi-religious	 states,	Turchetti	and	others	have	brought	to	our	attention	those	who	defended	the	necessity	to	arrange	some	sort	of	temporary	mode	of	coexistence.3	These	groups	are	known	under	a	number	of	different	names.	The	terms																																																									2	M.	Turchetti,	‘Middle	parties	in	France	during	the	wars	of	religion’,	in	P.	Benedict,	G.	Marnef,	 H.	 van	 Nierop,	 and	 M.	 Venard	 (eds.),	 Reformation,	 Revolt	 and	 Civil	 War	 in	
France	and	 the	Netherlands,	1555-1585	 (Amsterdam:	Royal	Netherlands	Academy	 of	Arts	and	Sciences,	1999):	pp.	69-82.		3	A.	 Duke,	 ‘The	 ambivalent	 face	 of	 Calvinism	 in	 the	 Netherlands,	 1561-1618’,	 in	 M.	Prestwich	 (ed.),	 International	Calvinism,	1541-1715	 (Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1985):	pp.	109-134,	on	p.	118.		
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moyenneurs,	 moderates,	 and	 politiques	 are	 all	 used	 to	 refer	 to	 this	group,	which,	it	has	to	be	emphasised,	was	by	no	means	uniform.4	The	terminology	 used	 to	 describe	 them	 is	 largely	 borrowed	 from	 their	opponents,	 who	 frequently	 accused	 proponents	 of	 concord	 and	coexistence	of	putting	political	considerations	above	religious	idealism	(hence	 the	 term	 politiques).	 This	 term	 has	 become	 part	 of	 the	historian’s	 vocabulary	 and	 is	 often	 used	 to	 label	 those	 individuals	 or	groups	who	do	not	easily	fit	in	the	traditional	confessional	categories.5	For	 instance,	William	of	Orange,	whose	private	beliefs	are	notoriously	hard	to	establish,	is	described	by	Jonathan	Israel	as	‘the	arch-politique’.6	Taking	 the	 derogatory	 nature	 of	 the	 terminology	 into	 account,	 it	 is	important	to	realise	that	this	category	of	beliefs	is	not	the	product	of	a	process	 of	 self-identification,	 but	 rather	 of	 the	 abuse	 of	 their	adversaries,	who	accused	 them	of	nicodemism,	crypto-atheism,	and	of	being	 ‘weathervanes’,	 turning	 with	 every	 religious	 wind.7	Those	 who	belonged	to	the	middle	parties	would	never	have	identified	themselves	as	such.	One	 of	 the	 most	 extensive	 works	 on	 the	 topic	 of	 unorthodox	religious	 identities	 is	Thierry	Wanegffelen’s	Ni	Rome	Ni	Genève,	which	provides	a	remarkably	wide-ranging	exploration	of	the	large	variety	of	different	 religious	 positions	 that	 could	 be	 found	 in	 mid-sixteenth	
																																																								4	Q.	 Skinner,	 The	 Foundations	 of	 Modern	 Political	 Thought,	 Volume	 II	 (Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1978):	pp.	149-150;	M.	Turchetti,	‘Religious	concord	and	political	 tolerance	 in	 sixteenth-	 and	 seventeenth-century	 France’,	 The	 Sixteenth	
Century	 Journal,	 22	 (1991):	 15-25;	 J.	 Woltjer,	 ‘Political	 moderates	 and	 religious	moderates	in	the	Revolt	of	the	Netherlands’,	in	P.	Benedict,	G.	Marnef,	H.	van	Nierop,	and	M.	Venard	(eds.),	Reformation,	Revolt	and	Civil	War	in	France	and	the	Netherlands,	
1555-1585	(Amsterdam:	Royal	Netherlands	Academy	of	Arts	and	Sciences,	1999):	pp.	185-200.		5	T.	 A.	 Brady,	 German	 Histories	 in	 the	 Age	 of	 Reformations,	 1400-1650	 (Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2009):	pp.	250-251.		6	J.	 I.	 Israel,	 The	 Dutch	 Republic,	 Its	 Rise,	 Greatness,	 and	 Fall,	 1477-1806	 (Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1995):	p.	96.		7	E.	 Fulton,	 ‘”Wolves	 and	 weathervanes”:	 Confessional	 moderation	 at	 the	 Habsburg	court	 of	 Vienna’,	 in	 L.	 Racaut	 and	 A.	 Ryrie	 (eds.),	Moderate	 Voices	 in	 the	 European	
Reformation	(Aldershot:	Ashgate,	2005):	pp.	145-161.		
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century	France.8	Wanegffelen	approaches	 the	 topic	by	 focusing	on	 the	lives	 and	 beliefs	 of	 a	 number	 of	 different	 clergymen,	 theologians,	 and	political	 thinkers,	 all	 men	 who	 did	 not	 quite	 fit	 into	 the	 doctrinal	frameworks	 that	were	 emerging.9	Wanegffelen’s	 greatest	 contribution	is	 his	 focus	 on	 the	 individuality	 of	 belief.	 Although	 he	 too	 writes	extensively	on	the	party	of	the	moyenneurs,	Wanegffelen	looks	beyond	these	 categories.	 He	 raises	 the	 question	 of	 what	 exactly	 constituted	orthodoxy	 in	 a	 mid-sixteenth	 century	 context	 and	 concludes	 that	opinions	on	this	matter	were	divided.10	This	 discussion	 echoes	 debates	 that	 were	 taking	 place	 in	 the	sixteenth	 century.	 The	 disputes	 between	 Gnesio-Lutherans	 and	Philippists	 that	 erupted	 after	 the	 death	 of	 Martin	 Luther	 in	 1546	centred	 around	 the	 ‘adiaphora	 controversy’;	 the	 disagreement	 over	which	elements	of	Lutheranism	were	non-negotiable,	and	which	could	be	 considered	 as	 ‘externals’.11	In	 other	 words,	 there	 was	 profound	disagreement	 over	 the	 question	 of	 which	 doctrines	 one	 had	 to	subscribe	to	in	order	to	be	considered	a	‘genuine’	Lutheran.		 The	 urge	 to	 categorise	 the	 various	 confessional	 positions	described	above	as	moderates,	moyenneurs,	and	politiques	ensures	that	the	 danger	 of	 oversimplification	 lurks	 around	 the	 corner.	 One	 of	 the	main	 conclusions	 that	 should	 be	 drawn	 from	 the	 work	 of	 Turchetti,	Wanegffelen,	and	others	 is	 that	 it	 is	dangerous	 to	assume	that	we	can	understand	 one’s	 exact	 set	 of	 beliefs	 simply	 by	 looking	 at	 what	confession	 they	 belonged	 to.	 This	 is	 clearly	 illustrated	 by	 Gerald	Strauss,	who	highlighted	the	astonishingly	wide	gap	between	Lutheran	doctrines	 as	 disseminated	 in	 catechisms,	 teaching,	 and	 preaching	 and	the	 level	 of	 understanding	 of	 these	 doctrines	 found	 by	 visitations	
																																																								8	T.	Wanegffelen,	Ni	Rome	Ni	Genève,	Des	Fidèles	entre	Deux	Chaires	en	France	an	XVIe	
Siècle	(Paris:	Honoré	Champion	Éditeur,	1997).		9	ibid,	pp.	37-74.		10	ibid,	pp.	3-31.		11	Nischan,	‘Germany	after	1550’,	pp.	387-409.		
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among	 the	 rural	 populations	 of	 Germany. 12 	Although	 the	 princes	studied	 in	 this	 thesis	 consistently	 display	 a	much	more	 sophisticated	understanding	 of	 theological	 issues,	 it	 is	 nonetheless	 important	 to	recognise	that	the	set	of	beliefs	they	held	did	not	necessarily	completely	conform	 to	 orthodox	 Lutheranism	 as	 captured	 in	 the	 Augsburg	Confession	 and	 the	 theological	 writings	 of	 Luther,	 even	 if	 the	differences	 might	 be	 subtle.	 Moreover,	 as	 has	 recently	 been	demonstrated	 by	 Stuart	 Carroll,	 noblemen	 with	 similar	 confessional	backgrounds	 could	 differ	 strongly	 in	 opinion	 about	 politics. 13	‘Protestant	 loyalists’	 abhorred	 anything	 that	 smacked	 of	 rebellion,	which	once	again	 illustrates	the	need	to	appreciate	the	nuances	of	 the	various	positions	held	by	Catholics,	Lutherans,	and	Calvinists.	As	will	 be	 demonstrated	 in	 this	 chapter,	 the	 German	 Lutheran	princes	found	it	difficult	to	formulate	a	uniform	answer	to	the	question	of	how	to	position	themselves	in	relation	to	Reformed	Protestants,	both	in	and	outside	the	Empire.	This	was	a	question	with	strong	political	as	well	as	theological	overtones.		
2.2	The	Peace	of	Augsburg		The	 establishment	 of	 the	 Peace	 of	 Augsburg	 in	 1555	 had	 a	 profound	impact	 on	 relations	 between	 Lutherans	 and	 Reformed	 Protestants	inside	 the	 Holy	 Roman	 Empire	 and	 beyond.	 The	 fact	 that	 the	 Peace	influenced	the	politics	and	religion	of	the	Empire	so	strongly	is	in	itself	surprising.	The	Peace	of	Augsburg	was	intended	to	be	a	political	rather	than	 a	 religious	 solution;	 it	 was	 negotiated	 by	 lawyers	 instead	 of	theologians	 and	 was	 widely	 expected	 to	 be	 short	 lived.	 14 	It	 was	assumed	that	it	would	soon	be	superseded	either	by	the	establishment																																																									12	G.	 Strauss,	 ‘Success	 and	 failure	 in	 the	 German	 Reformation’,	 Past	 &	 Present,	 67	(1975):	30-60.		13	S.	 Carroll,	 ‘”Nager	 entre	 deux	 eaux”:	 The	 princes	 and	 the	 ambiguities	 of	 French	Protestantism’,	The	Sixteenth	Century	Journal,	44	(2013):	985-1020.		14	T.	 A.	 Brady,	 E.	 Cameron,	 and	 H.	 Cohn,	 ‘The	 politics	 of	 religion:	 The	 Peace	 of	Augsburg	 1555,	 a	 roundtable	 discussion	 between	 Thomas	 A.	 Brady,	 Euan	 Cameron	and	Henry	Cohn’,	German	History,	24	(2006):	85-105.		
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of	a	permanent	restoration	of	religious	unity	in	a	general	council	or	by	an	 overall	 Catholic	 or	 Lutheran	 victory.	 The	 Peace	was	 negotiated	 by	two	parties	with	a	 strong	desire	 for	a	 short	 time	of	 reprieve	 in	which	they	 could	 consolidate	 their	 respective	 positions.15	The	 fact	 that	 the	Peace	 was	 in	 essence	 an	 undesirable	 compromise	 shines	 through	 in	some	of	 the	disappointed	reactions	 that	appeared	directly	after	 it	was	signed.	 Christoph	 of	 Württemberg,	 for	 instance,	 created	 a	 document	entitled	 ‘the	 reservations	 and	 complaints	 that	 I	 have	 concerning	 the	religious	 peace’,	 in	 which	 he	 listed	 six	 major	 grievances. 16 	For	Christoph,	 it	 was	 hardest	 to	 swallow	 that	 he	was	 now	 obliged,	 albeit	only	 temporarily,	 to	 look	on	passively	as	his	coreligionists	were	being	persecuted	 in	 the	 Catholic	 regions	 of	 the	 Empire:	 ‘5)	 The	 poor	Christians	outside	the	Empire	in	the	patrimonial	 lands	of	the	Emperor	and	 the	 King,	 those	 who	 should	 be	 supported	 by	 the	 estates	 of	 the	Empire,	are	not	considered;	we	 let	 those	singe	and	burn	miserably.	6)	So	also	…	the	poor	Christians	…	inside	the	Empire.’17		 It	 is	 remarkable	 how	quickly	 a	 construction	 that	was	 intended	and	 expected	 by	 most	 to	 be	 a	 temporary	 solution	 became	 the	 status	quo.	The	 failure	of	 the	Council	of	Trent	 to	 reunite	 the	church	ensured	that	 the	settlement	of	1555	became	a	seemingly	permanent	 feature	of	the	confessional	landscape	of	the	Empire.18	This	process	is	reflected	in	the	language	used	by	the	princes	to	describe	the	Peace.	In	1567,	twelve	years	 after	 its	 establishment,	 Wilhelm	 of	 Hesse	 described	 it	 as	 ‘an	
																																																								15	H.	Tüchle,	 ‘The	Peace	of	Augsburg:	New	order	or	 lull	 in	 the	 fighting’,	 in	H.	 J.	Cohn	(ed.),	Government	 in	Reformation	Europe,	1520-1560	 (London:	Macmillan,	 1971):	 pp.	145-165.		16	‘Was	ich	für	bedenken	und	berschwert	im	religionsfriden	hab’.	V.	Ernst,	Briefwechsel	
des	 Herzogs	 Christoph	 von	 Wirtemberg,	 Volume	 III	 (Stuttgart:	 Verlag	 von	 W.	Kohlhammer,	1902):	p.	341.		17	‘So	 sind	 die	 armen	 Christen	 usserhalb	 reichs	 in	 der	 Kai.	 und	 Ku.	 mt.	 erblanden,	denen	die	stend	des	reichs	sonst	hilf	thuen	muessen	…,	mit	nichten	bedacht;	die	lassen	wir	sengen	und	brennen	jammerlich.	So	…	der	armen	christen	…	auch	im	reich	…’	Ibid,	pp.	341-242.		18	H.	 Schilling,	 Religion,	 Political	 Culture	 and	 the	 Emergence	 of	 Early	Modern	 Society	(Leiden:	Brill,	1992):	pp.	205-245.		
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everlasting	peace’.19	During	the	first	decade	after	its	establishment,	the	Peace	of	Augsburg	thus	became	much	more	than	it	was	intended	to	be.	It	 changed	 from	 a	 temporary	 political	 and	 legalistic	 solution	 into	 a	longstanding	 mode	 of	 religious	 coexistence,	 which	 facilitated	 the	transformation	 of	 the	 Empire	 into	 a	 patchwork	 of	 Catholic	 and	Lutheran	states	and	cities.		
2.2.1	The	legal	status	of	Lutheranism		The	 development	 described	 above	 had	 a	 transformative	 effect	 on	 the	position	of	 the	Lutheran	religion	within	 the	Empire,	and	consequently	also	on	the	relation	between	Lutherans	and	Reformed	Protestants.	The	text	of	the	Peace	of	Augsburg	makes	it	explicitly	clear	that	the	religious	freedoms	 awarded	 by	 the	 Peace	 only	 extended	 to	 Lutheran	Protestantism:	 ‘So	 shall	 we,	 the	 Imperial	 Majesty,	 …	 with	 violence	overthrow,	damage,	or	violate	no	Estate	of	the	Empire	on	account	of	the	Augsburg	Confession	and	 its	doctrines,	religion,	and	beliefs	nor	 in	any	other	way	against	his	conscience,	morality,	and	will	drive	him	from	the	Augsburg	 Confession’s	 religion,	 beliefs,	 practices,	 order,	 and	ceremonies	…’20	Lacking	a	 commonly	used	 term	 for	what	we	now	call	Lutheranism,	choosing	the	Augsburg	Confession	as	a	touchstone	for	the	legally	acceptable	form	of	Protestantism	seems	sensible.	The	creation	of	the	 Confession	 in	 1530	 was	 in	 itself	 an	 attempt	 comprehensively	 to	capture	the	nature	of	the	new	religion	in	one	document.	The	Augsburg	Confession	is	fairly	complete,	including	articles	on	theology,	liturgy,	and																																																									19	‘ein	 ewig	 währender	 Friede’	 Wilhelm	 of	 Hesse	 to	 the	 princes	 of	 the	 Palatinate,	Württemberg,	and	Baden,	7	September	1567,	A.	Kluckhohn	(ed.),	Briefe	Friedrich	des	
Frommen,	 Kurfürsten	 von	 der	 Pfalz,	 mit	 Verwandten	 Schriftstücken,	 Volume	 II	(Braunschweig:	C.	A.	Schwetschte	und	Sohn,	1870):	p.	88.		20 	‘So	 sollen	 die	 Kayserl.	 Maj.	 …	 keinen	 Stand	 des	 Reichs	 von	 wegen	 der	Augspurgischen	 Confession	 und	 derselbigen	 Lehr,	 Religion	 un	 Glaubens	 halb	 …	gewaltiger	Weiß	überziehen,	beschädigen,	vergewaltigen	oder	in	andere	Wege	wider	sein	 Conscientz,	 Gewissen	 und	 Willen	 von	 dieser	 Augspurgischen	 Confessions-Religion,	 Glauben,	 Kirchengebräuchen,	 Ordnungen	 und	 Ceremonien	 …	 tringen’	‘Augsburger	 Reichsabschied’,	 Internet-Portal	 “Westfälische	 Geschichte,	 Accessed	November	13,	2014.		http://www.lwl.org/westfaelische-geschichte/portal/Internet/finde/langDatensatz.php?urlID=739&url_tabelle=tab_quelle.					
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ecclesiology.	 The	 central	 role	 of	 the	 Confession	 in	 the	 articles	 of	 the	Peace	 of	 Augsburg	 gave	 the	 text,	 and	 its	 corresponding	 beliefs	 and	religious	practices,	a	new	status.	From	September	1555,	the	‘religion	of	the	 Augsburg	 Confession’	 enjoyed	 legal	 recognition	 as	 one	 of	 the	 two	officially	recognised	religions	of	the	Empire.		 Together	with	legitimising	the	Augsburg	Confession,	the	Peace	of	Augsburg	 also	 implicitly	 widened	 the	 gap	 between	 Lutheranism	 and	Reformed	 Protestantism.	 As	 Johann	 of	 Nassau-Dillenburg,	 brother	 of	William	of	Orange,	phrased	it,	‘we	should	also	take	into	account,	that	…	in	 the	 religious	 peace,	 created	 in	 1555	 at	 Augsburg,	…	 the	 Zwinglian,	Calvinist,	and	similar	religions	were	expressly	 forbidden	and	excluded	from	the	peace.’21	Whereas	before,	though	significant	tensions	between	the	two	religions	already	existed,	Lutherans	and	Reformed	Protestants	were	both	subjected	to	Catholic	aggression	and	considered	unlawful	or	seditious	movements,	the	Peace	of	Augsburg	created	a	clear	distinction	between	legal	and	illegal	Protestantism.	Moreover,	the	use	of	the	text	of	the	Augsburg	Confession	as	the	instrument	of	defining	what	this	legally	sanctioned	 Protestantism	 exactly	 entailed	 left	 other	 Protestants	 little	room	for	manoeuvre.		 The	 Peace	 of	 Augsburg	 was	 of	 little	 use	 to	 many	 Lutherans	throughout	the	Empire,	since,	in	Johann	of	Nassau’s	words,	‘no	Estate	of	the	Empire	that	subscribes	to	the	old	Papist	religion	is	compelled	to	let	their	subjects,	who	follow	the	Augsburg	Confession,	 live	in	their	 lands,	let	 alone	 allow	 them	 to	 teach	 and	 preach	 openly.’22 	However,	 the	princes	studied	in	this	thesis	were	the	main	benefactors	of	the	Peace.	As	possessors	of	 the	 Ius	Reformandi,	 the	Lutheran	princes,	 including	such	figures	as	the	Duke	of	Württemberg,	Landgrave	of	Hesse,	and	Count	of																																																									21	‘wirdt	 auch	 hiebey	 erwogen,	 das	 …	 im	 religionfrieden,	 Anno	 55	 zu	 Augspürg	uffgericht,	 …	 die	 Zwinglischen,	 Calvinische	 und	 dergleiche	 lähren	 auszdrücklich	verboten	und	von	Religionsfrieden	auszgeschlossenn	[sind]’	Johann	of	Nassau	to	Louis	of	Nassau,	October	1566,	G.	Groen	van	Prinsterer,	Archives	ou	Correspondance	Inédite	
d’Orange-Nassau,	Volume	II	(Leiden:	Luchtmans,	1835):	pp.	352-353.		22	‘kein	standt	des	Raichs,	so	der	altenn	Papistischen	Religion	vonn	alters	zugethann	gewesen,	 schuldig	 ist	 seinen	 underthanen,	 so	 der	 Augspürgischen	 Confession	anhengig,	 under	 sich	 zu	wohnen,	 viel	weniger	 öffentlich	 zu	 lähren	und	 zu	predigen,	zugestatten.’	Johann	of	Nassau	to	Louis	of	Nassau,	October	1566,	ibid,	pp.	352-253.		
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Nassau,	were	 able	 to	 consolidate	 the	Reformations	 of	 their	 territories	whilst	 removing	 the	 stain	 of	 disloyalty,	 sedition,	 or	 rebellion	 that	tarnished	 their	 reputation	 during	 the	 early	 Reformation	 and	Schmalkaldic	 War.23	No	 wonder	 that,	 as	 will	 become	 apparent,	 the	princes	 embraced	 the	 Peace	 of	 Augsburg	 and	 consistently	 displayed	great	commitment	to	its	maintenance	and	protection.	
	
2.2.2	Reformed	Protestantism	in	the	Empire		Although	 Reformed	 Protestantism	 in	 the	 Empire	 flourished	 relatively	late,	 its	 influence	 had	 already	 been	 felt	 much	 earlier.	 Before	Protestantism	 crystallised	 into	 clearly	 distinguishable	 confessions,	ideas	and	doctrines	that	can	be	described	as	belonging	to	the	Reformed	tradition	 can	 be	 detected	 in	 the	 Protestant	 parts	 of	 the	 Empire,	 and	especially	 those	 regions	 close	 to	 Zurich	 and	 Strasbourg.	 The	dissemination	of	Reformed	ideas	was	encouraged	by	the	movement	of	preachers	 and	 theologians	 from	 these	 cities	 to	 other	 urban	 centres	throughout	Germany.	Christopher	Close,	for	instance,	has	examined	the	practice	 of	 southern	 German	 cities	 to	 look	 to	 Zwinglian	 Zurich	 as	 a	source	 for	 Protestant	 preachers	 during	 the	 Schmalkaldic	 War. 24	Similarly,	 Thomas	 Brady	 has	 demonstrated	 how	 some	 elements	 of	Zwinglian	 thought,	 particularly	 its	 emphasis	 on	 civic	 independence,	became	popular	in	many	Protestant	cities	near	the	Swiss	border.25	The	proximity	 of	 Zurich,	 and	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent	 Strasbourg,	 as	well	 as	 the	arrival	of	Reformed	exiles	from	the	Low	Countries	and	France,	ensured	that	 the	 Reformed	 influences	 were	 particularly	 strong	 in	 the	Rhineland.26	
																																																								23	Brady,	German	Histories,	pp.	229-256.		24 	C.	 W.	 Close,	 ‘Augsburg,	 Zurich,	 and	 the	 transfer	 of	 preachers	 during	 the	Schmalkaldic	War’,	Central	European	History,	42	(2009):	595-619.		25	T.	 A.	 Brady,	 Turning	 Swiss,	 Cities	 and	 Empire,	 1450-1550	 (Cambridge:	 Cambridge	University	Press,	1985):	pp.	184-221.		26	Brady,	German	Histories,	p.	252.		
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	 A	 second	 reason	 for	 the	 spread	 of	 Reformed	 Protestantism	 in	Germany	was	 the	 theology	 of	 Philipp	Melanchthon	 and	 his	 followers.	The	 Variata	 version	 of	 the	 Augsburg	 Confession,	 and	 its	 slight	rephrasing	of	the	doctrine	of	the	Eucharist,	opened	the	door	for	a	Swiss	interpretation	 of	 the	 sacrament	 of	 the	 Lord’s	 Supper.27	It	 has	 been	noted	 that	 throughout	 the	 sixteenth	 century,	 the	 conversion	 of	Lutheran	 princes	 and	 territories	 to	 Reformed	 Protestantism	 was	 in	most	 cases	 preceded	 by	 a	 ‘Philippist	 transitional	 phase’. 28	Melanchthon’s	 influences	were	 strong	 in	 the	Rhineland,	 even	 in	 those	places	that	did	not	turn	to	Reformed	Protestantism	later	in	the	century.	The	 Lutheran	 Ottheinrich	 had	 attempted	 to	 appoint	 Melanchthon	himself,	as	well	as	Matthias	Flacius	and	Johannes	Brenz,	to	positions	at	the	 university	 of	 Heidelberg.29	Philipp	 of	 Hesse,	 whose	 conversion	 to	Protestantism	had	been	inspired	by	Melanchthon,	and	his	son	Wilhelm	aimed	 to	 pursue	 a	 ‘Middle	 Road	 policy’,	 but	 the	 increasing	 contrast	between	the	two	variations	of	Protestantism	forced	Wilhelm	to	commit	solely	 to	Lutheranism.30	The	Peace	of	Augsburg	contributed	heavily	 to	the	on-going	process	of	 clearly	 separating	Lutheranism	and	Reformed	Protestantism	 doctrinally	 and	 politically,	 for	 instance	 through	 the	publication	of	the	first	and	second	Helvetic	Confessions.31																																																												27	Schilling,	Religion,	Political	Culture	and	the	Emergence	of	Early	Modern	Society…:	p.	218;	E.	Cameron,	‘The	possibilities	and	limits	of	conciliation,	Philipp	Melanchthon	and	inter-confessional	 dialogue	 in	 the	 sixteenth	 century’,	 in	 H.	 P	 Louthan	 and	 R.	 C.	Zachman	 (eds.),	 Conciliation	 and	 Confession,	 The	 Struggle	 for	 Unity	 in	 the	 Age	 of	
Reform,	1415-1648	(Notre	Dame:	University	of	Notre	Dame	Press,	2004):	pp.	73-88.		28	Schilling,	 Religion,	 Political	 Culture	 and	 the	 Emergence	 of	 Early	Modern	 Society,	 p.	263.		29 	V.	 Press,	 Calvinismus	 und	 Territorialstaat,	 Regierung	 und	 Zentralbehörden	 der	
Kurpfalz,	1559-1619	(Stuttgart:	Ernst	Klett	Verlag,	1970):	pp.	221-222;	H.	J.	Cohn,	‘The	territorial	 princes	 in	 Germany’s	 Second	 Reformation,	 1559-1622’,	 in	 M.	 Prestwich	(ed.),	International	Calvinism,	1541-1715	(Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1985):	p.	144.		30 	D.	 Mayes,	 ‘Heretics	 or	 nonconformists?	 State	 policies	 towards	 Anabaptists	 in	sixteenth-century	Hesse’,	The	Sixteenth	Century	Journal,	32	(2001):	1003-1026.		31	Schilling,	 Religion,	 Political	 Culture	 and	 the	 Emergence	 of	 Early	Modern	 Society,	 p.	218.	
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2.2.3	Lutheran	hostility	towards	Reformed	Protestantism		The	 legal	 distinction	 between	 Lutheranism	 and	 Reformed	Protestantism	that	was	created	by	the	Peace	of	Augsburg,	as	well	as	the	increasingly	 clear	 doctrinal	 distinction	 between	 the	 two	 confessions,	fuelled	 the	 sense	 of	 hostility	 towards	 Zwinglians	 and	 Calvinists	harboured	by	many	Lutherans.	These	anti-Reformed	sentiments	can	be	divided	into	two	elements:	doctrinal	and	political.		 Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 theological	 differences	 between	Lutheranism	and	the	various	 forms	of	Reformed	Protestantism	can	be	found	in	a	variety	of	different	areas,	including	soteriology,	ecclesiology,	and	 liturgy,	 the	 Lutheran	 princes	 almost	 exclusively	 focussed	 on	 only	one	 key	 theological	 difference:	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 Eucharist.	 This	 is	particularly	 interesting	 for	 two	 reasons.	 Firstly,	 it	 can	 be	 argued	 that	the	Lutheran	understanding	of	 the	Lord’s	Supper,	and	 its	 focus	on	 the	Real	 Presence,	 was	 on	 the	 theological	 spectrum	 much	 closer	 to	 the	Catholic	 interpretation	than	to	either	Zwinglianism	or	Calvinism.	Even	though	 Lutherans	 denied	 the	 agency	 of	 a	 consecrated	 priest	 through	transubstantiation,	 they	 nonetheless	 put	 a	 strong	 emphasis	 on	 the	bodily	 presence	 of	 Christ	 in	 the	 bread	 and	 wine.	 Both	 Calvin,	 who	constructed	 the	 doctrine	 of	 the	 ‘Spiritual	 Real	 Presence’	 and	 Zwingli,	who	explained	the	Supper	as	a	commemorative	act,	denied	that	Christ	is	‘substantially	 present’.	 Although	 Melanchthon’s	 Confessio	 Augustana	
Variata	is	on	purpose	ambiguous	on	this	topic,	for	many	Lutherans	the	doctrine	of	the	Real	Presence	was	(and	is)	central	to	their	religion.	The	fact	that	the	Huguenots	in	France	espoused	a	Eucharistic	theology	that	by	 most	 Protestant	 German	 princes	 was	 regarded	 as	 ‘infuriating	propositions’,	and	that	their	opponents,	the	French	Catholics,	defended	a	position	very	similar	to	that	of	the	Lutheran	princes,	is	significant.32		
																																																								32	‘ergerliche	propositiones’	Wolfgang	of	Zweibrücken	to	Friedrich	III,	21	June	1560,	A.	Kluckhohn	 (ed.),	 Briefe	 Friedrich	 des	 Frommen,	 Kurfürsten	 von	 der	 Pfalz,	 mit	
Verwandten	 Schriftstücken,	 Volume	 I	 (Braunschweig,	 C.A.	 Schwetschte	 und	 Sohn,	1868):	p.	140.		
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	 Secondly,	the	social	importance	of	the	Eucharist	in	the	sixteenth	century	has	been	emphasised	by	a	number	of	historians.	Participation	in	 the	 celebration	 of	 the	 Eucharist,	 and,	 in	 the	 Catholic	 world,	 in	 the	
Corpus	Christi	and	other	Eucharistic	processions,	enforced	the	unity	of	society.33 	The	 annual	 participation	 in	 taking	 communion	 was	 only	possible	 if	 the	 individual	 was	 ‘in	 a	 state	 of	 reconciliation	 with	 the	church’.34	The	 resolving	 of	 disputes	 in	 the	 community	 was	 also	 often	sealed	by	participation	in	the	mass.	Communion	thus	at	the	same	time	served	as	a	facilitator	for	good	neighbourliness,	a	tool	for	policing	social	order,	and	an	occasion	for	burying	personal	grudges	and	hostilities.	For	this	 reason,	 disputes	 over	 the	 Eucharist	 were	 more	 than	 theological	conflicts.	The	Calvinist	practice	of	refusing	to	take	part	in	the	Supper,	or	even	to	mock	the	Host	publically,	emphasised	the	impression	that	they	aimed	 to	 form	 ‘a	 state	 within	 the	 state’,	 or	 that	 they	 regarded	themselves	 as	 Israelites	 exiled	 to	 a	 land	 of	 idolaters.	 This	 position	contrasted	 sharply	 with	 the	 magisterial	 Lutheran	 Reformation	promoted	by	the	princes.	The	 political	 dimension	 of	 Lutheran	 hostility	 to	 Reformed	Protestantism	 centred	 on	 the	 persistent	 idea	 that	 the	 religion	 was	inherently	 seditious.	Accusations	of	 heresy	 and	 sedition	went	hand	 in	hand.	 In	France,	 the	persecution	of	Protestants	took	off	 in	seriousness	after	 the	 Affair	 of	 the	 Placards	 (1534),	 during	which	 an	 anti-Catholic	pamphlet	was	posted	on	the	door	of	the	King’s	bedchamber,	had	left	a	strong	sense	that	Protestantism	was	not	a	benign	reformist	movement	but	a	dangerous	and	subversive	sect.35	Lutherans	had	themselves	once	been	 subjected	 to	 such	 accusations.	 Nonetheless,	 as	 the	 distinctions	between	the	various	forms	of	Protestantism	became	clearer,	Lutherans	were	happy	to	use	the	trope	themselves.	Luther	himself,	in	response	to																																																									33 	C.	 Elwood,	 The	 Body	 Broken,	 The	 Calvinist	 Doctrine	 of	 the	 Eucharist	 and	 the	
Symbolization	of	Power	in	Sixteenth-Century	France	 (Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1999):	pp.	77-112;	J.	A.	Spohnholz,	‘Multiconfessional	celebrations	of	the	Eucharist	in	sixteenth-century	Wesel’,	The	Sixteenth	Century	Journal,	39	(2008):	705-730.		34 	M.	 Rubin,	 Corpus	 Christi,	 the	 Eucharist	 in	 Late	 Medieval	 Culture	 (Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1991):	p.	149.		35	R.	J.	Knecht,	The	French	Wars	of	Religion,	1559-1598	(London:	Longman,	1996):	p.	3.		
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the	 appearance	 of	 radical	 branches	 of	 the	 Reformation,	 had	 asserted	that	 all	 non-Lutheran	 forms	 of	 Protestantism	were	 ‘destructive	 of	 the	civil	 peace.’36	Throughout	 the	 early	German	Reformation,	 Anabaptists,	who	 often	 rejected	 worldly	 governments	 and	 whose	 reputation	 was	tarnished	 by	 the	 trauma	 of	 Münster,	 were	 the	 main	 focus	 of	 these	polemical	 attacks.	 The	 Peace	 of	 Augsburg,	 which	 put	 Reformed	Protestantism	and	Anabaptism	in	the	same	category	of	illegal	religions,	together	with	a	series	of	events	 in	France	and	the	Netherlands	shifted	the	 focus	 to	 Zwinglians	 and	 Calvinists.	 The	 Affair	 of	 the	 Placards,	 the	Tumult	 of	 Amboise	 (1560),	 and	 eruptions	 of	 iconoclastic	 violence	 in	France	 and	 the	 Netherlands	 all	 confirmed	 fears	 over	 the	 social	 and	political	agendas	of	Reformed	Protestants.	By	 taking	 a	 closer	 look	 at	 the	 correspondence	 of	 the	 Lutheran	princes	we	can	see	that	these	fears	were	widely	shared	and	frequently	discussed.	The	language	used	by	the	Protestant	princes	throughout	the	1550s	and	60s	reflect	these	concerns.	It	was	not	uncommon	among	the	princes	 to	 refer	 to	 Reformed	 Protestantism	 as	 ‘the	 Zwinglian	 sect’.37	Christoph	 of	 Württemberg,	 who	 throughout	 his	 political	 career	displayed	 a	 strong	 commitment	 to	 the	 advancement	 of	 Lutheranism,	was	 particularly	 outspoken	 on	 this	 issue.	 In	 a	 letter	 to	 Philipp	Melanchthon	written	in	1557,	he	contemplated	the	need	to	contain	the	rise	 of	 Reformed	 Protestantism:	 ‘that	 also	 a	 way	 has	 to	 be	 found,	 in	which	 the	 Swiss	 and	 other	 churches	 tarnished	 with	 the	 errors	 of	Zwinglianism	 also	 will	 be	 closed	 down,	 [and]	 thereby	 much	 peril	prevented;	since	unfortunately	such	errors	have	not	only	violently	torn	apart	Switzerland,	but	also	in	France,	Italy,	England,	Poland,	Spain,	and	other	 places’. 38 	Christoph	 added	 that	 he	 was	 well	 aware	 ‘what																																																									36	C.	Scott	Dixon,	 ‘The	politics	of	 law	and	Gospel:	The	Protestant	prince	and	the	Holy	Roman	 Empire’,	 in	 B.	 Heal	 and	 O.	 P.	 Grell	 (eds.),	 The	 Impact	 of	 the	 European	
Reformation,	Princes,	Clergy	and	People	(Aldershot:	Ashgate,	2008):	p.	45.		37 	‘der	 zwinglianischen	 Secte’	 Christoph	 of	 Württemberg	 and	 Wolfgang	 of	Zweibrücken	 to	 Friedrich	 III,	 24	 August	 1561,	 Kluckhohn,	 Briefe	 Friedrich	 des	
Frommen	…	Volume	I,	p.	196.		38	‘sonder	 das	 auch	 die	 wege	 gefunden	 mochten	 warden,	 das	 die	 Schweitzer	 und	andere	 …	 ecclesie	 so	 mit	 dem	 irthumb	 des	 zwinglianismi	 befleckt,	 auch	 zu	 und	gebracht	 warden,	 dardurch	 vil	 unrat	 verhuetet;	 dann	 laider	 sollicher	 irthumb	 nit	
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destruction,	disorder,	and	desolation	surely	will	be	created	among	our	people’	if	Reformed	Protestantism	were	to	spread	to	Württemberg.39	By	invoking	 Switzerland,	 Christoph	made	use	 of	 a	 trope	 that	would	have	induced	vivid	associations	among	his	audience.	From	the	early	days	of	the	Reformation,	Switzerland	had	been	associated	with	radicalism	and	erroneous	doctrine.	Luther	and	Zwingli	from	1524	had	been	embroiled	in	 a	 fierce	 dispute	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 Eucharist,	 in	 which	 the	former	 described	 the	 latter	 and	 his	 followers	 as	 ‘fanatics’,	 ‘new	heretics’,	and	associates	of	‘the	beasts	of	the	Apocalypse.’40	The	process	of	 ‘turning	 Swiss’	 that	 was	 unfolding	 in	 the	 Empire	 was	 among	 the	princes	 seen	 as	 an	 inspiration	 to	 those	who	 took	 part	 in	 the	 German	Peasants	War	of	 1524-5,	 Europe’s	 largest	 popular	 uprising	before	 the	French	Revolution.	Fear	of	popular	unrest	made	the	princes	particularly	sensitive	to	the	 dangers	 of	 internal	 theological	 splits	 among	 the	 Lutheran	community.	 As	 the	 conflict	 between	 Philippists	 and	 Gnesio-Lutherans	raged,	they	were	more	conscious	than	theologians	of	the	responsibility	to	maintain	peace	and	stability.	This	led	to	clashes.	Christoph	remarked	in	 1556	 in	 a	 letter	 to	 Johann	 Wilhelm	 of	 Saxe-Weimar	 that	 ‘it	 is	lamentable,	yes	even	frightful	to	hear,	that	some	leading	theologians	of	the	 Augsburg	 Confession	 in	 many,	 sometimes	 well-known	 points	directly	and	angrily	oppose	each	other	and	as	scholars	want	to	be	seen	as	 brighter	 and	 more	 pious	 than	 the	 other.’ 41 	It	 is	 clear	 that	 in	Christoph’s	eyes	the	Reformed	Protestants	were	guilty	of	a	much	more																																																																																																																																														allain	in	Schweiz,	sonder	Gallia,	Italia,	Engalland,	Poln,	Hispania	und	andern	mer	orten	heuftig	 eingerissen’	 Christoph	 of	Württemberg	 to	 Philipp	Melanchthon,	 1	December	1557,	 V.	 Ernst,	 Briefwechsel	 des	 Herzogs	 Christoph	 von	 Wirtemberg,	 Volume	 IV	(Stuttgart:	Verlag	von	W.	Kohlhammer,	1907):	p.	452.		39	‘was	fur	zerrüttung,	unordnung	und	abfoll	under	den	unsern	gewislich	zu	besorgen’	Christoph	of	Württemberg	to	Philipp	Melanchthon,	1	December	1557,	ibid,	p.	452.		40	M.	A.	Mullett,	Martin	Luther	(London:	Routledge,	2004):	p.	194		41	‘da	 ist	 wol	 erbärmlich	 und	 ja	 erschrockenlich	 zu	 hören,	 das	 etliche	 fürneme	theology	der	A.	C.	verwandt	in	vilen,	zum	theil	nemhaftigen	puncten	also	stracks	und	neidig	 einander	 zuwider	 seien	 und	 ie	 einer	 gelerter,	 eigenwitziger	 und	 frommer	angesehen	 sein	will	 als	 der	 ander.’	 Christoph	of	Württemberg	 to	 Johann	Wilhelm	of	Saxe-Weimar,	13	July	1556,	Ernst,	Briefwechsel	des	Herzogs	Christoph	von	Wirtemberg,	
Volume	IV,	p.	110.		
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threatening	version	of	the	same	sin.	As	‘instigators	of	the	…	discord’,	the	Reformed	had	separated	themselves	from	the	Augsburg	Confession	and	caused	an	‘angry	outburst’	of	inter-Protestant	religious	conflict.42	In	the	light	 of	 the	 political	 responsibilities	 of	 the	 princes,	 this	 was	 a	particularly	serious	accusation.	The	 iconoclastic	 riots	 that	 erupted	 in	 France	 and	 the	 Low	Countries	after	1560	confirmed	the	Lutheran	suspicions	that	Reformed	Protestantism	was	 in	 essence	 seditious.	The	 riots	were,	 in	 the	eyes	of	many	Lutherans,	prime	examples	of	how	not	to	pursue	religious	reform.	For	 them	 it	 symbolised	 the	 effects	 of	 a	 breakdown	 of	 doctrinal	 and	political	 authority.	 The	 symbolic	 nature	 of	 some	 of	 the	 iconoclasts’	targets,	including	the	tombs	and	monuments	of	monarchs	and	princes,	was	 particularly	 damaging	 for	 the	 reputation	 of	 Reformed	Protestantism	 and	 must	 have	 provoked	 memories	 of	 Münster.43	The	riots	 caused	 proponents	 of	 cordial	 relations	 with	 the	 Reformed	considerable	 embarrassment.	 The	 Nassau	 family,	 who	 carried	 some	responsibility	for	the	events	in	the	Netherlands	in	the	summer	of	1566,	attempted	 to	 play	 down	 the	 gravity	 of	 the	 riots.	 Johann	 of	 Nassau	 in	October	1566	wrote	that	‘many	people	realise	that	the	tumult	and	riots,	that	 have	 erupted	 in	 the	 form	 of	 the	 destruction	 of	 images	 and	 the	spoiling	 of	 churches	 in	 Antwerp	 and	 other	 places,	 have	 not	 been	conducted	on	the	order	of	…	our	allies,	but	have	only	been	conducted	by	several	 …	 tumultuous	 people.’44 	Moreover,	 Catholics	 with	 a	 vested	interest	 in	keeping	Lutherans	and	Reformed	Protestants	apart	 jumped	to	 the	 opportunity	 of	 using	 the	 iconoclasm	 to	 emphasise	 the	disobedience	of	Reformed	Protestants.	The	Cardinal	of	Lorraine	wrote																																																									42	‘die	 Anstifter	 …	 Zweitracht’	 ‘ärgerlichen	 Ausbruch’	 	 Christoph	 of	Württemberg	 to	Friedrich	III,	30	March	1564,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	I,	 	p.	501.		43	J.	H.	M.	Salmon,	Society	in	Crisis,	France	in	the	Sixteenth	Century	 (London:	Methuen,	1979):	pp.	136-137.		44	‘das	 meniglich	 wol	 bewust	 das	 der	 tumult	 und	 uffrhur,	 so	 sich	 in	 stürmung	 der	Bilder	und	spolirung	der	Kirchen	zu	Antorff	und	anderstwohe	zugetragen,	nich	ausz	bevelch	…	der	Bundtsgenossen,	sondern	allein	durch	etliche	…	auffrürische	leutch	sich	zugetragen	 …’	 Johann	 of	 Nassau	 to	 Louis	 of	 Nassau,	 October	 1566,	 Groen	 van	Prinsterer,	Archives	ou	Correspondance	…	Volume	II,		p.	346.		
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Christoph	 in	 May	 1562	 complaining	 of	 ‘the	 power	 that	 the	 wicked	ministers	have	had	 to	 raise	 the	people,	 seizing	 the	money	of	 the	king,	knocking	down	the	temples,	pillaging	all	 the	treasures,	driving	out	the	bishops	and	priests	with	infinite	sacking	and	pillaging.’45		However,	 if	 we	 take	 a	 closer	 look	 at	 the	 language	 used	 by	 the	German	Protestant	princes	when	discussing	 the	problem	of	Reformed	Protestantism	 we	 find	 a	 more	 nuanced	 response	 than	 the	 simplistic	picture	 painted	 by	 the	 Cardinal.	 Though	 all	 Lutheran	 princes	 viewed	Reformed	 Protestantism	with	 a	 degree	 of	 suspicion	 or	 hostility,	 their	tone	when	speaking	about	this	topic	could	differ	significantly.	Whereas	Christoph,	 but	 also	 Johann	Wilhelm	 of	 Saxe	 Weimar,	 condemned	 the	Reformed	 religion	 in	 the	 strongest	 terms,	 Philipp	 of	 Hesse	 chose	 a	softer	approach.	 ‘We	do	not	enjoy	hearing’,	he	wrote	to	Christoph	and	Wolfgang	 of	 Zweibrücken,	 ‘that	 people	 condemn	 Calvin	 and	 Bullinger	and	others,	who	do	not	write	of	the	Supper	in	the	same	way	as	those	of	Jena	 and	 their	 supporters,	 and	 explain	 their	 teachings	 in	 the	 worst	possible	way.’46	More	evidence	of	the	Landgrave	of	Hesse’s	conciliatory	attitude	can	be	found	in	his	longstanding	correspondence	with	Heinrich	Bullinger,	 Zwingli’s	 successor	 as	 head	 of	 the	 Zurich	 reformation.	 The	tone	 of	 the	 correspondence,	 which	 lasted	 from	 1534	 to	 1566,	 was	friendly,	despite	the	theological	differences	that	were	being	discussed.47	The	contrast	between	the	difference	in	attitude	of	Christoph	and	Philipp	shown	 above	 indicates	 the	 range	 of	 different	 understandings	 that	existed	among	the	Protestant	princes	of	the	Empire	about	the	nature	of	Reformed	 Protestantism	 and	 its	 relation	 to	 Lutheranism.	 Since	 the	French	Wars	of	Religion	pitted	Reformed	Protestants	against	Catholics,																																																									45	‘la	 force	 que	 les	mauvais	ministres	 ont	 eus	 de	 soullever	 les	 peuples,	 se	 saisir	 des	derniers	 du	 roy,	 abbatre	 les	 temples,	 piller	 tous	 les	 tresors,	 chasser	 les	 evesques	 et	prestres	avecques	infinis	sacagemans	et	pillories	…’	Charles	de	Lorraine	to	Christoph	of	Württemberg,	22	May	1562,	D.	Cuisiat	(ed.),	Lettres	de	Cardinal	Charles	de	Lorraine,	
1525-1574	(Geneva:	Droz,	1998):	p.	448.		46	‘Das	 man	 den	 Calvinum	 auch	 Bullingern	 und	 andere,	 die	 nicht	 anner	 dinge	 den	Jenischen	und	deren	anhenger	vom	nachtmal	gleich	schreiben,	verdampt	und	 ir	 lehr	ufs	 ubelste	 auslegt,	 horen	 wir	 nicht	 gerne.’	 Philipp	 of	 Hesse	 to	 Wolfgang	 of	Zweibrücken	 and	 Christoph	 of	 Württemberg,	 4	 September	 1561,	 Kluckhohn,	 Briefe	
Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	I,	p.	199.		47	HStaM	3,	1797.	
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these	 understandings	 had	 the	 potential	 to	 shape	 German	 attitudes	towards	the	conflict	and	its	main	players.		
2.3	The	conversion	of	Friedrich	III		Renegade	 preachers	 in	 Swiss	 cities	 and	 violent	 mobs	 in	 French	 and	Dutch	towns	made	easy	targets	for	Lutheran	polemicists.	Their	inferior	social	 status	 seemed	 to	 confirm	 the	 opinion	 that	 Reformed	Protestantism	was	 indeed	 a	 religion	 for	 upstarts.	 Explanations	 of	 the	religious	 turmoil	 centred	 on	 the	 role	 of	 rabble-rousing	 preachers	 and	unruly	 mobs.	 In	 both	 France	 and	 the	 Netherlands,	 leadership	 largely	devolved	 to	 the	 lesser	 nobility	 as	 princely	 sympathisers	 either	dissimulated	(e.g.	William	of	Orange)	or	remained	loyal	(e.g.	Antoine	de	Bourbon).	The	conversion	of	Elector	Palatine	Friedrich	III	to	Reformed	Protestantism,	 which	 took	 place	 sometime	 before	 1561,	 seriously	challenged	 this	 state	 of	 affairs.	 The	 crisis	 provoked	 by	 Friedrich’s	conversion	 lasted	 throughout	 the	 1560s	 and	 coincided	 with	 the	outbreak	 of	 the	 French	 Wars	 of	 Religion.	 The	 conversion	 not	 only	provided	the	Huguenots	with	their	most	ardent	advocate	in	Germany,	it	also	 created	 an	 intense	 and	 long-lasting	 debate	 among	 the	 German	Protestant	princes	about	the	nature	of	Reformed	Protestantism,	which	strongly	influenced	their	view	on	France.	Despite	the	direct	connections	between	debates	about	 the	Reformation	of	 the	Palatinate	and	debates	about	Lutheran-Huguenot	relations,	they	have	never	been	linked	in	the	existing	 historiography.	 Though	 Friedrich’s	 conversion	 has	 been	studied	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 religious	 history	 of	 Germany	 and	 in	relation	 to	 the	creation	of	Heidelberg	Catechism,	 the	historiographical	gap	 between	 French	 and	 German	 history	 has	 caused	 the	 French	dimension	of	this	important	development	to	be	overlooked.	I	will	here	address	this	oversight	by	demonstrating	how	discussions	about	France	were	 directly	 integrated	 into	 the	 controversy	 surrounding	 Friedrich’s	conversion.		 Friedrich’s	conversion	 is	often	said	to	have	been	the	result	of	a	period	of	 intense	 religious	 study	 and	 contemplation.	Having	 inherited	
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an	 extraordinarily	 quarrelsome	 team	 of	 theologians	 from	 this	ecumenically-minded	 predecessor	 Ottheinrich,	 the	 Palatinate,	 and	especially	the	university	of	Heidelberg,	was	home	to	a	range	of	different	theological	 opinions.	 Less	 than	 a	month	 after	 Friedrich’s	 accession	 as	Elector,	 rumours	 of	 the	 teaching	 of	 Reformed	doctrines	 at	Heidelberg	started	 to	 spread.	 Hieronymus	 Gerhard,	 theologian	 and	 advisor	 to	Christoph	 of	 Württemberg,	 warned	 ‘that	 at	 His	 Grace’s	 university	 in	Heidelberg	 there	 are	 two	 false	 professors,	 who	 without	 shame	 and	openly	 defend	 Zwinglianism,	 as	 well	 as	 a	 number	 of	 preachers,	 who,	because	 of	 [their	 membership	 of]	 the	 aforementioned	 sect,	 were	expelled	 by	 other	 princes.’48	Gerhard	 is	 amongst	 others	 referring	 to	Pierre	 Boquin,	 a	 French	 theologian	 who	 had	 previously	 lectured	 at	Bourges	and	the	Strasbourg	Academy.49	Boquin	has	often	been	credited	with	 persuading	 Friedrich	 of	 the	merits	 of	 the	Reformed	 religion	 and	from	 1560,	 three	 years	 after	 Boquin’s	 appointment,	 the	 Reformed	presence	 at	 Heidelberg	 was	 increased	 significantly	 with	 the	appointment	 of	 the	 prominent	 theologians	 Petrus	 Dathenus,	 Casper	Olevianus,	Immanuel	Tremellius,	and	Zacharius	Ursinus.50	Although	the	traditional	 narrative	 of	 Friedrich’s	 conversion	 emphasises	 that	 the	Elector	made	 his	 decision	 to	 convert	 based	 on	 a	 prolonged	 period	 of	Bible	study,	these	men	must	have	contributed	significantly.		
2.3.1	Lutheran	reactions		The	 discussions	 and	debates	 about	 the	 relation	 between	Lutheranism	and	 Reformed	 Protestantism	 were	 by	 no	 means	 restricted	 to	theologians.	 Rather,	 the	 Protestant	 princes	 of	 the	 Empire	 themselves																																																									48	‘…	das	bey	 irer	 churf.	G.	universität	 zu	Heydelberg	 sich	zwen	welsche	professores	halten,	so	Zwinglianismum	ungeschent	und	offentlich	verteidigen,	desgleichen	etliche	predicanten,	 so	 von	 wegen	 gemelter	 secten	 bey	 abdern	 christlichen	 fursten	 nicht	gedult	 …’	 Hieronymus	 Gerhard	 to	 Christoph	 of	 Württemberg,	 9	 March	 1559,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	I,	p.	28.		49	Press,	Calvinismus	und	Territorialstaat,	p.	240.		50	B.	Thompson,	The	Palatinate	Church	Order	of	1563,	Church	History,	23	(1954):	pp.	339-354.		
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participated	 very	 actively.	 Besides	 the	discussions	 of	 the	 political	 and	legal	implications	of	Friedrich’s	conversion,	which	one	would	expect	to	find	 in	 their	 writings,	 the	 correspondence	 of	 the	 Protestant	 princes	reveals	 a	 deep	 engagement	 with	 theological	 questions	 and	 a	 solid	understanding	 of	 the	 relevant	 doctrines.	 This	 engagement	 with	theology	was	the	product	of	the	princes’	self-assigned	role	as	leaders	of	the	princely	Reformations.	With	the	exception	of	William	of	Orange	and	Louis	of	Nassau,	all	princes	studied	in	this	thesis	played	leading	roles	in	the	 process	 of	 reforming	 their	 territories,	 commissioning	 catechisms,	church	 orders,	 school	 curricula,	 and	 even	 hymnals	 and	 creating	 the	institutional	 infrastructure	to	 facilitate	the	confessionalising	process.51	Moreover,	belonging	 to	 the	second	generation	of	Protestant	princes,	a	foundation	in	theology	had	been	part	of	their	education.	This	grounding	in	 theology	 came	 to	 the	 fore	 in	 the	 discussions	 about	 Friedrich’s	conversion.	Above	 all,	 Friedrich’s	 Lutheran	 peers,	 witnessing	 the	 rise	 of	Reformed	 Protestantism	 in	 the	 Palatinate,	 were	 alarmed	 and	 felt	 the	need	 to	 intervene.	 Friedrich	 received	 letters,	 amongst	 others	 from	Johann	 Friedrich	 of	 Saxony,	 warning	 him	 of	 the	 dangers	 of	‘Zwinglianism’,	 to	 which	 he	 replied	 with	 a	 polite	 thank-you	 note.52	Christoph	 of	Württemberg,	 ‘friendly	 and	 kind-hearted’,	 sent	 Friedrich	‘an	extract	from	Luther’s	books,	[in	which	can	be	read]	what	fights	and	disputes	he	has	had	with	the	Zwinglians	and	what	he	has	written	about	their	 teachings	 and	beliefs	…	 through	which	many	…	may	understand	how	 …	 far	 they	 are	 removed	 from	 the	 truth	 of	 God’s	 Word.’53	The																																																									51	Thompson,	 The	 Palatinate	 Church	 Order	 …;	 J.	 M.	 Estes,	 ‘Johannes	 Brenz	 and	 the	institutionalization	of	 the	Reformation	 in	Württemberg’,	Central	European	History,	 6	(1973):	44-59;	C.	Methuen,	‘Securing	the	Reformation	through	Education:	The	Duke’s	Scholarship	System	of	Sixteenth-Century	Wurttemberg’,	The	Sixteenth	Century	Journal,	25	 (1994):	 841-851;	 Mayes,	 ‘Heretics	 or	 Nonconformists?	 …;	 J.	 Ney,	 ‘Pfalzgraf	Wolfgang,	 Herzog	 von	 Zweibrücken	 und	 Neuburg’,	 Schriften	 des	 Vereins	 ƒür	
Reformationsgeschichte,	29	(1911):	1-124,	on	pp.	33-54.		52	‘Zwinglianismi’	 Friedrich	 III	 to	 Johann	 Friedrich	 of	 Saxony,	 18	 November	 1559,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	I,	p.	105.		53	‘Wir	schicken	E.	L.	auch	freundlicher	und	gutherziger	volmeynung	hiemit	ein	extract	aus	Lutheri	buechern,	was	fur	kempf	und	stritt	er	mit	dem	Zwinglianis	gehabt	und	vor	irer	leer	und	glauben	geschriben	hat	…	damit	meniglich	…	und	versteen	möge	…	wie	…	
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friendly	 tone	of	 Johann	Friedrich,	Christoph,	 and	others	 changed	after	the	Palatinate’s	Reformed	religion	was	institutionalised	in	1563	by	the	publication	of	 the	Heidelberg	Catechism	and	the	Palatine	Church	Order.	These	 documents	 contributed	 to	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 Palatinate	into	 one	 of	 Europe’s	 most	 important	 centres	 for	 the	 promotion	 of	Reformed	 Protestantism.	 These	 publications	 made	 it	 clear	 that	persuasion	was	now	no	longer	a	remedy.	Christoph	wrote	to	Wolfgang	of	 Zweibrücken	 in	March	1563:	 ‘It	 is	now	common	knowledge	 that	 in	the	Palatinate	 in	both	schools	and	churches	 the	Zwinglian	or	Calvinist	teachings	 on	 the	 Lord’s	 Supper	 have	 prevailed	 …	 however,	 they	 [the	Christian	princes]	have,	out	of	Christian	 love	and	good	 friendship	and	kinship,	not	failed	to	indicate,	what	damage	to	body	and	soul,	land	and	people,	 temporally	 and	 eternally,	 will	 result	 from	 this.’	 Christoph,	concluding	that	their	attempts	to	use	persuasion	to	prevent	Friedrich’s	conversion	 failed,	 unambiguously	 stated	 the	 political	 consequences	 of	Friedrich’s	 stubbornness:	 ‘So	 is	 Calvinism,	 as	 also	 all	 other	 sects	 that	contradict	 the	 Augsburg	 Confession,	 excluded	 from	 the	 religious	peace.’54		 Christoph	 was	 certainly	 not	 alone	 in	 his	 insistence	 that	Friedrich’s	 conversion	 should	 result	 in	 the	 exclusion	 of	 the	Palatinate	from	 the	 Peace	 of	 Augsburg.	 King	 Maximilian	 and	 the	 Emperor,	Ferdinand,	 both	 concluded	 that	 the	 Peace	 of	 Augsburg	 clearly	 stated	that	 ‘the	 aggravating,	 erroneous,	 and	 seductive	 Zwinglian	 or	 Calvinist	doctrines’	 were	 illegal	 and	 did	 not	 fall	 under	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	
																																																																																																																																													weyt	 sie	 von	 der	warheit	 götliches	worts	 abweichen.’	 Christoph	 of	Württemberg	 to	Friedrich	III,	16	December	1559,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	I,	p.	108.		54	‘es	 ist	 communis	 vox	 et	 fama,	 das	 in	 der	 Pfalz	 bei	 der	 schul	 und	 kirchen	 der	Zwinglisch	oder	Calvinisch	leer	de	cena	domini	die	oberhand	gewonnen	hab.	…	jedoch	haben	 sie	 [die	 christlichen	 chur	 und	 fursten]	 aus	 christlicher	 lieb	 auch	 gueter	freundschaft	 und	 verwandtnus	 nicht	 underlassen	 sollen,	 S.	 L.	 anzuzaigen,	 was	derselben	 hieraus	 fur	 nachtail	 an	 leib	 und	 seel,	 land	 und	 leuten	 zeitlich	 und	 ewig	begegnen	 möchte	 …	 Zu	 den	 ist	 Calvinismus	 wie	 auch	 alle	 andere	 secten	 wider	 die	Augspurgische	 confession	 von	 der	 religionsfrieden	 aussgeschlossen.’	 Christoph	 of	Württemberg	to	Wolfgang	of	Zweibrücken,	8	March	1563,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	
des	Frommen	…	Volume	I,	p.	376.		
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peace.55	Pressure	 was	 also	 mounting	 on	 the	 princes	 from	 below.	 The	Council	of	the	Duke	of	Saxony,	for	instance,	insisted	that	Friedrich	‘will	be	 excluded	 from	 the	 Augsburg	 Confession	 and	 removed	 from	 the	religious	 peace.’56	A	 possible	 exclusion,	 however,	 would	 pose	 some	significant	 problems.	 Firstly,	 it	 is	 unclear	 what	 this	 would	 mean	 in	practice.	Would	the	Lutheran	and	Catholic	powers	of	the	Empire	stage	a	military	campaign	to	enforce	conformity?	If	so,	the	Empire	would	once	again	 return	 to	 violent	 religious	 conflict.	 Alternatively,	 the	 threat	 of	violence	might	have	been	enough	to	pressurise	Friedrich	into	returning	his	lands	to	the	Lutheran	fold.	Secondly,	as	Elector,	Friedrich	was	one	of	the	most	 influential	Protestant	princes	and	a	political	player	 that	 they	could	hardly	afford	to	alienate.		The	 crisis	 was	 aggravated	 by	 the	 Lutheran	 princes’	 failure	 to	present	 a	 united	 front.	 The	 matter	 came	 to	 a	 head	 at	 the	 1566	 Diet.	Christoph,	together	with	Wolfgang	of	Zweibrücken,	on	whom	the	Duke	of	 Württemberg	 had	 considerable	 influence,	 were	 the	 most	uncompromising	advocates	of	Friedrich’s	exclusion.57	Philipp	of	Hesse,	whose	 Philippist	 and	 ecumenical	 tendencies	 have	 already	 been	discussed,	 was	 much	 more	 reluctant	 to	 proceed	 so	 harshly	 against	Friedrich.58	The	impasse	was	broken	by	August	of	Saxony	who,	despite	objecting	 to	 the	 Palatinate’s	 new	 religion,	 concluded	 that	 it	would	 be	unwise	to	start	armed	conflict	between	Protestants.59																																																													55	Maximilian	to	Friedrich	III,	25	April	1563,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	
…	 Volume	 I,	 p.	 398;	 ‘der	 ergerlichen	 irrigen	 verfuerischen	 Zwinglischen	 oder	Calvinischen	lehr’	Ferdinand	to	Friedrich	III,	15	July	1563,	ibid,	pp.	419-420.		56	‘von	 der	 A.	 C.	 ausgeslossen	 und	 also	 aus	 dem	 religionsfriden	 gesazt	 werden’	 The	Council	of	Saxony	to	August	of	Saxony,	17	May	1566,	Ibid,	p.	670.	57	Cohn,	‘The	territorial	princes,	pp.	145-146.		58	D.	 Visser,	 ‘Zacharias	 Ursinus	 and	 the	 Palatinate	 Reformation’,	 in	 D.	 Visser	 (ed.),	
Controversy	and	Conciliation,	The	Reformation	and	the	Palatinate,	1559-1583	 (Allison	Park:	Pickwick	Publications,	1986):	pp.	1-20.		59	Cohn,	‘The	territorial	princes,	pp.	145-146;	Visser,	‘Zacharias	Ursinus,	pp.	14-15.	
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2.3.2	Friedrich’s	defence		Although	the	Diet	of	1566	removed	the	threat	of	exclusion,	the	disputes	about	the	theology	of	the	Eucharist,	which	had	erupted	after	Friedrich	had	 started	 courting	 Reformed	 Protestantism,	 continued.	 Besides	 the	theological	 technicalities	 of	 ubiquity	 or	 consubstantiation,	 the	 princes	in	a	large	number	of	letters	also	discussed	the	very	nature	of	orthodoxy.	Friedrich,	who	did	not	show	signs	of	being	intimidated	by	the	pressures	put	 on	 him	 by	 his	 Lutheran	 peers,	 engaged	 in	 the	 debates	 with	confidence	 and	 flair.	 Friedrich’s	 justification	 of	 his	 own	 religious	position	consisted	of	three	main	elements.	Firstly,	 Friedrich	 directly	 addressed	 the	 question	 of	 religious	authority.	 The	 doctrine	 of	 Sola	 Scriptura,	 which	 denied	 the	 religious	authority	of	the	papacy	and	instead	rooted	it	firmly	in	Scripture	and	the	writings	 of	 the	 Church	 Fathers,	was	 one	 of	 the	 founding	 principles	 of	the	 Reformation.	 Despite	 the	 importance	 of	 this	 doctrine,	 many	Lutherans	 had	 started	 to	 treat	 the	 writings	 of	 Luther	 as	 Gospel.	Although	 Reformed	 Protestants	 tended	 to	 view	 Luther	 with	 great	respect	 and	admiration,	 they	did	not	 regard	his	writings	as	definitive.	Friedrich	 repeatedly	 argued	 that	 ‘Dr	 Luther	 was	 human,	 who	 was	capable	of	making	mistakes	like	other	human	beings.’60	Friedrich	made	a	clear	distinction	between	Luther	and	the	Church	Fathers:	 ‘That	I	will	not	 put	 [Luther]	 above	 Augustine	 and	 other	 old	 Christian	 writers	 or	shall	compare	[him]	to	other	prophets	and	apostles,	who	alone	have	the	privilege	that	they	cannot	be	accused	of	errors,	I	hope	will	not	for	Your	Grace	or	any	who	love	Christ	be	cause	to	hate	me,	since	they	have	often	made	 the	 late	Doctor	Luther	 the	 third	Elijah	 and	 through	 such	 excess	for	many	confused	the	necessary	doctrines.’61																																																									60	‘Dr	Luther	ist	ayn	mensch	gewesen,	der	sowal	als	andere	irren	konden’	Friedrich	III	to	 Johann	 Friedrich	 of	 Saxony,	 31	 December	 1564,	 Kluckhohn,	 Briefe	 Friedrich	 des	
Frommen	…	Volume	I,	p.	540.		61	‘Das	ich	ine	[Luther]	aber	uber	Augustinum	und	andere	allte	christliche	scribenten	sezen	 oder	 den	 propheten	 und	 aposteln	 vergleychen	 solte,	 welche	 diss	 privilegium	allayn	haben,	das	ine	aynicher	irtumb	nit	kan	zugemessen	warden,	das	hoff	ich,	werde	E.	L.	oder	kayn	christliebender	mich	hayssen,	weyl	 irer	vil	 aus	D.	Lutter	 seligen	den	dritten	Heliam	gemacht	und	durch	solchen	exces	die	nötige	 lehr	…	bey	vilen	sehr	 ist	
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Following	 from	 this	 position,	 Friedrich	 repeatedly	 vehemently	denied	being	a	follower	of	either	Zwingli	or	Calvin.	His	understanding	of	the	nature	of	the	Eucharist,	Friedrich	argued,	was	based	purely	on	the	authority	 of	 Scripture	 and	 the	witness	 of	 the	 apostles,	 rather	 than	 on	the	 theology	espoused	by	humans,	whether	Luther,	Zwingli,	Calvin,	or	others.	 For	 instance	 in	 a	 letter	 to	Wilhelm	 of	 Hesse,	 Friedrich	 denied	‘that	we	 are	 Calvinist,	 or	 how	 you	 call	 it’,	 adding	 ‘that	we	 never	 have	and	never	will	bear	witness	to	Calvin	or	any	other	human,	but	only	to	the	 one	 infallible	 foundation	 that	 is	 Jesus	 Christ.’ 62 	Resisting	 the	practice	 of	 labelling	 religions,	 Friedrich	 challenged	 the	 framework	created	 by	 the	 Peace	 of	 Augsburg,	 which	 attempted	 to	 mark	 a	 clear	distinction	between	Lutheranism	and	illegal	‘sects’	such	as	Calvinism.		Having	made	his	case	against	the	usage	of	the	terms	‘Zwinglian’	or	 ‘Calvinist’	 to	 describe	 his	 faith,	 Friedrich	 defended	 a	 typically	Reformed	understanding	of	the	relationship	between	the	Lutheran	and	Second	 Reformations.	 Whereas	 Reformed	 Protestantism	 was	 by	Lutherans	 widely	 regarded	 as	 a	 dangerous	 and	 radical	 sect,	 the	Reformed	 recognised	 their	 debt	 to	 the	 Lutheran	 Reformation	 and	regarded	 their	 position	 as	 an	 extension	 or	 continuation	 of	 Luther’s	work.	Following	this	logic,	Friedrich	did	not	consider	himself	to	be	part	of	a	different	religion.	He	continued	to	refer	to	himself	as	a	member	of	the	Augsburg	 Confession,	 and	 argued	 that	 besides	 their	 disagreement	about	 the	 Eucharist,	 his	 faith	 in	 essence	 conformed	 to	 that	 of	 the	Lutheran	 princes.	 When	 negotiating	 a	 possible	 marriage	 between	Friedrich’s	 son,	 Johann	Casimir,	 and	Elisabeth,	 the	daughter	of	August	of	Saxony,	in	the	summer	of	1568,	the	perceived	difference	between	the	religions	 of	 Saxony	 and	 the	 Palatinate	 threatened	 to	 block	 the	engagement.	 Although	 mixed	 marriages	 were	 not	 unheard	 of,	 they	required	 the	 creation	 of	 complicated	 marriage	 contracts	 allowing	 for																																																																																																																																														verdunkelt’	Friedrich	III	to	Johann	Friedrich	of	Saxony,	15	February	1565,	Kluckhohn,	
Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	I,	p.	558.		62	‘das	 wir	 calvinistisch	 wie	 sie	 es	 nennen	 …	 sein	 möchten’	 ‘das	 wir	 niemalen	 zu	Calvino	oder	enichem	menschen,	 sonder	zu	dem	einigen	unfelbarn	 fundament	 Jhesu	Christo	 …	 bekant	 und	 noch	 bekennen’	 Friedrich	 III	 to	Wilhelm	 of	 Hesse,	 10	 March	1567,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	II,	p.	11.		
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the	 wife	 to	 keep	 professing	 her	 ancestral	 religion.	 The	 Palatinate	chancellor,	 Christoph	 von	 Ehem,	 was	 adamant	 that	 this	 was	 not	necessary	since	 ‘there	 is	no	difference	 in	religion	between	Saxony	and	the	Palatinate.’63	Essentially,	Friedrich	and	his	council	argued	that	some	disagreements	over	particular	theological	questions	did	not	necessarily	imply	that	the	debating	parties	followed	a	different	religion.	Seeing	the	state	of	Lutheranism	since	the	death	of	Luther	in	1546,	this	is	not	such	a	strange	argument.	Despite	 the	 insistent	 denial	 that	 the	 Palatinate	 had	 adopted	 a	different	 religion,	 it	was	 impossible	 to	 ignore	 that	 at	 least	 in	 one	 key	doctrine,	 the	 Eucharist,	 Friedrich	 disagreed	 fundamentally	 with	 his	Lutheran	peers.	It	was	the	controversy	surrounding	the	doctrine	of	the	Real	 Presence	 that	 had	 strongly	 influenced	 Friedrich’s	 decision	 to	convert.	 The	 publication	 of	 the	Heidelberg	Catechism	 in	 1563	made	 it	very	clear	that	the	Palatinate	had	adopted	a	new	Eucharistic	 theology.	However,	it	also	underlined	that	Friedrich	was	right	in	claiming	that	his	theology	 was	 not	 the	 same	 as	 Calvin’s.	 Although	 in	 the	 Catechism	 a	clearly	Reformed	understanding	 of	 the	 Supper	 is	 articulated	 (denying	the	 bodily	 presence	 of	 Christ	 in	 the	 bread	 and	 wine),	 it	 nonetheless	ignores	Calvin’s	 sophisticated	 theology	 interpreting	 the	Eucharist	 as	a	‘Sign’. 64 	The	 Catechism’s	 somewhat	 open-ended	 definition	 of	 the	Eucharist	allowed	it	to	appeal	to	Zwinglians,	and	even	some	Philippists,	as	well	as	to	Calvinists.	More	evidence	of	Friedrich’s	personal	hand	in	the	formulation	of	the	Palatinate’s	new	 theology	 can	be	 found	 in	his	 letters;	he	 seems	 to	have	 had	 little	 trouble	 formulating	 the	 essence	 of	 the	 doctrine	 of	 the	Supper.	 Denying	 the	 doctrine	 of	 ubiquity,	 Friedrich	 explained	 in	 a	public	 proclamation	 that	 ‘it	 is	 impossible	 that	 He	 [Christ]	 after	 his	humanity	 can	 be	 with	 us	 on	 earth,	 seeing	 that	 he	 has	 ascended	 into																																																									63	Ein	unterschied	in	der	Religion	besteht	zwischen	Sachsen	und	Pfalz	nich’	Christoph	von	 Ehem	 to	 Dr	 Craco,	 11	 July	 1568,	 Kluckhohn,	 Briefe	 Friedrich	 des	 Frommen	 …	
Volume	II,	p.	226.		64	L.	P.	Wandel,	The	Eucharist	in	the	Reformation,	Incarnation	and	Liturgy	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2006):	pp.	205-206.		
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Heaven,	where	 he	 sits	 in	 loco	circumscripta	 [in	 a	 limited	 place],	 [and]	cannot	 descent	 to	 us	 until	 the	 Last	 Judgement.’65	Convinced	 that	 his	understanding	conformed	to	Scripture,	he	assumed	that	the	Lutherans’	insistence	 to	 hang	 on	 to	 the	 doctrine	 of	 the	 Real	 Presence	 was	 a	remnant	 of	 Catholicism.	 Friedrich	 asserted	 that	 the	 Lutheran	 princes	‘together	 with	 their	 theologians	 and	 with	 all	 the	 papists	 believe,	maintain,	 and	 defend,	 that	 one	 eats	 and	 drinks	 the	 sacrificed	 body	 of	Christ	 and	 his	 shed	 blood	 during	 the	 Holy	 Supper	 with	 the	 bodily	mouth.’66 	Believing	 to	 be	 completing	 the	 Reformation	 started	 with	Luther’s	 challenge	 of	 Catholic	 doctrine,	 Friedrich	 recognised	 that	 he	held	 different	 ideas	 concerning	 the	 Supper,	 but	 hoped	 (and	 probably	expected)	that	his	Lutheran	peers	would	catch	up.	During	 the	 crisis	 following	 the	 conversion	 of	 the	 Palatinate,	Friedrich	 challenged	 the	 traditional	 Lutheran	 perception	 of	 Reformed	Protestants.	 Firstly,	 his	 status	 and	 reputation	 as	 a	 Protestant	 prince,	who	 was	 leading	 a	 textbook	 magisterial	 Reformation,	 directly	contradicted	 the	 stereotypical	 image	 of	 the	 socially	 and	 politically	subversive	Calvinist.	Secondly,	Friedrich	repeatedly	presented	a	strong	argument	 for	 the	 compatibility	 of	 Lutheranism	 and	 Reformed	Protestantism.	 Crucially,	 Friedrich	 largely	 got	 his	 way.	 He	 was	 not	excluded	from	the	Peace	of	Augsburg,	maintained	more	or	less	friendly	contact	with	the	 ‘princes	of	 the	Augsburg	Confession’,	and	was	able	to	drive	 forward	 the	 reformation	 of	 the	 Palatinate.	 Even	 the	 marriage	between	 Johann	 Casimir	 and	 Elisabeth	 took	 place,	 albeit	 only	 after	 a	lengthy	 negotiation	 process.	 Friedrich’s	 conversion	 had	 a	transformative	 impact	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 a	 section	 of	 the	German	Lutheran	princes	and	the	Huguenots	in	France.	It	provided	an	example	 of	 the	 possibilities	 and	 even	 of	 the	 productivity	 of	 liaison																																																									65	Public	 proclamation,	 1	 December	 1566,	 ‘es	 sei	 unmüglich,	 das	 er	 nach	 seiner	menscheit	 bei	 uns	 uff	 erden	 konne	 sein,	 dieweil	 er	 gen	 himmel	 gefahren,	 alda	 er	 in	
loco	circumspripto	size,	könne	nit	zu	uns	herab	bis	an	jüngsten	tage.’	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	
Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	I,	p.	728.		66	‘sambt	iren	theologis	mit	allen	papisten	glauben,	hallten	und	vertaydingen,	das	man	den	 hingegebenen	 leyb	 Christi	 und	 seyn	 vergossnes	 blut	 im	 hay.	 abentm.	 mit	 dem	leyplichen	 mund	 esse	 und	 trincke.’	 Friedrich	 III	 to	 Johann	 Friedrich	 of	 Saxony,	 18	April	1565,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	I,	pp.	580-581.	
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between	 the	 Lutherans	 and	 Reformed	 Protestants.	 Although	 the	Lutheran	 princes	 remained	 somewhat	 suspicious,	 the	 conversion	 of	Friedrich	and	his	defence	of	 the	Reformed	position	paved	 the	way	 for	successful	cooperation	with	the	Huguenots	in	France.		
2.4	German	views	on	Reformed	Protestantism	in	France		The	 Palatinate	 controversy	 unfolded	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 religious	tensions	 in	 France	 started	 to	 escalate.	 	 Since	 the	 Huguenots	 too	professed	 the	 Reformed	 religion,	 the	 tensions	 inside	 the	 Empire	 to	 a	large	extent	shaped	German	perceptions	of	French	Protestantism.		
2.4.1	Lutheran	rejections	of	French	Reformed	Protestantism		It	 was	 widely	 recognised	 that	 the	 long	 list	 of	 grievances	 against	 the	Reformed	Religion	articulated	by	Lutherans	throughout	the	1550s	and	60s	 formed	 a	 considerable	 obstacle	 for	 constructive	 Lutheran-Reformed	 cooperation	 throughout	 Europe.	 The	 outbreak	 of	 religious	turmoil	 in	 the	 Netherlands	 in	 the	 summer	 of	 1566	 and	 the	 German	Lutherans’	 inactivity	 during	 the	 Catholic	 backlash	 illustrates	 this	problematic	 relationship.	 Johann	 of	 Nassau	 and	 Wilhelm	 of	 Hesse	concluded	 in	 late	 1566	 and	 early	 1567	 that	 the	 religious	 differences	made	 a	 Lutheran	 intervention	 unlikely	 or	 even	 impossible.	 Johann	observed	that	‘since	the	majority	of	the	German	princes	are	particularly	hostile	 and	 opposed	 to	 Calvinism,	 and	 therefore	 also	 hate	 this	 whole	business,	one	should	not	count	much	on	their	help	and	support	in	case	of	an	emergency.’67	Wilhelm	agreed:	‘firstly,	since	Calvinism	is	hated	by	all	princes	from	Upper	and	Lower	Saxony,	as	well	as	by	Württemberg,	Count	Palatine	Wolfgang,	Baden	and	other	princes	and	Estates,	 that,	 if	the	Dutch	will	not	all	convert	to	the	Augsburg	Confession	and	renounce																																																									67	‘damnach	die	Teutsche	Fürster	zum	mehrenteyl	deme	Calvinismo	sonderlich	feindt	und	 zuwider,	 auch	 derchalben	 diesser	 gentzen	 sachen	 gehessig	 seindt,	 man	 werde	sich	uff	iren	beystandt	oder	hülff	im	fall	der	noth	wenig	zu	verlassen	haben	…’	Johann	of	 Nassau	 to	 Louis	 of	 Nassau,	 October	 1566,	 Groen	 van	 Prinsterer,	 Archives	 ou	
Correspondance	…	Volume	II,		p.	351.		
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Calvinism,	there	cannot	be	much	hope	of	support	from	these	Estates.’68	Interestingly,	 Wilhelm	 does	 not	 include	 himself	 on	 the	 list	 of	 the	enemies	 of	 Calvinism.	 This	 underlines	 once	 more	 that	 among	 the	Lutheran	 princes	 a	 variety	 of	 attitudes	 towards	 Reformed	Protestantism	could	be	found.		 The	 tone	when	 speaking	 of	 French	 Calvinism,	 however,	 differs	slightly	 from	 the	 Lutherans’	 emphatic	 rejection	 of	 the	 Dutch	Protestants.	 When	 assessing	 the	 faith	 of	 the	 Huguenots,	 various	Lutheran	princes	displayed	a	willingness	 to	view	 it	 in	 a	positive	 light.	Discussing	 the	 matter	 with	 Christoph	 of	 Württemberg,	 Wolfgang	 of	Zweibrücken,	 who	 at	 the	 same	 time	 was	 one	 of	 the	 strongest	proponents	 of	 Friedrich’s	 exclusion	 from	 the	Peace	of	Augsburg,	 used	conciliatory	 language	 to	 describe	 the	 Huguenots:	 ‘Concerning	 the	religion	in	France	[we	need	to	consider]	the	means	and	way	…	in	which	we	 can	 teach	 the	 poor	 Christians	 all	 the	 articles	 of	 the	 right	 and	 true	foundation	of	our	Christian	doctrines,	and	…	keep	them	away	from	the	secretly	 advancing,	 seductive	 sects.’69	Wolfgang	 made	 an	 interesting	distinction	here.	 In	principle,	he	 regarded	 the	Huguenots	 in	France	as	Christians,	rather	than	as	sectarians.	The	fact	that	they	held	erroneous	beliefs,	 such	 as	 the	 Calvinist	 explanation	 of	 the	 Eucharist,	 did	 not	change	 their	 status	 as	 Christians.	 Nonetheless,	 Wolfgang	 saw	 this	element	of	 their	 religion	as	a	problem,	but	believed	 that	 this	 could	be	remedied	 by	 the	 proper	 explanation	 of	 the	 true	 (read	 Lutheran)	doctrine	 of	 the	 Eucharist.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 Huguenots	 differed	 from	Friedrich	 III,	who	himself	had	been	a	Lutheran	but	had	discarded	 this	faith	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 Calvinist	 ‘sect’.	 Since	 the	 Lutheran	 religion	 had																																																									68	‘dan	 erstlich	 ist	 der	 Calvinismus	 bey	 allenn	 denn	Obern-	 unnd	Niedersechsischen	Fursten,	dergleichen	bey	Wurtemberg,	Pfalzgrave	Wolffgangen,	Badenn	unnd	andern	Fursten	unnd	Stenden	so	verhast,	das,	wo	die	Niederlander	sich	nitt	per	Omnia	zu	der	Augspurgischen	Confession	bekennen	unnd	dem	Calvinismo	renunctirren,	sich	weinig	beystandts	vonn	gedachten	Stenden	zuverhoffen.’	Wilhelm	of	Hesse	to	Peter	Klotz,	16	January	 1567,	 P.	 J.	 Blok,	Correspondendie	van	en	Betreffende	Lodewijk	van	Nassau	en	
Andere	Onuitgegeven	Documenten	(Utrecht:	Kemink	en	Zoon,	1887):	p.	63.		69	‘Was	 dann	 die	 Religion	 zu	 Franckreich	 antreifft	 …	 auff	mittel	 und	weg	…	wie	 die	armen	 Christen	 inn	 allen	 articuln	 des	 rechten	 waren	 fundaments	 unnseren	Christlichen	 Lehre	 möchten	 underwissen,	 und	 …	 von	 den	 einschleichenden	verfüerischen	 Secten	 abgehallten	 were.’	 Wolfgang	 of	 Zweibrücken	 to	 Christoph	 of	Württemberg,	29	April	1561,	HStASt	A	71	Bü	895.	
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never	 made	 any	 significant	 inroads	 in	 France	 and	 most	 French	Protestants	 had	 converted	 directly	 from	 Catholicism	 to	 Reformed	Protestantism,	they	could	be	viewed	in	a	different	light.	Whereas	many	Reformed	 Protestants	 in	 the	 Empire	 had	 abandoned	 Lutheranism	 for	the	Reformed	faith,	the	Huguenots	were	as	yet	unaware	of	the	truth	of	the	doctrines	of	the	Augsburg	Confession.	In	the	discussions	about	the	religion	of	 the	Huguenots	 found	 in	 the	correspondence	of	 the	German	Protestant	 princes,	 a	 sense	 of	 hope	 and	 even	 anticipation	 shines	through	 that	 instruction	 into	 the	 correct	doctrines	 could	dissuade	 the	Huguenots	from	their	erroneous	path.		 This	doctrinal	change	was,	at	 least	during	the	First	War	(1562-63),	still	widely	regarded,	both	by	the	more	orthodox	Lutheran	princes,	such	 as	 Christoph	 and	Wolfgang,	 and	 the	more	 ecumenical	 Philipp	 of	Hesse,	 as	 a	 necessary	 precondition	 for	 substantial	 German	 aid	 to	 the	Huguenots.	 In	 June	 1562,	 roughly	 three	months	 after	 the	 outbreak	 of	war	in	France,	Philipp	informed	François	Hotman	that	the	‘controversy	concerning	 the	 article	 of	 the	 Lord’s	 Supper’	 was	 damaging	 the	Huguenots’	 cause,	 ‘since	 the	 following	 of	 different	 opinions	 by	 the	Church	 in	 France	 is	 the	 cause	 that	 the	 aforementioned	 princes	[Württemberg,	 Zweibrücken,	 and	 August	 of	 Saxony]	…	 have	 difficulty	providing	assistance.’70	For	this	reason,	the	Lutheran	princes,	hoping	to	guide	the	Huguenots	away	from	their	errors,	were	infuriated	by	the	role	of	 Friedrich	 III,	 who	 seemed	 to	 strengthen	 the	 French	 Protestants	 in	their	 erroneous	 ways.	 At	 a	 meeting	 between	 diplomats	 from	 the	Palatinate,	Veldenz	 (part	of	Wolfgang’s	patrimony),	Württemberg,	and	Hesse,	 the	 matter	 was	 discussed.	 Wolfgang	 summed	 up	 their	conclusions:	‘from	our	councils’	discussion	I	have	learned	with	a	heavy	heart	 that	 the	 council	 of	 Heidelberg	 has	 laboured	 diligently	 to	 justify	thoroughly	and	praise	the	confession	and	writings	of	the	new	churches	in	 France,	 and	 that	 therefore,	 since	 they	 give	 their	 approval	 to	 the																																																									70	‘controversia	in	articulo	De	Coena	domini’	 ‘Cum	autem	Ecclesiae	Gallicae	diversum	sequantur	opinionem,	 in	cause	est,	quod	praefati	Principes	…	difficulter	…	de	auxilio	incomittent.’	Philipp	of	Hesse	to	François	Hotman,	HStaM,	3,	1851,	f.	20-21;	for	more	information	on	François	Hotman’s	activities	in	Germany,	see	Chapter	III.		
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confession	 and	 writings	 of	 Calvinism	 and	 publically	 attack	 the	 true	opinion	of	the	Lord’s	Supper	…,	they	…	at	the	same	time	have	reinforced	and	 certified	 the	 Sacramentarian	 error	 and	 the	 damning	 of	 our	Christian	opinion	of	the	Lord’s	Supper.’71	In	this	statement,	the	idea	that	the	Huguenots	are	being	 led	astray	once	again	shines	 through.	As	will	be	discussed	in	detail	in	Chapter	IV,	a	number	of	Protestant	princes,	led	by	the	Duke	of	Württemberg,	regarded	the	promotion	of	the	Augsburg	Confession	and	 its	doctrines	 in	France	as	 the	 foundation	of	 a	possible	solution	to	the	conflict	in	France.		
2.4.2	Friedrich	III	as	promoter	of	the	Huguenot	cause	in	the	Empire		In	line	with	his	strong	commitment	to	religious	reform	along	Reformed	lines	and	his	close	personal	ties	to	France,	Friedrich	adopted	the	role	of	the	most	important	promoter	of	the	Huguenots	and	their	religion	in	the	Empire.	Throughout	 the	Wars	of	Religion,	 the	Elector	championed	 the	Huguenot	 cause	 through	 facilitating	 the	 publication	 of	 pro-Huguenot	polemic,	housing	French	refugees,	and	providing	 logistical	 support	 for	Huguenot	 diplomats.	 His	 most	 significant	 contribution,	 however,	 was	his	championing	of	the	Huguenots	in	correspondence	with	his	Lutheran	peers.	 In	contrast	with	the	anonymously	written	polemical	pamphlets,	private	 correspondence	 allowed	 for	 the	 development	 of	 genuine	debate.	Only	through	studying	this	correspondence	is	it	possible	to	get	an	 insight	 into	 the	 full	 range	of	 arguments	deployed	by	Friedrich	 and	their	 reception	amongst	 the	Lutheran	princes.	 In	his	 letters,	 Friedrich	presented	a	number	of	powerful	and	often	sophisticated	arguments	 in	favour	of	the	Huguenots.																																																									71 	‘…aus	 unserer	 rethe	 relation	 mit	 beschwertem	 gemuethe	 vernomen,	 das	 die	Heydelbergischen	 räthe	 mit	 sonderem	 fleis	 dahin	 gearbeitet,	 die	 Confession	 und	scripta	 der	 neuen	 kirchen	 in	 Frankreich	 durchaus	 für	 just	 zu	 halten	 und	hochzuruemen,	und	solchs	sonder	zweifel	darumb,	weil	solche	confession	und	scripta	dem	 Calvinismo	 und	 Zwinglianismo	 beifahl	 geben	 und	 unser	 christlichen	Augspurgischen	confession	warhaftige	meinung	de	coena	domini	offentlich		damniren,	…	zugleich	der	 sacramentisch	error	 und	damnation	 unserer	 christlichen	mainung	de	
coena	domini	 sollten	bestettigt	und	adprobiert	warden.’	Wolfgang	of	Zweibrücken	to	Christoph	of	Württemberg,	27	August	1563,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	
…	Volume	I,	pp.	434-435.		
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	 This	 first	 element	 of	 Friedrich’s	 defence	 of	 the	 Huguenots	 is	closely	 related	 to	 the	 debates	 surrounding	 his	 own	 conversion.	Friedrich	repeatedly	argued	that	the	doctrines	of	the	Reformed	church	in	France	were	correct.	Although	Friedrich	was	cautious	not	to	sanction	radical	preachers	(‘I	cannot	testify	to	the	preaching	in	France’),	he	was	positive	 ‘that	 the	 Reformed	 churches	 have	 been	 freed	 from	 all	 the	abominations	of	 idolatry,	and	the	teachings	 follow	the	Word	of	God.’72	He	was	also	keen	to	address	a	second	accusation.	This	was	based	on	the	persistent	 idea	 that	 the	Reformed	 religion	was	 socially	 and	politically	subversive,	and	the	fear	that,	lacking	central	and	magisterial	oversight,	it	 would	 serve	 to	 incubate	 even	 more	 dangerous	 and	 radical	 ideas.	Friedrich	 countered	 this	 accusation,	 emphasising	 the	 doctrinal	uniformity	of	the	French	Reformed	church:	 ‘I	have	up	till	now	from	all	the	reports	not	learned	anything	else	than	that	the	French	churches	in	the	matter	of	religion	are	united	throughout	and	that	they	do	not	have	the	 slightest	 disagreement	 amongst	 each	 other,	 let	 alone	 that	 they	complain	 of	 any	 sects.’73	Friedrich’s	 efforts	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 French	churches	 were	 intended	 to	 convince	 the	 Lutheran	 princes	 that	 the	Huguenot	party	was	a	credible	partner	 for	German	Lutherans	 in	what	was	understood	as	a	common	struggle	against	Catholicism.	Although	he	recognised	 that	 the	 Eucharistic	 beliefs	 of	 Lutherans	 and	 Reformed	Protestants	 differed,	 he	 also	 in	 this	 context	 maintained	 that	 this	difference	 did	 not	 mean	 that	 the	 Germans	 and	 French	 had	 different	religions.	As	 the	 conflict	 in	France	dragged	on,	Friedrich	deplored	 the	stubbornness	of	 those	Lutherans	who	continued	 to	 regard	Eucharistic	disagreement	as	an	insurmountable	stumbling	block.	In	March	1568	he	wrote	 angrily	 to	 Wilhelm	 of	 Hesse,	 stating	 that	 ‘it	 is	 much	 more																																																									72 	‘Von	 den	 predigten	 in	 Frankreych	 ways	 ich	 nit	 zeugnus	 zu	 geben’	 ‘das	 die	reformirten	 kirchen	 von	 allem	 greuel	 der	 abgotterey	 aufgesegt,	 und	 die	 lehr	 dem	worth	 gottes	 gemess	 gehen	 soll’	 Friedrich	 III	 to	 Christoph	 of	 Württemberg,	 3	 May	1562,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	I,	p.	292.		73	‘So	 hab	 ich	 bis	 anhero	 in	 allen	 berichten	 nie	 anders	 verstanden,	 dan	 das	 die	Franzosischen	 kirchen	 durchaus	 in	 causa	 religionis	 aynig	 und	 den	 wenigsten	misverstandt	under	ayn	ander	nitt	hetten,	vil	weniger	sich	aynischer	secten	beglagten.	Friedrich	III	to	Christoph	of	Württemberg,	3	May	1562,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	
Frommen	…	Volume	I,	p.	292.		
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troublesome	 to	 learn	 that	 Your	 Grace	 has	 allowed	 yourself	 to	 be	convinced	 that	 you	 do	 not	 labour	 and	 act	 against	 the	 [true]	 religion,	when	you	support	the	extermination	of	the	Calvinists,	as	if	their	religion	is	 contrary	 to	 the	 Augsburg	 Confession	 and	 our	 religion	 is	 not	 much	more	 in	 all	 and	 the	 most	 important	 points	 in	 agreement	 with	 the	same.’74	A	second	argument	presented	by	Friedrich	is	especially	relevant	to	 the	 status	 of	 Reformed	 Protestants	 in	 France	 and	 the	Netherlands.	From	 the	 beginning	 of	 his	 rule,	 Friedrich	 had	 displayed	 a	 strong	sympathy	for	persecuted	Protestants	and	the	Palatinate	soon	became	a	welcoming	place	for	Reformed	refugees	from	around	Europe.75	He	used	the	buildings	of	former	monasteries	and	convents	to	provide	a	home	to	communities	 of	 Reformed	 refugees.	 A	 Dutch	 community	 settled	 in	Frankenthal,	 French	 and	 Walloon	 congregations	 were	 established	 in	Heidelberg,	and	Reformed	Protestants	from	Frankfurt	were	given	a	new	home	 in	 Schönau. 76 	The	 Protestant	 princes,	 fearing	 an	 influx	 of	Reformed	ideas,	complained	that	Friedrich	was	bringing	in	‘Brabanders,	English,	 and	 such	 people	 …	 who	 follow	 the	 aforementioned	 Calvinist	sect.’77	Friedrich’s	 commitment	 to	 supporting	 his	 persecuted	 fellow	Christians	must	have	been	strengthened	by	 the	 idea	 that	 the	very	 fact	that	they	were	being	submitted	to	persecution	by	the	Catholics	was	in	itself	 proof	 of	 their	 godliness.	 Reformed	 Protestantism	 contains	 a	strong	train	of	thought	that	regarded	persecution	and	martyrdom	as	an																																																									74	‘Viel	 beschwerlicher	 is	 es	 zuvernemmen,	 das	 E.	 L.	 sich	 bereden	 lassen,	 sie	 ziehen	und	handlen	nit	wider	die	religion,	wann	sie	die	calvinisten	auszurotten	understehen,	gleich	als	ob	ir	religion	der	A.	C.	entgegen	und	nit	viel	mehr	in	allen	und	fürnembsten	hauptpunkten	 unsers	 christlichen	 glaubens	 mit	 derselben	 …	 übereinstimmte	 …’	Friedrich	 III	 to	 Wilhelm	 of	 Hesse,	 6	 March	 1568,	 Kluckhohn,	 Briefe	 Friedrich	 des	
Frommen	…	Volume	II,	p.	197.		75	B.	 Vogler,	 ‘Le	 rôle	 des	 électeurs	 Palatins	 dans	 les	 Guerres	 de	 Religion	 en	 France	(1559-1592)’,	 Cahiers	 d’Histoire,	 10	 (1965):	 51-85;	 Press,	 Calvinismus	 und	
Territorialstaat,	p.	188.		76	A.	L.	Thomas,	 ‘A	house	divided:	Wittelsbach	confessional	court	cultures	in	Bavaria,	the	 Palatinate,	 and	 Bohemia,	 c.	 1550-1650’	 (PhD	 dissertation,	 Purdue	 University,	2007):	pp.	159-160.		77	‘Brabander,	 Engelender	 und	 sollichen	 leuten	 …,	 so	 gedachter	 Calvinischen	 sect	angengig	 sein’	Wolfgang	of	Zweibrücken	 to	Friedrich	 III,	 February	1565,	Kluckhohn,	
Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	I,	p.	565.		
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integral	part	of	the	experience	of	the	righteous	on	earth.78		There	exists	a	large	body	of	Reformed	writing	expounding	this	vision,	of	which	John	Foxe’s	Acts	and	Monuments	 is	the	most	famous	example.	Such	writings	evoke	the	long	history	of	the	persecution	of	the	godly	that	can	be	found	in	the	Bible,	the	history	of	the	early	Church,	and	in	recent	examples	of	religious	 persecution.	 Reformed	 Protestants	 facing	 persecutions	 often	compared	 their	 position	 to	 that	 of	 the	 Israelites	 facing	 repression	 in	Egypt	 or	 living	 in	 exile	 in	 Babylon.79	Also	 the	 Biblical	 trope	 of	 the	righteous	being	submitted	to	trials	and	tribulations	at	the	hand	of	Satan	(or	the	Antichrist)	was	easily	applied	to	the	situation	of	the	Huguenots.	Building	 on	 this	 idea,	 Friedrich	 felt	 compelled	 to	 criticise	 the	Protestant	princes,	who	in	comfort	and	safety	debated	doctrinal	purity.	Friedrich	wrote	Johann	Wilhelm	of	Saxe-Weimar,	arguably	the	fiercest	critic	 of	 Reformed	 Protestantism	 among	 the	 princes:	 ‘I	 can	 easily	believe,	that	they	[the	Huguenots]	are	more	serious	than	we	Germans,	since	 they	 persist	 [in	 their	 faith]	 under	 persecution,	which	 is	 not	 the	least	 of	 trials.’80	Friedrich’s	 son,	 Johann	 Casimir,	 in	 a	 letter	written	 in	1566	 established	 a	 direct	 link	 between	 the	 Reformed	 Protestants	 in	France	 and	 the	 Netherlands	 and	 the	 persecuted	 Godly	 throughout	history:	‘From	the	beginning	of	the	World	…	many	Christian	and	Godly	people	and	their	teachings	have	often	been	condemned	as	sectarians	or	sects,	 persecuted,	 and	murdered,	 yet	 they	 were	 followers	 of	 the	 true	Christian	 religion,	 were	 the	 best	 Christians,	 and	 taught	 and	 defended	the	truth.’81	The	criticisms	and	arguments	put	forward	by	Friedrich	and																																																									78	C.	 H.	 Parker,	 French	 Calvinists	 as	 the	 children	 of	 Israel:	 An	 Old	 Testament	 self-consciousness	in	Jean	Crespin’s	Histoire	des	Martyrs	before	the	Wars	of	Religion’,	The	
Sixteenth	Century	Journal,	24	(1993):	227-248.		79	O.	P.	Grell,	 ‘Merchants	and	ministers:	the	foundation	of	 international	Calvinism’,	 in	A.	Pettegree,	A.	Duke,	and	G.	Lewis	(eds.),	Calvinism	in	Europe,	1540-1620	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1994):	pp.	254-273.		80	‘So	 kan	 ich	 leychtlich	 glauben,	 das	 inen	 mehr	 Ernst	 sehe	 als	 uns	 Deutschen,	demnach	 sie	 in	 der	 persecution,	 welches	 nit	 die	 geringste	 prob	 ist,	 bestanden	 …’	Friedrich	 III	 to	 Johann	 Friedrich	 of	 Saxony,	 9	 November	 1561,	 Kluckhohn,	 Briefe	
Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	I,	p.	210.		81	‘Von	 Anbeginn	 der	Welt	…	 [sind]	 zum	 öftern	 viel	 christliche	 und	 gottselige	 Leute	und	 ihre	 Lehre	 für	 Sectirer	 und	 Secter	 ausgeschrien,	 verfolgt,	 und	 umgebracht,	 die	doch	der	wahren	 christlichen	Religion	 anhängig,	 die	 besten	Christen	waren	und	die	
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Casimir	must	 have	 been	 difficult	 to	 counter	 for	 the	 German	 Lutheran	princes.	 On	 the	 one	 hand	 they,	 completely	 in	 line	 with	 widely	 used	Protestant	 polemic,	 identified	 the	 Roman	 Catholic	 Church	 as	 an	instrument	 of	 evil,	 violently	 persecuting	 the	 righteous.	 On	 the	 other	hand,	 they	 accused	 the	 Lutherans	 of	 failing	 to	 identify	 the	 Reformed	Protestants	in	France	and	the	Netherlands	as	the	primary	victims	of	the	Antichrist’s	rage	and	thus	by	extension	as	true	Christians.		
2.4.3	Defence	of	the	Huguenots’	religion	in	print		Though	 they	 provide	 a	 unique	 insight	 into	 their	 writers’	 personal	position,	the	letters	of	Friedrich	and	Casimir	were	by	no	means	the	only	place	 where	 this	 interpretation	 of	 the	 status	 of	 the	 Huguenots	 was	expounded.	Throughout	the	French	Wars	of	Religion,	a	large	number	of	German	 language	 books	 and	 pamphlets	 concerning	 the	 conflict	appeared	 in	 the	Empire.82	A	 significant	proportion	of	 these	pamphlets	focussed	on	the	persecution	of	the	Huguenots.	The	tone	of	some	of	the	pamphlets,	 which	 were	 aimed	 at	 a	 relatively	 wide	 audience,	 is	sensationalist	and	dramatic.	A	good	example	of	a	pamphlet	intended	to	appeal	to	the	reader’s	emotions	is	a	text	that	claimed	to	be	a	translation	of	a	letter	sent	by	the	inhabitants	of	Rouen,	who	in	October	1562	were	being	 besieged	 by	 a	 Catholic	 army.	 The	 pamphlet	 emphasised	 the	innocence	and	defencelessness	of	the	Rouen	citizenry,	who	embody	all	the	Huguenots,	and	gave	a	graphic	account	of	 the	persecution	of	 their	party.	 In	 the	 letter,	 the	people	of	Rouen	beg	 their	besiegers	 for	mercy	‘Since	 [they]	 know	well,	 that	many	 and	 the	most	 genuine	 and	 sincere	captains	of	this	realm	are	murdered	in	an	inhuman	fashion,	and	some	of	them	beheaded,	 and	others	hung,	 and	only	because	 they	have	obeyed	
																																																																																																																																													Wahrheit	lehrten	und	vertheidigten.’	Johann	Casimir	to	Friedrich	III,	23	January	1566,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	I,	p.	627.		82	For	a	more	detailed	discussion	of	German	print	 culture	about	 the	French	Wars	of	Religion	see	Chapter	III.		
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the	King’s	Edict.’83	Other	printed	texts	were	of	a	 less	polemical	nature,	but	nonetheless	used	the	persecution	of	the	Huguenots	as	proof	of	the	merits	 of	 their	 religion.	 In	 1563,	 a	 printer	 in	 Heidelberg	 published	 a	German	translation	of	the	church	order	used	by	the	Huguenot	churches	in	France.	In	the	introduction	the	publisher,	addressing	the	reader,	once	again	related	pure	doctrine	to	persecution:			 Dear	 Christian	 reader,	 do	 you	 want	 to	 know	 why	 the	 evil	 Fiend	 in	recent	years	has	murdered	and	killed	so	many	thousands	of	Christians	in	lamentable	fashion	in	France,	read	then	diligently	this	church	order	of	the	persecuted	Christians	…	Then	you	will	without	doubt	learn	that	Satan	 has	 no	 small	 cause	 to	 rage	 and	 rant	 in	 those	 places,	 since	 this	church	 order	 cannot	 be	 maintained	 and	 promoted	 with	 Christian	diligence	and	zeal	without	causing	great	danger	and	destruction	to	his	realm.84		 Other	 pamphlets	 argued	 that	 failing	 to	 help	 the	 beleaguered	Huguenots	 in	 effect	 made	 the	 German	 Protestants	 complicit	 in	 their	persecution.	This	complicity	was	made	worse,	it	was	argued,	by	the	fact	that	the	Huguenots	should	be	considered	the	Lutherans’	coreligionists.	In	a	pamphlet	printed	in	1568,	the	argument	was	once	again	made	that	the	Huguenots’	 beliefs	 only	 differed	 from	 the	 Augsburg	 Confession	 in	
																																																								83	‘Dan	 wir	 wissen	 all	 zuwol	 /	 dz	 vil	 und	 den	 waidlichste[n]	 un[d]	 redlichsten	Hauptleüten	dises	königreichs	sind	unmenschlicher	weise	ermördet	/	und	zum	thail	enthaupter	 /	 zum	 thail	 erhängt	worden	/	nur	umb	der	ursach	willen	 /	dasz	 sie	des	konigs	Edict	sind	gehorsam	gewesen.’	Anon.,	Abtruck	Aines	Briefs	dem	die	Burger	un[d]	
Einwonder	 zu	 Roan	 den	 25	 Octobris	 in	 disem	 Tausent	 Fünffhundert	 un[d]	 Zwai	 und	
Sechtzigsten	Jar	in	der	Belegerung	an	die	Königin	zu	Frankreich	haben	Geschriben	(s.	l.:	s.	n.	1562),	p.	6.		84	‘Christlichen	lieber	Leser	/	wilt	du	wissen	warumb	der	böse	Feind	in	kurzen	jaren	so	vil	tausend	Christen	in	Franckreich	jämerlich	ermordet	und	umbracht	hat/	so	lese	mit	 vleiß	 diese	 der	 verfolgten	 Christen	 daselbst	 Kirchenordnung	 …	 Darauß	 wirstu	ohne	zweiffel	gnugsam	erlernen	/	das	Sathan	nicht	geringe	ursachen	hat	/	an	diesen	orten	 fürnemlich	 zu	 wüten	 und	 zu	 toben	 /	 da	 solche	 Kirchenordnung	 nicht	 ohne	grosse	gefahr	und	abbruch	seines	Reichs	/	mit	Christlichem	ernst	und	eiffer	gehalten	und	 getrieben	 wirdt.’	 Anon.,	 Ordnung	 der	 Evangelischen	 Kirchen	 in	 Franckreich	 /	 so	
Gehalten	Wird	/	im	Gemeinen	Gebet	/	Reichung	der	Sacrament	/	Eingesegnen	der	Ehe	/	
Besuchung	der	Krancken	/	Und	Christlichen	Catechismo	 (Heidelberg:	 Johannes	Mayer,	1563),	f.	1	r.		
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one	 doctrine	 and	 that	 this	 deviation	 was	 caused	 by	 ignorance	 rather	than	ill	will.		 Third,	they	have	the	same	religion	and	faith	as	the	Germans,	they	also	have	 the	 same	 foe,	 the	 Antichrist,	 who	 persecutes	 them	 cruelly,	 that	therefore	 the	 Germans	 in	 no	 way	 can	 with	 a	 good	 conscience	 help	them	being	persecuted.	And	even	if	they	in	one	single	point	or	opinion	concerning	the	matter	of	the	Supper	think	different	than	the	Germans,	the	 poor	 people	 just	 do	 not	 know	 better,	 and	 are	 without	 doubt	 in	their	hearts	desirous	for	the	truth.85		Throughout	the	early	1560s	a	strong	argument	was	put	forward	for	the	need	for	cooperation	between	Lutherans	and	Reformed	Protestants.	In	both	 Friedrich	 III’s	 letters	 and	 in	 a	 number	 of	 pamphlets,	 the	differences	between	 the	 two	branches	of	Protestantism	were	 strongly	downplayed	 and	 the	 godliness	 of	 the	 persecuted	 Huguenots	emphasised.	 Importantly,	 these	 arguments	 were	 not	 presented	 in	isolation,	but	 fitted	directly	 into	 the	debates	and	discussion	about	 the	conversion	 of	 the	 Palatinate	 that	were	 taking	 place	 at	 the	 same	 time.	These	are	thus	two	developments	that	cannot	be	properly	understood	without	considering	them	together.		
2.4.4	 The	 alternative:	 a	 rapprochement	 with	 reform-minded	
Catholics		Having	 at	 length	 discussed	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	the	 two	 most	 important	 types	 of	 Protestantism,	 it	 is	 now	 important	briefly	 to	 consider	 an	 often-overlooked	 alternative:	 the	 possibility	 of																																																									85	‘Zum	dritten	/	so	haben	sie	dieselbige	Religion	und	glauben	wie	wir	Teütschen	/	sie	haben	 auch	 eben	 den	 selbigen	 feindt	 /	 der	 sie	 auffs	 graussamerst	 verfolget	 /	 den	Antichrist	 /	 das	 derwegen	 die	 Teütschen	 in	 keinem	 wege	 sollen	 noch	 mit	 guttem	gewissen	sie	verfolgen	helffen	können.	Und	ob	sie	gleich	inn	einem	einigen	punct	oder	maynung	die	Matery	vom	Abendtmal	betreffend	/	anders	dann	die	Teutschen	halten	/	so	wissen	doch	die	armen	leut	nicht	besser	/	und	seind	ohne	zweiffel	der	warheit	von	hertzen	begierig.’	Anon.,	Newe	Zeittung	von	Franckreich	unnd	Niderlandt.	Christlichen	
und	 hochwichtige	 gründe	 und	 ursache[n]/	 Warumb	 die	 Teutschen	 kriegsleut	 die	
Christen	inn	Franckreich	und	Niderlandt	nicht	verfolgen	helffen/	oder	auff	einige	weise	
sich	zu	iren	feinden	wider	sie	gestellen	sollen.	Allen	Ehrlichen,	unnd	Frommen	Teutschen	
zu	einem	newen	Jar	geschenckt	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1568),	f.	3	v.	
		 	125	
doctrinal	 reconciliation	 with	 Catholicism.	 This	 prospect	 was	 actively	promoted	 as	 an	 alternative	 to	 a	 strengthening	 of	 Lutheran-Reformed	relations.		 When	 studying	 the	 Reformation	 it	 is	 always	 important	 to	remember	 that	 the	 fracturing	 of	 the	 religious	 landscape	 into	 various	distinct	confessions	was	never	intended.	The	hope	of	Martin	Luther	and	other	reformers	was	that	 the	programme	of	 theological,	 liturgical,	and	organisational	 reforms	 that	 they	 had	 outlined	 would	 cleanse	 the	universal	church	from	false	doctrines,	superstition,	and	idolatry.	Reality	soon	 caught	 up	 as	 the	 unwillingness	 of	 the	 Catholic	 Church	 to	implement	 most	 of	 the	 reforms	 became	 painfully	 clear.	 As	 a	 result,	disappointment	and	hostility	started	to	dominate	confessional	relations	and	 a	 large	 body	 of	 aggressive	 polemic	was	 disseminated	 throughout	Europe	 in	 print,	 manuscript,	 preaching,	 and	 visual	 culture,	 depicting	Catholics	 as	 violent	 persecutors,	 idolaters,	 and	 followers	 of	 the	Antichrist.	 The	 escalations	 of	 Protestant-Catholic	 tensions	 in	 the	Schmalkalic	War	and	other	violent	conflicts	must	have	seemed	to	many	to	 be	 the	 final	 nail	 in	 the	 coffin	 for	 the	 prospect	 of	 reconciliation.	Nonetheless,	 as	 the	 recent	 historiographical	 interest	 in	 the	 ‘middle	parties’	 has	 demonstrated,	 throughout	 the	 1550s	 and	 60s	 there	were	ecumenically-minded	individuals	and	groups	who	advocated	some	sort	of	 rapprochement,	 whether	 for	 political	 or	 religious	 reasons.	 Some	chose	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 common	 ground	 shared	 by	 the	 various	confessions.	 Moreover,	 some	 Catholics	 displayed	 a	 willingness	 to	 go	remarkably	far	in	reforming	doctrine	and	liturgy	in	order	to	facilitate	a	restoration	of	the	unity	of	religion.		 Much	 of	 the	 hope	 of	 reconciliation	 rested	 on	 the	 prospect	 of	 a	general	 council.	 The	 Council	 of	 Trent,	which	 started	 in	 1545,	was	 for	many	 Protestants	 the	 extremely	 disappointing	 answer	 of	 the	 Catholic	Church	to	the	call	for	a	general	council.	Trent	was	dominated	by	three	consecutive	 popes	 and	 by	 Catholic	 prelates	 from	 Italy	 and	 Spain.	Protestant	 attendance	 was	 minimal.86	Of	 all	 the	 German	 Protestant																																																									86	E.	 Iserloh,	 ‘Luther	 and	 the	 Council	 of	 Trent’,	 The	 Catholic	 Historical	 Review,	 69	(1983):	563-576.	
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princes,	 Christoph	 of	 Württemberg	 was	 most	 interested,	 sending	 a	delegation	 to	 the	 session	 that	 lasted	 from	 January	 1552	 to	December	1553. 87 	Christoph	 hoped	 that	 his	 delegates	 could	 function	 as	‘arbitrators’	and	to	ensure	that	the	conclusions	of	the	Council	‘are	truly	founded	 on	 the	 Holy	 Scriptures	 together	 with	 the	 customs	 of	 the	apostles	and	the	early	church	…’88	Needless	to	say,	the	mission	ended	in	disappointment. 89 	As	 a	 result	 of	 this	 setback,	 the	 emphasis	 of	Christoph’s	 religious	 policies	 shifted	 from	 the	 promotion	 of	 the	 ‘true	religion’	throughout	Europe	to	the	consolidation	of	Lutheran	orthodoxy	within	Württemberg	and	the	Empire.90		 After	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 Trent	 had	 become	 apparent,	the	voices	of	those	calling	for	a	general	council	died	down	somewhat.	In	France,	 where	 the	 Council	 of	 Trent	 had	 never	 been	 popular,	 an	ecumenical	 agenda	 was	 still	 prominently	 present,	 especially	 among	Catholics.	 Building	 on	 the	 historic	 freedoms	 of	 the	 Gallican	 Church,	 it	was	 widely	 believed	 that	 the	 French	 had	 the	 prerogative	 to	independently	 settle	 their	 own	 religious	 disputes.	 The	 Colloquy	 of	Poissy	 (9	 September	 to	 9	 October	 1561)	 was	 the	 most	 ambitious	initiative	 of	 the	 conciliatory	 party. 91 	Although	 it	 failed,	 Poissy	resembled	 much	 more	 closely	 the	 general	 council	 envisaged	 by	Württemberg	and	others.	The	 failure	of	Poissy,	which	was	primarily	a	dialogue	between	Catholics	and	Calvinists,	did	not	crush	all	enthusiasm	for	 reconciliation.	 Between	 15	 and	 17	 February	 1562	 a	meeting	 took	place	 in	 Saverne,	 a	 small	 town	 in	 Lorraine,	 between	 the	 Duke	 of	Württemberg,	 the	 Duke	 of	 Guise,	 and	 the	 Cardinal	 of	 Lorraine.	 An																																																									87 	M.	 Langsteiner,	 Für	 Land	 und	 Luthertum:	 die	 Politik	 Herzog	 Christoph	 von	
Württemberg	(1550-1568)	(Cologne:	Böhlau	Verlag,	2008):	pp.	32-89.		88	‘arbitros’	…	 ‘warhaftig	uf	die	heilig	schrift	sampt	der	apostolen	und	ersten	kirchen	gebrauch	 fundieren	 …’	 Christoph	 of	 Württemberg	 to	 Charles	 V,	 February	 1552,	 V.	Ernst,	Briefwechsel	des	Herzogs	Christoph	von	Wirtemberg,	Volume	I	(Stuttgart:	Verlag	von	Kohlhammer,	1899):	p.	390.		89	Langsteiner,	Für	Land	und	Luthertum,	pp.	204-228.		90	Ibid,	pp.	204-228.		91	See	Chapter	IV	for	a	detailed	discussion	about	the	Colloquy	of	Poissy	and	the	role	of	German	Protestants	in	the	deliberations.		
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extensive	 account	 of	 the	 conversations	 conducted	 during	 those	 three	days,	written	by	Württemberg	himself,	survives.	During	the	meeting	the	failure	of	Poissy	was	discussed,	which	the	Cardinal	of	Lorraine	blamed	on	 the	 stubbornness	 of	 the	 Reformed	 Protestants.92	The	 conversation	then	 turned	 to	 the	 doctrinal	 differences	 between	 Lutherans	 and	Catholics.		“One	 is	 an	 idolater”,	 I	 [Württemberg]	 said	 to	 them,	 “when	 one	worships	other	gods	than	the	true	God,	or	when	one	searches	for	other	mediators	than	the	Son	of	God,	our	Lord	Jesus	Christ,	or	when	one	puts	his	 trust	 in	 the	 saints,	 the	virgin	Mary,	or	 in	his	own	good	works.”	 “I	believe	in	no	other	god	but	the	true	God”,	he	[Lorraine]	responded	to	me,	“I	confide	only	in	Jesus	Christ;	I	know	well	that	not	the	mother	of	our	Lord,	nor	the	saints	can	aid	me;	I	also	know	well	that	I	cannot	be	saved	by	my	good	works,	but	by	the	merits	of	Jesus	Christ.”	I	[replied]:	“I	hear	this	with	joy;	the	Lord	wants	to	keep	you	in	this	confession.”93			Without	doubt	despite	some	suspicions,	Christoph	thus	seems	to	have	viewed	 Lorraine’s	 testimony	 in	 a	 positive	 light.	 Hopeful	 that	 the	Cardinal	might	be	 ‘a	new	Saul	converted	 into	a	new	Paul’,	he	wrote	to	Wolfgang	 about	 their	 meeting. 94 	Lorraine’s	 apparent	 courting	 of	Württemberg	 and	 other	 Lutherans	 has	 been	 interpreted	 in	 different	ways.	 Huguenot	 pamphleteers	 were	 keen	 to	 emphasise	 Lorraine’s	religious	 hypocrisy.	 This	 interpretation	 has	 been	 copied	 by	 ‘most																																																									92	A.	 Muntz	 (ed.),	 ‘Entrevue	 du	 Duc	 Christophe	 de	 Würtemberg	 avec	 les	 Guise,	 a	Saverne,	peu	de	jour	savant	le	Massacre	de	Vassy,	1562.	Relation	autograph	du	Duc	de	Würtemberg’,	Bulletin	de	la	Société	de	l’Histoire	du	Protestantisme	Français,	4	(1856):	184-196,	on	p.	186.		93	‘On	est	idolâtre,	lui	dis-je,	lorsqu’on	adore	d’autres	dieux	que	le	vrai	Dieu,	ou	qu’on	cherche	d’autres	médiateurs	que	le	Fills	de	Dieu,	notre	Seigneur	Jésus-Christ,	ou	qu’on	met	 sa	 confiance	 dans	 les	 saints,	 dans	 la	 vierge	Marie,	 ou	 dans	 ses	 propres	 bonnes	oeuvres.	 Je	 n’adore	 d’autre	 Dieu	 que	 le	 vrai	 Dieu,	 me	 repondit-il,	 je	 me	 confie	uniquement	en	Jésus-Christ;	je	sais	bien	que	ni	la	mère	de	notre	Seigneur,	ni	les	saints	ne	peuvent	m’être	sauvé	par	mes	bonnes	oevres,	mais	pas	les	mérites	de	Jésus-Christ.	Moi:	 Voilà	 ce	 que	 j’entends	 avec	 joie;	 le	 Seigneur	 veuille	 vous	maintenir	 dans	 cette	confession.’	Muntz	(ed.),	‘Entrevue	du	Duc	Christophe	de	Würtemberg	avec	les	Guise,	187.		94	H.	 O.	 Evennet,	 ‘The	 Cardinal	 of	 Lorraine	 and	 the	 Colloquy	 of	 Poissy’,	 Cambridge	
Historical	Journal,	2	(1927):	133-150,	on	p.	145.		
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Protestant	 historians	 ever	 since’,	 who	 have	 described	 Lorraine’s	rapprochement	 with	 the	 Lutherans	 as	 a	 ploy	 intended	 to	 disrupt	Huguenot-Lutheran	 cooperation. 95 	Recently,	 however,	 Lorraine’s	position	has	been	re-evaluated.	96	It	has	been	persuasively	argued	that	Lorraine’s	statements	at	Saverne	are	typical	of	the	attitudes	of	reform-minded	French	Catholics.	Lorraine,	who	had	also	had	a	central	 role	 in	the	 organisation	 of	 the	 Colloquy	 of	 Poissy,	 seems	 at	 Saverne	 to	 have	articulated	the	idea	that	peace	or	reconciliation	could	only	be	achieved	by	emphasising	 the	common	ground	between	the	various	confessions.	For	 his	 part,	 Christoph	 seems	 to	 have	 viewed	 Lorraine’s	 statements	with	less	cynicism	than	many	historians.	This	episode	clearly	illustrates	a	very	 important	and	often-ignored	dimension	of	 the	above	described	debates:	 the	 idea	 that	 Lutheran-Reformed	 liaison	was	 not	 necessarily	the	 only	 option	 but	 that	 in	 some	ways	 Lutheran-Catholic	 cooperation	was	 more	 feasible.	 The	 attractions	 of	 this	 alternative	 option	 were	manifold.	 First,	 the	 German	 Lutheran	 princes	 had	 a	 history	 of	 very	productive	 cooperation	 with	 the	 Catholic	 kings	 of	 France.	 For	 the	princes,	 the	 alliance	with	 France	 had	played	 a	 central	 role	 in	 keeping	their	 lands,	 and	 therefore	 their	 reformations,	 safe.	 Moreover,	 as	 will	also	be	argued	 in	Chapter	 IV,	 there	was	no	 reason	yet	 to	 assume	 that	French	evangelical	Catholics	could	not	be	persuaded	to	accept	a	version	of	 the	 Augsburg	 Confession.	 A	 strong	 argument	 could	 be	 made	 that	through	close	contact	and	friendly	admonition	conversions	were	likely	to	take	place.	Hopes	of	this	sort	were	not	without	foundation,	since	on	some	levels,	Lutheran	doctrine,	liturgy,	and	ecclesiology	were	closer	to	Catholicism	 than	 to	 Reformed	 Protestantism.	 The	 possibility	 of	 a	reformed	 Mass	 provided	 common	 ground	 on	 which	 to	 build	conciliatory	 initiatives	 between	 Lutherans	 and	 evangelical	 French	Catholics.	 A	 tendency	 to	 focus	 exclusively	 on	 the	 Protestant-Catholic																																																									95	R.	M.	Kingdon,	Geneva	and	the	Coming	of	the	Wars	of	Religion	in	France,	1555-1563	(Geneva:	Droz,	1956):	p.	106;	D.	R.	Kelley,	François	Hotman,	a	Revolutionary’s	Ordeal	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	1973).		96	Evennet,	 ‘The	 Cardinal	 of	 Lorraine	 and	 the	 Colloquy	 of	 Poissy’,	 pp.	 133-150;	 S.	Carroll,	‘The	compromise	of	Charles	Cardinal	de	Lorraine:	New	evidence’,	The	Journal	
of	Ecclesiastical	History,	54	(2003):	469-483.	
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dichotomy,	 which	 can	 be	 found	 in	 most	 traditional	 narratives	 of	 the	Reformation,	 has	 overshadowed	 the	 nuances.	 True,	 the	 ideas	 of	evangelical	 and	 ecumenically	 minded	 French	 Catholics,	 which	 have	been	 comprehensively	 brought	 to	 light	 by	 Wanegffelen	 and	 others,	were	not	heard	as	loudly	in	the	Empire	as	the	pamphlets	of	Protestant	polemicists,	which	presented	a	very	stark	and	clear	choice	between	the	two	 confessions.	 However,	 among	 the	 princes,	 the	 existence	 of	alternative	 voices	 and	 positions	 had	 a	 much	 stronger	 impact.	 The	possibilities	 for	 working	 with	 Catholics	 led	 a	 number	 of	 Lutheran	princes	completely	to	reject	the	option	of	inter-Protestant	cooperation,	as	will	be	demonstrated	in	subsequent	chapters.		
2.5	Conclusion		As	 has	 been	 demonstrated	 over	 the	 last	 two	 decades	 by	 historians	focusing	 on	 the	 ‘middle	 parties’,	 there	 existed	 a	 variety	 of	 religious	positions	 in	 France	 and	 the	 Empire.	 In	 the	 1550s	 and	 60s	confessionalisation	 was	 in	 its	 early	 stages	 of	 progress.	 But	 the	teleological	 focus	of	the	historiography	on	the	creation	of	confessional	uniformity	has	blinded	historians	to	the	alternative	possibilities,	which	were	very	real	for	policymakers	in	the	1560s.	Patriotic	and	confessional	history	writing	tended	to	downplay	the	potential	for	intra-confessional	bickering	and	the	impact	this	had	on	the	course	of	events.	After	1555,	the	epicentre	of	religious	conflict	 inside	the	Empire	had	moved	from	the	struggle	between	Catholicism	and	Protestantism	to	strife	between	Lutheranism	and	Reformed	Protestantism.	On	the	whole,	Lutheran	attitudes	to	the	increasingly	numerous	Reformed	Protestants	were	 hostile.	 They	were	 routinely	 described	 as	 sectarian,	 radical,	 and	socially	and	politically	 subversive.	This	attitude	was	reinforced	by	 the	Peace	of	Augsburg,	which	created	a	clear	distinction	between	the	‘legal’	religion	 of	 the	 Augsburg	 Confession	 and	 the	 other	 ‘illegal’	 forms	 of	Protestantism.	Throughout	the	1560s,	this	point	of	view	was	regularly	confirmed	 by	 events	 taking	 place	 in	 France,	 the	 Low	 Countries,	 and	elsewhere	in	Europe.	Iconoclastic	riots,	political	conspiracies,	and	even	
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open	 revolt	 contrasted	 sharply	 with	 the	 orderly	 magisterial	reformations	presided	over	by	the	Lutheran	princes.		 As	 has	 been	 demonstrated	 above,	 this	 stereotype	 was	challenged.	The	most	important	catalyst	for	the	rethinking	of	Lutheran-Reformed	 relations	 was	 the	 conversion	 of	 Friedrich	 III.	 In	 his	correspondence	 with	 his	 Lutheran	 peers,	 he	 not	 only	 eloquently	 and	persuasively	argued	against	the	creating	of	a	clear	separation	between	the	 two	 confessions,	 but	 also	 challenged	 the	 persistent	 idea	 that	Reformed	 Protestantism	 was	 essentially	 a	 religion	 for	 the	 politically	subversive.	 Moreover,	 Friedrich	 explicitly	 brought	 the	 situation	 in	France	 and	 the	 Netherlands	 into	 the	 equation.	 He	 argued	 that	 the	persecution	of	the	Reformed	Protestants	in	France	and	the	Netherlands	at	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 Catholics	 was	 in	 itself	 ample	 proof	 of	 the	righteousness	of	the	Huguenots	and	their	religion.	Moreover,	he	did	not	shy	away	from	accusing	the	passive	Lutheran	princes	of	being	complicit	to	 the	persecution	of	Reformed	Protestants.	Friedrich’s	arguments	are	echoed	 in	 print.	 A	 substantial	 body	 of	 pro-Huguenot	 texts	 printed	 in	German	 appeared	 throughout	 the	 Wars	 of	 Religion.	 They	 often	appealed	 to	 the	 readers’	 emotions,	 providing	 graphic	 accounts	 of	 the	atrocities	committed	against	 the	 innocent	 ‘Christians’	 in	France	whilst	brushing	 over	 the	 religious	 differences	 between	 the	 Reformed	Huguenots	 and	 the	 largely	 Lutheran	 readership.	 Following	 his	conversion,	 Friedrich	 played	 a	 pivotal	 role	 in	 paving	 the	 way	 for	increased	 cooperation	 between	 German	 Lutherans	 and	 French	Protestants.	 By	 arguing	 that,	 despite	 some	 disagreements,	 Lutherans	and	 Reformed	 Protestants	 inherently	 shared	 a	 commitment	 to	 the	restoration	of	religious	purity,	he	removed	the	sting	 from	some	of	 the	hostility	 between	 members	 of	 the	 two	 confessions.	 Similarly,	 by	demonstrating	that	the	Reformed	religion	was	not	necessarily	a	religion	of	rabble-rousers	and	could	also	follow	a	similar	pattern	as	the	princely	reformations,	 Friedrich	 removed	 some	 of	 the	 apprehension	 amongst	Lutherans	about	supporting	the	Huguenots.		 A	 third	 and	often-overlooked	 interpretation	 of	 the	 relationship	between	 the	 three	 major	 religions,	 promoted	 by	 the	 Cardinal	 of	
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Lorraine	and	other	Reform-minded	Catholics,	advocated	the	possibility	of	 a	 doctrinal	 rapprochement	 between	 Lutherans	 and	 Catholics.	Although	 many	 advocates	 of	 reconciliation	 also	 hoped	 to	 include	Reformed	 Protestants	 in	 the	 religious	 settlement	 they	 aspired	 to,	 the	breakdown	 of	 Poissy	 may	 have	 contributed	 to	 the	 feeling	 that	Lutherans	 made	 better	 partners	 than	 the	 obstinate	 Calvinists.	 This	option	 for	 religious	 and	 political	 rapprochement	 also	 appealed	 to	 a	section	of	German	Lutherans.		 There	 thus	existed	parallel	 interpretations	of	 the	way	 in	which	the	 various	 confessions	 related	 to	 each	 other.	 This	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	wide	 variety	 of	 names	 used	 to	 describe	 the	 various	 religious	 groups.	Reformed	 Protestants	were	 described	 by	 Lutherans	 as	 the	 ‘Zwinglian	sect’,	 but	 also	 in	 some	 contexts	 as	 the	 ‘poor	 oppressed	 Christians’.	Although	 over	 time	 some	 interpretations	 dominated,	 one	 never	completely	excluded	another.	Moreover,	Reformed	Protestants	were	in	some	contexts	described	by	Lutherans	in	more	favourable	terms	than	in	others.	 The	 German	 Lutherans	 were	 more	 likely	 to	 regard	 the	beleaguered	Huguenots	in	France	as	fellow	Christians	than	the	German	Zwinglians	 and	Calvinists,	who	posed	 a	 direct	 threat	 to	 the	 unity	 and	dominance	of	their	own	faith.		 Finally,	 it	 has	 to	 be	 emphasised	 that	 among	 the	 German	Lutheran	 princes	 a	 range	 of	 sometimes	 subtly	 different	 attitudes	towards	 Reformed	 Protestantism	 could	 be	 found.	 On	 one	 end	 of	 the	spectrum	there	was,	amongst	others,	 Johann	Wilhelm	of	Saxe-Weimar,	who	 acted	 aggressively	 against	 unorthodox	 forms	 of	 Protestantism	 in	his	 own	 territories	 and	 in	 a	 number	 of	 letters	 and	 pamphlets	 put	Reformed	 Protestantism	 in	 the	 same	 bracket	 as	 other	 ‘damaging	 and	unchristian	disruptions	and	offences’,	such	as	Anabaptism.97	Christoph	of	 Württemberg	 and	 Wolfgang	 of	 Zweibrücken	 also	 considered	themselves	 champions	 of	 Lutheran	 orthodoxy.	 They	 were	 the	 two	strongest	 advocates	 of	 the	 Palatinate’s	 exclusion	 from	 the	 Peace	 of	Augsburg	 and	 repeatedly	 expressed	 concerns	 about	 the	 rise	 of																																																									97	‘schedliche	unnd	unchristliche	zerrütung	unnd	ergernissen’	ThHStAW,	Fürstenhaus,	A	195,	Bl.	185.	
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Reformed	Protestantism	in	Germany.	Nonetheless,	Christoph	remained	on	 relatively	 good	 terms	 with	 the	 Elector	 Palatine,	 allowing	 the	continuation	 of	 political	 cooperation.	 Wolfgang	 was	 willing	 to	 look	favourably	upon	the	Huguenots,	regarding	them	as	victims,	not	only	of	persistent	 Catholic	 persecution,	 but	 also	 of	 the	 teaching	 of	 false	doctrines.	 He	 also	 expressed	 the	 expectation	 that	 further	 religious	education	 could	 rectify	 the	 situation.	 The	 Landgraves	 Philipp	 and	Wilhelm	 of	 Hesse	 refused	 to	 demonise	 Calvinism.	 The	 relatively	ecumenical	 atmosphere	 at	 the	 courts	 and	university	 of	Marburg,	with	its	strong	Philippist	character,	 is	reflected	 in	the	comments	of	 the	two	Landgraves.	 Although	 they	 both	 emphasised	 the	 importance	 of	conformity	 to	 the	Augsburg	Confession,	 they	did	regard	 the	Reformed	Protestants	in	France	and	the	Netherlands	as	their	coreligionists.	Count	Johann	of	Nassau	was	of	a	similar	opinion.		 The	 various	 different	 angles	 and	 interpretations	 discussed	 in	this	 chapter	 illustrate	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 confessional	 landscape	 in	which	 liaison	 between	 the	 Huguenot	 leadership	 and	 the	 German	Protestant	 princes	 took	 place.	 This	 underscores	 the	 importance	 of	individual	 belief	 and	 conscience,	 which	 was	 crucial	 to	 Protestant	identity.	These	different	opinions,	which	could	be	found	among	people	who	considered	themselves	to	be	part	of	the	same	Church	would	have	far-reaching	 consequences	 for	 their	 attitudes	 towards	 intervention	 in	the	 conflict	 in	 France.	 The	 princes’	 position	 in	 the	 intra-Protestant	debate	determined	to	a	large	extent	his	support	for	the	Huguenot	cause.	However,	 views	 could	 change	 according	 to	 events	 in	 France	 and	 as	 a	result	 of	 propaganda,	 especially	 the	 incessant	 championing	 of	 the	Huguenots	by	Friedrich.	In	this	sense	the	1560s	witnessed	some	radical	rethinking	of	what	was	 to	be	done	about	France,	 revealing	once	again	how	 civil	 war	 forces	 people	 to	 choose	 sides	 when	 their	 initial	convictions	are	more	ambiguous	and	hesitant.	But	as	I	have	demonstrated	in	this	chapter,	the	relation	between	Huguenots	 and	 Lutherans	 was	 largely	 shaped	 by	 events	 taking	 place	within	 the	 Empire.	 The	 news,	 rumours,	 and	 propaganda	 from	 France	examined	 in	 the	 next	 chapter	 cannot	 be	 read	 in	 isolation	 from	 the	
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debates	 discussed	 above.	With	 the	 possible	 exception	 of	 Friedrich	 III,	who	 was	 strongly	 committed	 to	 supporting	 his	 French	 coreligionists,	the	Protestant	princes	were	no	obvious	or	natural	allies	to	either	of	the	warring	 parties	 in	 France.	 This	 conclusion	 conflicts	 with	 the	assumption,	 found	 in	 much	 of	 the	 historiography	 of	 German	intervention	 in	 the	 French	 Wars	 of	 Religion,	 that	 international	Protestant	 cooperation	 was	 logical	 and	 consistent	 with	 religious	allegiances	 and	 that	 Lutheran	 support	 for	 the	 Catholic	 King	 was	inconsistent	with	religious	principle	and	therefore	had	to	be	based	on	some	 other,	 less	 noble,	 conviction.98	This	 thesis	will	 demonstrate	 that	this	was	not	the	case.		
																																																								98	Vogler,	‘Le	role	des	Électeurs	Palatins,	pp.	54	and	62.	
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III.		 Propaganda	and	Diplomacy	
	
3.1	Introduction:	the	Massacre	of	Vassy	
	The	outbreak	of	 the	First	War	of	Religion	 in	France	was	caused	by	an	unexpected	event	that	took	place	in	the	small	market	town	of	Vassy	on	19	March	1562.	The	Duke	of	Guise	and	his	retinue,	on	their	way	to	Paris	from	 their	meeting	with	 the	Duke	of	Württemberg	at	 Saverne,	passed	Vassy.	 The	 exact	 sequence	 of	 events	 is	 not	 entirely	 clear,	 but	 it	 is	evident	that	a	violent	clash	took	place	between	Guise’s	retainers	and	a	congregation	 of	 Huguenots	 gathered	 in	 a	 barn	 for	 worship.1	What	happened	next	is	characteristic	for	the	way	in	which	German	audiences	became	 aware	 of	 major	 developments	 during	 the	 French	 Wars	 of	Religion.	Within	weeks	after	the	Massacre	of	Vassy,	Duke	Christoph	of	Württemberg	 received	 two	 letters	 claiming	 to	 provide	 an	 accurate	account	of	the	event.	The	 first	 letter	was	 an	 anonymous	 account	 that	 articulated	 the	Huguenot	 perspective	 on	 Vassy.	 The	 writer	 strongly	 emphasised	 the	unprovoked	nature	of	the	attack,	narrating	how	after	the	Duke	of	Guise	had	 sent	 a	 party	 to	 investigate	 what	 was	 happening	 in	 the	 barn,	 the	congregation	said	 to	 them:	 ‘“My	 lords,	 if	 it	pleases	you,	 take	a	seat:	 to	which	they	responded	in	these	terms:	by	God’s	death,	they	must	all	be	killed.”’2	They	soon	put	their	words	into	action	and	‘killed	and	injured	a	great	 number’,	 ‘men,	 women,	 and	 small	 children’. 3 	The	 writer	emphasised	both	 the	horror	 of	 the	 slaughter	 and	 the	 glee	with	which																																																									1	S.	 Carroll,	 Martyrs	 and	 Murderers:	 The	 Guise	 Family	 and	 the	 Making	 of	 Europe,	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2009):	pp.	12-19.		2	“Messieurs,	 s’il	 vous	 plaist,	 prennes	 place:	 à	 quoy	 pour	 responce	 du	 premier	mot,	usarent	 de	 ces	 termes:	 Mort-Dieu,	 il	 fault	 tout	 tuer.”	 Anonymous	 account	 of	 the	Massacre	at	Vassy,	1562,	J.	F.	Michaud	and	J.	J.	F.	Poujoulat	(eds.),	Nouvelle	Collection	
des	Mémoires	pour	server	a	 l’Histoire	de	France,	depuis	 le	XIIIe	Siècle	 jusqu’a	 la	Fin	du	
XVIIIe,	Volume	VI,	(Paris:	l’Éditeur	du	Commentaire	Analytique	du	Code	Civil,	1839):	p.	472.		3	‘tuarent	et	blessarent	grand	nombre’	‘hommes,	femmes	et	petitz	enffans’	Ibid,	p.	472		
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Guise’s	men	executed	it:	‘This	spectacle,	so	horrible	and	frightful,	lasted	an	hour	and	a	half	before	 it	ceased.	And	thereafter	 the	 trumpets	were	sounded	as	a	sign	of	triumph	and	victory.’4	This	passage	not	only	aimed	to	illustrate	Catholic	aggression,	provoked	solely	by	the	religious	beliefs	of	 the	Protestants	of	Vassy,	 it	also	underlined	 the	harmlessness	of	 the	congregation.	 The	 Huguenots	 greeted	 their	 future	 killers	 not	 with	hostility,	 but	 with	 their	 proper	 titles,	 inviting	 them	 to	 join	 them	 in	hearing	 the	 sermon.	 Despite	 their	 deference,	 they	 were	 subjected	 to	‘inhumanity,	tyranny,	and	cruelty.’5	The	 Catholic	 version	 of	 the	 events	 by	 contrast	 highlighted	 the	efforts	made	to	avoid	the	bloodshed.	François	de	Guise	himself	wrote	to	Christoph	to	explain	the	causes	of	the	unfortunate	event.	Aware	of	the	presence	 in	Vassy	of	 ‘scandalous,	 arrogant,	 and	reckless	people,	many	of	 whom	 were	 Calvinists’,	 François	 decided	 to	 have	 his	 dinner	 ‘in	 a	small	 village	 half	 a	 mile	 away	 [from	 Vassy]…	 expressly	 to	 avoid	 that	what	happened	there.’6	When	the	next	day	the	party	travelled	through	Vassy,	 they	 were	made	 aware	 of	 a	 Protestant	 service	 taking	 place	 at	that	moment	inside	the	city,	leading	François	to	conclude	‘that	I	was	too	near	to	them	not	to	rebuke	them.’7	When	the	Duke	sent	a	party	of	men	to	admonish	 the	Huguenots,	 they	 found	 the	 congregation	armed	 ‘with	harquebuses,	 pistols,	 and	other	munitions,	which	 further	 contravened	the	edicts	and	ordinances	of	the	said	Majesty	[the	King	of	France].’8	The	violent	 confrontation	 was	 thus,	 according	 to	 François’	 account,	 the	result	 of	 ‘the	 little	 respect	 [the	 Huguenot	 congregation]	 had	 for	 the																																																									4	‘Et	dura	ce	spectacle	tant	horrible	et	espouventable,	avant	que	cesser,	une	heure	et	demye.	 Puis	 après	 cela	 furent	 sounnées	 les	 trompettes	 en	 signe	 de	 triumphe	 et	victoire	…’	Ibid,	p.	472.		5	‘inhumanité,	tyrannie	et	cruaulté.’	Ibid,	p.	473.		6	‘gens	 scandalleux,	 arrogans	 et	 fort	 téméraires,	 combien	 quilz	 fussent	 Calvinistes’	 à	un	petit	village	plus	avant	à	demie	lieue	…	expressément	pour	y	éviter	ce	que	depuis	y	est	advenu’	François	de	Guise	to	Christoph	of	Württemberg,	17	March	1562,	Bulletin	
de	la	Société	de	l’Histoire	du	Protestantisme	Français,	24	(1875):	212-217,	on	p.	213.		7	‘j’estoit	trop	pres	d[eulx]	…	pour	ne	leur	devoir	faire	…	telles	remonstrances	que	je	cognoist[rois]	plus	a	propoz’	Ibid,	p.	214.		8	‘avec	 harquebuzes,	 pistoletz,	 et	 autres	munitions,	 qui	 estoit	 contrevenir	 advantage	aux	édictz	et	ordonnance	de	sa	dicte	Majesté.’	Ibid,	p.	214.		
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obedience	 they	 owed	 the	 King’	 and	 their	 ‘rebellions,	 seditions,	 and	insolences.’9	The	Duke	had	 long	been	aware	of	 the	Huguenot	presence	in	Vassy	and	had	initially	decided	not	to	act.	Only	when	confronted	with	both	 staggering	 insolence	and	armed	 resistance	–	François	 claimed	 to	have	 been	wounded	 himself	 –	 did	 his	 retainers	 resort	 to	 violence.	 In	this	account	Calvinism	is	directly	equated	with	disobedience	to	worldly	authority.	The	Edict	of	 January	expressly	only	allowed	public	worship	outside	towns	and	cities.	The	Huguenots	at	Vassy	thus	in	a	very	public	manner	contravened	the	law.	Moreover,	their	political	sedition	was	not	only	 displayed	 through	 disdain	 for	 the	 King’s	 laws,	 but	 also	 through	unprovoked	 violence	 against	 their	 natural	 superiors.	 The	 violence	committed	 by	 the	 Duke	 and	 his	 retainers,	 he	 argued,	 was	 thus	motivated	by	self-defence	and	by	the	necessity	to	subdue	the	rebellious	Huguenots.	It	 is	 not	 entirely	 clear	 how	 Christoph	 of	 Württemberg	interpreted	these	two	conflicting	accounts.	However,	in	two	letters	sent	by	Elector	Palatine	Friedrich	 III	 to	Philipp	of	Hesse	 and	Württemberg	respectively,	 we	 catch	 a	 glimpse	 of	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 event	 was	discussed	 among	 the	 German	 Protestant	 princes.	 Interestingly,	Friedrich’s	understanding	of	the	Massacre	seems	to	have	been	built	up	of	elements	from	both	accounts.	In	the	first	letter,	Friedrich	III,	contrary	to	the	Huguenot	account,	writes	how	the	congregation	at	Vassy	defied	the	Duke’s	men:	‘He	[Guise]	had	sent	a	nobleman	and	desired	to	speak	to	 the	 preacher.	 However,	 when	 the	 nobleman	 wanted	 to	 enter	 the	barn,	they	refused	to	let	him	in.’10	Friedrich,	this	time	contradicting	the	Catholic	account,	does	attribute	the	 first	act	of	violence	to	the	Duke	of	Guise’s	 retainers:	 ‘Then	 the	Duke	 of	 Guise	 together	with	 a	 number	 of	nobles,	who	were	accompanying	him,	…	quickly	went	[to	the	barn],	and																																																									9	‘le	peu	de	respect	quilz	avoient	à	lobeissance	quilz	devoitent	porter	au	Roi’	‘pour	les	rébellions,	seditions	et	insolences’	Ibid,	p.	214.		10	‘Hat	er	einen	edelman	hingeschickt	und	den	pfaffen	zu	sich	begert	zu	sprechen.	Wie	aber	 der	 edelman	 hat	wollen	 hineyngehen,	 haben	 sie	 ine	 nit	 wollen	 hineyn	 lassen.’	Friedrich	III	to	Philipp	of	Hesse,	1	April	1562,	A.	Kluckhohn	(ed.),	Briefe	Friedrich	des	
Frommen,	 Kurfürsten	 von	 der	 Pfalz,	 mit	 Verwandten	 Schriftstücken,	 Volume	 I	(Braunschweig,	C.A.	Schwetschte	und	Sohn,	1868):	pp.	268-269.		
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desired	 to	 enter	 it	 using	 violence	 …’11	In	 the	 second	 letter,	 Friedrich	specifically	discusses	 the	 justification	presented	by	 the	Duke	of	Guise:	‘[The	Huguenots	at	Vassy]	were	such	wicked	people,	who	slandered	his	mother	 …	 in	 a	 scandalous	 and	 evil	 manner	 …’12	Moreover,	 they	 ‘had	built	for	their	preacher	a	barn	with	two	levels,	where	they	kept	stones	for	 its	defence	…	and	the	Duke	was	himself	hit	by	a	stone	on	the	head	and	 wounded.’13	Although	 all	 these	 justifications	 seem	 credible	 and	understandable	 to	 Friedrich,	 they	 do	 not	 suffice	 in	 his	 eyes:	 ‘[The	Massacre]	is	barely	justifiable;	the	deed	is	too	evil.’14	This	 example	 not	 only	 clearly	 underlines	 that	 the	 German	Protestant	 princes	were	 among	 the	most	 important	 targets	 of	 French	propaganda,	 it	 also	 illustrates	 how	 this	 information	 was	 shared,	discussed,	and	 interpreted	by	 the	princes.	This	chapter	will	assess	 the	nature	and	impact	of	the	French	propaganda	efforts,	both	Huguenot	and	Catholic,	among	the	German	princes.	In	order	to	understand	the	context	in	which	French	justifications	for	the	use	of	violence	were	interpreted,	it	 is	 first	 important	 to	 consider	 the	 various	 theories	 of	 just	 war	 and	resistance	 that	 were	 developed	 in	 the	 Empire	 shortly	 before	 the	outbreak	of	the	French	Wars	of	Religion.	Secondly,	the	different	ways	in	which	Huguenots	and	Catholics	presented	the	nature	of	 the	conflict	 to	the	 Protestant	 princes,	 using	 correspondence	 and	 diplomats,	 will	 be	discussed	 in	 detail.	 Finally,	 the	 extensive	 body	 of	 German-language	pamphlets	 designed	 to	 communicate	Huguenot	 and	Catholic	 positions	will	be	assessed.																																																												11	‘Ist	 der	 von	 Guise	 sambt	 etlichen	 vom	 adel,	 so	 er	 bey	 sich	 gehabt,	 …	 bald	 darauf	gevolgt,	und	mit	gewalt	hineyn	begert	…’	Ibid,	p.	269.		12	‘…es	 were	 solche	 böse	 buben,	 die	 seiner	 frau	 mutter	 …	 schmehlich	 und	 übel	nachgeredt	…’	Ibid,	p.	276.		13	‘…	heten	zu	irer	predigt	ein	scheur	gebaut	mit	doppeln	gengen	und	die	mit	stainen	belegt,	zur	wehr	…’	Ibid,	p.	276.		14	‘Es	wirdt	sich	aber	schwerlich	verantworden	 lassen;	die	 that	 ist	zuvil	bös.’	 Ibid,	p.	276.	
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3.2	Civil	war:	religion	or	rebellion?		French	 attempts,	 both	 Catholic	 and	 Huguenot,	 to	 explain	 the	Wars	 of	Religion	to	German	audiences	in	essence	centred	on	the	issue	of	causes	and	 motives.	 In	 the	 two	 letters	 about	 the	 Massacre	 of	 Vassy	 we	 can	catch	a	glimpse	of	 the	question	at	 the	heart	of	 these	debates:	was	 the	war	fought	over	religion	or	was	it	a	rebellion	against	divinely	ordained	authority?	Whereas	the	Huguenot	writer	argued	that	the	attack	on	the	congregation	 at	 Vassy	 was	 simply	 the	 result	 of	 the	 Duke	 of	 Guise’s	hatred	of	the	Reformed	religion,	François	himself	was	adamant	that	the	bloodshed	was	exclusively	the	consequence	of	the	Huguenots’	political	disobedience.	 As	 we	 shall	 see,	 this	 contrast	 between	 religion	 and	politics	played	a	central	role	in	French	diplomacy	and	propaganda.		Moreover,	 this	 a	 question	 that	 still	 dominates	 much	 of	 the	historiography	of	the	French	Wars	of	Religion.	The	first	accounts	of	the	wars,	 such	 as	 Theodore	 Beza’s	 Histoire	 Ecclesiastique,	 written	 within	the	 confessional	 context	 of	 the	 late	 sixteenth	 century,	 attached	 great	importance	 to	 religion	 as	 the	 main	 topic	 of	 contention.15		 During	 the	nineteenth	 and	 twentieth	 centuries,	 historians	 instead	 looked	 to	politics,	economics,	and	social	tensions	as	the	main	motivations	behind	the	 violence.	 In	 the	works	of	 historians	 such	 as	 James	Thompson	 and	Lucien	 Romier,	 religion	 is	 often	 seen	 as	 ‘a	 cloak	 that	 political	 actors	used	 to	 disguise	 their	 more	 explicitly	 political	 motivations’.16	In	 Les	
Origins	Politiques	des	Guerres	des	Religion,	Romier	argued	that	religious	suppression	 in	France	 started	after	 ‘a	 feeling	of	 religious	and	political	insecurity’	 took	 hold	 among	 the	 monarchy	 and	 the	 ruling	 classes.17	Moreover,	according	to	Romier,	this	sense	of	danger	to	the	established	political	 order	 was	 justified.	 By	 allying	 themselves	 with	 important																																																									15	Théodor	 de	 Bèza,	 L’Histoire	 Ecclesiastique	 des	 Eglises	 Reformes	 au	 Royaume	 de	
France,	(Antwerp:	Jean	Remy,	1580).		16	M.	P.	Holt,	‘Putting	religion	back	into	the	Wars	of	Religion’,	French	Historical	Studies,	18	(1993):	524-551,	on	p.	526.		17	‘une	sensation	d’insécurité	religieuse	et	politique’	Romier,	Les	Origins	Politiques,	p.	225.		
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nobles,	both	in	France	and	abroad,	the	Reformed	movement	had	given	itself	 ‘the	 allure	 of	 a	 political	 movement.’18	In	 the	 last	 four	 decades,	however,	this	position	has	been	largely	overturned.	In	 her	 ground-breaking	 article	 ‘The	 rites	 of	 Violence’,	 Natalie	Zemon	Davis	argued	that	the	religious	riots	in	sixteenth-century	France	were	 not	 motivated	 by	 grain	 prices	 or	 abstruse	 theological	 concepts,	but	rather	they	were	inspired	by	a	popular	Catholicity	which	aimed	to	purify	 the	 community.19	Denis	 Crouzet,	 goes	 even	 further	 than	 Davis’	downplaying	of	the	non-religious	aspects	of	the	civil	war.20	He	explains	both	 the	 success	 of	 Calvinism	 and	 the	 violent	 Catholic	 reaction	 in	eschatological	terms.	Calvinism,	he	argues,	provided	a	way	out	of	these	apocalyptic	 fears	by	disconnecting	the	sacred	and	the	secular	spheres,	whereas	the	Catholics	saw	this	neglect	of	the	sacred	nature	of	everyday	life	as	yet	another	sign	that	the	apocalypse	was	near.	Paradoxically,	this	represents	a	return	to	an	older	tradition	that	seeks	to	separate	religion	and	politics,	 although	primacy	 is	now	given	 to	 the	 former	 rather	 than	the	 latter.	 As	 I	 shall	 demonstrate	 in	 this	 chapter,	 the	 dichotomy	between	religion	and	politics	was	well	known	to	contemporaries	and	it	was	used	to	serve	as	a	powerful	polemical	tool.		
3.3	Pre-Reformations	understandings	of	resistance		The	 reception	of	French	Protestant	 justifications	 in	Germany	was	 to	a	large	 extent	 shaped	 by	 existing	 understandings	 of	 the	 right	 to	 resist	tyranny.	France	and	parts	of	the	Holy	Roman	Empire,	notably	the	Low	Countries,	 had	 a	 long	 history	 of	 strife	 and	 competition	 between	monarchs	and	their	subjects.	Resistance	to	authority	gave	rise	to	a	body	of	thought	structuring	and	rationalising	the	right	of	vassals	and	subjects	
																																																								18	‘l’allure	d’un	parti	politique’	Romier,	Ibid,	p.	276.		19	N.	 Zemon	Davis,	 ‘The	 rites	of	 violence:	Religious	 riot	 in	 sixteenth-century	France’,	
Past	and	Present,	59	(1973):	51-91.		20	D.	Crouzet,	Les	Guerriers	de	Dieu,	La	Violence	au	Temps	des	Troubles	de	Religion	(vers	
1525	–	vers	1610),	(Seyssel:	Champ	Vallon,	1990).		
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to	defend	their	privileges	and	prerogatives	with	force.21	This	tradition,	which	made	ample	use	of	the	polemic	of	tyranny,	still	resonated	in	the	sixteenth	century.22		In	 Germany	 in	 particular,	 recent	 history	 provided	 ample	precedent	 for	 resisting	 monarchs.	 The	 political	 history	 of	 the	 Holy	Roman	Empire	was	dominated	by	conflicts	between	local	and	imperial	powers.	 In	 the	 German	 part	 of	 the	 Empire,	 these	 conflicts	 ‘were	characterised	 by	 fragmented	 politics	 under	 the	 limp	 hand	 of	 weak	emperors,	who	had	no	 significant	 institutions	 to	provide	 the	 focus	 for	unified	 political	 activity	 on	 an	 imperial	 level	 …’ 23 	Exploiting	 the	institutional	 weaknesses	 of	 the	 Empire,	 various	 princes	 attempted	 to	rein	 in	 the	 power	 of	 the	 Emperor	 as	 well	 as	 to	 extend	 their	 own	influence	and	independence.	As	has	already	been	discussed	in	Chapter	I,	appeals	 to	 the	 ancient	 German	 liberties	 were	 commonly	 used	 to	support	the	German	princes’	political	agenda.		A	 common	 feature	 of	 all	 these	 traditions	 of	 resistance	was	 the	belief	that	the	authority	of	monarchs,	whether	the	Emperor	or	the	King	of	 France,	 was	 conditional	 rather	 than	 absolute.	 The	 concept	 of	
dominium	 politicum	 et	 regale	 or	 mixed	 monarchy	 as	 opposed	 to	
dominium	regale	or	absolute	monarchy	had	already	been	developed	in	the	 fifteenth	 century. 24 	In	 polities	 of	 this	 type,	 including	 the	Netherlands,	 England,	 and	 the	 Holy	 Roman	 Empire,	 the	 monarch	required	 the	 consent	 of	 the	 estates	 or	 parliament	 before	 levying	extraordinary	 taxes	 or	 passing	 important	 legislation.	 Encouraged	 by	this	 conceptual	 framework,	 there	was	 a	 strong	 sense	 that	 individuals	and	 entities,	 including	 the	 nobility,	 the	 Church,	 and	 cities,	 were	 not	
																																																								21	P.	 Saenger,	 The	 earliest	 French	 resistance	 theories:	 the	 role	 of	 the	 Burgundian	court’,	The	Journal	of	Modern	History,	51	(1979):	1225-1249.		22	Ibid,	p.	1227.		23	B.	Scribner,	‘Germany’,	in	B.	Scribner,	R.	Porter,	and	M.	Teich	(eds.),	The	Reformation	
in	National	Context,	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1994):	pp.	5-6.		24	H.	G.	Koenigsberger,	Monarchies,	States	Generals	and	Parliaments,	the	Netherlands	in	
the	Fifteenth	and	Sixteenth	Centuries	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2001):	pp.	xvi	and	73-92.		
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obliged	to	display	unquestioning	obedience,	but	rather	had	the	right	(or	even	 duty)	 to	 protect	 their	 privileges	 from	 infringements	 by	 power-hungry	 monarchs.	 Connected	 to	 this	 idea	 was	 the	 commonly	 held	assumption	 that	 violence	 could	 be	 ‘a	 continuation	 of	 justice	 by	 other	means’	and	that	 it	could	be	a	useful	and	legitimate	tool	 for	addressing	political	 imbalances.25 	A	 third	 feature	 was	 the	 central	 role	 of	 the	nobility.	Theories	of	resistance	were	carefully	 formulated,	since	 it	was	feared	 that	 they	 might	 otherwise	 inspire	 anarchy.	 Their	 martial	prerogatives	 and	 their	 role	 as	 rulers	 in	 their	 own	 right	 made	 the	nobility,	 and	especially	high	ranking	aristocrats	 such	as	 the	princes	of	the	 Empire,	 particularly	 suitable	 for	 safeguarding	 the	 rights	 and	privileges	 of	 the	 various	 estates.	 Huguenot	 justifications	 were	 judged	very	much	in	the	light	of	the	German	experience.	
	
3.4	Lutheran	resistance	theory		The	 Calvinist	 resistance	 theories	 developed	 throughout	 the	 Wars	 of	Religion	 owed	 a	 great	 deal	 to	 the	 new	 political	 thinking	 developed	during	 the	 early	 years	 of	 the	Reformation.	 The	 political	 necessities	 of	the	 early	 1520s	 required	 that	 largely	 secular	 late-medieval	 ideas	 be	updated.	Luther	himself	was	at	best	ambivalent	towards	the	thought	of	sanctioning	 resistance.	 His	 theology	was	most	 clearly	 concerned	with	political	 theory	 in	 the	 doctrine	 of	 the	 Two	 Kingdoms,	 which	 made	 a	clear	distinction	between	the	persuasive	authority	of	the	Church,	which	concerns	the	soul,	and	the	coercive	authority	of	the	state,	governing	the	body.26	Luther	 also	 asserted	 that	 the	 worldly	 structures	 of	 authority,	ranging	 from	 the	 state	 to	 the	 household,	 were	 instituted	 by	 God	 and	thus	had	to	be	maintained	and	protected.27	His	insistence	on	obedience	was	inspired	partly	by	Scripture	and	partly	by	the	traumatic	experience																																																									25	J.	R.	Hale,	‘Sixteenth-century	explanations	of	war	and	violence’,	Past	and	Present,	51	(1971):	3-26	on	p.	7.		26	A.	 E.	McGrath,	Reformation	Thought,	an	Introduction,	 (Oxford:	Blackwell,	 1999):	 p.	225.		27 	C.	 G.	 Schoenberger,	 ‘Luther	 and	 the	 justifiability	 of	 resistance	 to	 legitimate	authority’,	Journal	of	the	History	of	Ideas,	40	(1979):	3-20,	on	p.	3.	
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of	 the	 Peasants’	 Revolt,	 which,	 spurred	 on	 by	 the	 new	 Reformation	ideas,	 led	 to	 a	 violent	 break-down	 of	 public	 order.	 However,	 as	 the	German	 Reformation	 unfolded,	 it	 became	 increasingly	 clear	 that	 the	Two	 Kingdoms	 were	 often	 at	 variance	 with	 each	 other.	 Obeying	 God	could	 sometimes	 mean	 disobeying	 worldly	 authority	 and	 visa	 versa.	The	 failure	 of	 Charles	 V	 to	 recognise	 the	 Reformation	 required	 new	thinking	 and	 by	 1530,	 two	 distinct	 theories	 had	 been	 created	 by	 the	lawyers	 of	 Hesse	 and	 Saxony	 respectively. 28 	The	 ‘constitutionalist	theory’,	developed	by	the	 jurists	of	Philipp	of	Hesse,	argued	that	since	the	 Holy	 Roman	 Empire	 was	 an	 elective	 monarchy,	 there	 were	conditions	 that	 the	Emperor	had	 to	 comply	with	 in	 order	 to	maintain	his	 legitimacy	as	monarch.	By	breaking	 these	conditions,	 the	Emperor	also	 forfeited	 his	 authority	 and	 could	 justly	 be	 resisted.29	The	 second	theory,	the	‘private	law	theory’	developed	by	lawyers	from	Saxony,	built	on	the	increasing	interest	in	Roman	civil	law.	It	referred	to	the	principle	that	 judges	 who	 are	 blatantly	 unjust	 should	 not	 be	 obeyed.30	This	principle	 was	 extended	 to	 the	 Emperor,	 regarding	 him	 as	 an	 unjust	judge.		Although	 both	 theories	 were	 secular,	 they	 had	 a	 distinctly	religious	 dimension,	 namely	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 Emperor’s	suppression	of	the	Lutheran	faith	constituted	a	gross	offence	against	his	subjects.	 Moreover,	 both	 theories,	 though	 asserting	 that	 a	 level	 of	resistance	against	the	Emperor	was	permitted,	were	not	intended	to	be	a	license	for	popular	sedition	and	revolt.	Resistance	was	predicated	on	the	idea	that	the	responsibility	for	good	governance	was	shared	among	a	range	of	different	magistrates,	which	not	only	included	the	Emperor,	but	 also	 princes,	 noblemen,	 and	 even	 civic	 authorities.	 When	 the	Emperor	 failed	 in	 his	 duties,	 which	 included	 the	 advancement	 of	 the																																																									28	Q.	 Skinner,	 The	 Foundations	 of	 Modern	 Political	 Thought,	 Volume	 II,	 (Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1978):	pp.	198-199.		29	Ibid,	pp.	198-199;	R.	M.	Kingdon,	‘Calvinism	and	resistance	theory,	1550-1580’,	in	J.	H.	 Burns	 (ed.),	 The	 Cambridge	 History	 of	 Political	 Thought,	 1450-1700,	 (Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1991):	pp.	200-201.		30	Skinner,	 The	 Foundations	 of	 Modern	 Political	 Thought,	 Volume	 II,	 pp.	 198-199;	Kingdon,	‘Calvinism	and	resistance	theory	…’:	pp.	200-201.	
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true	 religion,	 ‘lesser	 magistrates’	 were	 allowed	 or	 even	 obliged	 to	intervene.31	This	train	of	thought	was	widely	disseminated	in	print	and	was	 later	 to	 become	 a	 central	 characteristic	 of	 Calvinist	 resistance	theory.32	The	 Hessian	 and	 Saxon	 theories	 formed	 the	 foundation	 for	justifying	 the	 Schmalkaldic	 War.	 Since	 the	 Princes	 of	 the	 Augsburg	Confession	 were	 the	 most	 important	 ‘lesser	 magistrates’,	 a	 strong	awareness	of	these	theories	must	have	prevailed	among	the	Protestant	princes	even	after	the	war	ended	in	1548.	Moreover,	the	appeals	made	to	the	right	to	protect	their	ancient	German	liberties	that	supported	the	princes’	 alliance	 with	 Henry	 II	 of	 France	 echoed	 elements	 of	 both	theories.	Consequently,	any	French	narrative	 justifying	or	condemning	resistance	presented	to	the	German	Protestant	princes	was	interpreted	in	the	context	of	these	theories.		
3.5	Calvinist	resistance	theory		Calvinist	 leaders,	 faced	 with	 the	 threat	 of	 violent	 persecution	 at	 the	hands	of	Europe’s	Catholic	princes,	also	contemplated	the	 justifiability	of	 resistance	 to	 monarchs.	 However,	 Calvin’s	 own	 writings	 on	resistance	 are	 not	 quite	 as	 dismissive	 as	 Luther’s.	 Calvin	 was	 a	Humanist	and	knew	his	Cicero.	With	 the	precision	and	eloquence	of	a	well-trained	lawyer,	he	stated	that	though	it	is	the	duty	of	a	Christian	to	submit	‘patiently	to	the	yoke’,	the	ruler	also	has	a	God-given	duty,	which	is	‘to	lead	[the	people]	with	justice	and	equity’.33	When	a	ruler	fails,	this	duty	 falls	 to	other	 ‘“magistrates	and	orders”	 to	whom	“the	care	of	 the	commonwealth	 is	 committed”.’34	Though	 Calvin	 failed	 to	 define	 who																																																									31	R.	von	Friedeburg,	Self-Defense	and	Religious	Strife	in	Early	Modern	Europe:	England	
and	 Germany,	 1530-1680,	 (Aldershot:	 Ashgate,	 2002):	 p.	 70;	 R.	 von	 Friedeburg,	 ‘In	defense	of	Patria:	resisting	magistrates	and	duties	of	patriots	in	the	Empire	from	the	1530s	to	the	1640s’,	The	Sixteenth	Century	Journal,	32	(2001):	pp.	262-363.		32	H.	 Schilling,	 Religion,	 Political	 Culture	 and	 the	 Emergence	 of	 Early	Modern	 Society,	(Leiden:	Brill,	1992):	p.	240.		33	Skinner,	The	Foundations	of	Modern	Political	Thought,	Volume	II,	p.	214.		34	Ibid,	p.	214.	
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exactly	those	‘magistrates	and	orders’	might	be,	his	thinking	opened	up	the	 possibility	 of	 armed	 resistance	 to	 the	 crown	 and	 contributed	 to	some	 of	 the	 most	 famous	 political	 texts	 of	 the	 sixteenth	 century,	François	Hotman’s	Franco-Gallia	and	the	Vindiciae	contra	Tyrannos.	It	has	often	been	argued	that	the	St	Bartholomew’s	Day	Massacre	changed	 the	nature	of	Calvinist	 resistance	 theory,	 inspiring	ever	more	sophisticated	 and	 radical	 ideas.	 The	 texts	 from	 before	 1572,	 by	comparison,	have	often	been	dismissed	as	dull	and	unoriginal	and	have	been	described	as	‘not	of	great	interest	to	students	of	political	theory.’35	This	 attitude	 has	 led	 to	 a	 neglect	 of	 the	 large	 body	 of	 texts	 produced	during	 the	 first	 three	wars	 (1562-3,	 1567-8,	 1568-70)	 and	 concerned	with	 justifying	 and	 rationalising	 the	 actions	 of	 the	 warring	 parties.	These	texts	where	disseminated	in	manuscript	and	print	and	in	French,	German,	and	Latin	and	will	be	discussed	in	this	chapter	The	texts	from	France	became	part	of	a	larger	body	of	Reformed	Protestant	literature	of	 resistance	 that	 was	 being	 developed	 in	 the	 1550s	 and	 60s.	 These	were	 particularly	 turbulent	 decades	 for	 Reformed	 Protestants	throughout	Europe.	The	death	of	Edward	VI	and	the	re-catholicising	of	England	 under	 Mary	 I	 led	 to	 an	 exodus	 of	 the	 Reformed	 Protestants	who	 under	 Edward	 had	 enjoyed	 great	 influence.36	In	 Scotland,	 the	regency	of	Marie	de	Guise,	sister	of	François,	coincided	with	the	growth	of	Protestantism,	leading	to	increased	tensions	and	iconoclastic	riots	in	1558-9.37 	These	 tensions	 escalated	 into	 armed	 conflict	 and	 violent	resistance	against	 the	Catholic	regime.	The	connectedness	of	 the	strife	in	 Scotland	 and	 the	 wars	 in	 France	 has	 often	 been	 overlooked.	 The	theoretical	 framework	 created	 to	 legitimise	 resistance	 in	 Scotland,	 as	well	as	 the	success	of	 the	armed	struggle,	played	an	 important	role	 in	encouraging	the	Huguenots	in	France	to	pursue	aggressive	politics.	
																																																								35	Kingdon,	‘Calvinism	and	resistance	theory,	p.	206.		36	A.	 Pettegree,	 ‘The	 Marian	 exiles	 and	 the	 Elizabethan	 settlement’,	 in	 A.	 Pettegree	(ed.),	Marian	Protestantism:	Six	Studies,	(Aldershot:	Scolar	Press,	1996):	129-150.		37	M.	 F.	 Graham,	 ‘Scotland’,	 in	 A.	 Pettegree	 (ed.),	 The	 Reformation	World,	 (London:	Routledge,	2002):	pp.	410-431.		
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These	 conflicts	 inspired	 the	 formation	 of	 ideas	 about	 resisting	secular	authorities	that	hindered	the	progress	of	religious	reform.	As	a	safe	haven	for	religious	exiles,	the	Rhineland	became	the	epicentre	for	the	 creation	 of	 such	 ideas.	 John	 Knox,	 the	 father	 of	 the	 Scottish	Reformation	 and	 the	 author	 of	 the	 infamous	 The	 First	 Blast	 of	 the	
Trumpet	against	 the	Monstrous	Regiment	of	Women,	 lived	 in	 Frankfurt	in	1555-56.	In	1556	he	had	two	works	printed	in	the	Rhineland	town	of	Wesel. 38 	Knox’s	 uncompromising	 attitude	 reinforced	 the	 Lutheran	stereotypes	 about	 the	disorderliness	 of	Reformed	Protestants.	 Lesser-known	 Calvinist	 thinkers	 were	 also	 present	 in	 the	 Rhineland.	Unhindered	by	the	weight	of	responsibility	experienced	by	Luther	and	Calvin,	 these	 writers	 represented	 a	 more	 radical	 voice.	 Two	 such	writers	were	 John	 Ponet	 and	 Christopher	 Goodman,	 Englishmen	who	were	forced	into	exile	during	the	reign	of	Mary	Tudor.	Both	travelled	to	the	Rhineland,	were	they	found	a	safe	environment	in	which	to	develop	their	views	on	disobedience.	Their	works,	including	A	Short	Treatise	on	
Politique	 Power,	 and	 of	 True	 Obedience	 which	 Subjects	 Owe	 to	 Kings	(1556),	published	 in	Strasbourg,	and	How	Superior	Powers	Ought	to	be	
Obeyed	 (1558),	 not	 only	 relied	 on	 Scripture,	 but	 also	 took	 inspiration	from	legal	tradition,	especially	natural	law.39	The	intellectual	climate	of	the	 border	 regions	 of	 France	 and	 Germany,	 with	 cities	 such	 as	Strasbourg	 and	 Basel	 as	 important	 centres	 from	 which	 new	 ideas	spread,	thus	resonated	with	talk	of	resistance.		
3.6	French	diplomatic	missions	to	Germany		The	 Huguenots	made	 extensive	 use	 of	 the	 printing	 press	 to	 convince	readers	of	the	legitimacy	of	their	cause.	Studying	the	repeated	attempts	by	 both	 Huguenots	 and	 French	 Catholics	 to	 convince	 the	 German	Protestant	 princes	 can	 shed	 light	 on	 the	way	 in	which	 conceptions	 of																																																									38 	Universal	 Short	 Title	 Catalogue,	 accessed	 October	 21	 2015,	http://ustc.ac.uk/index.php.		39	VanDrunen,	‘The	Use	of	Natural	Law	in	Early	Calvinist	Resistance	Theory’,	pp.	143-167.	
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legitimacy	and	 justifiability	developed	throughout	the	first	 three	wars.	Although	there	existed	a	significant	body	of	pro-Huguenot	printed	texts	in	 German,	 the	 private	 correspondences	 of	 the	 German	 princes	 also	contain	 ample	 evidence	 that	 they	 were	 reading	 French	 justifications.	These	 letters	 provide	 a	 much	 more	 nuanced	 insight	 than	 a	 simple	reliance	on	pamphlet	wars	into	the	ways	in	which	readers	understood	and	 interpreted	 the	message	 they	were	 receiving	 from	 France.	 Letter	exchanges	reveal	a	sophisticated	dialogue	between	the	French	writers	and	the	German	recipients.	The	German	princes	continued	the	debate	in	German	 amongst	 themselves.	 The	 outcome	 of	 these	 internal	 debates	was	 to	 force	 the	 French	 to	 alter	 their	 justifications,	 tailoring	 them	 to	address	German	concerns	and	ensure	a	more	positive	reception.		
3.6.1	The	logistics	of	diplomacy	and	propaganda		Before	proceeding	to	discuss	the	contents	of	French	propaganda	aimed	at	German	audiences,	it	is	first	important	to	consider	the	various	ways	in	 which	 news	 and	 propaganda	 reached	 these	 audiences.	 The	 most	direct,	and	probably	also	the	most	persuasive	means	of	communicating	justifications	was	 through	 personal	 correspondence.	We	 have	 already	seen	 that	 the	 Duke	 of	 Guise	 addressed	 Christoph	 of	 Württemberg	directly	during	the	aftermath	of	the	Massacre	of	Vassy.	Building	on	their	long-standing	relation	(the	two	dukes	knew	each	other	from	the	time	of	Christoph’s	 residence	 at	 the	 French	 court),	 François’s	 personal	 touch	was	 likely	 to	 be	 better	 received	 than	 public	 polemic.	 Throughout	 the	wars,	 the	 Huguenot	 and	 Catholic	 leadership	 repeatedly	 thought	 it	necessary	 to	 directly	 address	 the	 German	 princes	 in	 person.	 These	‘personal’	letters	would	often	later	be	printed.	The	range	of	letters	and	therefore	 different	 explanations	 of	 the	 conflict	 and	 its	 causes	 that	circulated	 throughout	 Europe	 forced	 important	 other	 actors,	 such	 as	Charles	IX,	Catherine	de’	Medici,	and	the	Prince	of	Condé,	to	respond.	As	early	as	April	1562,	a	letter	written	in	name	of	Charles	IX	to	the	Duke	of	Würrtemberg	 aimed	 to	 ‘make	 sure	 that	 you	 [Christoph]	 have	understood	well	 at	 this	moment	 the	 troubles	 and	divisions	 are	 taking	
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place	 in	 my	 kingdom.’40	As	 the	 conflict	 dragged	 on,	 the	 potential	 for	contradiction	and	confusion	continued.	In	1567,	Charles	IX	complained	of	 all	 the	 different	 ‘rumours	 and	 reports’	 that	were	 in	 circulation	 and	once	 again	 felt	 compelled	 to	 explain	 the	 situation	 to	 the	 Protestant	German	princes,	this	time	Count	Palatine	Johann	Casimir,	the	Landgrave	of	Hesse,	and	the	Marquis	of	Baden.41		 In	 addition	 to	 personal	 correspondence,	 both	 warring	 parties	sent	diplomatic	missions	to	the	courts	of	the	German	princes.	The	most	famous	 Huguenot	 diplomat	 was	 François	 Hotman.	 His	 diplomatic	activity	 dated	 back	 to	 late	 1559	 or	 early	 1560,	 when	 he	 travelled	 to	Heidelberg	 to	 try	 to	 persuade	 the	 Elector	 Palatine	 to	 support	 the	Conspiracy	of	Amboise.42	Heidelberg	was	the	first	port	of	call	 for	most	Huguenot	 missions.	 But	 Hotman’s	 first	 mission	 to	 Germany	 was	hampered	 by	 the	 shadowy	 role	 of	 the	 Prince	 of	 Condé,	 who	 Hotman	claimed	to	be	representing.43	Condé	did	publicly	come	out	in	support	of	the	coup.	Once	it	failed,	he	denied	complicity	and	his	role	in	sanctioning	the	diplomatic	mission	 remains	unclear.	Hotman,	one	of	 the	 strongest	advocates	 of	 proactive	 and	 aggressive	 politics,	 thus	 lacked	 the	legitimacy	 of	 princely	 support	 for	 resistance.	 The	 fact	 that	 Huguenot	ambassadors	were	 not	 always	what	 they	 seemed	 became	 clear	 in	 the	autumn	of	1561,	when	both	Hotman	and	another	famous	French	jurist,	François	 Baudouin,	 travelled	 the	 courts	 of	 the	 German	 Protestant	princes	claiming	to	represent	Antoine	de	Bourbon.44	The	details	of	their	journeys	are	unclear,	as	are	 the	messages	 they	were	 trying	 to	convey.	Navarre’s	 own	 religious	views	 shifted	 in	 accordance	with	 the	political	situation	and	therefore	the	two	men	could	reasonably	claim	to	speak	for																																																									40	‘Je	m’asseure	que	vous	 avez	bien	entendu	de	 ceste	heure	 les	 troubles	 et	divisions	que	sont	en	mon	Royaume	…’	Charles	IX	to	Christoph	of	Württemberg,	17	April	1562,	HStASt	A	71	Bü	477.		41	‘bruits	et	rapports’	Charles	IX	to	Johann	Casimir,	Wilhelm	of	Hesse,	and	Philibert	of	Baden,	December	1567	BNF,	15918:	141.		42	Kelley,	François	Hotman,	a	Revolutionary’s	Ordeal,	p.	111.		43	Ibid,	p.	111.		44	Ibid,	p.	139.		
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him,	 though	they	held	 fundamentally	different	attitudes	to	 the	current	state	of	affairs.	Though	both	Huguenots,	Hotman	was	a	fierce	advocate	of	 an	 aggressive	 policy,	 whereas	 Baudouin	 was	 known	 for	 his	willingness	to	compromise.	The	incompatibility	of	both	men’s	messages	must	 have	 been	 very	 clear	 to	 Friedrich	 III	 and	 Christoph	 of	Württemberg,	their	primary	targets.		 Later	missions	were	directly	related	to	the	war	effort.	The	most	important	 Huguenot	 mission	 to	 Germany	 during	 the	 First	 War	 was	undertaken	 by	 François	 de	 Coligny	 d’Andelot,	 younger	 brother	 of	 the	Huguenot	 leaders	 Gaspard	 de	 Coligny	 and	 Odet	 de	 Châtillon.	 The	purpose	 of	 the	 mission	 was	 practical	 and	 the	 involvement	 of	 such	 a	prominent	Huguenot	 leader	underlined	the	importance	of	the	mission.	He	came	carrying	‘a	letter	addressed	to	all	the	princes	of	the	Augsburg	Confession,	[to	ask	for	help	in]	enlisting	two	to	three	thousand	[cavalry]	either	without	 infantry	 or	with	 approximately	 six	 regiments	knechten	(1200	pikemen	and	600	arquebusiers	…).’45		 The	 Catholic	 leadership	 too	 throughout	 the	 Wars	 of	 Religion	dispatched	a	number	of	different	high	profile	diplomats	to	the	German	Protestant	princes.	Amongst	others,	the	Lords	of	Lignerolles	and	Lansac	and	Etienne	Pasquier,	the	jurist	and	historian.	The	most	important	was	Bernardin	Bochetel,	 the	Bishop	of	Rennes.	 In	November	1567,	Charles	IX	first	sent	a	letter	‘to	the	German	princes’	to	explain	that	he	‘sent	the	bishop	of	Rennes,	my	councillor,	to	Germany	[and]	charged	him	to	visit	you	on	my	behalf	…	[to	ensure	that]	you	hear	about	the	affairs	and	state	of	 this	 kingdom	 and	 the	 causes	 and	 nature	 of	 the	 troubles	 that	 are	there.’46	
																																																								45	‘…	einer	an	alle	Kur-	und	Fürsten	der	Augsb.	Confession	gerichteten	Credenzschrift,	um	eine	Hülfe	von	2-	bis	3000	entweder	ohne	Fusvolk	oder	mit	ungefähr	6	Fähnlein	knechte	(1200	Spiesse	und	600	Schüzen	…)	zu	gewinnen.’	Friedrich	III	to	Christoph	of	Württemberg,	 20	 July	1562,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	I,	 p.	318.		46	‘envoyé	l’Evesque	de	Rennes	mon	counsiller	en	Allemaigne	…	donne	charge	de	vous	visiter	 de	 ma	 part…	 vous	 faire	 entendre	 les	 affaires	 et	 stat	 de	 ce	 Royaulme	 et	 les	causes	et	qualite	des	 troubles	qui	 sont	 [la].’	Charles	 IX	 to	 the	princes	of	Germany,	1	November	1567,	BNF,	15918:	21.		
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Occasionally,	 representatives	 of	 the	 Huguenots	 and	 Catholics	arrived	 at	 a	 prince’s	 court	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 presenting	 the	 two	 rival	accounts	 of	 the	war	more	 or	 less	 simultaneously.	 In	November	 1567,	Friedrich	III	related	to	the	princes	of	Saxony,	Württemberg,	Hesse,	and	Baden	how	shortly	after	Lansac	had	turned	up			one	of	Condé’s	men	arrived	at	Heidelberg	…	Thereafter	Lansac	desired	to	engage	in	a	disputation	…	with	this	Condéan,	since	one	could	learn	from	 this	 that	 the	 Princes	 and	 his	 party	 were	 not	 concerned	 with	religion	but	with	something	else.	The	Condéan	responded	to	this	and	desired	the	colloquium	no	less.47			Similarly,	 in	 January	 1568	 the	German	Protestant	 princes	 gathered	 at	Fulda	 for	 a	Kurfürstentag.	 At	 this	 conference,	 envoys	 from	 both	 sides	presented	their	explanations	of	the	on-going	violent	conflict	in	France.48	Throughout	 the	 first	 three	 wars	 the	 German	 princes	 were	 thus	continually	presented	with	two	or	more	different	interpretations	of	the	causes	 and	motives	 behind	 the	 violence.	As	 I	will	 demonstrate	 in	 this	chapter,	 these	 conflicting	 narratives,	 which	 also	 changed	 over	 time,	caused	confusion	amongst	the	princes.		 The	third	way	in	which	French	justifications	were	disseminated	among	the	princes	was	through	their	own	correspondence	 in	German.	The	letter	sent	by	Friedrich	to	Saxony,	Württemberg,	Hesse,	and	Baden	is	 characteristic	 of	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 German	 princes	 shared	information.	 This	 practice	 produced	 a	 very	 interesting	 body	 of	correspondence	 proving	 a	 unique	 insight	 into	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	conflicting	French	justifications	were	interpreted	and	discussed	by	their	intended	 audience.	 Moreover,	 reports	 shared	 among	 the	 German																																																									47	‘en	 Condé’scher	 in	 Heidelberg	 angekommen	 …	 Darauf	 begerte	 Lansac	 mit	 dem	Condé’schen	in	Gegenwort	…	zu	haltem,	weil	man	daraus	würde	vernehmen	können,	daß	 es	 dem	Prinzen	und	den	 Seinen	nicht	 um	die	Religion,	 sondern	um	Anderes	 zo	thun	 wäre.	 Der	 Condé’sche	 ging	 darauf	 ein	 und	 begehrte	 das	 Colluquium	 nicht	minder.’	 Friedrich	 III	 to	 the	 princes	 of	 Saxony,	 Württemberg,	 Hesse,	 and	 Baden,	November	1567,	A.	Kluckhohn	(ed.),	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen,	Kurfürsten	von	der	
Pfalz,	mit	Verwandten	Schriftstücken,	Volume	II	 (Braunschweig:	C.A.	Schwetschte	und	Sohn,	1870):	pp.	147-148.		48	Ibid,	pp.	174-179.	
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princes	 are	 often	 the	 only	 surviving	 evidence	 of	 French	 diplomatic	missions	 in	 Germany.	 The	 sharing	 of	 this	 information	was	 not	 only	 a	courtesy,	but	was	necessary	for	the	prevention	of	the	escalation	of	the	conflict	 to	German	 lands.	As	Friedrich	 III	phrased	 it	 in	a	 letter	 sent	 to	the	Catholic	Elector	of	Trier	in	1562:			 Since	many	reports	of	the	French	events	…	come	to	us	[we	must]	also	make	sure	that	these	things	are	verified,	since	because	of	these	in	the	future	all	sorts	of	misunderstandings	and	unrest	may	be	provoked	 in	the	Empire	of	the	German	Nation	…49			News	of	the	arrival	of	an	envoy	and	the	message	he	carried	was	on	most	occasions	 passed	 on	 to	 other	 German	 princes,	 both	 Protestant	 and	Catholic,	more	often	than	not	accompanied	by	the	interpretation	of	the	writer.	 This	 practice	 ensured	 that	 the	 Imperial	 princes	 were	 on	 the	whole	 well	 informed	 about	 events	 and	 able	 to	 judge	 the	 veracity	 of	Catholic	and	Huguenot	accounts.		
3.6.2	The	Huguenot	message		The	Reformed	claims	 for	 the	 justifiability	of	 resistance	became	 louder	after	the	Massacre	of	Vassy	and	the	subsequent	train	of	events	that	led	to	 the	 outbreak	 of	 the	 First	 War	 in	 1562.	 For	 the	 Prince	 of	 Condé,	communicating	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 Huguenot	 cause	 was	 an	 urgent	necessity.	 Only	 a	 day	 after	 the	 Huguenot	 armies	 started	 to	 mobilise,	Condé	issued	a	public	proclamation,	systematically	setting	out	his	aims	and	motivations.	Although	very	different	in	tone	from	the	legalistic	and	theological	 theories	 of	 obedience	 and	 resistance	 outlined	 above,	 its	arguments	 can	be	 seen	as	part	of	 the	 same	 tradition.	The	 first	part	of	Condé’s	 argument	 sounds	 familiar	 to	 those	 used	 in	 fifteenth	 and	sixteenth	century	conflicts	over	the	balance	of	power:																																																									49 	‘Dieweil	 uns	 mancherley	 zeitungen	 von	 der	 Französischen	 handlungen	 …	zuekommen	 und	 die	 fursorg	 tragen,	 da	 diesen	 diengen	 also	 nachgeschehen,	 das	dadurch	 kunftig	 allerhand	 misverstand	 und	 unruhe	 im	 reich	 Deutscher	 nation	 …	leichtlich	erweckt	werden	möcht.’	Friedrich	 III	 to	 the	Elector	of	Trier,	11	May	1562,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	I,	p.	299.	
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	the	 Lord	 of	 Guise	 …	 used	 all	 his	 friends	 and	 influence	 to	 retain	 the	Queen	 at	 Fontainebleau	…	 [and]	 the	 duke	 of	 Guise	went	 to	 the	 King	and	Queen	Mother	in	arms	…	and	…	the	Queen	…	could	not	help	being	intimidated	at	being	surrounded	by	forces	against	her	will	and	express	command.	…	And	because	the	lord	of	Guise,	as	Grand	Master	and	Great	Chamberlain,	 with	 the	 Constable	 and	 Marshal	 Saint-André,	 shield	themselves	behind	the	estates	and	charges	 they	hold	 in	 the	kingdom,	saying	that	it	 is	for	them	to	take	arms	whenever	they	think	fit;	added	to	which,	 they	 abuse	 the	 authority	of	 the	King	of	Navarre	…	 the	 lord	prince	[of	Condé]	declares	that	the	above	could	not	better	have	shown	how	 far	 they	 are	 from	 their	 duty	 of	maintaining	 the	King’s	 authority	…50		According	 to	 Condé,	 the	 carefully	 constituted	 and	 God-given	 order	 of	the	 Kingdom	 of	 France,	 in	 which	 everyone	 plays	 their	 own	 part	according	to	their	rank	and	status,	had	thus	been	violently	abused	and	usurped.	 After	 having	 established	 the	 true	 nature	 of	 the	 Guise	usurpation,	 Condé	 continued	 along	 a	 line	 of	 argumentation	 that	resembles	the	core	Calvinist	theory	of	resistance:51		 	First,	[Condé]	protests	that	he	is	moved	by	no	private	concern,	but	that	solely	 his	 duty	 to	 God,	 the	 particular	 duty	 he	 owes	 to	 the	 crown	 of	France,	 the	Queen’s	 government	 and	 finally	his	 love	of	 this	 kingdom,	compel	 him	 to	 seek	 all	 lawful	 means	 before	 God	 and	 men	 and	according	to	the	rank	and	degree	he	holds	 in	this	kingdom	to	restore	the	King’s	person	…	to	 full	 liberty	and	to	maintain	 the	observation	of	the	edicts	and	ordinances	of	His	Majesty	…52																																																										50	Original	 in	 A.	 Stegman,	 Les	 Édits	 des	 Guerres	 de	 Religion,	 Paris,	 1979.	 I	 used	 the	translation	 in	 Potter	 (ed.),	 The	 French	 Wars	 of	 Religion,	 Selected	 Documents,	(Basingstoke:	Macmillan,	1997):	pp.	73-74.		51	This	 gives	 credence	 to	 the	 view	 that	 the	 protestation	 might	 in	 fact	 have	 been	composed	 by	 Théodore	 de	 Bèze.	 Kingdon,	 Geneva	 and	 the	 Coming	 of	 the	 Wars	 of	
Religion	in	France,	1555-1563,	(Geneva:	Droz,	1956):	p.	107.		52	Potter,	The	French	Wars	of	Religion,	pp.	73-74.		
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Condé	 here	 argued	 that	 he	 was	 forced	 by	 his	 God-given	 position	 as	Prince	of	the	Blood,	arguably	one	of	Calvin’s	‘magistrates’,	or	as	Hessian	lawyers	 would	 call	 it,	 a	 holder	 of	 Imperium,	 to	 do	 everything	 in	 his	power	 to	 restore	 the	 political	 order.	 Condé’s	 protestation	 was	consciously	 political	 in	 nature.	 The	 plight	 of	 the	 Huguenots	 is	 only	mentioned	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 Duke	 of	 Guise’s	 disobedience	 to	 the	King’s	edicts	and	proclamations,	in	this	case	the	Edict	of	January	(17-1-1562),	which	allowed	Huguenots	a	degree	of	freedom	of	worship.	This	tendency	to	discuss	his	motivations	in	secular	terms	can	be	explained	in	two	 ways.	 First,	 Condé	 and	 his	 faction	 were	 keen	 to	 disassociate	themselves	 from	 the	 common	 perception	 that	 Protestantism	 and	political	sedition	were	the	same.	By	using	legal	vocabulary	that	echoed	pre-Reformation	 political	 thought,	 Condé	 hoped	 to	 appeal	 beyond	 the	committed	Calvinists,	who,	after	Vassy	needed	little	incentive	to	take	up	arms.		 Condé’s	 public	 justification	 also	 formed	 the	 basis	 of	 the	Huguenots	diplomatic	missions	 in	Germany.	On	 a	number	of	 different	occasions,	 Huguenot	 diplomats	 presented	 the	 German	 princes	 with	copies	 of	 this	 document.	 In	 early	May	 1562,	 for	 instance,	 ‘[Guillaume	Stuart,	 sire	 de]	 Vézines,	 came	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 Prince	 of	 Condé,	 to	[Friedrich	 III],	 handing	 over	 his	 letter	 together	 with	 the	 attached	protestation	of	the	same	prince	…’53		Finding	the	right	tone	when	appealing	to	the	German	Protestant	princes	proved	difficult.	The	first	consideration	was	that	the	very	basis	for	 the	 Huguenots’	 request	 for	 support	 was	 a	 sense	 that	 they	 shared	with	the	German	Protestants	the	same	faith	as	well	as	the	same	enemy.	Following	 this	 rationale,	 it	 would	 make	 sense	 to	 emphasise	 their	struggle	against	Catholics,	the	followers	of	the	Antichrist,	and	to	appeal	to	a	sense	of	confessional	solidarity.	Considering	his	known	works,	it	is	likely	that	Hotman	did	just	that	when	he	attempted	to	win	the	backing																																																									53	‘Er,	der	von	Vesines,	 ist	von	wegen	des	Prinzen	von	Conde	bey	mir	gewesen,	seyn	ausschreiben	 sambt	 angeheffter	 protestation	 von	 gemelts	 prinzen	 wegen	 ,ir	ubergeben	 …’	 Friedrich	 III	 to	 Christoph	 of	 Württemberg,	 3	 May	 1562,	 Kluckhohn,	
Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	I,	p.	291.		
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of	Friedrich	III	and	Württemberg	in	1561	and	1562.		On	the	other	hand,	the	 fraught	relationship	between	Lutherans	and	Reformed	Protestants	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter	made	this	a	dangerous	strategy.	It	is	clear	 from	 the	 German	 princes’	 correspondence	 that	 the	 Huguenot	diplomats	 were	 keen	 at	 every	 opportunity	 to	 underline	 that	 their	actions	should	not	be	described	as	‘a	reprehensible	rebellion	against	the	King,	 but	 much	 more	 [as]	 a	 permissible	 natural	 defence	 against	 his	enemy,	 the	 Cardinal	 of	 Guise	 and	 his	 adherents.’ 54 	This	 shows	awareness	on	the	part	of	the	Huguenots	of	their	reputation	for	sedition,	commonly	held	among	Lutherans.	To	square	 this	circle,	 the	Huguenot	 leadership	 to	a	 large	extent	based	their	justifications	on	the	Edict	of	St	Germain,	also	known	as	the	Edict	of	 January,	which	on	 the	eve	of	 the	outbreak	of	war	granted	 the	French	Calvinist	 limited	 freedoms	of	worship.	 In	a	 letter	 addressed	 in	September	1563	to	the	German	princes,	Coligny	and	Andelot	reiterated	‘that	 the	 Prince	 of	 Condé,	 the	 Admiral,	 and	 the	 other	 allies	 had	 not	wished	 for	anything	more	 than	 the	peace,	and	 the	maintenance	of	 the	Royal	edicts.’55	The	Huguenots	thus	argued	that	the	religious	freedoms	they	desired	were	 also,	 at	 least	 in	 part,	 the	wish	 of	 the	King	 and	 that	therefore	 the	promotion	of	 their	religious	agenda	coincided	with	 their	concern	for	the	protection	of	the	King’s	authority.		Huguenot	 justifications	 sounded	 very	 similar	 during	 the	 Third	and	 Fourth	 Wars.	 Jeanne	 d’Albret,	 Queen	 of	 Navarre	 and	 one	 of	 the	Huguenots’	 political	 leaders,	 was	 during	 this	 period	 active	 in	communicating	 with	 foreign	 Protestant	 princes.56	The	 three	 themes,	identified	 by	 Nancy	 Roelker,	 that	 formed	 the	 basis	 for	 Jeanne’s																																																									54	‘ein	sträfliche	Rebellion	wider	den	König,	sondern	vielmehr	eine	erlaubte	narürliche	Defension	wider	ihre	Feinde,	den	Cardinal	Guise	und	seine	Adhärenten	…’	Friedrich	III	to	August	of	Saxony,	12	December	1567,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	
Volume	II,	p.	150.		55	‘das	der	Printz	von	Conde,	der	Ammiral,	und	die	andere	Ire	mit	und	buntsverwanten	nichts	hohers	gewunscht	alls	den	fridden,	unnd	handthabung	des	koniglichen	Edicts.’	Gaspard	 de	 Coligny	 and	 François	 de	 Coligny	 d’Andelot,	 September	 1563,	 HStAM	 3,	1854:	f.	35.		56 	N.	 L.	 Roelker,	 Queen	 of	 Navarre,	 Jeanne	 d’Albret,	 1528-1572,	 (Cambridge	 MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	1968):	pp.	301-302.		
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argument	 corresponded	 closely	 to	Condé’s	 justification	 from	six	 years	earlier.	 Jeanne	 d’Albret	 championed	 the	 religious	 freedoms	 of	 the	Huguenots	 by	 pointing	 out	 that	 these	 freedoms	 had	 been	 agreed	 in	various	 edicts	 and	 treatises	 (St	 German,	 Amboise,	 and	 Longjumeau).	Moreover,	 using	 the	 classic	 trope	 of	 the	 ‘evil	 counsellors’,	 she	 again	blamed	the	breaking	of	these	edicts	on	the	Guise.57	Finally,	she	praised	the	 Huguenots’	 restraint	 when	 responding	 to	 the	 overwhelming	Catholic	aggression.58	However,	 as	 Hugues	 Daussy	 has	 argued,	 these	 ‘constitutional’	underpinnings	 of	 their	 justification	 were	 not	 quite	 sufficient. 59	Accusations	of	personal	political	ambition,	which,	as	we	shall	see,	were	frequently	 launched	 against	 Condé	 and	 Coligny,	 forced	 the	 two	Huguenot	 leaders	 to	 underline	 their	 commitment	 to	 their	 religious	agenda.	Moreover,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 add	 that	 this	 religious	 agenda	 as	presented	by	Condé,	Coligny,	d’Albret,	and	other	Huguenot	leaders	did	not	 constitute	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 Calvinist	 France,	 but,	 at	 least	 on	 the	short	 term,	 freedom	 of	 worship	 for	 Protestants.	 This	 prospect	 was	likely	to	appeal	to	the	German	Lutherans.	Increased	religious	freedoms	in	France,	though	not	in	itself	something	the	German	princes	aspired	to,	could	pave	the	way	for	the	spread	of	the	Lutheranism	in	the	kingdom.	As	will	 be	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 IV,	 the	 creation	 of	 an	 environment	 in	France	in	which	the	religion	of	the	Augsburg	Confession	could	flourish	was	central	to	the	vision	for	France	promoted	by	a	number	of	German	princes.	Moreover,	in	order	to	persuade	the	German	Protestant	princes	to	engage	in	far-reaching	military	action	on	behalf	of	the	Huguenots,	the	defence	of	the	‘true	religion’	in	the	face	of	Catholic	aggression	had	to	be	part	of	the	motivation.																																																												57	Ibid,	pp.	301-302.		58	Ibid,	pp.	301-302.		59	Daussy,	Le	Parti	Huguenot,	p.	304.	
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3.6.3	The	Catholic	message		In	response	to	the	Huguenot	diplomatic	efforts	in	Germany,	the	French	Catholic	leadership	also	justified	their	position.	In	three	letters	sent	by	Catherine	de’	Medici	to	the	Bishop	of	Rennes,	France’s	most	prominent	envoy	 to	 the	 German	 princes,	 the	 essence	 of	 their	message	 is	 clearly	summed	 up.	 Firstly,	 the	 French	 Catholic	 efforts	 were	 launched	 in	reaction	to	the	Huguenot	courting	of	the	German	princes.	In	July	1562,	Catherine	expressed	her	concern	that	‘those	who	are	in	Orléans,	having	persuaded	 the	 princes	 of	 Germany	 that	 the	 entire	 subject	 and	foundation	of	our	strife	is	only	religion,	have	great	hope	of	having	some	relief	 from	 them	 in	 the	 shape	 of	 cavalry	 and	 infantry	 …’60	Although	Catherine	 does	 not	 quite	 capture	 either	 the	 crux	 of	 the	 Huguenot	message,	 nor	 the	 likelihood	 of	 immediate	 military	 support	 from	 the	German	 Protestants,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 German-Huguenot	 alliance	 troubled	 her	 greatly.	 In	 September,	 Rennes	 was	dispatched	to	‘visit	on	behalf	of	the	King	…	the	princes	of	Germany	who	are	attending	the	said	Diet	[at	Frankfurt].’61	Rennes	mission	was	clear:	to	stop	the	recruitment	of	‘soldiers	who	[the	princes]	have	permitted	to	be	 levied	 in	Germany	to	 the	benefit	of	 those	who	are	notorious	rebels	against	 the	 King.’ 62 	To	 add	 weight	 to	 his	 message,	 Rennes	 was	instructed	to	remind	them	of	the	‘friendship’	and	the	‘help,	favour,	and	pleasures	 that	 the	princes	of	Germany	have	received	 from	this	crown’	and	warn	 that	 supporting	 the	Huguenots	could	damage	 the	 ‘perpetual	
																																																								60	‘ceulx	 qui	 sont	 à	 Orleans	 ayans	 persuadé	 les	 princes	 de	 la	 Germanie	 que	 tout	 le	subject	et	fondement	de	noz	dissensions	est	le	seul	faict	de	la	religion,	sont	en	grande	espérance	d’avoir	quelque	secours	d’eulx	de	gens	de	cheval	et	de	pié	…’	Catherine	de’	Medici	to	the	Bishop	of	Rennes,	22	July	1562,	H.	de	la	Ferrière,	Lettres	de	Catherine	de	
Medicis,	Volume	I:	1533-1563,	(Paris:	Impremerie	Nationale,	1880):	p.	363.		61	‘d’aller	 visiter	 de	 la	 part	 du	 Roy	 …	 les	 princes	 de	 la	 Germanie	 qui	 assisteront	 à	ladicte	diette	…’	Ibid,	p.	417.		62	‘des	gens	de	guerre	qu’ilz	ont	permis	estre	 levez	en	Germanie	à	 la	 faveur	de	ceulx	qui	sont	notoirement	rebelles	au	Roy	…’	Ibid,	p.	417.		
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friendship	 and	 alliance	 that	 has	 always	 existed	 between	 the	 Holy	Roman	Empire	and	the	Kingdom	of	France.’63	Access	 to	 and	 control	 of	 the	 German	mercenary	market	was	 a	pressing	concern.	German	 landsknechten	and	reiters,	 for	 the	most	part	Protestants,	 formed	 the	 backbone	 of	 most	 armies,	 Catholic	 and	Huguenot,	 during	 the	 Wars	 of	 Religion.	 Appeals	 to	 the	 long-standing	good	 relationship	 between	 the	 Protestant	 princes	 and	 the	 French	monarchy,	which	was	substantiated	in	a	formal	alliance	by	Henry	II	 in	1552,	were	more	 than	a	diplomatic	courtesy.	Many	Protestant	princes	regarded	 the	 support	 of	 the	 Kingdom	 of	 France	 as	 an	 important	precondition	for	offsetting	the	danger	of	Catholic	Habsburg	aggression.	Although	the	Peace	of	Augsburg	removed	some	of	the	immediate	fears,	it	 is	evident	from	the	princes’	correspondence	throughout	the	Wars	of	Religion	 that	 the	 maintenance	 of	 good	 relations	 with	 the	 French	monarchy	was	a	constant	concern.64	The	 second	 element	 of	 the	 Catholic	 diplomats’	 strategy	 in	Germany	 appealed	 to	 the	 stereotypical	 understanding	 of	 Reformed	Protestantism	held	by	many	Lutherans.	Throughout	the	first	three	wars,	the	 Catholic	 envoys	 routinely	 described	 the	 Huguenot	 faction	 as	‘rebellious	 subjects’.65	Not	 surprisingly,	 this	damning	 condemnation	of	the	Huguenot	party’s	political	 agenda	dated	back	 to	 the	Conspiracy	of	Amboise.	 During	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 Conspiracy,	 a	 letter	 written	 on	behalf	of	Francis	II	to	Philipp	of	Hesse	described	in	no	uncertain	terms	how	 the	 conspirators	 tried	 to	 use	 religion	 to	 cloak	 their	 seditious	agenda.	 The	 conspirators,	 who	 had	 launched	 an	 attack	 ‘against	 our	person,	 also	against	 the	princes	and	our	most	 important	 servants	and																																																									63	‘amitié’	 ‘les	 aydes,	 faveurs	 et	plaisirs	que	 la	princes	de	 la	Germanie	ont	 receuz	de	ceste	couronne.’	 ‘la	perpetuelle	amitié	et	alliance	qui	a	toujours	estré	entre	le	Sainct-Empire	et	la	couronne	de	France.’	Ibid,	pp.	417-418.	64	For	instance,	when	Wolfgang	of	Zweibrücken	in	1563	contemplated	supporting	the	Huguenots	 in	various	ways,	he	wrote	 to	Christoph	of	Württemberg:	 ‘Concerning	 the	King	of	France	we	have	good	hope	that	he	will	not	damn	us	scandalously	…’	‘Was	dan	den	Khonig	aus	Frankreich	betrifft	sein	wir	auch	der	getrösten	hoffning	er	werde	unns	onverhört	 nicht	 verdammen	 …’	 Wolfgang	 of	 Zweibrücken	 to	 Christoph	 of	Württemberg,	April	1563,	HStASt	A	71	Bü	917,	28.		65	‘subjects	Rebelles’	 Charles	 to	 IX	 to	 the	 ambassadors	 of	Hesse,	 January	1568,	BNF,	15918:	f.	210.		
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loyal	 subjects	of	our	kingdom	…’,	 ‘amongst	others	misuse	 the	name	of	religion,	 [and]	under	 the	pretext	 of	 this	 religion	were	 to	 recruit	 some	foreign	 princes	 to	 their	 cause	…’66	This	 trope	 remained	 in	 use	 during	the	first	three	wars.	It	proved	to	be	particularly	effective	since	it	played	to	 deep-seated	 Lutheran	 fears	 about	 the	 rebelliousness	 of	 social	inferiors.		 The	 Protestant	 princes	 of	 the	 Empire	 were	 exposed	 to	 the	Catholic	 message	 for	 more	 than	 a	 decade.	 The	 intensity	 of	 Catholic	diplomatic	 efforts	 is	 illustrated	 in	 a	 letter	 written	 by	 Friedrich	 III	 to	Charles	 IX	 in	 1568.	 Although	 it	 is	 safe	 to	 assume	 that	 Friedrich’s	description	is	somewhat	exaggerated,	it	still	gives	a	strong	sense	of	the	scope	 of	 Catholic	 propaganda	 as	 well	 as	 of	 the	 aggressiveness	 of	 the	message:		 Your	ambassadors	Lignerolles,	the	Bishop	of	Rennes,	and	Lansac	have	throughout	 Germany	 sown	 the	 rumour	 that	 the	 present	 troubles	 are	not	about	religion	and	to	prove	this	they	have	alleged	that	the	Edict	of	Pacification	 has	 always	 been	maintained	 in	 its	 entirety	 and	 that	 the	acts	of	my	lord	the	Prince	and	his	party	was	nothing	else	but	a	horrible	rebellion	against	 their	King,	and	that	 they	want	 to	deprive	you	of	 the	crown,	and	that	my	lord	the	Prince	wanted	to	make	himself	king.67			This	message	appealed	more	 to	 the	Catholic	princes	of	 the	Empire.	 In	their	correspondence	with	their	Lutheran	peers,	 the	German	Catholics	echoed	the	words	of	Rennes.	For	instance,	envoys	from	the	Archbishop	of	Trier,	discussing	the	matter	with	Friedrich’s	councillors	in	May	1562,																																																									66	‘widder	 unnser	 person,	 auch	widder	die	 fürsten	unnd	unsere	 fürnembsten	diener	und	 getraue	 underthanen	 unsers	 reichs.’	 ‘under	 andern	 des	 damens	 der	 religion	misbrauchten,	 unnder	 wilcher	 religion	 schein	 die	 etliche	 auslendische	 fürsten	sollicitirt	 haben	 soltten	…’	 Francis	 II	 to	 Philipp	 of	 Hesse,	 17	March	 1559,	 HStAM	 3,	1843:	f.	87-88.		67	‘…	 vos	 Ambassadeurs	 Lignerolles,	 Levesque	 de	 Rennes,	 et	 Lansac	 ont	 par	 toute	l’Allemaigne	semé	bruict	que	les	p[rese]ns	troubles	nestoient	point	pour	la	religion,	et	pour	prouve	cela	ils	ont	allegué	que	l’Edict	de	Pacification	est	tousioures	demouré	en	son	entire,	 et	que	 le	 faict	de	Monsr	 le	Prince	&	 les	 siens	nestoit	 aultre	 chose	qu’une	horrible	 rebellion	 contre	 leur	 Roy,	 et	 quils	 vous	 vouliens	 oster	 la	 couronne,	 et	 que	Monsr	 le	 Prince	 se	 vouloit	 faire	Roy	…’	 Friedrich	 III	 to	 Charles	 IX,	 19	 January	1568,	BNF,	15918,	f.	189-190.		
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were	 adamant	 that	 the	 conflict	 in	 France	 was	 ‘explicitly	 a	 rebellion’,	strongly	dismissing	the	suggestion	that	religion	had	anything	to	do	with	it.68	Thus,	 the	Protestant	princes	were	not	only	put	under	pressure	by	the	 French	 to	 denounce	 Condé’s	 party,	 but	 also	 by	 one	 of	 the	 most	important	Catholic	princes	of	the	Empire.		
3.7	French	propaganda	in	print		The	conflict	 in	France	not	only	dominated	the	private	correspondence	of	 the	 princes	 but	 was	 also	 hotly	 debated	 in	 the	 public	 domain.	 The	printed	 pamphlet,	 a	 genre	 that	 came	 of	 age	 during	 the	 Reformation,	played	 a	 central	 role	 in	 informing	 debate	 and	 fuelling	 conflict.	 In	 the	1550s	and	60s,	Calvin	produced	at	least	100,000	printed	words	a	year,	ranging	 from	 long	 and	 sophisticated	 scholarly	 texts	 to	 shorter	pamphlets	aimed	at	broader	audiences.69	Besides	this	enormous	output,	the	printing	presses	of	Switzerland	and	France	were	also	occupied	with	the	production	of	the	ever-increasing	body	of	pamphlets	that	fuelled	the	French	 Wars	 of	 Religion.	 Besides	 the	 Protestants,	 who	 had	 best	exploited	the	possibilities	of	the	printed	text,	Catholic	writers	now	too	found	their	voice	in	print.	This	increasingly	bitter	conflict	in	print	found	its	climax	in	the	St	Bartholomew’s	Day	Massacre	of	24	August	1572.70		 The	transnational	impact	of	the	French	Wars	of	Religion	is	once	again	 underlined	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 pamphlet	 war	 was	 fought	 in	German	 as	 well	 as	 in	 French.	 Between	 the	 Conspiracy	 of	 Amboise	(1560)	 and	 the	 St	 Bartholomew’s	 Day	 Massacre	 (1572)	 at	 least	 113	separate	 titles	 about	 the	 wars	 in	 France	 were	 published	 in	 the	 Holy	Roman	 Empire	 (see	 Figure	 6).	 The	 overwhelming	 majority	 of	 this	output	was	in	German:	101	titles	in	German,	nine	in	French	and	three	in	Latin.	Cornel	Zwierlein	has	calculated	that	more	than	90,000	copies	of																																																									68	‘ausdrücklich	 eine	 Rebellionssache’,	 Friedrich’s	 council	 to	 Friedrich	 III,	 27	 May	1562,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	I,	p.	305.		69	A.	Pettegree,	The	Book	in	the	Renaissance,	(New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	2010):	p.	208.		70	Ibid,	p.	213.		
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the	 various	 pro-Huguenot	 pamphlets	 in	 German	 were	 printed	 during	the	 First	 War	 alone.	71	As	 well	 as	 engaging	 German	 audiences	 in	 the	debates	about	the	nature	of	the	French	Wars	of	Religion,	the	pamphlets	also	played	to	the	insatiable	demand	for	news.	This	helps	explain	both	the	 popularity	 of	 texts	 about	 France	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 generally	appeared	 in	 one	 edition	 only.	 Similar	 to	many	 other	 news	pamphlets,	the	 titles	 of	 these	 publications	 emphasised	 that	 the	 information	presented	 was	 both	 ‘recent’	 and	 ‘accurate’.72	Moreover,	 the	 peaks	 in	output	 in	 the	 years	 1562	 and	 1568	 –	 27	 and	 16	 titles	 respectively	 -	shows	that	flare-ups	in	France	were	quickly	reflected	in	German	texts.	Place	of	publication	 Strasbourg	 Heidelberg	 Unspecified	 Other	Language:	 F	 G	 F	 G	 F	 G	 F	 G	 L	1560	 2	 2	 0	 0	 0	 1	 0	 2	 0	1561	 1	 0	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	 4	 0	1562	 0	 1	 0	 13	 0	 12	 0	 1	 0	1563	 0	 4	 0	 3	 0	 5	 0	 4	 2	1564	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	1565	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	1566	 2	 1	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	1567	 2	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	1568	 0	 2	 0	 2	 0	 11	 0	 1	 0	1569	 1	 3	 0	 0	 0	 3	 0	 3	 0	1570	 0	 0	 0	 2	 0	 2	 0	 6	 1	1571	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1	 0	1572	 0	 2	 0	 0	 0	 2	 0	 4	 0	Total:	 9	 16	 0	 22	 0	 37	 0	 26	 3	25	 22	 37	 29	Figure	 6:	 Table	 of	works	 about	 the	 French	Wars	 of	 Religion	 printed	 in	 the	Holy	Roman	Empire.73																																																									71 	C.	 Zwierlein,	 Discorso	 und	 Lex	 Dei,	 Die	 Entstehung	 neuer	 Denkrahmen	 in	 16.	
Jahrhundert	 und	 die	 Wahrnehmung	 der	 Französische	 Religionskriege	 in	 Italien	 und	
Deutschland,	(Göttingen:	Vandenhoeck	&	Ruprecht,	2003):	p.	670.		72	‘newlich’	Anon.,	Kurze	beschreibung	des	Aufflauffs/	so	sich	newlich	in	Franckreich	zu	
Ambosen/	 wider	 deren	 von	 Guysze	 Regierung/	 von	 dem	 Frantzösischen	 Adel	 in	 dem	
Mertzen/	des	yetzlauffenden	sechsigsten	jars	erhaben	hatt.	Darbey	aycg	angeschenckt/	
Das	 offentlich	 auszschreiben	 beider	 Königreich	 Engellandt/	 und	 Franckreich	 gemelter	
von	 Guyss	 Regierung	 betreffende,	 (s.	 l.:	 s.	 n.,	 1560);	 ‘warhaftig’	 Anon.,	 Kurtzer	
warhaffter	un[d]	Grundtlicher	Bericht/	von	der	Baptischen	Conspiration	und	Bündtnuß/	
auch	 derselbigen	 jetzigen	 kriegsexpedition	 in	 Franckrych	 und	 Brabanct	 sampt	 deren	
ursachen.	Zu	Christlicher	getrūwer	Warning	der	Frommen	Tütschen/	so	sich	deßwegen	
in	dienst	und	bestallung	und	geringes	zergeugkliches	guts	und	gelts	willen	begeben	und	
inlassend,	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1568),	f.	1	v.		73	For	the	creation	of	this	table	I	relied	on	the	Universal	Short	Title	Catalogue	and	the	catalogue	of	 the	microfilm	collection	Flugschriften	des	Späteren	16.	Jahrhunderts.	The	figures	presented	thus	represent	minimum	values	and	do	not	account	for	texts	that	do	
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	 As	 in	 France,	 Protestant	 texts	 heavily	 outnumbered	 those	championing	 the	 Catholics	 cause.	 Moreover,	 the	 production	 of	 texts	about	 France	 was	 concentrated	 in	 a	 small	 number	 of	 cities.	 With	 its	well-developed	printing	industry,	Geneva	was	of	pivotal	importance	for	the	 production	 of	 pro-Huguenot	 propaganda	 in	 French.	 The	 city’s	printers	 produced	 ‘dozens	 of	 editions’	 of	 Condé’s	 manifesto.74	In	 the	Holy	Roman	Empire,	the	printers	of	Strasbourg	and	Heidelberg	took	up	Geneva’s	 role.	 The	 prominence	 of	 Strasbourg	 as	 a	 centre	 for	 the	production	of	 texts	about	France	 is	not	surprising.	A	printing	 industry	had	been	established	in	the	city	since	the	1460s	and	as	the	Rhineland’s	major	 trading	 hub	 it	 remained	 one	 of	 the	 Empire’s	 most	 important	centres	 for	 the	production	of	printed	 texts.	Moreover,	 its	proximity	 to	France,	 large	 francophone	 community,	 and	 reputation	 as	 a	 city	 that	provided	 religious	 dissenters	 unusual	 freedoms	 made	 Strasbourg	 an	obvious	base	from	which	the	Huguenots	could	direct	their	propaganda	efforts.	In	1560,	François	Hotman	made	use	of	two	Strasbourg	printers	to	 publish	 L’Histoire	 du	 Tumulte	 d’Amboyse	 and	 the	 inflammatory	
Epistre	 envoiee	 au	 Tigre	 de	 la	 France,	 a	 pamphlet	 which	 deployed	Ciceronian	republican	rhetoric	to	novel	effect.	Heidelberg’s	 printing	 industry	 was	 of	 relatively	 minor	importance.	 The	 contrast	with	 Strasbourg	 is	 clearly	 illustrated	 by	 the	number	of	 titles	 produced	 in	 the	period	between	1560	 and	1572:	 the	Universal	 Short	 Title	 Catalogue	 lists	 862	 titles	 for	 Strasbourg	 against	197	for	Heidelberg.	Nonetheless,	Heidelberg	trumped	Strasbourg	as	the	most	important	centre	for	the	production	of	pro-Huguenot	texts.	Cornel	Zwierlein	has	demonstrated	that	the	numbers	in	Figure	6	are	somewhat	misleading.	 By	 comparing	 typefaces,	 especially	 capitals,	 he	 concluded	that	 a	 large	 proportion	 of	 the	 anonymously	 printed	 pamphlets	 were																																																																																																																																														not	 survive	 or	 are	 not	 (yet)	 included	 in	 either	 catalogue.	 Universal	 Short	 Title	Catalogue,	accessed	October	21	2015,	http://ustc.ac.uk/index.php;	H.	Köhler,	Register,	
Flugschriften	des	Späteren	16.	Jahrhunderts,	Lieferung	I	–	XIV,	(Leiden:	IDC	Publishers,	2015).		74	Kingdon,	Geneva	and	the	Coming	of	the	Wars	of	Religion,	p.	107.		
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produced	 in	Heidelberg.75	Relative	 to	 the	 size	 of	Heidelberg’s	 printing	industry,	the	city’s	printers	thus	devoted	a	much	larger	proportion	of	its	resources	 to	 the	 production	 of	 texts	 about	 France	 than	 Strasbourg.	Rather	 than	 a	 purely	 commercial	 decision,	 this	 seems	 to	 have	 been	coordinated	 by	 Friedrich	 III.	 In	 line	 with	 his	 championing	 of	 the	Huguenot	cause	in	correspondence,	the	Elector	also	made	Heidelberg	a	hub	from	which	the	Huguenots’	diplomatic	and	propaganda	campaigns	were	 launched.	Moreover,	 from	that	city	Condé’s	protestation	(as	well	as	Huguenot	justifications	in	the	subsequent	two	wars)	was	also	‘copied	in	manuscript	and	sent	to	other	princes’.76	
	
3.7.1	Pro-Huguenot	pamphlets		The	 tone	 of	 most	 pamphlets	 contrasts	 with	 that	 of	 the	 diplomatic	correspondence	discussed	above.	Whereas	the	Huguenots’	letters	speak	of	 the	 constitutional	 privileges	 of	 the	 princes	 of	 the	 blood,	 the	 rights	granted	by	the	various	peace	edicts,	and	the	restraint	of	Condé	and	his	party,	many	pamphlets	invoke	an	epic	struggle	between	good	and	evil.	A	 favoured	 rhetorical	 device	 was	 the	 use	 of	 classical	 or	 biblical	archetypes	of	evil.	 In	a	pamphlet	 justifying	the	Conspiracy	of	Amboise,	the	writer	not	only	likened	Charles	de	Lorraine	to	Tarquinius	Superbus,	but	also	stated	that	‘the	Cardinal	…	is	Amaziah	the	priest	of	Bethel,	who	was	 held	 in	 high	 regard	 by	 King	 Jeroboam.’77	These	 two	 examples	
																																																								75	C.	 Zwierlein,	 ‘Une	 propaganda	 huguenote	 internationale:	 le	 début	 des	 Guerres	 de	Religion	en	France	perçues	en	Allemagne,	1560-1563’,	in	J.	Foa	and	P.	Mellet,	Le	Bruit	
des	 Armes	 Mises	 en	 Formes	 et	 Désinfromations	 en	 Europe	 pendant	 les	 Guerres	 de	
Religion	(1560-1610),	(Paris:	Honoré	Champion,	2012):	pp.	397-415;	C.	Zwierlein,	‘The	Palatinate	 and	Western	Europe,	 1555-1563’,	 in	C.	 Strohm	and	 J.	 Stievermann	 (eds.),	
The	Heidelberg	Catechism:	Origins,	Characteristics,	and	Influences,	Essays	in	Reappraisal	
on	the	Occasion	of	its	450th	Anniversary,	(Gütersloh:	Gütersloh		Verlaghaus,	2015):	pp.	163-188,	on	p.	171.		76	‘…	übersetzt	und	handschriftlich	an	andere	Fürsten	verschickt	wurden	…’	Zwierlein,	
Discorso	und	Lex	Dei,	p.	655.		77	‘…	 als	 Tarquinii	 Superbi	 …’	 ‘…	 der	 Cardinal	 von	 Lotheringen	 seye	 Amazia	 dem	Priester	 zu	 Bethel	 /	 der	 bey	 dem	König	 Jeroboam	 in	 grosser	würde	 unnd	 ansehen	war	 …’	 Anon.,	 Kurze	 beschreibung	 des	 Aufflauffs/	 so	 sich	 newlich	 in	 Franckreich	 zu	
Ambosen/	 wider	 deren	 von	 Guysze	 Regierung/	 von	 dem	 Frantzösischen	 Adel	 in	 dem	
Mertzen/	des	yetzlauffenden	sechsigsten	jars	erhaben	hatt.	Darbey	aycg	angeschenckt/	
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powerfully	 reflect	 the	 Huguenot	 grievances	 towards	 the	 Cardinal.	Lorraine	not	only,	 like	the	 last	King	of	Rome,	behaved	as	a	murderous	and	 power-hungry	 tyrant	 but	 also	 as	 a	 false	 prophet,	 misleading	 the	King	and	blinding	him	for	the	truth	of	the	religion	of	the	Huguenots.		 Other	 pamphlets	 provide	 a	 more	 systematic	 but	 no	 less	emotional	exposition	of	the	Huguenot	position.	In	a	pamphlet	printed	in	Heidelberg	 in	 1562,	 the	 writer	 appealed	 to	 natural	 law	 to	 justify	Condé’s	actions,	arguing	that	he	acted	out	of	self-defence:	‘Seeing	that	it	is	public	knowledge	that	His	Grace	[Condé]	did	not	 take	up	arms	first,	and	that	His	Grace	had	good	reasons,	according	to	natural	law	and	the	King’s	justice’,	to	resist	those	‘who	against	the	express	command	of	the	King	have	armed	themselves.’78	The	pamphlet	then	proceeds	to	engage	directly	 with	 the	 Catholic	 propaganda	 efforts,	 lamenting	 that	 the	Catholics	‘have	called	out	throughout	the	entire	world	that	[Condé]	is	a	rebel	and	an	enemy	of	the	King’	and	that	‘they	have	released	much	false	and	deceitful	clamour	against	His	Grace.’79	The	inclusion	of	this	clause	is	telling.	It	shows	that	Catholic	accusations	of	rebellion	and	sedition	were	being	disseminated	widely	and	that	they	threatened	to	weaken	support	for	 the	 Huguenots	 in	 Germany.	 This	 need	 to	 engage	 with	 Catholic	propaganda	is	underlined	by	another	section	from	the	same	pamphlet,	this	time	tackling	the	awkward	problem	of	iconoclasm:	‘Concerning	the	iconoclasm	 committed	 at	 Tours	 and	 Blois	 …	 [Condé]	 intends	 to	 offer	them	[the	King’s	officers]	all	help	and	support	so	that	such	violators	as	
																																																																																																																																													
Das	offentlich	auszschreiben	beider	Königreich	Engellandt/	und	Franckreich	gemelter	
von	Guyss	Regierung	betreffende,	(s.	l.:	s.	n,	1560),	f.	4	v.		78	‘…	in	ansehung	daß	offenbar	und	gewiß	ist	/	daß	ir	F.	G.	[Condé]	nit	erstlich	zu	den	waffen	griffen	haben	/	und	daß	ir	F.	G.	gute	sug	und	ursach	gehabt	/	von	natürlichen	rechts	 und	 billichait	 wegen	 den	 Konig	 …	 welche	 wider	 der	 Königin	 außdrucklich	verbott	sich	in	rüstung	begebe[n].’	Anon.,	Andere	Erclärung	des	Hertzogen	von	Conde/	
in	 welche	 die	 anfänger	 und	 ursächer	 diser	 jetzigen	 empörung	 in	 disem	 Königreich	
Franckreich	 offenbaret:	 und	 was	 irem	 F.	 G.	 bißher	 zu	 hin[n]legung	 derselben	
fürzunemen	 gebürt	 hat/	 un[d]	 noch	 gebüren	will/	 angezaigt	 wird,	 (Heidelberg:	 s.	 n.,	1562),	p.	5.		79	‘…	 dieselbigen	 [Condé]	 durch	 die	 gantze	 welt	 für	 auffrhurer	 un[d]	 feinde	 des	Königs	außschreien	…	sie	lassen	vil	falschen	lugenhafftiges	geschrai	/	wider	ir	F.	G.	…	außgehen.’	Ibid,	p.	14.		
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example	 and	 deterrent	 for	 others	 will	 be	 punished.’ 80 	Iconoclasm	continued	 to	 be	 a	 problem	 for	 the	 Huguenot	 leadership,	 since	 it	confirmed	in	a	particularly	visible	way	the	stereotypical	understanding	of	 the	 seditious	 and	 tumultuous	 Reformed	 Protestants.	Moreover,	 the	practice	 underlined	 confessional	 differences	 between	 the	 Huguenots	and	the	overwhelmingly	Lutheran	German	Protestants	whose	help	the	pamphlets	tried	to	solicit.		 The	 necessity	 of	 countering	 the	 potentially	 damaging	 influence	of	Catholic	propaganda	is	addressed	in	most	pro-Huguenot	pamphlets.	A	remarkably	wide	variety	of	techniques	of	persuasion	are	used	for	this	purpose.	A	particularly	striking	example	is	a	pamphlet	printed	in	1562.	Rather	 than	 offering	 a	 direct	 refutation	 of	 Catholic	 accusations	 of	sedition,	 it	 provides	 a	 translation	 of	 a	 prayer	 supposedly	 said	 in	 the	Huguenots’	military	camps.	The	soldiers	pray	God			 that	Thou	will	guide	us,	our	hands,	and	our	weapons	through	the	grace	of	Thy	Holy	Spirit,	so	that	we	let	our	wages	be	sufficient	for	us,	that	we	live	in	discipline	and	moderation,	without	quarrels,	mutiny,	pranking,	robbery,	 blasphemy,	 fornication,	 or	 other	 extravagance,	 walking	 in	fear	 of	Thee	…	 that	we	with	 a	 good	 conscience	maintain	 and	protect	Thou	Honour,	 together	with	 the	welfare	of	 our	 fatherland,	 under	 the	regiment	of	the	Queen.81			Despite	its	seemingly	neutral	tone,	this	text	served	to	convey	effectively	two	 important	 components	of	 the	Huguenots’	 justification.	 Firstly,	 the	Huguenot	 army	 did	 not	 constitute	 a	 lawless	mob	 bent	 on	 destruction	
																																																								80	‘Was	aber	das	bilderstürmen	zu	Tours	und	zu	Bloys	bagangen	anlangt	…	sie	[Condé]	wollten	 inen	 [the	King’s	officers]	 alle	hilff	un[d]	beistand	 thun	dz	 sölche	übertretter	anderen	zum	exempel	und	abscheuwen	gestrafft	werden.’	Ibid,	p.	23.		81	‘…	das	da	uns	/	unser	hende	/	und	waffen	/	durch	die	gnade	deines	hailigen	gaistes	/	also	laiten	un[d]	fueren	wöllest	/	auft	das	wir	uns	unsers	solds	benügen	lassen	/	in	aller	 zucht	 unnd	messigkeyt	 lebe	 /	 ohne	 gezenck	 /	meutterey	 /	 balgerey	 /	 Raub	 /	gotteslesterung	 /	 hurerey	 /	 oder	 ander	 uppigkeyt	 /	 durch	 deine	 gnade	 /	 in	 deiner	forcht	wandln	…	das	wir	inn	eim	gutten	gewissen	/	deine	ehr	/	zusampt	unsers	Kunigs	und	Vatterlands	wolfart	 /	under	der	kunigin	Regiment	erhaltten	un[d]	beschütze[n]	sollenn.’	Anon.,	Gebett	die	in	des	Härzogen	von	Conde	Veldleger	in	Franckreich	gehalten	
und	nach	gelegenheyt	der	zeit	gerichtet	warden,	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1562),	p.	4.		
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and	the	overthrowing	of	the	political	and	social	order.	On	the	contrary,	Condé’s	God-fearing	men	aimed	 to	 restrain	 from	every	 ‘extravagance’,	even	 those	 you	 would	 normally	 expect	 from	 soldiers,	 such	 as	blasphemy	or	 fornication.	Secondly,	 the	prayer	revealed	 the	Huguenot	army’s	 true	 intention,	 namely	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 King,	 the	 Queen	Mother,	and	their	kingdom.		 The	pamphleteers	also	made	clever	use	of	developments	during	the	wars.	In	1562,	Elizabeth	agreed	to	support	the	Huguenots	militarily.	The	 agreement	 resulted	 in	 the	 occupation	 of	 Le	 Havre	 by	 an	 English	force	 led	 by	 the	 Earl	 of	Warwick.82	Elizabeth’s	 support	 lent	 the	 revolt	badly	needed	legitimacy.	Protestant	propaganda	attempted	to	capitalise	on	 this	 and	 a	 German	 pamphlet	 was	 devoted	 to	 the	 Anglo-Huguenot	alliance.	It	provided	a	German	translation	of	a	text,	supposedly	written	by	 Elizabeth	 herself,	 in	 which	 the	 Queen	 outlined	 her	 reasons	 for	supporting	the	Huguenots.		 Then,	 although	 the	 cause	 of	 this	 entire	 affair	 was	 first	 completely	obscure,	 it	 has	 still	 come	 thus	 far,	 that	 many	 know,	 and	 the	 Queen	[Elizabeth]	 has	 found,	 that	 not	 only	 her	 beloved	 brother	 the	 King	 of	France	 has	 against	 all	 equity	 been	 endangered	 by	 some	 of	 His	Majesty’s	subjects,	who	are	hostile	to	the	same	Majesty’s	relatives,	and	who	treat	the	innocent	subjects	pitifully,	torturing	them	horrendously,	and	murdering	them	in	a	tyrannical	fashion.83		
																																																								82	J.	B.	Trim,	‘Seeking	a	Protestant	alliance	and	liberty	of	conscience	on	the	Continent,	1558-85’,	 in	 S.	 Doran	 and	 G.	 Richardson	 (eds.),	 Tudor	 England	 and	 its	 Neighbours,	(Basingstoke:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2005):	pp.	139-177.		83	‘Denn	 ob	 wol	 die	 ursach	 dises	 gantzen	 haldels	 erstlich	 gantz	 und	 gar	 verborgen	gewesen	/	so	ist	es	doch	nun	mehr	so	weit	kommen	/	dasz	meniglich	waisz	/	und	die	Königin	 in	 wreck	 befunden	 /	 dasz	 nicht	 allain	 ir	 geliebter	 brud	 der	 König	 in	Franckreich	 von	 etlichen	 serselben	M.	 underthanen	wider	 alle	 billichkait	 in	 euserte	gefahr	gebracht	ist	/	die	derselben	blutsverwandten	feindtlich	anfeinden	/	un[d]	mit	den	unschuldigen	underthanen	uffs	erbarmlischste	umgehen	/	sie	auffs	greuwlischste	martern	/	und	gantz	 tyrannischer	weis	ermörden	…’	Anon.,	Der	Königin	zu	Engeland	
Außschreiben/	darinnen	sie	die	ursachen	anzaiget/	warumb	sie	etliche	irer	underthanen	
auffgebracht/	 ire	 und	 ires	 vilgeliebten	 Brüders	 Carols	 des	 Neündten/	 Königs	 in	
Franckreich/	underthanen	damit	zubeschützen,	(Frankfurt:	Ludwig	Lücken,	1563),	pp.	3-4.		
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This	 pamphlet	 shows	 that	 the	 pro-Huguenot	 writers	 were	 not	 above	fabrication.	 Despite	 the	 taking	 of	 La	 Havre,	 Elizabeth	 never	unconditionally	 supported	 the	 Huguenots.	 After	 the	 end	 of	 the	 First	War,	 Elizabeth	 was	 keen	 to	 emphasise	 that	 the	 mission	 had	 been	 a	response	to	the	loss	of	Calais	to	the	French	in	1558.	Moreover,	though	continuing	 to	 support	 the	 Huguenots	 with	 money	 and	 supplies,	Elizabeth	 preferred	 to	 do	 so	 covertly,	 insisting	 ‘that	 she	would	 never	encourage	 or	 support	 any	 subject	 in	 rebellion	 against	 his	 prince.’84	However,	by	putting	the	words	of	Condé’s	justification	in	the	mouth	of	Elizabeth,	 the	 anonymous	 writer	 of	 the	 pamphlet	 added	 more	credibility	to	the	message.		 When	 open	 war	 broke	 out	 again	 in	 1567,	 the	 printing	 of	 pro-Huguenot	pamphlets	was	continued	with	renewed	vigour.	Moreover,	as	the	 conflict	 continued,	 the	 texts	 became	 more	 sophisticated.	Increasingly,	 they	made	 the	 reader	 aware	 of	 the	 source	 of	 the	 text.	 A	good	 example	 is	 a	 pamphlet	 printed	 in	 Heidelberg	 in	 1568.	 The	Huguenot	message	had	barely	altered,	 since	 the	pamphlet	 still	 argued	‘that	 the	Lord	prince	and	his	party	are	not	motivated	 to	 take	up	arms	and	 resist	 by	 nothing	 else	 but	 the	 justifiable	 fear	 that	 they	 [the	Catholics]	intended	to	do	something	against	his	religion	and	against	his	person.’85	This	time,	though,	the	writer	of	the	text	is	referred	to,	namely	Odet	 de	 Châtillon,	 brother	 of	 Coligny	 and	 one	 of	 the	most	 prominent	Huguenot	 diplomats.	 Another	 type	 of	 pamphlet	 that	 was	 frequently	used	 was	 translations	 of	 public	 documents,	 such	 as	 edicts	 and	proclamations.	 These	 pamphlets	 were	 particularly	 persuasive	 since	writers	could	bend	their	contents	somewhat	without	losing	the	veneer	of	objectivity	by	guiding	the	reader	with	introductions	and	annotations.																																																									84	Trim,	‘Seeking	a	Protestant	alliance,	p.	164.		85		 ‘…	Daß	den	Herren	Printzen	unnd	seine	mitverwanten	nichts	anders	beweget	hett	/	sich	in	kriegsrüstung	und	zur	gegenwehr	zubegeben	/	als	allein	die	billiche	forcht	die	sie	gehabt	hetten	/	daß	man	etwas	wider	ihre	Religion	und	wider	ihre	personen	fürzunemen	sich	understehn	wolle[n].’	Anon.,	Relation	und	Bericht	des	Cardinals	von	
Chastillon	was	sich	zwüschen	der	königlichen	Würden	in	Franckreich	Verordneten	auch	
ihme	und	anderen	von	wegen	des	Printzen	von	Conde	abgesanten/	der	verströsten	unnd	
hernacher	 zerschlagnen	 friedshandlung	 halben	 inn	 newligkeit	 verlauffen	 etc.,	(Heidelberg:	Agricola,	1568),	f.	4	v.		
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We	 have	 already	 encountered	 a	 German	 translation	 of	 the	 Huguenot	Church	Order	(including	a	preface	arguing	for	the	holiness	of	the	text	by	pointing	 towards	 the	 persecution	 of	 its	 adherents)	 as	 well	 as	translations	 of	 a	 letter	 from	 the	 inhabitants	 of	 Rouen	 and	 a	 prayer.	These	examples	show	the	remarkable	range	of	translated	texts	used	for	propaganda	 purposes.	Most	 commonly	 used	 for	 this	 purpose,	 though,	were	public	proclamations.	The	peace	edicts	of	Amboise,	Longjumeau,	and	Saint-German-en-Laye,	ending	the	first	three	wars,	all	appeared	in	German	 translations. 86 	Considering	 that	 the	 edicts	 granted	 the	Huguenots	 some	 limited	 freedoms	 of	 worship	 and	 protection	 from	Catholic	violence,	making	Protestant	Germany	aware	of	these	texts	was	a	 priority	 for	 Huguenot	 propagandists.	 When	 France	 descended	 into	open	war	again	 in	1567	and	1568,	 the	Huguenots	 lamented	 that	 their	religious	rights	were	being	violated.	The	(re)publication	of	the	edicts	in	German	 allowed	 the	 people	 of	 the	 Holy	 Roman	 Empire	 to	 verify	 this	claim.	 One	 particularly	 large	 publication	 tied	 most	 of	 the	abovementioned	elements	together.	A	printed	text	from	1569	of	over	a	hundred	 pages	 long	 not	 only	 provided	 translations	 of	 all	 the	 most	important	 edicts	 and	 treaties,	 but	 also	 a	 lengthy	 polemical	 account	 of	the	 causes	 and	 development	 of	 the	 first	 three	 wars.87	To	 add	 to	 the																																																									86	Anon.,	 Edict	 und	 Erclerung/	 von	 der	 Königlichen	 würden	 in	 Franckreich/	 CAROLO	
dem	IX.	ausgegangen/	von	wegen	der	 friedtshandlung	und	hinlegung	der	netbörungen	
so	 in	 gemeltem	 königreich	 entstanden,	 (s.	 l.:	 s.	 n.,	 1563);	 Anon.,	 Newe	 warhafftige	
Zeitung	 aus	 Franckreich,	 Nemlich	 das	 Edict	 unnd	 Erklerung	 des	 Durchleuchtigen	 und	
Christlichen	 Fürsten	 und	 Herrn/	 Herrn	 Carlen	 des	 Namens	 des	 9.	 Von	 Wegen	 der	
fridshandlung	 und	 hinlegung	 de	 Empöru[n]g	 so	 gegenwertige	 zeit	 zwüschen	 seiner	
königlichen	 würden	 und	 dem	 hochgebornen	 Printzen	 von	 Conde	 sampt	 seinen	
mitverwanten	 wider	 in	 gemeltem	 königreich	 entstanden	 und	 eingrissen,	 Auß	 dem	
französichen	trewlich	und	fleissig	verdolmetscht,	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1568);	Anon.,	Friefhandlung	
in	 Franckreich.	 Warhafftige	 beschreibung	 des	 Edicts	 unnd	 befehls	 des	 königs	 ausz	
Franckreich/	uber	den	Vertrag	un[d]	hinlegung	der	zwispalt	und	zerrüttung	derselbigen	
königreich/	 etc.	 Ausz	 dem	 Frantzösischen	 Exemplar	 trewlich	 verteutscht,	 Langingen,	Emmanuel	Seltzer,	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1570).		87	Anon.,	Frantzösischen	kriegsempörung.	Das	ist	Gründlicher	Warhafftiger	Bericht/	von	
jüngst	verschienenen	ersten	und	andern/	und	jetz	zum	dritten	mal	newer	vorstehender	
kriegsempörung	 in	 Franckreich.	 Darinnen	 angezeigt	 wirdt/	 Auß	 was	 genotdrangten	
hochheblichen	 ursachen/	 die	 newen	 Reformierten	 Religions	 verwanthe/	 (wie	 man	 sie	
nennet)	 widerumb	 gegenwertige	 unvermeidliche	 Defension	 und	 Nothwehre	 wider	 des	
Cardinals	 von	 Lottringen/	 und	 seines	 Angangs	 der	 Papisten	 unerhörte	 Fridbrüchtige	
verfolgung	 ƒür	 die	 handtzunemen	 getrungen.	 Deßgleichen	was	 er	 gestalt	 obgedachter	
Cardinal	durch	zerrüttung	wachsen	auff	und	zunemmen	gesucht.	Item/	Abschrifft	einer	
Werbung/	 So	 der	 königin	 auß	 Engelandt	 Gesandter/	 bey	 der	 königlichen	 Würden	 in	
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persuasiveness	 of	 the	 text,	 the	 writer	 laced	 the	 prose	 with	 vivid	accounts	of	 atrocities	 committed	by	Catholics	 against	Huguenots.	This	particular	 publication	 sums	 up	 the	 various	 techniques	 of	 persuasion	employed	by	Huguenot	writers.	First,	it	was	important	to	emphasise	the	justifiability	of	 their	cause.	According	 to	 the	 laws	God,	nature,	and	 the	Kingdom	 of	 France,	 they	 had	 justice	 on	 their	 side,	 so	 argued	 the	pamphlets.	 Secondly,	 the	 pamphleteers	 used	biting	polemics	 to	 attack	their	enemies.	Thirdly,	the	pamphlets	aimed	to	provoke	a	sense	of	pity	for	 the	sufferings	of	 the	poor	people	of	France,	who	had	done	nothing	but	obey	God	and	king.		
3.7.2	Pro-Catholic	pamphlets		Mirroring	 the	 diplomatic	 developments	 of	 the	 1560s,	 Catholic	pamphlets	 in	 German,	 intended	 to	 offset	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 Huguenot	propaganda,	soon	followed.	Although	pro-Catholic	pamphlets	were	less	numerous,	they	nonetheless	presented	a	strong	argument.	 It	consisted	of	 two	 simple	 and	 connected	 elements.	 The	 first	 directly	 attacked	Huguenot	justifications.	It	was	argued	repeatedly	that	Condé’s	claims	of	political	 legitimacy	 and	 piety	 were	 nothing	 more	 than	 a	 pretext	 for	subversion.	 A	 pamphlet	 printed	 as	 early	 as	 1561	 poured	 scorn	 on	 all	Huguenots	 claiming	 to	 be	 defending	 the	 true	 religion	 against	 Catholic	persecution:		 …	 especially	 their	 disgraceful	 intention	 to	 whitewash	 [their	 actions]	with	the	Gospel	of	Christ,	even	though	there	is	no	religion	in	the	world,	that	gives	subjects	the	power	to	use	the	sword	without	the	command	or	permission	of	their	sovereign,	[moreover]	God’s	Word	has	not	been	created	by	human	power,	let	alone	that	it	is	in	need	of	human	help	…	88																																																																																																																																														
Franckreich	etc.	gethan.	Auß	Frantzösischer	Sprach	trewlich	verdolmetschet,	 (s.	 l.:	s.	n.,	1569).		88	‘…	sonder	ir	schandtlich	fürnemen	auch	/	mit	Christi	Evangelio	beschönen	wöllen	/	da	 doch	 kein	 Religion	 inn	 der	 Welt	 ist	 /	 die	 den	 Underthanen	 gewalt	 gibt	 /	 das	Schwert	zugebrauchen	/	one	 ihr	Oberkeit	bevelch	und	zulassung	/	Gottes	Wort	hat	nit	durch	Menschlichen	gewalt	auffgenommen	/	noch	vil	weniger	Menschlicher	hülff	bedorfft	…’	Anon.,	Verantworttung	für	die	Konigklich	Mayestet	von	Franckreich	wider	
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	Besides	 undermining	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 Huguenot	 cause,	 Catholics	were	 also	 keen	 to	 underline	 the	misbehaviour	 of	 Calvinists	 and	 their	disregard	 for	 the	 natural	 order.	 As	 in	 diplomatic	 correspondence,	 the	word	 rebellion	 also	 pops	 up	 with	 great	 regularity	 in	 pro-Catholic	pamphlets.	 Catholic	 propagandists	 too	 were	 keen	 to	 appeal	 to	 the	emotions	of	the	reader	by	painting	vivid	pictures	of	the	barbarity	of	the	Huguenots.	Naturally,	mentioning	the	iconoclastic	riots	was	popular,	as	well	as	the	disobedience	of	Condé	and	his	party.	A	pamphlet	from	1562	illustrates	the	tone	of	much	of	the	Catholic	propaganda.	It	reminded	the	reader	 	 ‘that	 all	 churches	 in	 this	 Kingdom	 are	 being	 damaged,	overthrown,	 and	 pillaged,	 with	 great	 disdain	 for	 God,	 his	 Church,	 the	King,	[and]	his	rulings	and	edicts.’89	Despite	the	fact	that	the	volume	of	pro-Catholic	 pamphlets	 was	 significantly	 smaller,	 the	 message	 they	conveyed	was	clear.		
3.7.3	Audiences		The	 question	 remains,	 for	 who	 were	 these	 pamphlets	 intended?	 The	sheer	number	of	 texts	 about	France	printed	 in	 the	empire,	 the	 size	of	the	 print	 runs,	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 overwhelming	 majority	 of	 these	texts	were	in	German	point	toward	a	relatively	wide	readership.	Miriam	Chrisman	 has	 chronicled	 the	 growth	 in	 importance	 of	 printing	 in	 the	vernacular	and	has	demonstrated	how	this	fostered	the	formation	of	a	type	of	printed	 text	quite	 separate	 from	 the	 scholarly	 tradition.90	This																																																																																																																																														
derselben	 Rebellen	 Schrift/	 ihr	 Mayestet	 vollkom[m]ens	 Alter	 belangend,	 Auß	 dem	
Frantzösischen	inns	Teutsch	gebracht,	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1561),	f.	15	v.		89 	Dasz	 alle	 kirchen	 so	 in	 disem	 Königreich	 geschwächt	 /	 abgeworffen	 un[d]	geplündert	worden	/	zu	grosser	verachtu[n]g	Gottes	/	seiner	kirchen	/	des	Königs	/	seiner	ordnungen	und	Edicten	…’	Anon.,	Erclärung	un[d]	Schreiben	der	Herzogen	von	
Guise/	Connestabels	und	Marschalcks	von	sanct	Andre/	dem	König	und	der	Königin	in	
Franckreich	 gethan/jetzige	 kriegsrüstung/	 und	 wie	 derselben	 zuhelffen/	 belangend’,	(Heidelberg:	Ludwig	aus	der	Wetterau,	1562),	p.	7.		90	M.	U.	Chrisman,	 ‘Printing	and	 the	evolution	of	 lay	 culture	 in	 Strasbourg’,	 in	R.	Po-chia	 Hsia	 (ed.),	 The	 German	 People	 and	 the	 Reformation,	 (Ithaca:	 Cornell	 University	Press,	1988),	pp.	74-101.		
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lay	readership,	which	Chrisman	defined	as	‘men	and	women	without	a	university	 education	 who	 were	 not	 involved	 in	 the	 intellectual	establishment’,	formed	an	important	market	for	the	printing	industry.91	Moreover,	 this	 group	 of	 book-reading	 laypeople,	 which	 included	‘military	 men,	 patricians,	 artisans,	 designers,	 engineers,	 apothecaries,	accountants,	veterinary	surgeons,	and	housewives’,	were	considered	to	be	 sufficiently	 significant	 to	 attempt	 to	 mobilise.92	The	 importance	 of	shaping	 public	 opinion	 was	 widely	 recognised;	 governments	 did	 not	only	 use	 the	 technology	 of	 print	 to	 inform	 the	 population	 about	 new	legislation	or	taxation	but	also	to	persuade	the	readers	of	the	necessity	and	 justifiability	 of	 these	 measures.93	The	 rewards	 of	 winning	 over	sections	of	the	urban	elite	can	be	seen	in	the	financial	support	provided	by	Hamburg	merchants	 for	 the	campaign	of	Wolfgang	of	Zweibrücken	in	1569.94		 A	second	clue	pointing	towards	the	intended	audience	of	printed	works	 about	 France	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	 texts	 themselves.	 The	 length	and	sophistication	of	many	of	these	pamphlets	makes	it	seem	likely	that	at	 least	 a	 significant	 proportion	 of	 the	 pamphlets	 were	 aimed	 at	 the	educated.	 References	 to	 classical	 antiquity,	 the	 Old	 Testament,	 and	natural	law	that	can	be	found	in	many	pamphlets	presuppose	a	certain	level	of	sophistication.	Other	works	published	by	and	for	this	audience	show	that	this	group	was	interested	in	the	wider	world,	keen	to	appear	cultured,	and	devoted	to	self-improvement.	Though	lacking	the	depth	of	knowledge	of	 the	scholarly	elite,	 these	 laymen	were	reading	books	on	theology,	 science,	geography,	ethics,	and	drama.95	Texts	explaining	 the	nature	 of	 the	 conflict	 that	 was	 unfolding	 on	 their	 doorstep	 fit	 well	
																																																								91	Ibid,	p.	76.		92	Ibid,	p.	76.		93	A.	Pettegree,	The	Invention	of	News,	How	the	World	Came	to	Know	about	Itself	(New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	2014):	p.	84-88.		94	See	chapter	VI.		95	Chrisman,	‘Printing	and	the	evolution	of	lay	culture’,	p.	75.		
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within	this	body	of	literature,	at	the	same	time	satisfying	their	thirst	for	news,	interest	in	world	affairs,	and	concerns	for	religion	and	morality.	Finally,	Cornel	Zwierlein	has	argued	that	these	pamphlets	served	a	 more	 direct	 political	 goal	 and	 were	 primarily	 aimed	 at	 German	mercenary	 soldiers. 96 	Certainly,	 considering	 the	 key	 importance	 of	German	 mercenaries	 on	 the	 battlefields	 of	 France,	 persuading	 these	men	 of	 the	 merits	 of	 the	 Huguenot	 or	 Catholic	 causes	 could	 prove	crucial.	Moreover,	 some	of	 the	pamphlets	 even	directly	 addressed	 the	soldiers.97	On	the	other	hand,	 literacy	was	not	particularly	widespread	among	 the	 social	 class	 providing	 the	 bulk	 of	 the	 mercenary	 soldiers.	They	must	 therefore	 mostly	 have	 relied	 on	 the	 public	 reading	 of	 the	shorter	 pamphlets	 by	 their	 officers	 or	 the	 members	 of	 their	communities	who	could	read.		
	
3.7.4	Religion	or	politics?	
	Contemporary	observers	viewing	the	conflict	in	France	from	a	distance	asked	 the	 same	 questions	 as	 many	 historians.	 As	 Wilhelm	 of	 Hesse	phrased	it	in	a	letter	to	William	of	Orange	written	in	February	1568:	‘we	have	 asked	 you	 earnestly,	 how	 do	 you	 see	 the	 troubles	 in	 France,	whether	 they	 are	 motivated	 mainly	 by	 religion,	 or	 whether	 it	 is	 a	rebellion	and	a	private	enterprise.’	98	The	nature	of	propaganda,	which	relies	 for	 its	 effectiveness	 on	 communicating	 a	 clear	 and	 concise	message	 painting	 stark	 contrasts,	 meant	 that	 the	 complex	 interplay	between	 the	 religious	 and	 political	 dimensions,	 as	 highlighted	 in	 the	recent	 historiography,	was	 not	 represented.	 Instead,	many	 pamphlets																																																									96	Zwierlein,	Discorso	und	Lex	Dei,	p.	670.		97 	Anon.,	 Kurtzer	 warhaffter	 un[d]	 Grundtlicher	 Bericht/	 von	 der	 Baptischen	
Conspiration	und	Bündtnuß/	auch	derselbigen	 jetzigen	kriegsexpedition	 in	Franckrych	
und	Brabanct	 sampt	 deren	 ursachen.	 Zu	 Christlicher	 getrūwer	Warning	 der	 Frommen	
Tütschen/	so	sich	deßwegen	 in	dienst	und	bestallung	und	geringes	zergeugkliches	guts	
und	gelts	willen	begeben	und	inlassend,	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1568),	f.	1	v.		98	‘Wir	 haben	 sie	 mit	 ernst	 gefragt,	 wofür	 sie	 das	 betrübte	 wesen	 in	 Frankreich	ansegen,	ob	er	vornemblich	der	Religion	halben	zu	thun,	oder	ob	es	ein	Rebellion	und	privatsache	 seye.’	 G.	 Groen	 van	 Prinsterer,	 Archives	 ou	 Correspondance	 Inédite	
d’Orange-Nassau,	Volume	III	(Leiden:	Luchtmans,	1836):	p.	165.		
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reinforced	the	idea	that	the	conflict	was	either	religious	or	political.	In	a	long	 publication	 printed	 in	 Heidelberg	 in	 1568,	 a	 Huguenot	 diplomat	mocks	 Catholic	 representations	 of	 the	 war,	 who	 ‘when	 it	 suits	 them,	[claim	 that]	we	must	 be	 heretics,	 and	when	 it	 does	 not	 suit	 them,	we	must	 be	 seditious	 rebels.’99	Ironically,	 Huguenot	 propaganda	 suffered	from	 the	 same	 fundamental	 flaw.	 One	moment,	 Condé	 strived	 to	 free	the	King	and	the	Queen	mother	from	captivity	at	the	hands	of	the	Guise	and	 to	 restore	 the	 Princes	 of	 the	 Blood	 to	 their	 rightful	 place	 in	 the	political	 hierarchy.	 The	 next,	 the	 Huguenots	 struggled	 to	 protect	 and	preserve	freedom	of	worship,	so	that	the	Word	of	God	might	flourish	in	France.	 This	 muddled	 message	 was	 the	 result	 of	 the	 difficulty	 of	tailoring	 justifications	 to	 different	 audiences.	 Ideally,	 the	 justifications	presented	 by	 Catholics	 and	 Huguenots	 should	 appeal	 to	 princes	 and	peoples	 of	 all	 branches	 of	 Christianity.	 Political	 justifications	 had	 the	potential	to	do	so.	The	preservation	of	the	political	and	social	order	was	deemed	 extremely	 important	 by	 Catholics	 and	 Protestants	 alike,	with	the	 exception	 of	 some	 religious	 radicals.	 Similarly,	 German	 princes,	themselves	 anxious	 to	 protect	 their	 political	 position,	 could	 easily	identify	 with	 concerns	 expressed	 by	 Huguenot	 diplomats	 over	 the	blatant	 infringements	of	 the	rights	and	privileges	of	 the	Princes	of	 the	Blood.		 However,	 such	 political	 justifications	 were	 more	 likely	 to	provoke	sympathy	rather	than	to	spur	potential	allies	on	to	far-reaching	action.	Appealing	to	religious	solidarity	did	have	the	potential	to	do	so.	For	 instance,	 Friedrich	 III’s	 almost	 unconditional	 support	 for	 the	Huguenots	was	based	 largely	on	 religious	 grounds.	Moreover,	 graphic	accounts	of	the	slaughter	at	the	hands	of	the	forces	of	the	Antichrist	of	men	 and	 women	 guilty	 of	 nothing	 but	 following	 the	 Gospel	 of	 Christ																																																									99	‘Wen[n]	 es	 inen	 gelege[n]/	 müssen	 wir	 Ketzer	 sein	 /	 wen[n]	 es	 ihnen	 aber	 nit	gelegen/	müssen	wir	auffrührischen	Rebellen	sein.’	Anon.,	Des	Prin[n]tzen	von	Conde	
gesanten	Herrn	Honorat	 vonn	Chastellirs	bericht/	des	 itzigen	 in	Franckreich	abermals	
enstandene[n]	kriegs/	So	er	dem	Durchleuchtigste[n]	Hochgebornen	Fürsten	und	Herrn/	
Herrn	 Friederichen	 Pfalzgraven	 bey	 Rhein/	 des	 Heiligen	 Römischen	 Reichs	
Ertztruchsessen	un[d]	Churfürste[n]/	Herzoge[n]	in	Bayern	etc.	in	personlicher	gegewert	
des	 königlichen	würde	 in	Franckreich	gesanten/	Herrn	 von	Lansacs/	 erstlich	müntlich	
gethan/	 und	 hernacher	 ihren	 Churfürstlichen	 Gnaden	 in	 schrifte[n]/	 auff	 gnedigst	
erfordere[n]/	ubergeben	den	4	Decembris	Anno	1567,	Auß	Französicher	sprach	trewlich	
verteutschet,	(Heidelberg:	Agricola,	1568),	f.	35	r.	
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were	 much	 more	 likely	 to	 rally	 support	 than	 complaints	 of	constitutional	infringements.	Similarly,	Catholic	accounts	of	the	horrors	of	heresy	and	the	destruction	of	churches	were	also	likely	to	galvanise	their	coreligionists.	By	presenting	both	an	intellectual	argument,	rooted	in	 constitutional	 concerns,	 for	 the	 wars	 as	 a	 political	 conflict	 and	 an	emotional	 argument,	 emphasising	 the	wickedness	 of	 their	 opponents,	for	 the	 war	 as	 religious	 strife,	 both	 Catholic	 and	 Huguenot	propagandists	 muddied	 the	 waters	 somewhat,	 leading	 to	 confused	responses	among	their	German	audiences.	
	
3.8	Reception		Having	 established	 that	 the	 Protestant	 princes	 of	 the	 Holy	 Roman	Empire	were	 throughout	 the	 first	 three	Wars	of	Religion	continuously	exposed	to	conflicting	accounts	of	the	struggle	and	its	causes,	it	is	now	time	to	investigate	the	reception	of	these	messages.	It	is	of	course	very	difficult	to	establish	precisely	the	princes’	private	thoughts	or	reactions	on	 receiving	 news	 from	 France.	 Nonetheless,	 their	 private	correspondence	does	provide	 an	 insight	 into	 the	ways	 in	which	 these	accounts	were	being	discussed.		 On	one	end	of	 the	 spectrum	we	again	 find	Friedrich	 III.	Due	 to	his	conversion	to	Reformed	Protestantism,	which	took	place	roughly	at	the	 same	 time	 as	 France	 descended	 into	 civil	 war,	 Friedrich	 did	 not	need	much	persuasion	to	back	the	Huguenot	cause.	On	the	contrary,	the	Elector	 Palatine	 played	 a	 central	 role	 in	 facilitating	 the	 Huguenots	diplomatic	 efforts,	 including	 the	 production	 and	 dissemination	 of	pamphlets.	Moreover,	the	court	of	the	Elector	Palatine	became	the	first	port	of	call	for	most	Huguenot	diplomats.	Friedrich	employed	François	Baudouin	at	his	university	and	was	also	briefly	represented	by	François	Hotman.100	Most	 importantly,	 however,	 Friedrich	 himself	 adopted	 the	arguments	of	the	Huguenot	diplomats	and	pamphlets	and	used	them	in	his	 own	 correspondence	 with	 his	 Lutheran	 peers.	 Friedrich	 thus																																																									100	Kelley,	François	Hotman,	p.	121.		
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became	 the	 spokesperson	 for	 the	 Huguenot	 cause	 in	 Germany.	 In	 his	attempts	 to	 persuade	 his	 peers,	 Friedrich	 echoed	 some	 of	 the	arguments	of	 the	Huguenots.	 In	a	 letter	 to	Christoph	of	Württemberg,	for	instance,	Friedrich	not	only	professes	to	be	driven	by	‘a	sincere	pity’	for	 the	 ‘oppressed	 Christians	 in	 the	 Kingdom	 of	 France’,	 but	 also	launches	a	biting	attack	on	‘the	Duke	of	Guise	and	his	party’,	who	since	Vassy	have	shown	 ‘that	 they	are	striving	 for	 the	extinction	of	our	true	Christian	religion.’101	Friedrich’s	commitment	to	the	Huguenots	made	him	deaf	to	the	arguments	 of	 Catholic	 diplomats.	 After	 having	 made	 yet	 another	attempt	to	persuade	Friedrich	of	the	merits	of	the	Catholic	position,	the	Bishop	of	Rennes	wrote	a	letter	to	Charles	IX	in	which	he	expressed	his	frustrations:		[Friedrich]	 does	 not	 respond	 to	 me	 but	 with	 passages	 from	 Holy	Scripture	 and	with	 revelations	 and	with	 the	 power	 of	 God,	which	 he	prays	 every	 day	 to	 inspire	 him	 to	 follow	 the	 enterprise	 that	 is	 good	and	leave	that	which	is	bad.102		Rennes	added	that	Friedrich	ignored	‘all	other	arguments	of	friendship	and	 of	 good	 neighbourliness’	 and	 that	 he	 instead	 already	 had	committed	himself	to	‘favouring	the	rebels’.103		 The	 single	 mindedness	 displayed	 here	 by	 Friedrich	 was	 rare	among	the	Protestant	German	princes.	A	more	common	reaction	to	the	two	 conflicting	 narratives	 was	 confusion.	 This	 confusion	 was	 partly	caused	by	the	accusations	of	false	pretexts	and	conspiracy	theories	that																																																									101	‘ain	herzlichs	mitleiden’	‘betrangten	christen	in	der	cron	Frankreich’	‘des	herzogen	zu	 Guisa	 sambt	 seines	 anhangs’	 ‘das	 sie	 umb	 die	 ausrottung	 unserer	 waren	christlichen	 religion	 zuthun	 were.’	 Friedrich	 III	 to	 Christoph	 of	 Württemberg,	 15	November	1567,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	II,	pp.	134-135.		102	‘On	ne	me	respond	que	par	passages	de	la	Ste	scripture	et	par	Revalla[ti]ons	et	par	la	 puissance	 de	 dieu	 lequel	 ilz	 prient	 tous	 les	 Jours	 les	 Inspirer	 a	 pour	 suivre	l’enterprise	si	elle	est	bonne	et	la	laisser	si	elle	est	maulvaise.’	The	Bishop	of	Rennes	to	Charles	IX,	1	November	1567,	BNF,	15918,	f.	22-23.		103	‘toutes	les	aultres	raisons	d’amytie,	de	bon	voisinage’	‘favoriser	les	rebelles’	Ibid,	f.	22-23.		
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played	 a	 prominent	 role	 in	 both	 Catholic	 and	 Huguenot	 propaganda.	With	 all	 this	 talk	 of	 hidden	 agendas	 and	 false	 justifications,	 it	 was	difficult	 to	know	what	 to	believe.	 Jean	Philippe,	Rhinegrave	and	Count	of	 Salm,	 was	 the	 Lutheran	 prince	 from	 the	 Rhineland	 who	 was	most	directly	involved	in	the	conflict.	Having	from	the	age	of	eighteen	spent	most	 of	 his	 time	 in	 the	 service	 of	 the	 King	 of	 France,	 he	 should	 have	been	 well	 informed	 about	 the	 causes	 of	 the	 Wars	 of	 Religion.104	However,	 in	 a	 letter	 to	 Friedrich	 III	 written	 whilst	 being	 part	 of	 the	Royal	army	besieging	Bourges	 in	August	1562,	he	expressed	profound	confusion:	‘I	would	love	to	have	informed	Your	Grace	more	often	about	how	everything	develops	here	[in	France].	Everything	has	transformed	so	much	everyday,	that	I	do	not	know	what	to	write	…	I	have	not	seen	a	stranger	war	 in	my	 lifetime’.105	As	 a	professional	 soldier	bound	 to	 the	King	of	France,	the	Rhinegrave	was	obliged	to	fight	for	the	Catholic	side.	Nonetheless,	 in	 his	 letter	 he	 emphasised	 that	 he	 did	 ‘not	 want	 to	 be	used	against	the	Christian	religion.’	He	did,	however,	question	‘whether	[the	Huguenots]	only	 fight	 for	 the	sake	of	 religion,	or	 if	 they	as	 rebels	against	the	crown	occupy	the	city	[of	Bourges].’106	A	similar	doubt	was	voiced	 by	 the	 Elector	 August	 of	 Saxony	 in	 November	 1567.	 He	complained	that	he	had	not	yet	been	able	to	understand	completely	the	nature	 and	 causes	 of	 the	 conflict,	 lamenting	 that	 the	 contradicting	
																																																								104	D.	 Potter,	 ‘Les	 Allemands	 et	 les	 armées	 françaises	 au	 XVIe	 siècle.	 Jean-Philippe	Rhingrave,	chef	de	 lansquenets:	étude	suivie	de	sa	correspondence	en	France,	1548-1566’,	Francia,	Frühe	Neuzeit,	Revolution,	Empire	1500-1815,	20	(1993):	1-20;	104	F.	W.	Barthold,	Deutschland	und	die	Hugenotten,	Geschichte	des	Einflusses	der	Deutschen	auf	
Frankreichs	 Kirkliche	 und	Bürgerliche	 Verhältnisse	 von	 der	 Zeit	 des	 Schmalkaldischen	
Bundes	 bis	 zum	 Geseze	 von	 Nantes,	 1531-1598	 (Bremen,	 Verlag	 von	 Franz	Schlodtmann,	1848):	pp.	374-375.		105	‘E.	 C.	 F.	 G.	 wolt	 ich	 gern	 öfter	 vergewist	 haben,	 wie	 alle	 sachen	 hie	 zu	 land	geschaffen.	So	seint	sy	dermassen	von	tag	zu	tag	verwandlt,	das	man	nicht	wohl	weiß,	was	gewiß	zu	schreiben	…	Kein	wunderbarlichern	kriege	hab	ich	mein	tage	gesehen.’		Jean-Philippe	of	Salm	to	Friedrich	III,	25	August	1562,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	
Frommen	…	Volume	I,	pp.	329-330.		106	‘…	 ob	 sy	 sich	 allein	 der	 religion	 halben	 bewahren	 oder	 als	 rebellen	 der	 cron	 die	statt	vorhalten.’	Ibid,	p.	330.		
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nature	of	the	various	reports	he	received	made	it	impossible	for	him	to	make	up	his	mind.107		 	
3.8.1	The	limits	of	resistance		A	 second	 important	 concern	when	 deciding	 the	 tone	 and	 contents	 of	justifications	 was	 their	 compatibility	 with	 established	 theories	 of	resistance.	 Although	 there	 is	 no	 evidence	 that	 any	 of	 the	 German	princes	ever	directly	compared	Huguenot	justifications	to	the	Saxon	or	Hessian	 theories	 of	 resistance,	 these	must	 have	 been	 instrumental	 in	shaping	 the	 reception	 of	 Huguenot	 propaganda.	 In	 as	 far	 as	 the	Huguenots’	motives	and	justifications	for	resistance	resembled	those	of	the	 Schmalkaldic	 League,	 some	 Lutheran	 princes	 were	 willing	 to	 go	along	 with	 them.	 A	 good	 example	 of	 the	 conditionality	 of	 Lutheran	support	 for	 the	 Huguenot	 cause	 is	 the	 reaction	 of	 Christoph	 of	Württemberg	and	Philipp	of	Hesse	to	the	requests	of	Andelot	 in	1562.	As	 mentioned	 before,	 Andelot	 travelled	 the	 courts	 of	 the	 German	princes	with	 the	 aim	of	 persuading	 them	 to	provide	 financial	 support	for	Condé.	To	persuade	the	Lutheran	princes,	Andelot	presented	some	of	the	key	Huguenot	arguments,	namely	that	the	Guise	have	usurped	the	power	of	the	monarch	by	keeping	the	King	and	Queen	mother	captive.	Moreover,	 he	 argued,	 the	 violence	 committed	 against	 the	 Huguenots	was	 illegal,	 since	 the	 Edict	 of	 Saint	 German	 (January	 1562)	 allowed	them	some	religious	freedoms.	These	arguments	must	have	appealed	to	the	 Lutherans	 at	 some	 levels.	 Complaints	 by	 the	 princes	 of	 the	 blood	that	 their	 rights	 and	 privileges	 were	 being	 violated	 must	 have	resonated	 among	 the	German	princes.	 Secondly,	 claims	 that	 the	Guise	family	 and	 their	 party	 have	 lost	 all	 legitimacy	 because	 of	 their	tyrannical	behaviour	and	violence	against	the	Protestant	religion	must	have	 reminded	 the	 princes	 of	 the	 Hessian	 and	 Saxon	 theories	 of	resistance.	 Thirdly	 and	 most	 importantly,	 the	 Prince	 of	 Condé	 as	 a	
																																																								107		 August	 of	 Saxony	 to	 Gerhard	 Pastor,	 14	 November	 1567,	 Kluckhohn,	 Briefe	
Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	II,	pp.	129-130.	
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prince	 of	 the	 blood	 was	 the	 right	 person	 to	 redress	 this	 political	imbalance.		 However,	 the	 success	 of	 Andelot’s	mission	was	 not	 a	 foregone	conclusion.	The	English	diplomats	Henry	Knolles	and	Christopher	Mont	witnessed	 the	 Catholic	 reaction	 to	 Andelot’s	 mission:	 ‘the	 French	ambassador	 had	 been	 there	 for	 some	 time	 to	 stop	 M.	 D’Andelot’s	purpose,	and	to	persuade	the	princes	that	the	cause	of	these	troubles	in	France	was	not	religion.’108	In	other	words,	French	Catholics	attempted	to	discredit	Andelot	by	alleging	that	his	justifications	were	just	a	façade	to	mask	Condé’s	political	ambitions.		 More	 problematic	 for	 the	 Huguenots	 was	 the	 reaction	 of	Württemberg	and	Hesse,	who	 revealed	 that	doubts	 remained.	A	 letter	written	 by	 Friedrich	 III	 in	 August	 1562	 shows	 how	 the	 Huguenots	managed	 to	 allay	 some	 of	 this	 doubt:	 ‘Condé	 has	 delivered	 us	 five	princes	[Württemberg,	Hesse,	Baden,	Zweibrücken,	and	Palatinate]	…	a	written	guaranty	…,	that	he	will	only	use	and	spend	the	100,000	florins	for	 the	 deliverance	 of	 the	 King	 and	 the	 Queen	 Mother	 and	 for	 the	benefit	 of	 the	 same	 and	 for	 the	 conservation	 and	 preservation	 of	religion	and	the	King’s	edict	published	throughout	France	 last	 January	…’109	A	 written	 declaration	 by	 the	 hand	 of	 Condé	 himself	 was	 thus	necessary	 to	 offset	 the	 Lutherans’	 apprehensions.	 This	 anecdote	illustrates	 the	 working	 of	 both	 propaganda	 efforts.	 Firstly,	 it	 shows	how,	at	least	during	the	First	War,	the	Huguenot	justifications	struck	a	chord	among	some	of	the	most	important	Lutheran	princes.	However,	it	also	 shows	 how	 Catholic	 propaganda	 managed	 to	 sow	 doubt	 in	Germany	about	the	true	nature	of	the	Huguenots’	motives.	
	
																																																									108		 ‘Knolles	and	Mundt	 to	Elizabeth	 I,	3-9-1562’,	 J.	Stevenson	(ed.),	Calendar	of	State	
Papers	Foreign,	Elizabeth,	Volume	5	(London:	Her	Majesty’s	Stationary	Office,	1867):	p.	576.		109	‘…	 uns	 funf	 fursten	 von	 dem	 princes	 von	 Conde	 ein	 …	 verschreibung	 …,	 das	 er	100,000	fl.	zu	erledigung	des	konigs	und	konigin	mutter	und	zu	nutzs	derselben	auch	erhaltung	 und	 handhabung	 der	 religion	 und	 des	 kon.	 edicts	 im	 Januario	 nechsthien	durch	ganz	Frankreich	publicirt	gebrauchen	und	aufwenden	wölle	…’	Briefe	Friedrich	
des	Frommen	…	Volume	I,	p.	326.	
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3.9	Conclusion		The	 sheer	 intensity	 of	 French	diplomacy	 and	propaganda	 in	Germany	strongly	underlines	 the	perceived	 influence	of	 the	 Imperial	princes	on	the	outcome	of	 the	Wars	of	Religion.	The	earliest	French	propaganda,	explaining	 the	 causes	 and	motives	behind	 the	Conspiracy	 of	Amboise,	dates	 from	two	years	before	 the	outbreak	of	open	war.	As	 the	conflict	intensified,	French	activity	in	Germany	became	more	diverse	as	well	as	more	 intense.	 Personal	 correspondence	 and	 the	 sending	 of	 diplomats	served	 to	 target	 the	 German	 princes	 directly.	 They	 presented	arguments	 tailored	 towards	 their	 audiences	 and	 allowed	 for	 the	possibility	 of	 engaging	 in	 a	 dialogue.	 These	 arguments	 tended	 to	 be	more	 finessed,	 appealing	 to	 intellect	 rather	 than	 emotion.	Simultaneously,	 French	Catholics	 and	Huguenots	 and	 their	 supporters	in	 the	Empire	oversaw	the	production	of	 large	numbers	of	pamphlets,	which	despite	 their	 variety	 in	 length	and	 sophistication,	 on	 the	whole	appealed	 to	 the	 emotions	 of	 the	 reader,	 often	 by	 emphasising	 the	horrors	and	atrocities	committed	during	the	wars.			 Examples	 can	 be	 found	 in	 all	 three	 types	 of	 propaganda	 of	occasions	 in	which	writers	and	diplomats	 felt	 the	necessity	directly	 to	engage	 with	 their	 opponents’	 message.	 Moreover,	 in	 the	 Empire,	 the	messages	 were	 supposed	 to	 appeal	 to	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 audiences,	including	Catholics,	Lutherans,	and	Reformed	Protestants.	Although	the	propaganda	 managed	 to	 appeal	 to	 some,	 for	 instance	 the	 Elector	Palatine,	 it	 also	 caused	considerable	 confusion.	Especially	attempts	by	various	 pamphleteers,	 both	 Catholic	 and	 Huguenot,	 to	 describe	 the	conflict	 in	either	exclusively	political	or	exclusively	religious	terms	led	to	bewildered	reactions.	This	confusion	was	confounded	by	the	various	conspiracy	theories	presented	to	German	audiences.	The	success	of	the	various	justifications	was	conditioned	by	their	compatibility	with	existing	ideas	about	the	justifiability	of	resistance.	By	1562,	a	number	of	 theories	and	traditions	of	resistance,	both	religious	and	secular,	had	already	been	developed	in	the	Empire,	most	notably	by	Lutheran	 thinkers.	 These	 understandings	 of	 the	 justifiability	 of	
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resistance,	 and	 its	 limits,	 shaped	 the	 German	 reception	 of	 French	diplomacy	and	propaganda.	
		 179	
	
IV.	 German	solutions	for	religious	divisions	in	France		Having	 been	 subjected	 to	 a	 barrage	 of	 reports,	 news,	 pleas,	 and	propaganda	 from	 France,	 it	 remained	 for	 the	 princes	 to	 formulate	 a	cogent	 response.	 Considering	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 conflict	 and	 the	range	of	different	explanations	of	its	causes	presented	to	the	princes,	it	is	unsurprising	that	 they	sometimes	 failed	to	reach	a	consensus	about	the	 best	 solution.	 Evidence	 concerning	 the	 princes’	 visions	 for	 the	future	 of	 France	 can	 be	 found	 in	 a	 number	 of	 different	 sources.	Discussions	 amongst	 the	 German	 nobility	 and	 German	 appeals	 to	 the	leaders	of	 the	warring	parties	 in	France	were	rarely	presented	clearly	and	 unambiguously.	 Despite	 this,	 such	 discussions	 allow	 for	 the	reconstruction	of	their	 ideas	about	possible	solutions	to	the	conflict	 in	France.	Four	distinct	yet	 interrelated	proposals	can	be	 identified.	 	The	first	was	the	promotion	of	Lutheranism	as	a	via	media.	The	second	was	the	creation	of	a	legal	settlement	similar	to	the	Peace	of	Augsburg.	The	third	was	the	implementation	of	tolerant	policies	intended	to	defuse	the	religious	tensions	and	open	the	door	to	the	spread	of	Lutheranism.	The	final	 proposal	 emphasised	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 protection	 of	 royal	authority,	 asserting	 that	 the	 Reformation	 of	 France	 would	 have	 to	follow	 the	 model	 of	 the	 German	 magisterial	 reformations.	 These	solutions	were	 rooted	 in	moral	 and	 theological	 thinking,	 informed	 by	the	 experience	 of	 religious	 conflict	 in	 the	 Holy	 Roman	 Empire,	 and	heavily	influenced	by	the	events	in	France.	In	this	chapter	I	will	discuss	how	these	ideas	were	developed	in	response	to	the	changing	situation	in	 France.	 Moreover,	 I	 will	 briefly	 discuss	 the	 intellectual	 contexts	 in	which	these	ideas	were	formed.		
4.1	The	Naumburg	Convention		Even	 before	 the	 outbreak	 of	 war	 in	 1562,	 German	 Protestants	 felt	compelled	to	contribute	to	the	defusing	of	religious	tensions	in	France.	
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This	 was	 partly	 the	 consequence	 of	 the	 strong	 Franco-German	connections	discussed	in	Chapter	I,	and	partly	because	they	linked	the	worrying	 spread	 of	 Reformed	 Protestantism	 in	 the	 Empire	 to	 the	success	 of	 Calvinism	 in	 France.	 On	 the	 insistence	 of	 Wolfgang	 of	Zweibrücken	 and	Huguenot	diplomats,	 the	question	of	 France	was	on	the	agenda	at	the	Naumburg	Convention,	organised	in	January	1561	to	create	 unity	 amongst	 the	 Germany’s	 Protestant	 princes. 1 	The	conclusions	of	Naumburg	reveal	that	on	the	eve	of	the	French	Wars	of	Religion	most	German	Lutheran	princes	were	in	agreement	concerning	solutions	for	the	rapidly	escalating	tensions	in	France.	The	majority	of	the	twelve	princes	present	at	Naumburg	concluded	that	the	promotion	of	the	Lutheran	religion	could	bring	Huguenots	and	Catholics	together.	Collectively,	 they	 dispatched	 a	 French	 translation	 of	 the	 Augsburg	Confession	 to	 Charles	 IX	 and	 Antoine	 de	 Bourbon.	 Christoph	 of	Württemberg,	 the	 strongest	 promoter	 of	 this	 policy,	went	 further.	 He	dispatched	a	number	of	theological	books	to	Antoine	de	Bourbon	with	the	 intention	 of	 clarifying	 Lutheran	 doctrine.2	The	 princes	 hoped	 that	French	 Protestants,	 who	 had	 never	 been	 Lutheran,	 would	 respond	positively	 to	 a	 clear	 exposition	 of	 Lutheran	 theology.	 Moreover,	 they	recognised	 that	 Lutheran	 theology,	 liturgy,	 and	 ecclesiology	 could	bridge	the	gap	between	the	Catholic	Evangelicals,	who	wanted	a	reform	of	 liturgy,	 and	 Reformed	 Protestants.	 The	 formulation	 of	 a	 via	media	solution	 for	 France	 fitted	 well	 in	 the	 spirit	 of	 the	 deliberations	 at	Naumburg.	 At	 the	 convention,	 the	 princes	 attempted	 to	 reformulate	some	 of	 the	 doctrines	 of	 the	 Augsburg	 Confession	 to	 make	 them	acceptable	to	both	Philippists	and	Gnesio-Lutherans.3	The	idea	was	that	conflict	 could	be	 avoided	by	 creating	 a	 broad	definition	of	 orthodoxy.	The	 measures	 introduced	 at	 Naumburg	 were	 unsuccessful	 and	 were																																																									1	R.	Shornbaum,	‘Zum	Tage	von	Naumburg	1561’,	Archiv	für	Reformationsgeschichte,	7-8	(1911):	181-214.		2	H.	 O.	 Evennet,	 ‘The	 Cardinal	 of	 Lorraine	 and	 the	 Colloquy	 of	 Poissy’,	 Cambridge	
Historical	Journal,	2	(1927):	p.	145;	E.	Koch	and	H.	J.	A.	Bouman,	‘Striving	for	the	union	of	 Lutheran	 churches:	 The	 church-historical	 background	 of	 the	 work	 done	 on	 the	Formula	of	Concord	at	Magdenburg’,	The	Sixteent	Century	Journal,	8	(1977):	105-122.		3	Koch	and	Bouman,	‘Striving	for	the	union	of	Lutheran	churches,	p.	112.		
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heavily	criticised	by	conservative	Lutherans.	Nevertheless,	the	principle	of	 broad	 orthodoxy,	 based	 on	 the	 Variata	 edition	 of	 the	 Augsburg	Confession,	 remained	 for	 many	 Lutheran	 princes,	 including	Württemberg,	Hesse,	 and	 Zweibrücken,	 the	 preferred	 solution	 for	 the	religious	tensions	in	France	and	the	Empire.4	As	will	be	demonstrated,	a	Lutheran	France	was	more	than	merely	a	fancy.	Rather,	it	was	a	policy	that	was	pursued	vigorously.	At	Naumburg,	Württemberg	made	it	clear	that	 the	 Huguenots’	 conversion	 from	 Reformed	 Protestantism	 to	Lutheranism	was	a	necessary	precondition	for	German	support.5	This	is	illustrative	of	the	force	with	which	this	solution	was	advocated.			
4.2	The	idea	of	religious	reconciliation		In	 sixteenth-century	 understandings	 of	 social	 cohesion,	 the	 collective	membership	of	a	common	body	of	believers,	or	Corpus	Christianum,	was	of	pivotal	 importance.6	This	membership	was	granted	though	baptism.	It	 held	 strong	 secular	 connotations	 alongside	 the	 vital	 religious	dimension	 of	 belonging	 to	 the	 entire	 body	 of	 Christian	 believers.	Harmony	 in	 society	 was	 created	 and	 safeguarded	 by	 the	 collective	membership	 of	 this	 one	body	of	 believers,	 reinforcing	 social	 cohesion	and	 good	 neighbourliness.	 At	 a	 national	 level,	 the	 same	 principle	applied.	 In	 France,	 the	 idea	 that	 a	 shared	 religion	was	 one	 of	 the	 key	forces	 binding	 the	 French	 people	 together	 was	 widely	 accepted. 7	Though	the	Protestant	Reformation	shattered	the	unity	of	Christendom,	the	 equation	 of	 confessional	 uniformity	 with	 social	 order	 remained.																																																									4	Ibid,	p.	112.		5	R.	 Stupperich,	 ‘La	 Confession	 d’Augsbourg	 au	 Colloque	 de	 Poissy’,	 in	 L’Amiral	 de	
Coligny	et	son	Temps	 (Paris:	 Société	de	 l’Histoire	du	Protestantisme	Français,	 1974):	pp.	117-133,	on	p.	120.		6	H.	de	Wall,	 ‘Corpus	Christianum’,	 in	H.	Dieter	Betz,	S.	Browning,	B.	 Janowski,	and	E.	Jüngel	 (eds.),	Religion	Past	and	Present,	 (Leiden:	 Brill,	 2011).	 Accessed	 online	 on	 30	October	 30,	 2015:	 http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/religion-past-and-present/corpus-christianum-SIM_03244.		7	Kaplan,	 Divided	 by	 Faith,	 Religious	 Conflict	 and	 the	 Practice	 of	 Toleration	 in	 Early	
Modern	Europe,	(Cambridge	MA:	The	Belknap	Press,	2007):	pp.	99-124.		
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There	 is	 no	doubt,	 therefore,	 that	 a	 restoration	of	 religious	 as	well	 as	social	and	political	unity,	 if	not	uniformity,	was	an	 integral	part	of	 the	ideal	 solution.	 There	 were	 very	 few	 who	 celebrated	 the	 merits	 of	 a	multi-confessional	 society.	 After	 the	 rise	 of	 Protestantism,	 the	overwhelming	instinct	was	first	to	work	towards	‘preserving’	and	later	towards	 ‘restoring	 a	 unity	 that	 the	 church	 had	 once	 enjoyed.’8	It	 is	important	to	avoid	teleological	thinking,	especially	the	assumption	that	the	 division	 of	 Europe’s	 religious	 landscape	 into	 a	 variety	 of	 distinct	confessions	was	an	inevitable	outcome	of	the	Reformation.	Moreover,	it	is	 also	 easy	 to	 dismiss	 irenicists	 in	 the	 midst	 of	 religious	 conflict	 as	either	 naïve	 or	 as	 ignored	 and	marginalised	 visionaries.	 In	 fact,	 there	were	many	vocal	and	influential	proponents	of	an	ecumenical	or	irenic	agenda.	In	order	to	properly	understand	German	calls	for	a	restoration	of	religious	unity	it	 is	necessary	first	briefly	to	discuss	the	activities	of	these	irenicists.		
4.2.1	Influential	ecumenical	thinkers		Discussions	about	 the	 feasibility	of	 religious	 reconciliation	necessarily	boil	down	to	the	question	of	which	elements	of	a	religion	constitute	its	essence	and	are	therefore	non-negotiable,	and	which	elements	are	mere	externals	 (or	adiaphora).	A	second	and	related	 factor	 that	determined	the	 feasibility	 of	 reconciliation	 was	 a	 willingness	 and	 ability	 to	compromise.	The	uncompromising	adherents	to	a	narrowly	defined	and	‘pure’	Calvinism	or	Catholicism	naturally	found	it	both	difficult	to	reach	an	 accommodation	with	 those	who	 did	 not	 adhere	 to	 the	 exact	 same	doctrines	or	to	accept	that	these	believers	practiced	another	version	of	the	same	faith.	By	contrast,	 the	Rhineland,	 the	Low	Countries,	and	the	north	of	France	were	home	to	a	religious	mentality	that	has	often	been	described	as	 ‘Erasmian’.	Although	 Judith	Pollmann	has	questioned	 the	‘explanatory	powers’	of	Erasmianism	as	a	shaper	of	the	Dutch	attitude																																																									8	H.	Hotson,	‘Irenicism	in	the	Confessional	Age:	The	Holy	Roman	Empire,	1563-1648’,	in	H.	P.	Louthan	and	R.	C.	Zachman	(eds.),	Conciliation	and	Confession	in	the	Struggle	
for	 Unity	 in	 the	 Age	 of	 Reform,	 1415-1648	 (Notre	 Dame:	 University	 of	 Notre	 Dame	Press,	2004):	pp.	228-285.	
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to	 religious	 pluralism,	 it	 is	 nonetheless	 clear	 that	 there	 were	 in	 this	region	 many	 who,	 though	 interested	 in	 the	 reformation	 of	 religion,	were	strongly	committed	to	the	unity	of	the	Church.9	Besides	Erasmus,	the	 most	 important	 examples	 are	 the	 German	 theologian	 and	 ex-Lutheran	Georg	Witzel,	 the	Flemish	humanist	 Joris	Cassander,	and	the	French	 jurist	François	Baudouin.10	These	 three	 thinkers	all	 favoured	a	fairly	 broad	 interpretation	 of	 orthodoxy,	 intended	 to	 incorporate	 a	variety	of	different	practices	and	interpretations	whilst	at	a	basic	level	preserving	doctrinal	uniformity.11	They	recognised	the	need	to	address	the	decrepit	 state	 of	 religion,	 but	 emphasised	 that	what	 needed	 to	 be	pursued	 was	 a	 Reformatio;	 a	 return	 to	 the	 early	 Church,	 and	 not	 a	
Transformatio,	which	they	feared	the	Protestants	were	implementing.12	The	 tendency	 of	 such	 thinkers	 to	 switch	 between	 confessions	 made	them	vulnerable	to	accusations	of	apostasy	and	Nicodemism,	illustrated	by	Hotman’s	famous	remark	that	Baudouin	was	‘like	the	dog	[returned]	to	his	vomit.’13	These	three	thinkers	published	extensively	in	Germany,	France,	 and	 the	 Low	 Countries	 and	 their	 ideas	 were	 well	 known	throughout	 the	 region.	 Moreover,	 as	 highlighted	 before,	 Baudouin	travelled	the	German	courts	as	a	Huguenot	envoy,	advocating	his	irenic	agenda.	 Irenic	 and	 conciliatory	 thinking	 thus	 contributed	 significantly	
																																																								9	J.	 Pollmann,	 ‘Countering	 the	 Reformation	 in	 France	 and	 the	 Netherlands:	 clerical	leadership	and	Catholic	violence	1560-1585’,	Past	&	Present,	190	(2006):	83-120,	on	p.	92.		10 	D.	 R.	 Kelley,	 François	 Hotman,	 a	 Revolutionary’s	 Ordeal	 (Princeton:	 Princeton	University	 Press,	 1973):	 p.	 135;	 M.	 Turchetti,	 ‘Religious	 concord	 and	 political	tolerance	 in	 sixteenth-	 and	 seventeenth-century	 France’,	 The	 Sixteenth	 Century	
Journal,	22	(1991):	15-25.		11	J.	A.	 Sponholz,	 ‘Multiconfessional	 celebration	of	 the	Eucharist	 in	 sixteenth-century	Wesel’,	 The	 Sixteenth	 Century	 Journal,	 39	 (2008):	 705-730;	 M.	 Turchetti,	 ‘Middle	parties	in	France	during	the	Wars	of	Religion’,	in	P.	Benedict,	G.	Marnef,	H.	van	Nierop,	and	M.	Venard	(eds.),	Reformation,	Revolt	and	Civil	War	in	France	and	the	Netherlands	
1555-1585,	 (Amsterdam:	Royal	Netherlands	Academy	of	Arts	and	Sciences,	1999):	p.	168.		12	T.	Wanegffelen,	Ni	Rome	Ni	Genève,	Des	Fidèles	entre	Deux	Chaires	en	France	au	XVIe	
Siècle	(Paris:	Honoré	Champion	Éditeur,	1997):	pp.	103-112.		13	‘comme	le	chien	[retourné]	à	son	vomissement’	Ibid,	p.	103.		
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to	 the	 intellectual	 climate	 in	which	German	solutions	 for	 the	 future	of	France	were	formulated.	
	
4.3	The	Colloquy	of	Poissy	
	The	common	desire	 to	 restore	 religious	unity	 found	expression	 in	 the	many	 religious	 councils	 organised	 during	 the	 first	 fifty	 years	 of	 the	Reformation.	 In	 their	 attempts	 to	 create	 or	 preserve	 unity,	 the	Protestant	princes	had	repeatedly	resorted	 to	councils,	 for	 instance	at	Marburg	in	1529,	Worms	in	1557,	Frankfurt	in	1558,	and	Naumburg	in	1560.14	Despite	the	limited	success	of	these	conferences,	the	belief	that	a	 universal	 council	 represented	 the	 best	 chance	 for	 pan-European	restoration	 of	 religious	 unity	 was	 widespread	 among	 German	Protestants.15	The	 Council	 of	 Trent,	 intended	 to	 be	 such	 a	 universal	council,	was	bitterly	disappointing	for	Protestants,	who	recognised	that	a	 conference	 organised	 within	 the	 existing	 structures	 of	 the	 Catholic	Church	was	unlikely	to	favour	them.	Christoph	of	Württemberg	was	the	only	German	Protestant	prince	who	 sent	 a	delegation	 and	he	 too	was	soon	 left	 disillusioned.	 At	 Naumburg	 it	 was	 decided	 that	 further	Protestant	German	participation	at	Trent	was	out	of	the	question.16	This	hostility	to	the	Council	of	Trent	was	shared	by	much	of	the	French	 Catholic	 establishment.	 The	 French,	 whose	 Gallican	 tradition	was	 characterised	 by	 opposition	 to	 papal	 authority,	 resented	 the	dominance	 of	 the	 papacy	 over	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 Council	 and	 were	very	concerned	about	the	likelihood	of	having	a	reform	agenda	imposed	upon	them	by	Rome.17	By	1560,	they	had	lost	all	faith	in	the	Council	of	Trent	and	they	dismissed	the	idea	of	reopening	it.	Instead,	Catherine	de’																																																									14	Koch	and	Bouman,	‘Striving	for	the	union	of	Lutheran	churches,	p.	106.		15	See	Chapter	II.		16	A.	Tallon,	La	France	et	le	Concile	de	Trente	(1518-1563)	 (Rome:	École	Française	de	Rome,	1997):	p.	288.		17	T.	 I	 Crimando,	 ‘Two	 French	 views	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 Trent’,	 The	 Sixteenth	 Century	
Journal,	19	(1988):	169-186.		
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Medici,	Michel	 de	 l’Hôpital,	 Antoine	 de	 Bourbon,	 Charles	 de	 Lorraine,	and	their	entourages	played	with	the	 idea	of	organising	an	alternative	council.18	During	 the	months	 leading	 up	 to	 Poissy,	 Catherine,	 through	her	 diplomats,	 discussed	 her	 plans	 with	 the	 princes	 of	 the	 Empire.	Catherine	was	 strengthened	 in	 her	 dismissal	 of	 the	 papacy’s	 plans	 to	reopen	Trent	by	a	number	of	German	princes,	including	Philip	of	Hesse,	Wolfgang	 of	 Zweibrücken,	 and	 Christoph	 of	 Württemberg,	 who	 all	asserted	 that	 they	 had	 no	 faith	 in	 another	 council	 in	 the	 mould	 of	Trent.19		In	 the	 spring	 of	 1561	 the	 format	 of	 the	 proposed	 alternative	council	 took	 shape.	 It	 was	 to	 be	 a	 national	 council	 at	 which	representatives	of	both	Catholics	and	Reformed	Protestants	would	take	part.	 In	 the	 eyes	 of	 Catherine	 and	 other	 French	 proponents	 of	reconciliation,	 the	 absence	 of	 Protestants	 at	 Trent	 made	 the	 Council	redundant.20	Though	 it	 was	 not	 initially	 the	 intention	 that	 Lutherans	would	 be	 present	 at	 Poissy,	 the	 German	 princes	 were	 once	 again	involved	 in	 the	 build-up.	 In	 the	 summer	 of	 1561	Charles	 de	 Lorraine,	through	 his	 representative	 Christophe	 Rascalon,	 contacted	 the	Protestant	 princes	 to	 explain	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 Colloquy.21	Lorraine	recognised	 that	 the	 reunifications	 of	 the	 French	 church	 depended	 on	the	reaching	of	an	accord	about	the	Eucharist.	He	criticised	advocates	of	freedom	 of	 conscience,	 defended	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 unity	 of	 the	church,	and	argued	that	reconciliation	could	only	be	achieved	by	finding	theological	common	ground.	The	doctrines	of	the	Augsburg	Confession,	he	argued,	could	help	Catholics	and	Huguenots	in	finding	this	common	ground.	Initially,	German	Protestant	reactions	to	the	organisation	of	the	Colloquy	 were	 predominantly	 positive.	 Philipp	 of	 Hesse	 was	
																																																								18	Tallon,	La	France	et	le	Concile	de	Trente,	p.	286.		19	Crimando,	‘Two	French	views	of	the	Council	of	Trent’	p.	54		20	Tallon,	La	France	et	le	Concile	de	Trente,	pp.	292-293.		21	Ibid,	pp.	309-311.		
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particularly	 optimistic.22	In	 April	 1561	 the	 Landgrave	 discussed	 his	hopes	 and	 expectations	 with	 Heinrich	 Bullinger	 and	 Christoph	 of	Württemberg,	writing			 that	messages	have	come	to	me	in	which	it	is	claimed	that	the	French	…	have	allowed	that	in	the	planned	council	…	the	Pope’s	abominations	and	 abuses	will	 be	 discussed,	 and	 that	 France	 is	 so	 inclined	 that	 the	Reformation	should	be	started	against	the	Pope.23		The	 belief	 that	 the	 truth	 of	 the	 Gospel	would	 shine	 through	 during	 a	true	 religious	 council	 can	 also	 be	 detected	 in	 the	 writings	 of	 other	princes.	Friedrich	III’s	optimism	was	inspired	by	his	unshakable	belief	that	 in	 a	 theological	 dispute	 between	 Reformed	 and	 Catholic	theologians,	the	Reformed	could	count	on	divine	inspiration:			 it	is	so	with	our	dear	God,	He	can	surely	support	them,	as	the	prophet	Jesiah	said,	and	the	Lord	Christ	in	John	6	also	indicated:	they	will	all	be	taught	 by	 God,	 since	 these	 are	 the	 things	 pertaining	 to	 him.	 He	 will	defend	his	own	interests	well.24			However,	 there	was	 considerable	Protestant	 opposition	 to	 the	 idea	 of	Lutheran	participation.	Hubert	Languet	 lamented	 that	 ‘many	Germans	[Protestants]	appear	rather	to	favour	the	papists’	and	that	the	presence	at	Poissy	of	strict	Lutheran	theologians,	such	as	Johannes	Brenz,	would	ensure	 that	 the	 Augsburg	 Confession	 would	 serve	 to	 foster	 discord																																																									22	H.	Hauser,	‘Antoine	de	Bourbon	et	l’Allemagne’,	Revue	Historique,	45	(1891):	54-61,	on	p.	56.		23	das	unss	itzo	zeitungenn	ainkommen	/	darinnen	gemeldet	/	daß	die	frantzosenn	…	in	daß	angestelte	Concilium	bewilligt	/	daß	…	daß	Bapst	gruwell	unnd	mißbreuch	ann	denn	 tag	 …	 gebracht	 werde	 /	 und	 daß	 Frannckreich	 dahin	 gesinnen	 /	 daß	 die	Reformation	 ann	 dem	 Babst	 anngefangen	 werdenn	 solle	 …’	 Philipp	 of	 Hesse	 to	Heinrich	Bullinger,	27	April	1561,	HStAM	3,	1797:	f.	121.		24	‘so	steht	es	doch	bei	dem	lieben	Gott,	der	kan	inen	wol	beystehen,	wie	der	prophet	Jsayus	…	 sagt,	 und	 der	 herr	 Christus	 Jo.	 6	 selbst	 anzeugt:	 Sie	werden	 alle	 von	 Gott	gelehrt,	 dessen	 ist	 die	 sachen	 selbst	 eigen.	 Der	 wurdt	 auch	 seyn	 aygen	 wol	verdaydingen.’	Friedrich	III	to	Christoph	of	Württemberg,	28	July	1561,	A.	Kluckhohn	(ed.),	 Briefe	 Friedrich	 des	 Frommen,	 Kurfürsten	 von	 der	 Pfalz,	 mit	 Verwandten	
Schriftstücken,	Volume	I	(Braunschweig,	C.A.	Schwetschte	und	Sohn,	1868):	p.	190.		
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rather	 than	 reconciliation. 25 	The	 Imperial	 princes	 themselves	 also	doubted	 the	 value	 of	 German	 participation.	 They	 were	 primarily	concerned	 that	 the	 presence	 of	 their	 theologians	might	 complicate	 or	disturb	the	process.	The	danger	of	exposing	the	deep	rifts	between	the	various	 forms	of	Protestantism	was	a	concern.	On	 the	other	hand,	 the	German	 princes	 could,	 through	 their	 theological	 representation,	exercise	influence	over	the	outcome	of	this	most	crucial	of	discussions.	In	a	letter	to	Christoph	of	Württemberg	written	in	July	1561,	Friedrich	III	 toyed	with	 the	 idea	of	 sending	 ‘our	 theologians’	 to	 the	 council,	 but	added	 that	 such	 action	 would	 certainly	 be	 ‘questionable’.26	Christoph	did	 not	 share	 Friedrich’s	 reservations.	 Despite	 the	 disappointment	 of	Trent,	 he	 continued	 to	 believe	 in	 the	 possibility	 of	 religious	reconciliation.	 In	 correspondence	with	Antoine	de	Bourbon	 from	 June	1561	 Christoph	 expressed	 his	 firm	 opinion	 that	 German	 theologians	should	be	present	too.27	The	Duke	hoped	that	his	Lutheran	theologians	could	steer	the	discussion	in	the	right	doctrinal	direction	and	facilitate	reconciliation	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 Augsburg	 Confession.	 On	 3	 October	1561,	 the	Württemberg	 theologians	 Jakob	 Beurlin,	 Jakob	 Andreä,	 and	Balthasar	Bidembach	left	Stuttgart	in	order	to	join	the	deliberations	at	Poissy.28	Friedrich	 too,	 despite	 his	 reservations,	 decided	 to	 send	 two	theologians,	 Michael	 Diller	 and	 Peter	 Boquin,	 to	 the	 Colloquy.29	Both	sets	of	theologians,	however,	failed	to	reach	Poissy	in	time	to	take	part	in	the	proceedings.30																																																									25	‘semblant	 favoriser	 plutôt	 les	 papistes’	 B.	 Nicollier-de	 Weck,	 Hubert	 Languet,	 Un	
Réseau	 Politique	 International	 de	Melanchthon	 à	 Guillaume	 d’Orange	 (Geneva:	 Droz,	1995):	p.	134.		26	‘unsere	 theologos’	 ‘bedencklich’	 Friedrich	 III	 to	 Christoph	 of	 Württemberg,	 20	March	1561,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	I,	p.	169.		27 	D.	 Nugent,	 Ecumenism	 in	 the	 Age	 of	 the	 Reformation:	 The	 Colloquy	 of	 Poissy,	(Cambridge	MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	1974):	p.	59;	Hauser,	‘Antoine	de	Bourbon	et	l’Allemagne’;	Tallon,	La	France	et	le	Concile	de	Trente,	p.	312	
	28	G.	Bossert,	 ‘Die	Reise	der	Württembergische	Theologen	nach	Frankreich	im	Herbst	1561’,	Württembergische	Vierteljahreshefte	für	Landesgeschichte,	8	(1899):	351-412.		29	Michael	Diller	and	Peter	Boquin	to	Friedrich	III,	December	1561,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	
Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	I,	pp.	215-229.			30	Tallon,	La	France	et	le	Concile	de	Trente,	p.	315.	
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Despite	 the	 lack	 of	 German	 participation,	 the	 Augsburg	Confession	 was	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 deliberations	 at	 Poissy.	 After	 a	promising	meeting	between	Théodore	de	Bèze	and	Lorraine	on	the	eve	of	 the	Colloquy,	 tensions	 soon	 flared	when	Bèze	 took	 the	 floor	 and	 in	sharp	 terms	defended	 the	Reformed	 interpretation	 of	 the	Eucharist.31	Lorraine	 responded	 with	 a	 long	 speech	 in	 which	 he	 defended	 the	doctrine	of	 the	Real	Presence,	which,	he	added,	was	supported	by	 the	Lutherans	and	the	Orthodox	as	well	as	Catholics.32	After	 two	weeks	of	fruitless	 deliberations,	 Lorraine	 attempted	 to	 break	 the	 deadlock	 by	asking	 Bèze	 to	 subscribe	 to	 the	 Augsburg	 Confession.33	Bèze	 and	 the	Huguenots	interpreted	this	move	not	as	an	attempt	to	find	a	theological	middle	 ground,	 but	 as	 a	 trick	 intended	 to	 isolate	 them	 from	 the	Lutherans.	 With	 Bèze’s	 dismissal	 of	 Lorraine’s	 proposal	 the	 Colloquy	had	effectively	failed.		
4.4	The	aftermath	of	Poissy		The	 failure	of	Poissy	had	a	 significant	 impact,	not	only	on	France,	but	also	on	the	Empire.	German	audiences	had	taken	a	great	interest	in	the	event.	In	contrast	to	Trent,	Poissy	had	been	designed	with	the	genuine	intention	 of	 reconciling	 Huguenots	 and	 Catholics,	 and	 consequently	there	was	optimism	in	Protestant	Germany.	After	Poissy	collapsed,	the	discussion	 shifted	 to	 ascribe	 blame	 for	 its	 failure.	 Naturally,	 two	contrasting	 explanations	 circulated.	 Directly	 after	 Poissy	 German	translations	 of	 the	 speeches	 of	 both	 Theodore	 Beza	 and	 Charles	 de	Lorraine	were	printed	in	the	Empire.34	Whilst	the	Huguenots	presented																																																																																																																																															31	Nugent,	Ecumenism	in	the	Age	of	the	Reformation,	pp.	98-100;	S.	Carroll,	Martyrs	and	
Murderers:	 The	 Guise	 Family	 and	 the	 Making	 of	 Europe,	 (Oxford:	 Oxford	 University	Press,	2009):	p.	150.		32	Carroll,	Martyrs	and	Murderers,	pp.	151-152.		33	Ibid,	152.		34	Charles	 de	 Lorraine,	Oration	 oder	 Gegenantwort	 des	 Cardinals	 von	 Lothringen	 das	
Angefangen	 Gespraech	 die	 Religion	 in	 Franckreich	 Belangend	 Gehalten	 zu	 Poissy	 den	
Sechzehenden	Septembris	Anno	M.D.LXI,	 (s.l.,	 s.n.,	 1561);	 Theodore	 Beza,	Oration	das	
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Lorraine’s	 attempts	 as	 political	 manoeuvring	 -	 a	 narrative	 that	 until	recently	 dominated	 the	 historiography	 of	 the	 Colloquy	 –	 the	 Cardinal	lamented	 the	 obstinacy	 of	 the	 Reformed	 Protestants.	 Both	 in	correspondence	 with	 Württemberg	 in	 October	 1561	 and	 at	 their	meeting	at	Saverne	the	following	February,	Lorraine	cleared	himself	of	blame.	At	Saverne	he	told	Christoph	that			 the	Calvinist	ministers	have	from	the	beginning	shown	themselves	to	be	 people	 with	 whom	 reconciliation	 cannot	 be	 expected,	 who	 have	called	all	 the	Catholics	 idolaters,	which	has	resulted	 in	an	 intolerable	irritation.35			Discussions	about	the	future	prospects	of	reconciliation	also	flared	up.	The	 failure	 of	 Poissy	 divided	 opinion	 on	 this	 matter.	 Whereas	 some,	including	Lorraine	and	Württemberg,	remained	committed	to	the	ideal	of	religious	reconciliation,	others	concluded	that	it	was	time	to	consider	other	options.	In	France,	Michel	de	l’Hôpital	and	his	party	advocated	a	tolerant	 policy.	 In	 Germany,	 a	 number	 of	 Protestant	 princes	 shifted	their	 focus	 from	 a	 religious	 to	 a	 legal	 solution.	 Württemberg’s	conciliatory	efforts	as	well	as	the	alternatives	solutions	developed	after	1561	will	be	discussed	in	detail	below.		
4.4.1	The	Württemberg	and	Palatinate	missions		Having	missed	Poissy,	Beurlin,	Andreä,	and	Bidembach	did	not	directly	return	to	Germany.	They	instead	arranged	opportunities	to	pitch	their	
																																																																																																																																													
Angefangenen	 Gespraech	 in	 Franckreich	 von	 Religions	 Sachen	 Belangend	 welche	 er	
Gehabt	 Hat:	 Auff	 Dienstag	 den	 Neündten	 Septembris,	 Anno	 1561.	 In	 ainen	
Frauwencloster	 de	 Poissy	 Genannt,	 (Heidelberg:	 Ludwig	 Lucius	 aus	 der	 Wetterau,	1561).		35	‘les	ministres	calvinistes	s’étaient,	des	l’abord,	montrés	comme	gens	avec	lesquels	il	n’y	a	pas	de	conciliation	à	espérer;	qu’il	avaient	appelé	idolàtres	tous	les	catholiques,	et	qu’il	était	résulté	de	cela	une	irritation	intolerable.’	A.	Muntz	(ed.),	‘Entrevue	du	Duc	Christophe	de	Würtemberg	avec	les	Guise,	a	Saverne,	peu	de	jour	savant	le	Massacre	de	Vassy,	1562.	Relation	autograph	du	Duc	de	Würtemberg’,	Bulletin	de	la	Société	de	
l’Histoire	du	Protestantisme	Français,	4	(1856):	184-196,	on	p.	186.		
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proposed	 solution	 to	 France’s	 most	 prominent	 individuals.36 	When	doing	so,	they	were	aware	of	their	responsibilities	to	their	master	and	ensured	that	they	acted	within	the	mandate	that	he	had	given	them.	In	order	 to	 increase	 the	possible	 impact	of	 their	embassy,	 the	 team	from	Württemberg	 worked	 together	 with	 the	 two	 Palatinate	 theologians,	Michael	Diller	and	Peter	Boquin.37	Soon,	however,	 the	doctrinal	cracks	that	had	already	started	to	damage	relations	between	the	princes	of	the	Augsburg	Confession	began	to	affect	this	joint	diplomatic	effort.38	It	was	clear	that	the	Württemberg	delegation	had	different	goals	than	the	men	from	the	Palatinate,	who	were	primarily	interested	in	strengthening	the	connections	 between	 Friedrich	 and	 the	 Huguenot	 leadership.	 This	problem	was	exacerbated	by	the	fact	that	Christoph’s	theologians	had	a	particularly	clearly	defined	goal	 in	mind,	namely	 the	promotion	of	 the	Augsburg	 Confession,	 which	 they	 not	 only	 considered	 to	 be	 the	 only	correct	exposition	of	religious	truth,	but	also	saw	as	the	media	via	that	could	unite	France	religiously.	They	were	convinced	 that	 the	 truths	of	the	Augsburg	Confession,	provided	that	 they	were	properly	explained,	should	 appeal	 to	 all.	 Therefore,	 Württemberg’s	 theologians	 made	arrangements	 to	meet	with	 a	 number	 of	 important	 individuals	 at	 the	French	 court.	 On	 19	 November	 1561	 they	 met	 with	 Coligny	 in	 Saint	Germain.	 A	 day	 later	 they	 were	 granted	 an	 audience	 with	 the	 King,	Catherine	de’	Medici,	 and	Antoine	de	Bourbon.	On	21	November	 they	were	again	requested	to	appear	before	Catherine.39	At	 these	meetings,	they	 explained	 and	 expounded	 on	 Lutheran	 theology.	 However,	 not	only	were	the	conversations	slowed	down	significantly	by	the	need	for	interpreters,	 both	 Catherine	 and	 Navarre	 also	 explained	 that,	 though	they	strongly	desired	religious	reconciliation,	they	were	not	interested	
																																																								36	Bossert,	‘Die	Reise	der	Württembergische	Theologen	nach	Frankreich,	pp.	367-412.		37	Michael	Diller	and	Peter	Boquin	to	Friedrich	III,	December	1561,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	
Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	I,	pp.	215-229.		38	Bossert,	‘Die	Reise	der	Württembergische	Theologen	nach	Frankreich,	pp.	397-398.		39	Ibid,	pp.	391-393.		
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in	 converting	 to	 Lutheranism.40	Only	 two	 months	 before,	 a	 similar	proposal	 had	 been	 on	 the	 table	 at	 Poissy	 and	 had	 been	 rejected	emphatically.	 It	was	 clear	 to	 Catherine	 that	 at	 this	 particular	 junction	the	solution	was	not	feasible.	
	
4.4.2	Religious	tolerance	in	France		After	 Poissy,	 Catherine	 and	 Michel	 de	 L’Hôpital	 abandoned	 their	conciliatory	agenda	and	instead	aimed	to	implement	tolerant	policies	in	order	 to	 preserve	 the	peace	between	 the	 competing	 confessions.	 This	was	 not	 an	 obvious	 move.	 In	 the	 sixteenth	 century,	 the	 concept	 of	religious	 tolerance	had	very	negative	connotations.	The	phrase	un	roi,	
une	loi,	une	foi,	which	captured	the	idea	that	the	very	essence	of	French	unity	depended	on	uniformity	of	 law	and	religion	under	one	monarch,	is	 often	 mentioned	 to	 underline	 this	 point.41	The	 term	 tolerance	 is	derived	from	the	Latin	verb	tolerare,	which	translates	as	‘to	bear’	or	‘to	endure’.	 Sixteenth-century	 interpretations	 of	 the	 concept	 focused	 on	the	idea	that	tolerance	forces	one	to	remain	inactive	in	the	face	of	evil.42	Instead	 of	 undertaking	 action	 to	 end	 the	 erroneous	 or	 forbidden	activities,	one	was	expected,	so	it	was	argued,	to	grudgingly	endure	the	error	 to	 continue.43	The	 majority	 of	 sixteenth-century	 theorists	 thus	concluded	that	religious	tolerance	should	be	avoided,	not	only	because	of	 the	 intrinsic	 immorality	 of	 the	 concept,	 but	 also	 because	 it	 ripped	society	 apart.44	Voices	 that	 advocated	 tolerance	 on	 purely	 principled	grounds	were	rare,	but	not	entirely	absent	in	France.	Pierre	du	Chastel	
																																																								40	Bossert,	‘Die	Reise	der	Württembergische	Theologen	nach	Frankreich,	p.	294.		41	Kaplan,	Divided	by	Faith	pp.	99-124.		42	P.	 Benedict,	 ‘Un	 roi,	 une	 loi,	 deux	 fois:	 parameters	 for	 the	 history	 of	 Catholic-Reformed	 co-existence	 in	 France,	 1555-1685’,	 in	 O.	 P.	 Grell	 and	 B.	 Scribner	 (eds.),	
Tolerance	 and	 Intolerance	 in	 the	 European	 Reformation,	 (Cambridge:	 Cambridge	University	Press,	1996):	p.	67.		43	Turchetti,	‘Religious	concord	and	political	tolerance,	p.	18.		44	Kaplan,	Divided	by	Faith,	p.	114.		
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and	Sebastian	Castellio	were	two	of	the	few	that	argued	that	it	is	wrong	in	principle	to	execute	someone	for	their	beliefs.45	When	 religious	 tolerance	 was	 considered,	 it	 was	 usually	 on	pragmatic	rather	than	philosophical	grounds.	For	instance,	a	significant	number	of	 large	trading	centres	implemented,	sometimes	temporarily,	tolerant	policies	for	economic	reasons.	The	citizens	of	Antwerp	argued	that	 ‘where	 the	 inquisition	 treads,	 the	merchant	 departs.’46	Therefore,	the	 city’s	magistrates	were	amongst	 the	most	 vehement	opponents	of	anti-heresy	 legislation	 and	 instead	 allowed	 plurality	 of	 religion.	 For	German	 cities,	 too,	 there	 were	 direct	 economic	 incentives	 to	 tolerate	multiple	 religions	 within	 their	 walls.47	Especially	 in	 the	 religiously-diverse	 Rhineland	 cities	 could	 not	 afford	 to	 alienate	 merchants,	artisans,	 and	 apprentices	 from	 outside	 the	 city,	 on	 whom	 their	economies	depended.	 In	Münster,	prominent	guild	members	struggled	to	 keep	 the	 city	 open	 for	 non-Lutheran	 economic	 participation.48	In	Strasbourg,	 too,	 toleration	 was	 briefly	 established	 for	 economic	 and	political	 reasons.	 Not	 only	was	 it	 argued	 that	 tolerance	was	 good	 for	business,	 Strasbourg’s	 unusual	 religious	 policies	 also	 underlined	 its	political	independence.49	Despite	 the	 negative	 connotations	 of	 the	 concept,	 there	 were	thus	 plenty	 of	 examples	 of	 de	 facto	 religious	 tolerance	 in	 the	 regions	bordering	France	 for	Catherine,	de	L’Hôpital,	 and	other	proponents	of	tolerance	 to	 draw	on.	De	 l’Hôpital’s	 arguments	 for	 religious	 tolerance	had	both	pragmatic	and	ideological	dimensions.	The	Chancellor	came	to	realise	that	it	was	foolish	to	assume	that	Protestantism	in	France	could	be	wholly	 eradicated	 by	 force.	 The	Huguenots,	 he	 argued,	 had	 simply																																																									45	Benedict,	‘Un	roi,	une	loi,	deux	fois,	p.	69;	Turchetti,	‘Middle	parties,	p.	172.		46	Duke,	Dissident	Identities,	p.	67.		47	C.	Scott	Dixon,	 ‘Urban	order	and	religious	coexistence	in	the	German	Imperial	city:	Augsburg	and	Donauwörth,	1548-1608’,	Central	European	History,	40	(2007):	1-33.		48	R.	 Po-chia	 Hsia,	 Society	 and	 Religion	 in	 Münster,	 1535-1618,	 (New	 Haven:	 Yale	University	Press,	1984):	p.	134.		49	MacCulloch,	 Reformation,	 Europe’s	 House	 Divided,	 1490-1700,	 (London:	 Penguin	Books,	2004):	pp.	183-184.		
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grown	 too	 numerous. 50 	Moreover,	 they	 were	 particularly	 well	represented	 amongst	 the	 gentry	 and	 nobility,	 giving	 the	 Huguenot	faction	access	to	significant	military	power.	Trying	to	supress	them,	he	feared,	 would	 rip	 the	 French	 state	 apart.	 The	 Chancellor	 emphasised	that	 his	 proposed	 solution	 was	 not	 a	 religious	 but	 a	 constitutional	settlement.51	The	 second	 part	 of	 de	 l’Hôpital’s	 rationale	 was	 rather	more	 positive.	 He	 likened	 the	 people	 of	 France	 to	 a	 family	 in	 which	differences	of	opinion	could	be	found.52	As	in	a	family,	one	was	obliged	to	 love	 each	 other	 despite	 these	 differences.	 He	 also	 argued	 that	 the	monarchy’s	primary	responsibilities	were	the	protection	of	this	 family	from	 unrest	 and	 war	 and	 ‘the	 maintenance	 of	 the	 commonwealth’.53	Moreover,	 whilst	 bemoaning	 the	 futility	 of	 using	 violence	 to	 affect	religious	conversion,	he	argued	that	‘the	arms	of	charity,	prayers,	[and]	persuasion’	were	more	potent	in	the	struggle	to	bring	Protestants	back	to	 the	 fold.54	Catherine	 de’	 Medici’s	 and	Michel	 de	 l’Hôpital’s	 tolerant	agenda	 was	 institutionalised	 in	 the	 Edict	 of	 Saint	 Germain,	 issued	 in	January	 1562.	 The	 Edict	 was	 in	 essence	 a	 temporary	 compromise.	 It	was	 intended	 ‘to	 halt	 all	 troubles	 and	 seditions	 whilst	 awaiting	 the	organisation	 of	 a	 general	 council’. 55 	It	 allowed	 the	 Huguenots	 to	organise	 themselves	 in	 synods	 and	 consistories	 and	 hold	 public	gatherings	outside	cities.	The	writers	of	the	Edict	attempted	to	separate	heresy	 and	 sedition.	 It	 decreed	 that	 the	Huguenots	were	 not	 ‘to	 have	any	armed	assemblies	…	[nor]	insult,	reproach,	or	provoke	on	religious																																																									50	Benedict,	‘Un	roi,	une	loi,	deux	fois,	p.	69.		51	L.	Romier,	Catholiques	et	Huguenots	a	la	Cour	de	Charles	IX,	(Paris:	Perrin,	1924):	p.	286.		52	Wanegffelen,	Ni	Rome	Ni	Genève	p.	215.		53	Q.	 Skinner,	 The	 Foundations	 of	 Modern	 Political	 Thought,	 Volume	 II	 (Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1978):	p.	251.		54	S.	Kim,	‘”Die	nous	garde	de	la	messe	du	chancelier”:	the	religious	beliefs	and	political	opinion	of	Michel	de	l’Hopital’,	Sixteenth	Century	Journal,	24	(1993):	595-620.		55	‘en	attendant	la	determination	d’ung	concile	general	…	faire	cesser	tous	troubles	et	seditions.’	‘Édit	de	Janvier’,	Éditions	en	Ligne	de	l’École	des	Chartes,	École	Nationale	des	Chartes,	 17-1-1562.	 Accessed	 January	 2016.	http://elec.enc.sorbonne.fr/editsdepacification/edit_01.		
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grounds	or	 create,	 solicit,	 or	 favour	any	sedition,	but	 live	and	 interact	with	 each	 other	 gently	 and	 graciously.’56	Though	 the	 Edict	 did	 not	advocate	tolerance	as	the	preferred	long-term	solution	for	the	religious	tensions	 in	 France,	 it	 did	 consider	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 bi-confessional	society.	 Among	 the	 Protestant	 German	 princes	 there	was	 not	 yet	 any	enthusiasm	 for	 religious	 tolerance	 in	 1560	 or	 1561.	 They	 were	themselves	 heavily	 invested	 in	 the	 creation	 and	 preservation	 of	religious	 uniformity	 in	 their	 own	 territories.	Moreover,	 in	 the	 Empire	they	had	managed	to	create	a	stable	peace	without	having	to	resort	to	tolerance.	 In	 the	 short	 period	 between	 Poissy	 and	 the	 Massacre	 of	Vassy,	 the	 German	 Protestant	 princes	 primarily	 looked	 at	 their	 own	experiences	 in	 the	 Empire	 and	 started	 to	 consider	ways	 in	which	 the	successful	 formula	 of	 the	 Peace	 of	 Augsburg	 could	 be	 replicated	 in	France.57	Nonetheless,	 the	 Edict	 of	 Saint	 Germain	 provided	 a	 legal	precedent	on	which	German	calls	for	tolerance	later	in	the	1560s	could	be	based.		
4.5	German	mediation	during	the	First	War	of	Religion		Only	 two	 months	 after	 the	 Edict	 of	 Saint	 Germain	 was	 issued,	 the	Massacre	 of	 Vassy	 sparked	 the	 outbreak	 of	war.	 German	 involvement	during	 the	 years	 1562	 and	 1563	 was	 limited.	 The	 exception	 was	Christoph	of	Württemberg’s	diplomatic	activity.	Despite	the	breakdown	of	the	Colloquy	of	Poissy	and	the	failure	of	his	theologians	in	France,	he	continued	to	see	himself	as	a	reconciler	of	the	warring	parties.58	In	June	
																																																								56	‘faire	aucunes	assemblées	à	port	d’armes	…	injurier,	reprocher	ne	provocquer	pour	le	 faict	de	 la	religion	ne	faire,	emouvoir,	procurer	ou	favoriser	aucune	sedition,	mais	vivent	et	se	comportent	les	ungs	avec	les	autres	doulcement	et	gracieusement’	Ibid.		57	H.	 Daussy,	 Le	 Parti	 Huguenot,	 Chronique	 d’une	 Désillusion	 (1557-1572),	 (Geneva:	Droz,	2014):	p.	393.		58 	F.	 W.	 Barthold,	 Deutschland	 und	 die	 Hugenotten,	 Geschichte	 des	 Einflusses	 der	
Deutschen	 auf	 Frankreichs	 Kirchliche	 und	 Bürgerliche	 Verhältnisse	 von	 der	 Zeit	 des	
Schmalkaldischen	Bundes	bis	zum	Geseze	von	Nantes,	1531-1598,	 (Bremen:	Verlag	von	Franz	Schlodtmann,	1848):	pp.	489-490.		
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1562	 he	 wrote	 a	 letter	 to	 Anne	 de	 Montmorency	 in	 which	 he	summarised	all	he	had	done	to	restore	peace:		 We	have	sent	 letters	to	the	most	serene	King	of	France,	 to	the	Queen	Mother,	and	also	to	the	King	of	Navarre	and	the	prince	of	Guise,	as	well	as	 to	 the	 Prince	 of	 Condé,	 and	 together	 with	 some	 other	 German	electors	and	princes	we	have	sent	envoys	…	In	order	that	they	with	all	care	 and	 diligence	 …	 can	 serve	 for	 the	 restoration	 of	 tranquil	harmony.59		A	 number	 of	 Christoph’s	 letters	 survive.	 Though	 they	 lack	 concrete	suggestions	 about	 how	 to	 end	 the	 bloodshed,	 they	 do	 give	 an	 insight	into	 Christoph’s	 overall	 attitude	 to	 the	 conflict	 and	 its	 possible	resolution.	 As	 early	 as	 3	 March	 1562,	 he	 wrote	 a	 letter	 to	 Condé	 in	which	 he	 advocated	 peace.	His	 sole	motivation	 for	 this	 call	 for	 peace,	Christoph	wrote,	was	the	preservation	of	public	and	institutional	order	in	France:			 …	in	the	first	place	for	her,	which	is	the	sole	Church	of	Christ,	and	her	safety,	to	which,	for	the	sake	the	royal	dignity,	the	common	fatherland,	and	the	peace	of	the	Christian	state,	I	urge	singular	piety	and	diligent	respect,	I	beg	you	to	accommodate	our	…	petitions	…60			In	order	to	preserve	peace,	Christoph	emphasised	the	necessity	of	‘first	putting	aside	the	weapons	and	as	far	as	possible	restoring	the	dignity,	
																																																								59	‘Dedimus	ad	serenissimum	Regem	Francia,	ad	Reginam	matrem,	necnon	ad	Regem	Navarrae,	Principes	Guisianos,	adhaec	ad	Principem	Condensem,	literas,	atq.	una	cum	aliorum	 quorundam	 Electorum	 et	 Principum	 Germaniae	 legatis	 …	 Ut	 omni	 cura	 et	diligentia	 id	 agunt.	 …	 ad	 reparandum	 publicam	 tranquillitatem	 concordiam	 servire	potest.’	Christoph	of	Württemberg	to	Anne	de	Montmorency,	21	June	1562,	HStASt,	A	71	Bü	472,	35.		60	‘	…	in	primis	autem	pro	ea,	que	est	vestra	singularis	erga	Ecclasiam	Christi	et	eius	salute	 ad	 haec	 erga	 regiam	dingnitatem,	 communem	patriam	 et	 Christianae	Reipub.	tranquillitatem	 singularis	 pietas	 et	 observantia	 diligentissime	 vos	 hortor	 et	 oro	 …	nostrorum	 petitioni	 …	 accommodentis	 …’	 Christoph	 of	 Württemberg	 to	 Louis	 de	Bourbon,	3	March	1562,	HStASt,	A	71	Bü	472,	31.		
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reputation,	 and	 grace	 of	 the	 King	 of	 France	 …’61	Despite	 advocating	loyalty	 and	 respect	 for	 Church	 and	 King,	 Christoph	 did	 not	 want	 to	seem	 hostile	 to	 Condé,	 ensuring	 him	 that	 his	 letter	was	 ‘lovingly	 and	courteously’	written.62	In	this	 letter,	Christoph’s	personal	views	on	the	Huguenot	 party	 shine	 through.	 In	 line	 with	 Lutheran	 attitudes	 to	Reformed	Protestantism,	he	believed	that	Condé’s	cause	could	only	be	legitimate	and	successful	if	it	did	not	seek	to	alter	or	damage	the	social	and	political	fabric	of	French	society.		Three	months	 later,	Christoph	reaffirmed	his	commitment	to	a	
media	via	solution	in	a	series	of	letters	to	the	French	establishment.	In	a	letter	to	Antoine	de	Bourbon,	commander-in-chief	of	the	royal	army,	written	 on	 the	 9	 June	1562,	 Christoph	 expressed	 some	 sympathy	 for	the	 plight	 of	 the	 Huguenots.	 He	 regarded	 the	 suffering	 of	 the	persecuted	 Protestants	 in	 France	 as	 part	 of	 ‘all	 the	 pious	 blood	 that	since	 the	 blood	 of	 the	 righteous	 Abel	 has	 been	 shed.’63	However,	 the	answer	 to	 persecution,	 Christoph	 argued,	 was	 not	 rebellion:	 ‘The	pretext	 of	 protecting	 the	 public	 peace	 will	 not	 stand	 up	 before	 the	tribunal	 of	God,	 so	 beware	 of	 sedition.’64	Christoph	 clearly	 supported	the	stance	of	Navarre,	who	despite	his	association	with	the	Huguenot	party	had	remained	loyal	to	the	Catholic	king.	On	 the	 same	 day,	 Christoph	 also	 wrote	 to	 Charles	 IX	 and	 his	mother	Catherine	de’	Medici.	The	Duke	started	by	reminding	the	young	king	 of	 his	 responsibilities:	 ‘[You	 have]	 not	 only	 your	 own	 entire	Kingdom	 of	 France,	 but	 the	 safety	 and	 peace	 of	 all	 of	 Christianity	 to	
																																																								61	‘In	primis	autem	arma	deponantur	et	quantum	fieri	potest	Regiea	dignitati	Gallicae	existimatio	et	gratia	conservantur	…’	Christoph	of	Württemberg	to	Louis	de	Bourbon,	3	March	1562,	HStASt,	A	71	Bü	472,	31.		62	‘amanter	 et	 officiose’	 Christoph	 of	 Württemberg	 to	 Antoine	 de	 Bourbon,	 9	 June	1562,	HStASt,	A	71	Bü	472,	34.		63	‘…	 omnem	 sanguinem	 piorum,	 qui	 iam	 inde	 a	 sanguine	 iusti	 Abel	 effusus	 est.’	Christoph	of	Württemberg	to	Antoine	de	Bourbon,	9	June	1562,	HStASt,	A	71	Bü	472,	34.		64 	‘Nec	 valebit	 coram	 tribunal	 Dei	 preatextus	 tuendae	 publicae	 tranquilitatis,	 et	cavende	 seditionis.’	 Christoph	of	Württemberg	 to	Antoine	de	Bourbon,	9	 June	1562,	HStASt,	A	71	Bü	472,	34.		
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consider.’65	Christoph	was	genuinely	troubled	by	the	way	in	which	the	religious	conflict	in	France	developed	and,	despite	the	polite	tone	of	the	letter,	spelled	out	unambiguously	what	was	happening	in	France:			After	the	great	clemency,	goodness,	and	kindness	of	the	expectations,	the	 start,	 and	 the	 beginnings	 of	 Your	 Majesty’s	 highest	 reign,	 such	horrible	 armed	 actions	 of	 persecution	 and	 the	 shedding	 of	 innocent	blood	have	been	undertaken.66			The	 letter	 to	 Catherine	 de’	 Medici	 has	 an	 even	 more	 ominous	 tone.	Christoph	underlined	the	urgency	of	a	swift	and	peaceful	solution,	since	the	calamities	in	France	were	partly	caused	by			 the	 shedding	of	 the	blood	of	 innocents,	 contrary	 to	 the	precepts	 and	commandments	 of	 God,	whose	 persecution,	 as	 is	 evident	 from	many	examples	and	histories,	calls	…	the	wrath	of	God	over	us	…67		Christoph	thus	believed	that	both	sides	held	some	responsibility	for	the	violence	 and	 chaos	 in	 France.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 he	 was	 not	 afraid	 to	condemn	in	strong	words	the	violence	committed	by	Catholics	against	Huguenots,	reminding	the	King	and	his	mother	of	their	responsibly	for	maintaining	 law	 and	 order.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 this	 violence	 was,	according	to	Christoph,	no	justification	for	rebellion.	 Instead,	he	urged	Condé	 to	 refrain	 from	 using	 violence	 and	 to	 seek	 a	 solution	 through	legitimate	means,	respectful	of	the	King	and	his	authority.	These	letters	are	 characteristic	 of	 Christoph’s	 attitude	 throughout	 the	 Wars	 of																																																									65	‘…	non	minus	propriam	suam	totius	Regni	sui	Gallici	quam	universa	Christianitatis	salute	et	tranquillitatem	sit	consideratura.’	Christoph	of	Württemberg	to	Charles	IX,	9	June	1562,	HStASt,	A	71	Bü	472,	32.		66	‘Adhaec	 Ram	Dtem	 vestram	 auspitia,	 initia,	 et	 ingressus	 amplissimi	 sui	 Regni	magis	clementia,	 bonitate	 et	 benignitate	 quam	 horrendis	 armoris	 motibus	 persecution	 et	effusione	 innocentis	 sanguinis	 sit	 susceptura.’	 Christoph	 of	Württemberg	 to	 Charles	IX,	9	June	1562,	HStASt,	A	71	Bü	472,	32.		67	‘…	 contra	 praecepta	 &	 mandata	 Dei	 effusione	 innocentis	 et	 eius	 sanguinis,	 cuius	persecutione,	ut	ex	multis	exemplis	et	historiis	constat,	Ira	Dei	super	nos	…	causatur	…’	Christoph	of	Württemberg	 to	Catherine	de’	Medici,	9	 June	1562,	HStASt,	A	71	Bü	472,	33.		
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Religion.	 A	 strong	 commitment	 to	 Lutheranism	 and	 a	 concern	 for	 the	preservation	of	political	and	social	order	were	the	two	pillars	on	which	his	vision	 for	 the	 future	of	France	was	built.	As	 in	1560	and	1561,	his	mediation	 efforts	 during	 the	 First	War	were	 ineffective.	 The	 repeated	French	dismissal	of	German	suggestions	inspired	a	rethink	in	the	years	after	the	Peace	of	Amboise.	
	
4.6	Between	the	wars	
	The	 end	 of	 the	 First	War	 in	 the	 spring	 of	 1563	 did	 not	 end	 German	discussions	 about	 the	 future	 of	 France.	 In	 the	 summer	 of	 1563,	Christoph	 of	 Württemberg	 and	 Wolfgang	 of	 Zweibrücken	 exchanged	letters	in	which	they	discussed	ways	in	which	a	stable	and	lasting	peace	could	be	guaranteed.68	The	precise	nature	of	their	shared	vision	for	the	future	of	France	is	most	clearly	formulated	in	a	resolution,	composed	in	the	name	of	Wolfgang	by	his	council.	 It	stated	that	a	translation	of	the	Augsburg	Confession	should	be	send	to	the	Huguenots			 …	 in	 order	 that	 they	 may	 recognise	 even	 more,	 that	 the	 German	princes,	 who	 have	 sent	 this	message,	 desire	 nothing	more	 than	 that	the	 Word	 of	 God	 may	 be	 spread	 and	 maintained	 throughout	 the	Kingdom	of	France	and	that	the	general	peace	may	be	lasting.	…	These	letters	are	also	created	in	the	hope	that	through	these	the	particularly	Christian	 trust	 and	 lasting	 friendship	 between	 the	 Crown	 of	 France	and	 the	 estates	 of	 the	 Augsburg	 Confession	 may	 be	 strengthened,	enlarged,	 and	 sustained,	 leading	 to	 the	 increased	 welfare	 and	resilience	of	Christianity	in	general,	against	all	tyrannies,	persecutors,	and	 corruptors	 of	 the	 sacred	 and	 divine	 Word	 and	 the	 venerable	sacraments.	 …	 [The	 Huguenots]	will	 read	 [the	 Augsburg	 Confession]	diligently	and	through	it	recognise	their	own	errors	…	and	from	then	on	they	will	maintain	the	true	Christian	opinion	of	the	Lord’s	Supper	…	and	also	be	in	unanimous	consensus	with	the	Christian	churches	of	the	
																																																								68	J.	 Ney,	 ‘Pfalzgraf	 Wolfgang,	 Herzog	 von	 Zweibrücken	 und	 Neuburg’,	 Schriften	 des	
Vereins	ƒür	Reformationsgeschichte,	29	(1911):	pp.	1-124,	on	pp.	54-75.		
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Augsburg	 Confession,	 in	 [the	 areas	 of]	 doctrine,	 sacraments,	 and	discipline	…69		Louis	of	Nassau	also	believed,	at	 least	before	1566,	 that	 the	Augsburg	Confession	was	at	the	heart	of	any	lasting	resolution	of	religious	strife	in	 France.	 Like	Wolfgang	 of	 Zweibrücken,	 he	 repeatedly	 insisted	 that	the	 Huguenots	 should	 publicly	 subscribe	 to	 the	 Augsburg	 Confession.	However,	 Louis	 did	 by	 no	 means	 share	 Zweibrücken’s	 or	Württemberg’s	 deep	 devotion	 to	 the	 doctrines	 formulated	 in	 the	Confession.	Rather,	Louis	saw	it	primarily	as	a	political	tool.	The	roots	of	Louis’	religious	and	political	agenda	can	be	found	in	his	longstanding	admiration	 of	 François	 Baudouin.	 Between	 1550	 and	 1560,	 Baudouin	worked	 tirelessly	 to	 restore	 the	 unity	 of	 Christendom.	 Though	 he	considered	himself	a	Protestant,	he	championed	a	return	to	the	Church	in	the	time	of	Constantine.	The	universality	of	Constantine’s	Church	was	in	 the	eyes	of	Baudouin	one	of	 its	most	 important	 features.	Regarding	himself	a	true	reformer,	he	criticised	the	Protestant	‘transformers’	who	were	 creating	 new	 churches. 70 	Committed	 to	 this	 ideal	 of	 unity,	Baudouin	even	reconverted	to	Catholicism	in	1563.	Whereas	Baudouin	despaired	at	 the	 inflexibility	of	Calvin’s	dogmatism,	Calvin	 in	turn	saw	Baudouin	 as	 the	 worst	 kind	 of	 apostate. 71 	According	 to	 Louis	 of	Nassau’s	 biographer,	 Petrus	 Johannes	 Blok,	 Louis	 met	 Baudouin	 in	secret	 in	 1563,	 probably	 to	 discuss	 the	 best	 means	 of	 resolving	 the																																																									69	‘…	uff	 das	man	desto	mehr	…	merken	möge,	 das	 die	Teutschen	Chur	 und	 fürsten,	weslche	 diese	 pottschafft	 abgesanndt	 haben,	 nichts	 hoher	 begern,	 dann	 das	 Gottes	wortt	in	der	Chron	Frankreich	…	ausgebraittet	und	erhallten	werde	unnd	der	gemain	fried	 bestenndig	 pleiben	 möge.	 …	 Unnd	 seinndt	 diese	 Media	 also	 geschaffen	 dass	hoffenlich	 dardurch	 ein	 sonnders	 Christlichs	 vertrouens	 unnd	 bestendige	freundtschafft	 zwischen	 der	 Chron	 Franckreich	 unnd	 den	 Stennden	 der	Augspurgischen	Confession	kan	gestifftet	vermehret	und	erhalten	warden,	zu	grosser	wolfarth	und	Craft	der	allgemeinen	Christenhait	wider	alle	Tirannen,	verfolger	unnd	verfelscher	 deß	 hailig	 göttlichen	 wortts	 und	 der	 hochwurdigen	 sacramenten.	 …	woltten	 vleiszig	 lesen,	 unnd	 Ihren	 Irrtumb	 darauß	 erkennen	 …	 und	 der	 wahren	Christlichen	mainunge	vonn	dess	herrn	Nachtmahl	hinfuro	zugethan	sain	…und	also	ein	 einhelligen	 consensum	 mit	 den	 Christlichen	 Kirchen	 der	 Augspurgischen	Confession	 inn	der	Lehre,	Sacramenten,	un	disciplina	…’	Resolution	of	 the	council	of	Zweibrücken,	August	1563,	HStASt,	A	71	Bü	920,	56	a.		70	‘transformateurs’	Wanegffelen,	Ni	Rome	Ni	Genève,		p.	111.		71	Ibid,	p.	108.		
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intensifying	 religious	 tensions	 throughout	 Europe. 72 	In	 line	 with	Baudouin’s	 irenic	 philosophy,	 Louis	 despaired	 at	 the	 theological	inflexibility	and	stubbornness	that,	in	his	eyes,	caused	the	rift	between	Lutheranism	 and	 Reformed	 Protestantism.	 In	 an	 exchange	 of	 letters	with	Landgrave	Wilhelm	of	Hesse	from	1565	Louis	outlined	his	vision:		As	 I	 have	written	 Your	 Grace	 the	 last	 time	 concerning	 the	matter	 of	religion,	 so	 I	 have	 since	 then	 once	 again	 received	 a	 writing	 from	France,	 in	 which	 they	 assure	 me	 that	 our	 coreligionists	 [the	Huguenots]	 have	 no	 objection	 to	 the	 complete	 adoption	 of	 the	Augsburg	Confession,	insofar	as	they	think	of	the	points	on	the	Lord’s	Supper	 as	 true	or	bad,	 one	 cannot	 condemn	or	dismiss	 any	of	 these;	and	it	seems	to	me	in	truth	that	we	should	drop	all	trivial	disputes,	or	on	 purpose	 overlook	 some	 things,	 since	 because	 of	 this	 the	 two	nations	can	 then	be	brought	 together	and	after	 this,	when	peace	and	quiet	returns	and	we	are	unhindered	and	untroubled	by	the	Catholics,	we	 can	 with	 good	 manners	 and	 without	 bitterness	 decide	 on	 these	differences	…73		The	central	principle	of	Louis’	vision	is	thus	that,	in	essence,	Lutherans	and	Reformed	Protestants	belonged	to	the	same	religion.	Interestingly,	though	 recognising	 the	 discord	 over	 the	 Eucharist	 that	 disrupted	Reformed-Lutheran	 relations,	 he	 did	 not	 regard	 this	 issue	 as	 either	 a	deal-breaker	 or	 as	 something	 irresolvable.	 Moreover,	 Louis,	 and	apparently	also	his	unnamed	correspondents	in	France,	concluded	that																																																									72	P.	J.	Blok,	Lodewijk	van	Nassau,	(The	Hague:	Martinus	Nijhoff,	1889):	p.	24.		73	‘Wie	E.	F.	G.	 ich	am	letzen	der	religionssachen	halber	geschrieben,	so	hab	ich	sindt	der	 zeit	 aus	 Franckreich	 widderum	 schreiben	 bekommen,	 darinnen	 mann	 mich	versichert,	 das	 die	 religionsverwanten	 darselbst	 die	 Augspurgische	 Confession	durchauss	 ahntzunemen	 keine	 beschwerung	 machen	 werden,	 so	 ver	 mann	 den	puncten	 de	 coena	 rein	 unnd	 schlecht	 stelle,	 damit	 man	 kein	 theil	 darauss	condamnieren	 oder	 verwerffen	 moge;	 unndt	 duncket	 mich	 inn	 der	 warheit,	 mann	solte	 billich	 alle	disputationes	 fallen	 lassen,	 oder	uber	 etwas	durch	die	 finger	 sehen,	damit	mann	 diese	 zwo	 nationes	 zusamenbringen	moge	 unndt	 darnach,	 wann	mann	mit	ruhen	sein	mochte	unndt	von	dem	Bapstum	ungehindert	undt	sonder	sorg,	alsdan	mit	gueten	manieren	ohn	verbitterung	disse	differentias	decidieren	…’	Louis	of	Nassau	to	 Wilhelm	 of	 Hesse,	 26	 June	 1565,	 P.	 J.	 Blok,	 Correspondentie	 van	 en	 Betreffende	
Lodewijk	 van	 Nassau	 en	 Andere	 Onuitgegeven	 Documenten,	 Verzameld	 door	 Dr.	 P.	 J.	
Blok,	(Utrecht:	Kemink	en	Zoon,	1887):	p.	35.		
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in	 all	 other	 areas	 the	 religions	 of	 the	 Huguenots	 and	 the	 German	Lutherans	 were	 in	 harmony	 with	 each	 other.	 If	 the	 two	 confessions	were	 in	all	but	one	doctrine	already	 the	same,	why	 then	was	Louis	so	adamant	 that	 the	 Huguenots	 should	 ‘commit	 themselves	 to	 the	Augsburg	 Confession’?74	And	 if	 Louis	 did	 not	 expect	 a	 rapprochement	on	the	issue	of	the	Lord’s	Supper	in	the	short	term,	what	would	be	the	benefit	of	the	Huguenots	publically	adopting	the	Confession?		
4.6.1	The	Peace	of	Augsburg	in	France		Louis’	 insistence	that	the	Huguenots	should	subscribe	to	the	Augsburg	Confession	was	part	of	a	new	strategy	that	was	becoming	increasingly	popular	among	the	German	Protestant	princes.		In	1563,	Zweibrücken’s	council	 also	 advocated	 ‘that	 in	 France	 a	 religious	 peace	 may	 be	established,	 similar	 to	 that	 in	 Germany,	 following	 the	 formula	 of	 the	Religious	 Peace,	 that	 from	 the	 Recess	 of	 the	 year	 [15]55	 will	 be	translated	 in	 the	 French	 and	 Latin	 languages	 …’ 75 	This	 statement	echoed	the	comments	of	a	number	of	German	nobles	who	also	believed	that	 the	 success	 of	 the	Peace	 of	Augsburg	 could	be	 replicated	outside	the	Empire.76	Various	historians	have	highlighted	this	proposal.	Hugues	Daussy,	for	instance,	writes	that	Wilhelm	of	Hesse,	the	Elector	Palatine,	and	 Chistoph	 of	 Württemberg	 in	 the	 summer	 of	 1561	 intended	 ‘to	suggest	the	establishment	in	France	of	a	religious	peace	similar	to	that	which	 had	 been	 put	 into	 effect	 in	 the	 Empire.’77	However,	 historians	have	 never	 unravelled	 the	 exact	 nature	 and	 possible	 consequences	 of	this	 idea.	 This	 is	 probably	 because	 evidence	 of	 explicit	 discussions	 of	
																																																								74	‘sich	zur	den	Augspurgischen	Confesion	begeben’	Ibid,	p.	47.		75	‘…	das	man	inn	Frankreich	einen	Religion	frieden,	gleich	dem	Teutschen	uffrichten	sole,	nach	der	formula	des	Religion	friedens,	die	auß	dem	Reichsabschiedt	anno	55	in	
gallicam	&	latinam	linguam	 transferiert	…’	Resolution	of	 the	council	of	Zweibrücken,	August	1563,	HStASt,	A	71	Bü	920,	56	a.		76	Friedrich	III	to	Philip	of	Hesse,	16	September	1561,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	
Frommen	…	Volume	I,	pp.	200-201.		77	Daussy,	Le	Parti	Huguenot,	393.		
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this	idea	remains	elusive.	Expressions	of	the	notion	seem	to	have	been	limited	 to	 brief	 remarks,	 such	 as	 the	 single	 sentence	 from	 the	 pen	 of	Zweibrücken’s	 council	 quoted	 above.	 Nonetheless,	 I	 will	 try	 to	reconstruct	 the	underlying	 assumptions	 that	 led	 a	number	of	German	princes,	 including	 Zweibrücken,	 Nassau,	 and	 Hesse,	 to	 believe	 that	 a	settlement	 in	the	mould	of	 the	Peace	of	Augsburg	could	be	possible	 in	France.	
	
4.6.2	 Theoretical	 underpinnings	 of	 a	 Peace	 of	 Augsburg-style	
solution		The	proposals	to	 introduce	the	Peace	of	Augsburg	 in	France	rested	on	two	 important	 assumptions.	 First,	 it	 was	 informed	 by	 the	 Lutheran	conviction	 that	Reformed	Protestantism	was	 intrinsically	 seditious.	 In	contrast	to	Christoph	of	Württemberg,	Louis	of	Nassau,	and	Wilhelm	of	Hesse	did	not	see	the	promotion	of	the	Augsburg	Confession	in	France	as	a	goal	 in	 itself,	but	rather	as	a	means	to	an	end.	They	believed	that	such	a	move	could	take	some	of	the	viciousness	out	of	the	conflict,	not	only	 by	 ending	 the	 damaging	 and	 escalating	 tensions	 within	Protestantism,	but	also	by	quelling	the	socially	subversive	tendencies	of	some	 Protestants.	 Following	 from	 this,	 they	 assumed	 that	 a	 united,	orderly,	 and	 socially	 conservative	 form	 of	 Protestantism	 could	 be	accepted	 much	 more	 easily	 by	 the	 Catholic	 powers	 of	 Europe.78	In	 a	letter	written	 to	Louis	of	Nassau	 in	1566	(during	 the	aftermath	of	 the	Wonderjaar)	Wilhelm	of	Hesse	argued	that			 it	 would	 be	 very	 good	 if	 the	 preachers	 in	 these	 places	 [the	Netherlands]	were	admonished	to	abstain	from	subtle	disputes	and	do	not	 split	 up	 the	 Christian	 Church	with	 such	 bickering;	 that	 also	 they	collectively	 subscribe	 to	 the	 Augsburg	 Confession	 and	 in	 compliance	with	it	keep	to	its	doctrines	and	ceremonies;	if	the	same	also	publish	a	public	 confession,	 then	 we	 have	 little	 doubt	 that	 it	 will	 significantly	
																																																								78	Daussy,	Le	Parti	Huguenot,	471.		
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halt	the	…	persecution,	and	also	will	move	the	King	of	Spain	to	tolerate	the	religion	in	these	places.79			William	of	Orange	agreed.	In	September	1566	he	remarked			 ‘that	 since	 so	 many	 religions	 have	 arisen	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 namely	[that	of]	 the	Augsburg	Confession,	 the	doctrines	of	Calvin,	and	also	…	the	Anabaptists	…,	 it	 is	most	 to	be	 feared	that	 the	King’s	Majesty	and	the	 other	 Catholic	 princes	 and	 lords,	 using	 the	 pretext	 of	 all	 these	sects,	will	repress	these	lands	with	violence.’80			Orange	 thus	 directly	 linked	 disunity	 among	 Protestants	with	 Catholic	violence,	 arguing	 that	 the	 sectarianism	 of	 some	 movements	 could	legitimise	 Catholic	 persecution.	 Although	 the	 former	 phrased	 it	 in	positive	and	 the	 latter	 in	negative	 terms,	both	Hesse	and	Orange	 thus	bought	 into	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 unification	 of	 Protestantism	 under	 the	umbrella	 of	 the	 Augsburg	 Confession	 could	 reduce	 the	 dangers	 of	persecution.	Louis	of	Nassau	concurred.	When	he	anticipated	a	future	in	which	Protestants	in	France	would	be	‘untroubled	by	Catholics’,	he	did	not	 imply	 the	 complete	 destruction	 or	 disappearance	 of	 the	 Catholic	religion	 in	France,	but	rather	a	situation	 in	which	Protestantism	could	enjoy	 some	 form	 of	 official	 or	 legal	 recognition,	 protecting	 it	 from	Catholic	 aggression.	 As	 a	 skilled	 and	 experienced	 diplomat,	 Louis	 of	
																																																								79	‘…	were	 sehr	 guett	das	die	predicanten	dere	örtter	 ermhanett	wurdenn	vonn	den	subtilen	disputationibus	 abzustehen	undt	durch	 solch	 gezenck	die	Christliche	Kirche	nitt	 zu	 trennen;	 das	 sie	 auch	 sämbtlich	 sich	 zue	 der	 Augspürgischenn	 Confeszion	erclertt	 undt	 derselben	 gemez,	 beid	 inn	 Lher	 undt	 Ceremonien,	 sich	 verhieltten;	deszenn	 auch	 ein	 öffentliche	 Confeszion	 lieszen	 ausgehen,	 so	 trugenn	 wir	 keinen	zweiffel	es	wurde	der	…	verfolgung	…	viell	nachbleibenn,	sich	auch	die	Kön.	Wür.	zue	Hispanien	desto	ehir	bewegen	laszen	die	religion	der	örtter	zu	tollerieren	…’	Wilhelm	of	 Hesse	 to	 Louis	 of	 Nassau,	 13	 October	 1566,	 G.	 Groen	 van	 Prinsterer,	Archives	ou	
Correspondance	Inédite	d’Orange-Nassau,	Volume	II	(Leiden:	Luchtmans,	1835):	p.	392.		80	‘Dan	 dieweill	 in	 dieszen	 länden	 so	 mancherley	 relligionen	 zugleich	 endtstanden	weren,	 nemblich	 die	 Augspürgische	 Confeszion,	 Calvini	 lehr,	 und	 auch	 …	 der	wiederthauff	…	so	were	ahm	meisten	zu	beförchten	das	die	Kön.	Mat.	und	ander	Irer	relligion-verwandte	 Fürsten	 und	 Herren,	 underm	 schein	 der	 mancherley	 secten,	dieszen	landen	mit	gewalt	zu	setzen	…’	William	of	Orange	to	Louis	of	Witgenstein,	20	September	1566,	Ibid,	p.	300.		
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Nassau	worked	hard	 to	achieve	such	an	accommodation.81	Both	 in	 the	Netherlands	and	in	France,	where	he	moved	in	the	entourage	of	Jeanne	d’Albret,	Louis	worked	towards	a	legal	compromise	that	could	end	the	violence	between	Catholics	and	Protestants.82	 Although	 Louis	 took	part	 in	 various	 military	 campaigns	 (and	 perished	 at	 the	 Battle	 of	Mookerheyde	 in	1574),	he	realised	that	 the	use	of	violence	could	only	have	 a	 limited	 effect.83	With	 the	 chances	 of	 a	 religious	 reconciliation	also	quickly	diminishing,	a	 legal	construction	following	the	example	of	Augsburg	became	a	more	attractive	proposition.84	The	 second	 assumption	 relates	 to	 the	 role	 of	 the	 nobility.	 It	 is	important	 to	 re-emphasise	 here	 that	 the	 Peace	 of	 Augsburg	 did	 not	create	 or	 promote	 a	 form	 of	 religious	 tolerance,	 or	 even	 a	 religiously	diverse	 society.	 Rather,	 it	 divided	 the	 Empire	 into	 a	 patchwork	 of	smaller	 jurisdictions	 that	 for	 the	 most	 part	 only	 allowed	 one	 official	religion.	 Herein	 lay	 the	 greatest	 difficulty	 in	 translating	 the	 Peace	 of	Augsburg	 to	a	French	or	Dutch	context.	 Surely,	 the	princes	must	have	known	 that	 the	 strict	 application	 of	 the	 legal	 principles	 of	 the	 Peace	would	 make	 France	 entirely	 Catholic.	 The	 Cuius	 Regio,	 Eius	 Religio	principle,	 which	 granted	 the	 Ius	 Reformandi	 only	 to	 princes	 and	Imperial	Free	Cities,	decided	the	religion	of	the	territories	and	cities	of	the	 Empire.	 Due	 to	 the	 more	 centralised	 nature	 of	 sovereignty	 in	France,	it	would	logically	follow	from	this	that	the	right	to	reform	was	exclusively	vested	in	the	monarchy,	which	so	far	remained	Catholic.	The	differences	between	the	political	constitution	of	the	Empire	and	France	thus	 made	 it	 impossible	 to	 directly	 copy	 the	 format	 of	 the	 Peace	 of	Augsburg.	For	all	their	promotion	of	this	solution,	there	is	no	evidence	of	 any	 concrete	 discussion	 of	 how	 the	 princes	 thought	 the	 Peace	 of	Augsburg	could	be	translated	to	a	French	context.	
																																																								81	P.	J.	van	Herweden,	Het	Verblijf	van	Lodewijk	van	Nassau	in	Frankrijk,	Hugenoten	en	
Geuzen,	1568-1572,	(Assen:	Van	Gorcum,	1932):	pp.	82-104.		82	Blok,	Lodewijk	van	Nassau,	pp.	56-92.		83	Ibid,	pp.	116-117.		84	Ibid,	p.	46.	
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I	 believe	 that	 when	 speaking	 of	 introducing	 the	 Peace	 of	Augsburg	 in	 France,	 the	 German	 princes	 envisaged	 a	 settlement	 in	which	 the	 most	 influential	 noble	 families	 should	 have	 the	 right	 and	opportunity	 to	 introduce	an	 institutionalised	Lutheran	Reformation	 in	their	territories.	This,	they	believed,	could	end	seditious	and	disorderly	manifestations	 of	 religious	 zeal	 and	 instead	 create	 princely	reformations	 in	 the	 German	 mould.	 Such	 a	 set-up	 fitted	 well	 in	 the	political	 and	 religious	 climate	 of	 the	 early	 1560s:	 it	 spoke	 to	 deep-seated	 concerns	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 aristocratic	 independence,	conformed	 to	Lutheran	understandings	of	 the	religious	role	of	 secular	magistrates,	 and	 fitted	within	 the	 legal	 framework	 already	 in	place	 in	France.	The	ongoing	attempts	by	the	nobility	of	Europe	to	consolidate	or	extend	 their	 power	 in	 the	 face	 of	 growing	 royal	 authority	 strongly	informed	 this	solution.	Discussions	concerning	 the	prerogatives	of	 the	nobility	dominated	much	of	the	political	discourse	of	the	mid-sixteenth	century.	 In	 France,	 the	 traditional	 nobility	 jealously	 guarded	 its	privileges.85	Faced	 with	 the	 dangers	 of	 an	 expansion	 of	 royal	 power,	political	 encroachment	 by	 the	noblesse	de	 robe,	 and	 competition	 from	rival	 aristocratic	 families,	 the	 high	 nobility	 in	 word	 and	 action	frequently	asserted	and	reasserted	its	independent	power.86	In	the	Low	Countries,	members	of	the	high	nobility	became	increasingly	concerned	by	 Habsburg	 attempts	 to	 centralise	 the	 political	 structure	 of	 the	country.	 Besides	 the	 controversial	 Pragmatic	 Sanction,	 a	 plan	 to	reorganise	 the	 region’s	 bishoprics	 caused	 a	 stir	 among	 the	 grands	
seigneurs.87	The	polemic	used	by	the	League	and	the	Compromise	–	two	aristocratic	associations	created	in	opposition	to	Habsburg	overreach	-																																																									85	L.	 Romier,	 Les	 Origins	 Politiques	 des	 Guerres	 des	 Religion,	 Volume	 II,	 (Geneve:	Slatkine-Megariotis	Reprints,	1974):	p.	283.		86	R.	A.	Jackson,	‘Peers	of	France	and	Princes	of	the	Blood’,	French	Historical	Studies,	7	(1971):	27-46;	 J.	Dewald,	The	European	Nobility,	1400-1800,	 (Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	 Press,	 1996):	 pp.	 15-59;	 G.	 R.	 Asch,	 Nobilities	 in	 Transition	 1550-1700,	
Courtiers	and	Rebels	in	Britain	and	Europe,	(London:	Arnold,	2003):	pp.	101-103.		87	P.	Arnade,	Beggars,	 Iconoclasts	and	Civic	Patriots,	The	Political	Culture	of	the	Dutch	
Revolt,	(Ithaca:	Cornell	University	Press,	2008):	pp.	58-59.		
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closely	resembled	the	language	used	by	the	German	princes	to	describe	their	conflict	with	the	Emperor	in	the	1550s.	The	princes	studied	in	this	thesis	 were	 themselves	 deeply	 invested	 in	 the	 struggle	 for	 the	protection	 of	 the	 rights	 of	 the	 nobility.	 Furthermore,	 in	 line	 with	Luther’s	writings	on	the	religious	responsibilities	of	the	magistrate,	the	princes	 considered	 themselves	 the	 natural	 custodians	 of	 the	Reformation	in	the	Empire.	They	took	this	responsibility	very	seriously,	playing	 leading	 roles	 in	 the	 reformation	 of	 their	 territories.	 In	 this	atmosphere	 of	 aristocratic	 independence	 and	 noble	 control	 over	religious	reform	it	 is	not	strange	that	the	German	princes	advocated	a	central	role	for	the	French	nobility.	More	importantly,	there	was	a	legal	foundation	on	which	such	a	model	could	be	built.	In	contrast	with	the	Edict	of	Saint	Germain,	which	had	a	strong	focus	on	the	urban	dimension	of	French	Protestantism,	the	Edict	of	Amboise,	which	ended	the	First	War,	was	strongly	seigneurial	in	character.	Whereas	Saint	Germain	made	provisions	 for	 the	worship	by	 urban	 communities,	 Amboise	 restricted	 Protestant	 worship	 to	 the	households	 of	 the	 nobility.	88	As	 a	 result	 of	 this,	 control	 of	 French	Protestantism	shifted	from	the	cities	to	the	aristocracy	and	the	private	chapels	of	noblemen	became	a	focal	point	of	French	Protestantism	after	1563.	 In	 fact,	 the	 right	 of	 Protestant	 worship	 on	 noble	 lands	 was	recognised	 in	 the	 1563	 religious	 peace	 of	 Amboise.	 This	 brought	 the	French	 Reformation	 more	 in	 line	 with	 the	 other	 European	Reformations,	which	had	eventually	been	taken	over	by	an	aristocratic	leadership.	 In	 effect,	 the	 contours	 of	 the	 solution	 advocated	 by	Zweibrücken	 and	 other	 German	 princes	 were	 already	 in	 place.	Moreover,	there	was	no	reason	to	assume	that	such	a	settlement	would	not	last.	After	all,	the	Catholic	Habsburg	Emperor	had	accepted	a	similar	settlement	and	the	kings	of	France	had	long	been	well	disposed	to	the	leaders	 of	 Germany’s	 orderly	 princely	 reformations.	 Despite	 its	supposed	 temporary	 nature,	 the	 Peace	 of	 Augsburg	 was	 strongly	supported	 by	 most	 German	 Protestant	 princes.	 It	 allowed	 them	 to	implement	 their	 reformations	 without	 the	 immediate	 danger	 of																																																									88	Kaplan,	Divided	by	Faith	p.	186;	Turchetti,	‘Middle	parties,	pp.	172-173.	
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Catholic	 aggression.	 Moreover,	 a	 settlement	 in	 which	 the	 French	aristocracy	 was	 given	 the	 right	 to	 reform	 fitted	 within	 their	 wider	political	agenda,	was	rooted	in	Lutheran	doctrine,	and	was	compatible	with	legislation	already	in	place	in	France.	The	popularity	of	the	idea	of	expanding	this	settlement	to	include	France	was	thus	more	logical	than	it	seems.	
	
4.7	The	Second	and	Third	Wars		The	outbreak	of	war	in	1567	opened	a	new	phase	in	discussions	about	the	 future	of	 France.	 In	 the	 years	between	Naumburg	 and	 the	 Second	War	it	had	become	clear	that	neither	reconciliation	on	the	basis	of	the	Augsburg	Confession	nor	a	settlement	similar	to	the	Peace	of	Augsburg	were	feasible.	Despite	the	princes’	defence	of	the	merits	of	the	Augburg	Confession,	 their	 appeals	 had	 fallen	on	deaf	 ears.	Both	 the	Huguenots	and	 the	Catholic	 leadership	 had	 repeatedly	 declared	 that	 they	 had	no	interest	 in	 embracing	 Lutheranism.	 The	 Edict	 of	 Amboise,	 which	 had	enjoyed	 broad	 support	 among	 the	 German	 princes,	 too	 had	 failed	 to	prevent	further	bloodshed.	This	led	some	to	reconsider	their	visions	for	the	future	of	France.	Moreover,	the	horrors	of	war	and	the	prospect	of	the	 destruction	 of	 Protestantism	 in	 France	 made	 a	 new	 solution	 a	pressing	 necessity.	 Because	 of	 the	 urgency	 of	 the	 situation,	 many	princes	 now	 openly	 considered	 solutions	 that	 were	 previously	unthinkable.			
4.7.1	German	calls	for	tolerance	in	France		With	reconciliation	out	of	 the	question	and	a	rapprochement	between	Lutherans	 and	 Calvinists	 increasingly	 unlikely,	 a	 number	 of	 German	princes	 started	 to	 advocate	 religious	 tolerance.	One	of	 the	most	 vocal	advocates	 of	 tolerance	 was	 Friedrich	 of	 the	 Palatinate.	 In	 November	1567	he	argued	in	a	letter	to	the	Bishop	of	Rennes	that			
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if	 [his	Majesty]	wishes	 to	have	and	maintain	his	kingdom	 in	peaceful	repose	 and	 secure	 and	 permanent	 unity	 …	 and	 …	 does	 not	 want	 to	witness	a	horrible	…	conflict,	desolation,	and	ultimately	the	ruin	of	his	kingdom,	 then	 it	 is	necessary	 to	advice	him	…	to	abolish	 the	horrible	persecutions	 and	 spilling	 of	 the	 blood	 of	 innocent	 Christians	 of	 the	Reformed	 religion,	 and	 following	 the	 example	 of	 Germany	…,	 liberty	should	be	given	to	all	to	preach	…	the	pure	word	of	God.89			Friedrich	 thus	 presented	 freedom	 of	worship	 as	 a	 pressing	 necessity,	and	 the	 only	 way	 to	 avert	 certain	 disaster.	 Other	 pleas	 for	 the	introduction	 of	 freedom	 of	 worship	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	correspondences	 of	 a	 number	 of	 other	 Protestant	 German	 princes.	Johann	 Casimir,	 Friedrich’s	 son,	 wrote	 to	 the	 King	 in	 January	 1558,	urging	him	to	‘grant	to	your	subjects	who	are	of	the	Reformed	Religion	…	 liberty	 and	 the	 exercise	 of	 their	 religion.’90	He	 added	 in	 a	 different	letter	 from	 the	 same	 month	 that	 by	 ensuring	 the	 Huguenots	 the	‘conservation	and	security	of	honour,	goods,	and	life,	they	are	prompted	(as	 loyal	 subjects	 are	 required	 to	 do)	 to	 place	 body	 and	 goods	 under	your	command.’91	The	advantages	of	a	policy	of	 freedom	of	worship	were	twofold.	Not	only	could	it	return	France	to	peace	and	tranquillity,	it	also	opened	up	 the	 door	 for	 the	 further	 spread	 of	 Protestantism.	 Friedrich	 and	his	Reformed	 son	 Johann	 Casimir	 of	 course	 hoped	 that	 the	 Reformed	Religion	would	establish	an	even	stronger	foothold	in	France	as	a	result	of	 a	 prolonged	 period	 of	 freedom	 of	 worship.	 Toleration	 for	 Johann																																																									89	‘si	 sa	 [Majesté]	 desire	 d’avoir	 &	 maintenir	 en	 son	 Royaulme	 paix	 repose	 et	 unie	seure	…	et	…	ne	vouldroit	veoir	une	horrible	et	esponantable	…	desolation,	et	par	fin	la	ruine	 de	 son	 Royaulme,	 qu’il	 est	 necessaire	 d’y	 aviser	 …	 abolier	 les	 horribles	persecutions	&	effusions	de	sang	des	chrestiens	innocens	de	la	religion	refformee,	et	suivant	l’example	de	la	germanie	…,	liberté	soit	donnee	a	un	chascon	de	prescher	…	la	pure	parole	de	Dieu.’	 Friedrich	 III	 to	 the	Bishop	of	Rennes,	 3	November	1567,	BNF,	15918,	f.	27-42.		90	‘Octroyer	 a	 vos	 subiects	qui	 sont	de	 la	Religion	Reformee	…	 liberte	 et	 exercise	de	leur	religion.’	Johann	Casimir	to	Charles	IX,	6	January	1568,	BNF,	15918,	f.	162.		91	‘conservation	et	seurete	de	leurs	honneurs,	biens,	et	vies:	quilz	sont	promtz	(comme	loyaux	 subjects	 sont	 tennuz)	demployer	 corps	et	biens	 soubz	vre	 obeissance.’	 Ibid,	 f.	154-155.		
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Casimir	also	had	attractions	closer	to	home.	For	the	German	Lutherans,	however,	 the	hope	was	 that	 in	 a	 relatively	open	and	 tranquil	 religious	environment	 Lutheranism	 could	 start	 to	 make	 headway	 in	 France.	Wilhelm	 of	 Hesse	 in	 December	 1571	 called	 it	 ‘a	 Christian	 duty’	 to	promote	 religious	 freedoms,	 even	 for	 those	 who	 ‘misunderstand	 one	article	or	another’,	‘so	that	after	that	we	can	endeavour	that	the	King	will	in	due	course	be	won	for	the	Religion	and	that	thus	the	realm	of	Christ	might	 be	 expanded.’92	Due	 to	 these	 advantages,	 the	 introduction	 (or	maintenance)	 of	 limited	 religious	 freedoms	 in	 France	 became	 the	preferred	 option	 for	 many	 German	 princes,	 especially	 during	 the	 late	1560s	and	early	1570s.	In	1571,	August	of	Saxony	brought	together	the	most	 influential	 Protestant	 princes	 (Palatinate,	 Saxony,	 Brandenburg,	Hesse,	Braunschweig,	and	Württemberg)	to	pressure	the	King	of	France	into	 maintaining	 the	 ‘Edict	 of	 Religion’	 (Peace	 of	 Saint-Germain-en-Laye).93	By	1571,	 the	 consensus	amongst	 the	German	princes	was	 that	the	Edicts	-	and	the	religious	liberties	that	they	protected	-	represented	the	best	chance	of	restoring	order	and	tranquillity	in	France.	German	 advocates	 of	 religious	 liberties	 were	 strengthened	 in	their	 convictions	 by	 the	 existence	 of	 legislation	 that	 allowed	 various	levels	 of	 freedom	of	 conscience	or	 freedom	of	worship	 in	 France.	 Like	the	 Edict	 of	 Saint-Germain	 (January	 1562)	 and	 the	 Edict	 of	 Amboise	(March	 1563),	 the	 Peace	 of	 Saint-Germain-en-Laye	 (August	 1570)	allowed	for	limited	freedom	of	worship.94	Though	these	edicts	were	only	intended	 to	be	 temporary	compromise	solutions,	 they	provided	a	 legal	precedent	for	tolerant	policies	in	France	and	were	repeatedly	invoked	in																																																									92 	‘Christenpflicht’	 ‘in	 dem	 einen	 oder	 anderen	 Artikel	 ein	 Misverständnis	 seen	möchte’	 ‘so	 wie	 darnach	 zu	 streben,	 das	 der	 König	 mit	 der	 Zeit	 für	 die	 Religion	gewonnen	 und	 damit	 das	 Reich	 Christi	 gemehrt	 werde.’	Wilhelm	 of	 Hesse	 to	 Erich	Volkmar	von	Berlepsch,	3	December	1571,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	
Volume	II,	p.	431-432.		93	‘den	Häusern	Pfalz,	Sachsen,	Brandenburg,	Hesse,	Braunschweig	und	Würtemberg’	‘Religionsedict’	 Opening	 statement	 of	 the	 meeting	 of	 the	 meeting	 of	 German	Protestant	 princes,	 12	 December	 1572,	 Kluckhohn,	 Briefe	 Friedrich	 des	 Frommen	…	
Volume	II,	pp.	428-429.		94 	M.	 P.	 Holt,	 The	 French	 Wars	 of	 Religion,	 1562-1629,	 (Cambridge:	 Cambridge	University	Press,	1995):	pp.	8-75.		
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the	letters	of	the	German	princes.	The	Landgrave	of	Hesse,	for	instance,	wrote	 to	 Charles	 IX	 in	 September	 1568:	 ‘I	 think	 that	 the	 strict	observation	[of	the	edicts]	is	especially	in	these	times	the	only	means	by	which	…	your	majesty	can	return	your	subjects	to	their	…	obedience	and	maintain	 your	 kingdom	 in	 tranquil	 peace	 …’95	The	 existence	 of	 these	‘edicts	 of	 toleration’	 added	 great	 strength	 to	 their	 arguments.	Conveniently	 ignoring	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 were	 half-hearted	 affairs	granting	the	Huguenots	severely	limited	forms	of	religious	freedom,	the	princes	 argued	 that	 their	 calls	 for	 freedom	 of	 conscience	were	 not	 an	innovation,	 but	 merely	 the	 maintenance	 of	 legislation	 that	 already	existed.	 In	 line	 with	 much	 of	 the	 Huguenot	 propaganda	 published	 in	Germany	in	the	1560s,	it	is	assumed	that	the	cause	of	the	crisis	in	France	was	not	the	Huguenot	demands	for	religious	freedoms,	but	rather	ultra-Catholic	 resistance	 to	 the	 royal	 edicts	 granting	 them	 these	 freedoms.	The	 edicts	 thus	 allowed	 French	 and	 German	 advocates	 of	 freedom	 of	worship	 to	 present	 themselves	 as	 the	 voice	 of	 conservatism	 and	moderation	and	as	defenders	of	the	power	of	the	monarchy.	
	
4.7.2	Religious	tolerance	in	the	principality	of	Orange		Of	 all	 the	 princes	 studied	 in	 this	 thesis,	William	 of	 Orange	 was	most	famous	 for	promoting	 tolerance.	By	1569,	Orange	had	become	closely	involved	in	the	conflict	in	France	(see	Chapter	VI).	Around	this	time,	the	prince	wrote	repeatedly	about	the	nature	of	the	conflict	and	its	possible	solutions.	 His	 comments	 are	 disappointingly	 unoriginal.	 In	 a	 letter	 to	the	Duke	of	Saxony,	written	in	July	1569,	Orange	echoes	the	simplistic	tone	 of	many	 pro-Huguenot	 pamphlets.	 He	 argues	 that	 the	 conflict	 is	caused	by	the	 fact	 that	 ‘the	poor	Christians’	are	being	 ‘robbed	of	 their	
																																																								95	‘que	le	stricte	observation	iceulx	est	principalement	en	ce	lemps	y	le	seul	moyen	par	laquel	 …	 vre	 mare	 peut	 retenir	 ses	 subjects	 en	 leur	 …	 obeisance	 et	 maintenir	 sond	royaume	en	paix	tranquil	…’	Wilhelm	of	Hesse	to	Charles	IX,	6	September	1568,	BNF,	15608,	f.	199-200.		
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religion.’96	Orange	added	that	he	believed	‘that	all	prominent	lords	have	advised	 the	 crown	 of	 France	 [to	 restore]	 peace,	 and	 unity,	 and	 the	freeing	of	the	Religion.’97	For	an	observer	with	a	seemingly	keen	eye	for	the	 practical	 dimensions	 of	 religious	 policy,	 this	 statement	 is	 rather	vague.	Orange’s	public	statements	of	intent	in	relation	to	France	are	no	more	 developed.	 In	 August	 1568,	 the	 prince	 signed	 a	 treaty	with	 the	Huguenot	leaders	Condé	and	Coligny.	The	public	announcement	of	the	treaty	 uses	 a	 language	 that	 very	 closely	 resembles	 the	 Huguenot	polemic	 that	had	been	rolling	off	 the	printing	presses	since	1562.	The	text	 of	 the	 treaty	 laments	 the	 actions	 of	 evil	 ‘councillors’	 whose	‘intention	it	is	to	exterminate	the	true	religion	and	also	the	nobility’	in	order	 to	 ‘enlarge	 their	dominion.’98	It	 adds	 that	 the	 ‘Christian	alliance’	has	been	established	for	‘the	glory	of	God,	the	benefit	and	service	of	our	King,	and	 the	public	good,	and	 the	 freedom	of	 religion,	without	which	we	cannot	 live	 in	peace.’99	Although	 ‘freedom	of	religion’	 is	mentioned	as	a	necessary	prerequisite	for	a	lasting	peace,	it	is	nowhere	explained	what	 exactly	 such	 freedom	of	 religion	would	 entail.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	such	an	explanation	it	remains	a	somewhat	hollow	phrase.	The	best	insight	into	the	prince’s	vision	for	the	future	of	France	is	 provided	 by	 the	 example	 of	 the	 religious	 policies	 introduced	 in	 his	principality	of	Orange	in	southern	France.	The	principality,	just	north	of	Avignon	 in	 Provance,	 had	 been	 the	 basis	 of	 William’s	 international	prestige	 since	 he	 inherited	 it	 from	 his	 uncle	 in	 1544.	 However,	 its	isolated	 location	 far	 away	 from	 Orange’s	 other	 possessions	 ensured																																																									96	‘armen	 Christen’	 ‘der	 Religion	 beraubt	 werden’	 William	 of	 Orange	 to	 August	 of	Saxony,	19	July	1569,	Blok,	Correspondentie	van	en	Betreffende	Lodewijk	van	Nassau,	p.	80.		97 	‘das	 alle	 vornehme	 herrn	 der	 khron	 Frankreich	 zu	 friede	 und	 einigkeit	 und	freylassung	der	Relligion	gerathen	haben	…’	Ibid,	p.	81.		98	‘conseilliers’	‘leur	intention	est	d’exterminer	la	vraye	religion	et	aussy	la	noblesse’	…	‘agrandir	 leurs	 dominations’	 Treaty	 between	 Orange,	 Condé,	 and	 Coligny,	 August	1568,	 G.	 Groen	 van	 Prinsteren,	 Archives	 ou	 Correspondance	 Inédite	 de	 la	 Maison	
d’Orange-Nassau,	Volume	III,	1567-1572,	(Leiden:	Luchtmans,	1836):	p.	284.		99	‘alliance	Christienne’	 ‘la	gloire	de	Dieu,	 le	profict	et	service	de	nos	Roys,	et	 le	bien	publicq,	et	la	liberté	de	la	religion,	sans	laquelle	nous	ne	pouvons	vivre	en	paix.’	Ibid,	p.	284.		
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that	 for	 much	 of	 his	 life	 the	 prince	 did	 not	 gain	 much	 from	 the	principality	 apart	 from	 his	 title.	 For	 a	 brief	 period,	 however,	 the	Orange-Nassau	 family	 did	 gain	 control	 over	 the	 principality	when	 the	Peace	of	Saint-Germain-en-Laye	stipulated	that	it	had	to	be	returned	to	its	rightful	lord.100	This	gave	Orange	the	opportunity	to	dictate	policy	in	the	 principality.	 The	 pursuit	 of	 independent	 religious	 policy	 in	territories	with	sovereign	status	inside	the	Kingdom	of	France	was	not	unheard	 of.	 Henri	 Robert	 de	 la	 Marck,	 for	 instance,	 in	 the	 1560s	exploited	 the	 independence	 of	 his	 strategically	 located	 principality	 of	Sedan	 in	 order	 to	 make	 it	 a	 safe	 haven	 for	 Huguenots.101	As	 in	 the	Empire,	the	ambiguities	of	sovereignty	allowed	de	la	Marck	and	Orange	to	implement	policies	that	contravened	those	of	the	Kingdom.	Louis	of	Nassau,	 who	 spent	 the	 years	 1568	 to	 1572	 in	 France,	 was	 the	 ideal	person	to	see	to	the	execution	of	the	prince’s	policies	in	Orange.102	In	many	ways,	 the	 principality	 of	 Orange	 resembled	 France	 in	microcosm.	 It	 was	 positioned	 in	 the	 Midi,	 which	 was	 a	 hotbed	 of	Huguenot	 activity,	 and	 consequently	 was	 home	 to	 a	 sizable	 and	influential	Protestant	population.	However,	Orange	was	also	located	in	the	middle	 of	 the	 Comtat	 Venaissin,	 a	 region	 surrounding	 the	 city	 of	Avignon	 that	 fell	directly	under	papal	 jurisdiction.	The	presence	of	an	influential	 Protestant	 party	 in	 an	 area	 dominated	 by	 Catholic	authorities	 set	 the	 stage	 for	 recurrent	outbreaks	of	 religious	 violence.	The	 council	of	 the	 city	of	Orange	 in	a	 letter	 to	Louis	 spoke	of	 ‘infinite	internal	 enmities,	 the	 ones	 against	 the	 others’,	 which	 polluted	 social	relations	 within	 the	 principality.103	The	 council	 therefore	 suggested	that	 only	 a	 clean	 break	 with	 the	 past	 could	 lead	 to	 a	 stable	 peace.	Moreover,	they	insisted	that	the	official	introduction	of	Protestantism	in	
																																																								100	van	Herweden,	Het	Verblijf	van	Lodewijk	van	Nassau	in	Frankrijk,	p.	198.		101	S.	Hodson,	‘Politics	of	the	frontier:	Henri	IV,	the	Marechal-Duc	de	Bouillon	and	the	sovereignty	of	Sedan’,	French	History,	19	(2005):	413-439,	on	p.	419.		102	Blok,	Lodewijk	van	Nassau,	pp.	56-92.		103	‘infinies	inimities	intestines	des	ungs	contre	les	aultres.’	van	Herweden,	Het	Verblijf	
van	Lodewijk	van	Nassau	in	Frankrijk,	p.	199.		
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Orange	should	happen	‘without	prejudice	against	and	hindrance	of	the	Roman	Catholic	religion.’104	Realising	that	a	solution	in	which	one	of	the	two	religions	would	be	excluded	was	not	 feasible,	Louis	of	Nassau,	with	 the	consent	of	his	brother,	 introduced	 in	 1571	 a	 policy	 that	 aimed	 to	 ‘reunite	 [the	inhabitants	of	Orange]	in	concord	and	stable	friendship	as	members	of	one	 and	 the	 same	 body.’105	The	 policy	 that	 was	 developed	 by	 Louis	rested	 on	 two	 principles.106	The	 first	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 relatively	 far-reaching	 form	of	 religious	 tolerance.	 Although	 no	mention	 is	made	 of	radical	 sects	 (the	document	 speaks	 in	 terms	of	 two	 religions,	Catholic	and	Protestant),	the	inhabitants	of	Orange	were	granted	the	same	rights	and	privileges	regardless	of	their	religion.	In	Louis’	plans,	Catholics	and	Protestants	 were	 given	 the	 right	 to	 worship,	 maintain	 ecclesiastical	institutions,	 and	 participate	 in	 public	 functions	 and	 offices.	Moreover,	outsiders	were	welcome	to	settle	 in	Orange	and	could	expect	 to	enjoy	the	 same	 rights.	 Secondly,	 the	 past	 ‘troubles’	 were	 to	 be	 forgotten.	Those	 who	 lost	 possessions	 during	 the	 troubles	 were	 to	 be	compensated	 and	 the	 continuation	 of	 disputes	 from	 the	 time	 of	 the	troubles	were	 strictly	 forbidden,	 as	was	 the	 use	 of	 inflammatory	 and	provocative	 language.	 Louis	 thus	 attempted	 to	 make	 a	 fresh	 start	 in	Orange,	neutralising	old	enmities	and	creating	a	 tranquil	environment	in	which	a	tolerant	religious	policy	could	succeed.	Due	 to	 the	many	parallels	between	 the	situation	 in	Orange	and	that	in	France	as	a	whole	it	is	safe	to	assume	that	the	Nassau	brothers	envisaged	a	similar	solution	for	the	entire	country.	Moreover,	the	policy	in	 Orange	 in	 many	 ways	 foreshadows	 the	 Religievrede	 Orange	attempted	 to	 introduce	 in	 the	 Netherlands	 in	 the	 late	 1570s.	 The	problem	was,	however,	that	it	failed	miserably.	A	mere	seventeen	days	after	 the	 implementations	 of	 Louis’	 religious	 policies	 in	 Orange,	 the																																																									104	‘sans	preiudice	et	empechement	de	la	religion	Catholicque	et	Romaine’	Ibid,	p.	199.		105	‘reunir	en	concorde	et	amitie	stable	comme	membres	d’ung	mesme	corps.’	Ibid,	p.	200.		106	Ibid,	pp.	200-204.		
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principality	descended	 into	chaos,	 leading	 to	 the	killing	of	Protestants	known	as	la	massacreuse.107	The	failure	of	religious	tolerance	in	Orange	fits	 into	 a	wider	pattern.	 In	 their	 attempts	 to	 formulate	 a	 solution	 for	the	 violence	 in	 France,	 the	 German	 princes	 were	 time	 and	 again	confronted	 by	 reality	 on	 the	 ground.	 The	 solutions	 presented	 by	 the	princes	 were	 therefore	 as	 much,	 if	 not	 more,	 shaped	 by	 what	 was	deemed	realistic	and	feasible	as	by	idealism.		
4.8	Protestant	loyalists		The	 three	 solutions	 discussed	 above	 reflect	 the	 dominant	 opinions	amongst	 most	 German	 Protestant	 princes	 studied	 in	 this	 thesis.	Between	1560	and	1572,	their	opinions	in	many	cases	progressed	from	favouring	complete	religious	reconciliation,	via	a	model	resembling	the	Peace	 of	 Augsburg,	 to	 calls	 for	 freedom	 of	 conscience	 or	 freedom	 of	worship.	All	 three	solutions	have	in	common	that	they	provide	for	the	preservation	 of	 the	 ‘true	 religion’.	 Another	 alternative,	 however,	 has	largely	been	overlooked.	 Its	distinguishing	feature	 is	 that	 it	placed	the	protection	 of	 the	 political	 and	 social	 order	 above	 the	 promotion	 of	doctrinal	 purity.	 Stuart	 Carroll	 has	 recently	 demonstrated	 that	 a	significant	 proportion	 of	 France’s	 evangelical	 princes	 did	 not	 join	 the	Huguenot	 party.	 Instead,	 these	 ‘Protestant	 loyalists’	 often	 fought	against	their	coreligionists.108	It	is	tempting	to	interpret	this	position	as	pragmatic	or	un-ideological.	However,	it	has	to	be	remembered	that	an	emphasis	on	the	God-given	authority	of	the	monarchy	can	be	found	in	both	 Lutheran	 and	 Reformed	 thought.	 Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 both	Lutheranism	 and	 Reformed	 Protestantism	 tentatively	 developed	theories	of	resistance,	a	strand	of	thought	also	existed	in	both	traditions	that	 underlined	 loyalty	 to	 the	 monarch	 as	 a	 sacred	 obligation,	 even	when	 the	 monarch	 belonged	 to	 a	 different	 religion.	 Both	 in																																																									107	Ibid,	pp.	205-207.		108	S.	 Carroll,	 ‘”Nager	 entre	 deux	 eaux”:	 The	 princes	 and	 the	 ambiguities	 of	 French	Protestantism’,	The	Sixteenth	Century	 Journal,	 44	 (2013):	 985-1020,	 on	 pp.	 991	 and	997.	
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contemporary	 public	 opinion	 and	 in	 much	 of	 the	 historiography	individuals	 whose	 political	 engagement	 did	 not	 seem	 to	 match	 their	confessional	 identity	 have	 often	 been	 dismissed	 as	 Nicodemites,	opportunists,	or	hypocrites.	These	labels,	however,	are	misleading	since	they	do	not	reflect	the	profundity	of	their	commitment	to	their	duties	as	subjects	and	magistrates.			
4.8.1	 Johann	 Wilhelm	 of	 Saxe-Weimar	 and	 the	 preservation	 of	
monarchical	power		Johann	 Wilhelm	 of	 Saxe-Weimar	 has	 often	 been	 described	 as	 a	hypocrite	who	prioritised	personal	political	and	financial	concerns	over	loyalty	to	either	his	faith	or	the	Empire.	His	longstanding	service	to	the	kings	of	France	and	his	role	as	mercenary	captain	in	the	French	Catholic	forces	 have	made	him	 infamous	 for	 being	 an	 adventurer	 and	political	opportunist.	 Although	 a	 desire	 for	 adventure	 and	 the	 expectation	 of	financial	 reward	 could	 well	 have	 featured	 amongst	 his	motivations,	 I	believe	it	is	too	simple	to	dismiss	his	motives	as	purely	cynical.	Instead,	I	will	argue	that	 Johann	Wilhelm’s	position	should	be	approached	 in	a	similar	fashion	as	the	Protestant	loyalists.		 Like	 the	 Protestant	 loyalists,	 the	 Duke	 of	 Saxe-Weimar	 was	driven	by	a	concern	for	the	preservation	of	order	and	stability	and	by	a	sense	of	loyalty	to	the	French	royal	family,	who	he	served	for	more	than	a	decade.	Although	his	association	with	the	King	of	France	complicated	his	relationship	with	Emperor	Maximilian	II,	he	continued	to	profess	his	loyalty	 to	 the	Emperor.	 This	 social	 and	political	 conservatism	merged	with	 his	 deeply	 orthodox	 interpretation	 of	 Lutheranism	 to	 shape	 his	vision	 for	 the	 future	of	France.	This	vision	 is	reflected	 in	 the	 language	he	used	when	writing	about	the	Wars	of	Religion.	Rather	than	referring	to	 the	French	Protestants	as	 ‘Christians’,	as	was	common	amongst	 the	German	 princes,	 Johann	 Wilhelm	 adopted	 the	 vocabulary	 of	 Catholic	polemicists.	In	a	letter	to	Charles	IX	from	January	1568	he	lamented	‘the	great	predicament	of	 the	 affairs	of	Your	Majesty’	 adding	 that	 ‘as	 loyal	servant’	 he	 was	 committed	 to	 ‘secure	 and	 protect	 your	 crown’	 by	
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‘supressing	 the	 rebels.’109	In	April	 1569	he	 reasserted	his	 intention	 to	‘establish	 a	 good	 and	 lasting	 peace’	 by	 supressing	 the	 Huguenots.110	Johann	Wilhelm	 thus	 saw	 the	 suppression	 of	 the	Huguenot	 faction	 as	the	 best	way	 of	 achieving	 peace	 in	 France.	 The	Duke	 of	 Saxe-Weimar	also	 felt	 the	 necessity	 to	 explain	 his	 understanding	 of	 the	 Wars	 of	Religion	publicly.	In	a	pamphlet	published	in	1568	he	asserted	that:		 Although	 we	 are	 now	 noticing,	 that	 for	 some	 time	 here	 and	 there,	among	 high	 and	 low	 estates,	 clerical	 and	 secular	 persons,	 in	 the	Empire	of	 the	German	nation,	also	amongst	 the	members	of	our	 true	Christian	religion,	similarly	amongst	our	own	subjects	and	associates,	there	 are	 all	 sorts	 of	 contradicting	 opinions	 concerning	 the	 current	warlike	 uproar	 in	 France,	 in	 particularly	 it	 is	 being	 said,	 that	 [the	conflict]	…	is	about	the	Christian	religion,	and	its	suppression,	we	can	give	 this	 [rumour]	no	 credence	…	 Instead	we	have	 learned,	 from	 the	account,	 given	 to	us	by	 the	King’s	Majesty,	 and	on	 top	of	 that	 from	a	large	 number	 of	 decrees,	 which	 the	 King’s	 Majesty	 had	 published	during	 the	growing	unrest	…	and	 then	…	had	 called	out	publicly	 and	which	came	to	us	first	 in	French	and	then	in	the	German	language	…,	that	 it	 is	 purely	 a	 rebellion	 …,	 which	 has	 been	 put	 in	 place	 by	 the	subjects	against	the	authority	established	by	God.111																																																									109	‘grande	 necessity	 des	 affaires	 de	 vre	 mate’	 ‘comme	 fidele	 serviteur’	 ‘secourir	 sa	couronne	et	 la	maintenir’	 ‘reprimer	 les	Rebelles’	 Johann	Wilhelm	of	Saxe-Weimar	 to	Charles	IX,	10	January	1568,	BNF,	15544:	f.	49-50.		110	‘faire	une	bonne	&	perdurables	paix’	Johann	Wilhelm	of	Saxe-Weimar	to	Charles	IX,	24	April	1569,	BNF,	15549:	f.	149.		111	‘Wiewol	wir	nun	vermercken/	Dass	 jetziger	zeyt	hin	und	wider/	bey	hohes	unnd	nidrigen	 Standes	Geistlichen	und	Weltlichen	Personen/	 im	Reich	Deutscher	Nation/	auch	 bey	 den	 Verwandten	 unserer	 waren/	 Christlichen	 Religion/	 Dessgleichen	 bey	unsern	 selbst	 unterthanen/	 und	 zugehörigen/	 von	 allerhand	 ungleicher	meinunge/	jetzigen	 Frantzöschischen	Kriegs	 empörunge/	 Sonderlich	 aber	 davon	 geredet	wird/	Ob	es	…	umb	die	Christliche	Religion/	und	derselben	vertrückunge/	zu	thun	sey/	So	können	wir	 doch	 demselben	 keinen	 glauben	 zusetzen/	…	 So	 haben	wir	 doch/	 auss	dem	 bericht/	 welche	 uns	 die	 Kön.	 W.	 derwegen	 thun/	 und	 darüber	 auss	 etzlichen	vielen	 Mandaten/	 die	 ire	 Kön.	 Wirde/	 unter	 entstandener	 unruhe…	 unnd	 denn	 …	aussruffen	 lassen/	 Die	 uns	 in	 Französischer/	 und	 dann	 in	 die	 deutsche	 Sprach	 …	zukommen	 …	 vernommen/	 dass	 es	 ein	 lauter	 Rebellion	 …	 sey/	 Welche	 von	 den	unterthanen/	gegen	ire	von	Gott	geordente	Obrigkeit/	…	angestellet	wirdet/’	 Johann	Wilhelm	 of	 Saxe-Weimar,	 Ausschreiben.	 Des	 Durchlauchtigen	 Hochgebornen	 Fürsten	
unnd	 Herrn,	 Herrn	 Johans	Wilhelmen	Hertzogen	 zu	 Sachssen.	 An	 seiner	 F.	 G.	 Getrewe	
Landschafft	 von	 Prelaten,	 Graffen,	 Herrn,	 Ritterschafft	 und	 Stedte,	 Seiner	 F.	 G.	 jtzigen	
zugs	 in	 Franckreich,	 unnd	 warumb	 die	 Könnigliche	 Wirde	 doselbst	 Seine	 F.	 G.	 Auff	
sonderbare	 benentliche	 ausziehunge	 unnd	 vorbehaltunge	 derselben	 Dienstbestallunge,	
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		 Johann	Wilhelm’s	perspective	on	the	troubles	in	France	was	also	shaped	 by	 his	 unusually	 strict	 Lutheran	 orthodoxy.	 Like	 many	 of	 his	peers,	 the	 Duke	 was	 a	 driving	 force	 behind	 the	 reformation	 of	 his	territories.	The	title	page	of	Saxe-Weimar’s	official	theology,	the	Corpus	
Doctrinae	Christianae,	underlines	the	religious	 importance	of	 the	Duke	by	stating	that	 the	doctrines	presented	are	 those	that	 Johann	Wilhelm	‘through	the	grace	of	God	harmoniously	professed	and	taught.’112	This	is	again	 illustrated	 on	 page	 two,	 where	 we	 find	 a	 portrait	 of	 the	 Duke	encircled	 by	 the	 text:	 ‘Lord	 govern	 me	 through	 Thy	Word.’113	Johann	Wilhelm	also	issued	legislation	in	his	duchy	outlawing	the	preaching	of	anything	 but	 ‘the	 prophetic	 and	 apostolic	 writings	 of	 the	 Augsburg	Confession	 as	 presented	 to	 the	 Emperor	 in	 the	 year	 1530	 [not	 the	
Variata	 edition],	 together	 with	 the	 its	 apologies,	 the	 Schmalkaldic	Articles,	 Doctor	 Martin	 Luther’s	 blessed	 books	 and	 our	 Christian	 …	Confutations’.114	Johann	Wilhelm’s	university	at	Jena	was	the	epicentre	of	Gnesio-Lutheran	activity	and	the	theologians	in	his	service	espoused	a	deeply	conservative	version	of	Lutheranism,	which	was	highly	critical	of	 Philippism	 let	 alone	 of	 Reformed	 Protestantism.	 Johann	Wilhelm’s	commitment	to	the	Gnesio-Lutheran	agenda	made	him	much	less	likely	to	 sympathise	 with	 the	 Huguenots	 than	 his	 Philippist	 peers	 in	 Hesse	and	(to	a	lesser	extent)	Zweibrücken.	Johann	Wilhelm	of	Saxe-Weimar’s	commitment	 to	 the	 preservation	 of	 monarchical	 power	 in	 France,																																																																																																																																														
auch	Ehren	unnd	Glimpffs	wegen	nicht	vorlassen	können	(Weimar:	s.	n.,	1568):	f.	3	v	–	f.	4	r.		112	‘durch	Gottes	gnade	eintrechtig	bekant	und	geleret	wird’	Anon.,	Corpus	Doctrinae	
Christianae,	Das	ist	Summa	der	Christlichen	lere/	aus	den	Schrifften	der	Propheten	und	
Aposteln/	 sein	 Kurtz/	 rundt/	 und	 gründlich	 D.	 Martinum	 Lutherum	 sonderlich/	 und	
andere	dieser	Lande	Lerer	zusamen	gefasset.	Die	dieselbige	in	unser	von	Gottes	gnaden	
Johans	Wilhelm/	Hertzogen	zu	Sachssen/	Landgraffen	 in	Thüringen/	und	Marggraffen	
zu	 Meissen/	 Fürstenthumen	 und	 Landen/	 durch	 Gottes	 gnade	 eintrichtig	 bekant	 und	
geleret	wird,	(Jena:	Donatum	Kirchtzenhau,	1571),	f.	1	v.		113	‘Her	Regier	Mich	Durch	Dein	Wordt’	Ibid,	f.	2	v.		114	‘Prophetischen	und	Apostolischen	Schrifften	Augsburgischen	Confession	Rom.	Kai.	May.	 Anno	 1530	 ubergeben,	 sampt	 derselben	 Apologien	 den	 Schmalkaldischen	Artikeln	 Doctoris	 Martini	 Lutheri	 seligen	 Büchern	 und	 unsern	 Christlichen	 …	Confutation.’	 Declaration	 by	 Johann	 Wilhelm	 of	 Saxe-Weimar,	 16	 January	 1568,	ThHStA	A	195,	Bl.	185	r.	
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together	 with	 his	 deeply	 rooted	 prejudice	 against	 Reformed	Protestantism,	made	 it	 possible	 for	 him	 to	 endorse	 the	 agenda	 of	 the	Catholic	 party	 in	 France.	 In	 this	 he	 closely	 resembles	 the	 Protestant	loyalists.	 He	 too	 believed	 that	 the	 best	 solution	 for	 the	 troubles	 in	France	was	the	crushing	of	the	Huguenot	‘rebellion’	that	he	considered	the	root	of	the	problem.		
4.9	Conclusion		During	 the	 twelve	 years	 between	 the	 Naumburg	 Convention	 and	 the	Saint	Bartholomew’s	Day	Massacre	the	Protestant	princes	of	the	Empire	developed	four	distinct	solutions	for	the	troubles	in	France.	On	the	eve	of	the	Wars	of	Religion,	they	were	largely	in	agreement	about	what	was	to	 be	 done.	 Assuming	 a	 lack	 of	 familiarity	 with	 Lutheran	 doctrines	among	French	Catholics	 and	Huguenots,	 they	 concluded	 at	Naumburg	that	 the	 expounding	 of	 the	 theology	 of	 the	 Augsburg	 Confession	 was	likely	to	win	over	the	French.	Lutheranism,	they	argued,	could	serve	to	bridge	 the	 gap	 between	 Catholicism	 and	 Reformed	 Protestantism.	 At	the	 Colloquy	 of	 Poissy,	 this	 proposal	 was	 on	 the	 table	 but	 was	emphatically	rejected.	The	failure	of	Poissy	 led	a	number	of	princes	to	consider	 alternative	 solutions.	 Inspired	by	 the	 success	of	 the	Peace	of	Augsburg	in	the	Empire,	they	discussed	the	possibility	of	introducing	a	similar	 settlement	 in	 France.	 Christoph	 of	Württemberg,	Wolfgang	 of	Zweibrücken,	Wilhelm	of	Hesse,	and	Louis	of	Nassau	assumed	that	the	respectable	 Lutheran	 religion	 was	 easier	 to	 accept	 for	 Catholic	monarchs	than	socially-subversive	Reformed	Protestantism.	Moreover,	they	were	encouraged	by	the	Edict	of	Amboise,	which,	like	the	Peace	of	Augsburg,	 placed	 the	 right	 to	 reform	 firmly	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 the	aristocracy.	 The	 prospects	 of	 this	 solution	 were	 hampered	 by	 the	Huguenots’	 continued	 disinterest	 in	 Lutheran	 doctrine	 and	 by	 the	outbreak	of	war	again	in	1567.		After	1567,	the	need	for	a	speedy	end	to	the	violence	in	France	led	 many	 princes	 to	 consider	 a	 policy	 of	 religious	 tolerance.	 The	Reformed	Elector	 Palatine	 and	 his	 son	 Johann	Casimir	were	 the	most	
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ardent	 advocates	 of	 religious	 freedoms	 for	 the	Huguenots.	 They	were	soon	joined	by	a	number	of	Lutherans,	including	the	princes	of	Saxony,	Hesse,	 Brandenburg,	 and	 the	 new	 Duke	 of	 Württemberg.	 Their	advocacy	 of	 religious	 tolerance	 was	 made	 easier	 by	 the	 existence	 of	various	French	‘edicts	of	toleration’.	These	made	it	possible	to	promote	tolerant	policies	and	at	the	same	time	defend	royal	authority.	The	most	concrete	 expression	 of	 German	 calls	 for	 tolerance	 in	 France	 was	 the	introduction	 of	 religious	 freedoms	 in	 the	 principality	 of	 Orange.	 In	Orange,	 Louis	 of	 Nassau	 attempted	 to	 break	 the	 vicious	 circle	 of	religious	violence	and	to	encourage	good	neighbourliness.	The	example	of	 Orange	 revealed	 the	 limitations	 of	 tolerance	 as	 the	 community	descended	 into	 violent	 conflict	 only	 weeks	 after	 the	 policy	 was	introduced.			 The	 German	 Protestant	 princes	were	 not	 always	 in	 agreement	about	what	was	to	be	done	in	France.	Instead	of	religious	tolerance,	the	strictly	 Lutheran	 Johann	 Wilhelm	 of	 Saxe-Weimar	 advocated	 the	destruction	 of	 the	 Huguenot	 ‘rebels’.	 The	 attitude	 of	 Johann	Wilhelm	resembles	 the	 position	 of	 Protestant	 loyalists	 in	 France,	 who	 also	regarded	 the	 preservation	 of	 royal	 authority	 as	more	 important	 than	the	spread	of	Protestantism.	This	position	was	a	practical	expression	of	the	doctrine	that	royal	authority	was	divinely	ordained	and	needed	to	be	 obeyed	 at	 all	 times.	 Moreover,	 Johann	 Wilhelm’s	 intense	 hostility	towards	 Reformed	 Protestants	 fuelled	 his	 conviction	 that	 the	Huguenots	were	a	destructive	force	that	needed	to	be	eradicated.		 These	 four	 German	 solutions	 for	 the	 turmoil	 in	 France	 were	shaped	 by	 a	 number	 of	 different	 influences.	 First	 and	 foremost,	 they	were	the	product	of	the	intellectual	and	religious	climate	of	the	1560s	and	 depended	 heavily	 on	 theoretical	 discussions	 of	 concepts	 such	 as	religious	 plurality,	 obedience,	 tolerance,	 and	 reconciliation.	 Secondly,	they	were	informed	by	the	princes’	own	experiences	in	the	Empire,	and	in	particular	their	experience	of	dealing	with	religious	conflict.	Finally,	the	 reality	 of	 the	 conflict	 in	 France	 forced	 the	 German	 princes	repeatedly	to	reconsider	their	solutions.	The	impact	of	events	in	France	
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and	 beyond	 on	 the	 attitudes	 of	 the	 German	 Protestant	 princes	 was	considerable,	as	will	be	demonstrated	in	the	next	chapter.	
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V.		 The	Catholic	Conspiracy		German	 perspectives	 on	 the	 French	Wars	 of	 Religion	were	 to	 a	 large	extent	 shaped	 by	 domestic	 events.	 Their	 own	 experiences	 of	 dealing	with	 the	 consequences	 of	 religious	 plurality	 informed	 the	 German	princes’	 visions	 for	 the	 future	 of	 France.	 However,	 they	 were	 also	influenced	 by	 developments	 abroad.	 By	 far	 the	most	 influential	 event	occurred	close	at	hand:	the	outbreak	of	unrest	in	the	Netherlands	in	the	summer	of	1566	and	subsequent	response	of	the	Habsburg	authorities	resonated	strongly	among	German	Protestants.	Talk	of	an	international	Catholic	Conspiracy	designed	to	roll	back	the	Reformation	and	restore	Catholic	 dominance	 circulated	 in	 Protestant	 circles	 and	 grew	 in	strength	 in	 the	 years	 after	 1566.	 Instances	 of	 Catholic	 violence	throughout	 Europe	 fed	 these	 fears	 and	 strengthened	 the	 position	 of	those	advocating	international	Protestant	solidarity.		 This	 chapter	 will	 demonstrate	 how	 the	 prophecies	 of	propaganda	 seemed	 to	 be	 fulfilled	 and	 a	 wider	 belief	 in	 the	 struggle	between	 good	 and	 evil	 began	 to	 influence	 the	 Rhineland	 princes’	attitudes	 to	 the	 French	 Wars	 of	 Religion.	 After	 summarising	 the	chronology	 of	 the	 quick	 escalation	 of	 religious	 tensions	 in	 the	Netherlands	and	France	in	1566	and	1567,	it	will	be	demonstrated	that	these	 new	 developments	 proved	 to	 be	 a	 turning	 point	 in	 German	understandings	 of	 the	 French	 Wars	 of	 Religion.	 In	 these	 years,	 the	Catholic	 Conspiracy	 dominated	 discussions	 about	 France.	 Moreover,	after	1566,	the	princes	of	the	Empire	were	subjected	to	a	second	wave	of	 Huguenot	 diplomacy	 and	 a	 large	 number	 of	 anonymous	 German	pamphlets	 on	 the	 subject	 of	 the	 Conspiracy	 were	 published.	 This	chapter	will	explore	the	ways	in	which	the	Conspiracy	was	discussed	in	diplomacy,	 in	 print,	 and	 among	 their	 German	 audiences.	Moreover,	 it	will	 be	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 narrative	 created	 a	 new	 atmosphere	amongst	 the	 German	 Protestant	 princes.	 This	 new	 sense	 of	 the	
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connectedness	of	religious	conflict	throughout	Europe	opened	the	door	for	German	intervention	in	the	French	Wars	of	Religion.		
5.1	The	tumultuous	years	1566	and	1567		In	the	spring	of	1566,	a	crisis	in	the	Netherlands	set	in	motion	a	series	of	 events	 that	more	 than	 ever	 proved	 the	 transnational	 nature	 of	 the	French	Wars	of	Religion.	In	April	of	that	year,	the	slumbering	tensions	in	 the	Netherlands,	which	were	 caused	 by	 a	 combination	 of	 religious,	constitutional,	 and	 economic	 grievances,	 boiled	 over. 1 	After	 the	initiatives	 of	 the	 country’s	 grands	 seigneurs	 to	 soften	 the	 anti-heresy	laws	and	curtail	 the	power	of	 the	hated	Cardinal	Granvelle,	a	group	of	minor	 noblemen,	 calling	 themselves	 the	Compromise,	 took	matters	 in	their	own	hands.2	On	5	April	a	group	of	around	200	noblemen	marched	through	Brussels	and	presented	a	petition	to	the	governess	Margaret	of	Parma.	 Alarmed	 by	 this	 show	 of	 force,	 Margaret	 conceded	 to	 their	demands	and	temporarily	suspended	the	heresy	placards.3	Rather	than	safeguarding	 peace	 and	 tranquillity,	 this	 concession	 gave	 Protestants	the	courage	to	profess	their	religion	publically.	During	the	tumultuous	summer	 that	 followed,	 large	 congregations	 of	 Protestants,	 often	protected	by	armed	guards,	gathered	publically	to	listen	to	sermons.4	In	August,	 iconoclastic	 riots	 broke	 out	 in	 many	 cities	 across	 the	 Low	Countries,	including	Antwerp	and	Amsterdam.		 The	 Catholic	 backlash	 that	 followed	 set	 in	 motion	 a	 series	 of	events	 that	radically	changed	German	perceptions	of	 the	French	Wars																																																									1	J.	 I.	 Israel,	 The	 Dutch	 Republic,	 Its	 Rise,	 Greatness,	 and	 Fall,	 1477-1806	 (Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1995):	pp.	129-154.		2	H.	van	Nierop,	‘A	Beggars’	Banquet:	The	Compromise	of	the	Nobility	and	the	Politics	of	Inversion’,	European	History	Quarterly	21	(1991):	419-443.		3	H.	van	Nierop,	‘The	nobility	and	the	Revolt	of	the	Netherlands:	Between	church	and	king,	and	Protestantism	and	privileges’,	 in	P.	Benedict,	G.	Marnef,	H.	van	Nierop,	and	M.	 Venard	 (eds.),	 Reformation,	 Revolt	 and	 Civil	 War	 in	 France	 and	 the	 Netherlands	
1555-1585,	(Amsterdam:	Royal	Netherlands	Academy	of	Arts	and	Sciences,	1999):	pp.	83-97,	on	p.	92.		4	A.	Duke,	Dissident	 Identities	 in	 the	Early	Modern	Low	Countries,	 (Farnham:	Ashgate,	2009):	pp.	179-197.		
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of	Religion.	Enraged	by	the	blatant	breakdown	of	order	and	flaunting	of	the	law,	Philip	II	in	the	spring	of	1567	dispatched	the	Duke	of	Alba	with	a	force	of	around	10,000	soldiers	to	the	Netherlands.5	Alba’s	force	made	use	of	the	so-called	Spanish	Road,	an	established	route	that	connected	the	 Habsburg	 territories	 in	 Spain,	 northern	 Italy,	 the	 Franche-Comté,	and	the	Netherlands	(see	Figure	7).6	This	route	not	only	brought	Alba’s	troops	uncomfortably	close	to	France,	but	also	to	the	territories	of	the	princes	studied	in	this	thesis.	The	proximity	of	the	hated	Duke	of	Alba	and	his	large	force	of	veterans	sent	a	wave	of	panic	through	Protestant	France.	 The	 fragile	 peace	 established	 at	 Amboise	 in	March	 1563	was	rocked	 by	 the	 breakdown	 of	 order	 just	 beyond	 France’s	 borders.	Alarmed	by	 the	prospect	of	 renewed	Catholic	violence,	Condé	decided	that	a	pre-emptive	 strike	was	necessary	 to	 remove	Charles	 IX	and	his	mother	from	the	influence	of	Catholic	courtiers.	On	28	September	1567	Condé	attempted	to	abduct	the	King	and	his	mother	from	the	castle	at	Montceaux	 in	 what	 has	 become	 known	 as	 the	 Surprise	 of	 Meaux.7		However,	 the	 scheme	 failed	 as	 the	 king	 and	 his	 mother	 narrowly	escaped.	 The	 next	 day,	 agitated	 and	 enraged	 Huguenots	 in	 Nîmes	murdered	twenty-four	Catholic	clergymen.	This	eruption	of	unrest	 led	to	the	outbreak	of	the	Second	War.		
																																																								5	Israel,	The	Dutch	Republic,	pp.	155-168.		6	G.	 Parker,	 ‘The	 Spanish	 road	 to	 the	Netherlands’,	History	Net,	 28	 September	 2012,	accessed	 4	 November	 4	 2015,	 http://www.historynet.com/the-spanish-road-to-the-netherlands.htm.		7	N.	M.	Sutherland,	Princes,	Politics	and	Religion,	1547-1589,	(London:	The	Hambledon	Press,	1984):	p.	166.	
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	Figure	7:	Route	taken	by	Alba	and	his	forces	in	1567.8		 The	 events	 of	 1566	 and	 1567	 marked	 a	 new	 phase	 in	 the	European	 religious	 conflict.	 For	 the	 first	 time,	 tensions	 in	 France,	 the	Low	 Countries,	 and	 Germany	 were	 explicitly	 linked.	 Besides	underlining	the	transnationality	of	the	conflict,	the	events	of	1566	and	1567	created	a	new	intellectual	and	emotional	climate.	As	a	result	of	the	escalation	 of	 the	 confessional	 conflict	 in	 the	 Netherlands	 and	 the	aggressive	Spanish	reaction,	distrust	and	hostility	in	France	turned	into	panic.	 Conspiracy	 theories	 that	 before	 1566	had	been	 confined	 to	 the																																																									8	Parker,	‘The	Spanish	road	to	the	Netherlands’.	
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fringes	of	public	discourse	now	came	 to	dominate	 it.	A	very	elaborate	narrative	 about	 an	 international	 Catholic	 plot	 was	 developed	 and	circulated	 widely	 both	 in	 print	 and	 in	 private	 correspondence.	 Even	among	 Europe’s	 Protestant	 elite	 the	 theory	 was	 popular.	 In	 the	 anti-Catholic	 atmosphere	 of	 the	 early	 Elizabethan	 court,	 for	 instance,	 the	theory	 thrived.	 A	 number	 of	 influential	 English	 diplomats,	 including	Nicholas	 Throckmorton,	 Francis	Walsingham,	 and	 the	 ambassador	 to	Germany	Christopher	Mont,	were	 convinced	of	 the	 truthfulness	of	 the	theory.9	This	 narrative	 was	 so	 widely	 disseminated	 and	 so	 evocative	that	 during	 the	 late-1560s	 it	 came	 to	 dominate	 discussions	 about	France.		
5.2	The	theory	of	the	Catholic	Conspiracy		The	various	narratives	of	the	Catholic	Conspiracy	that	were	developed	in	1566	and	1567	had	a	number	of	 core	elements	 in	common.	Firstly,	proponents	of	the	theory	were	convinced	that	the	individual	outbreaks	of	 religiously	 motivated	 violence	 were	 manifestations	 of	 a	 larger	Catholic	strategy.	There	was	a	strong	sense	that	the	events	unfolding	in	1566	and	1567	were	planned	in	the	highest	echelons	of	Catholic	power.	An	 anonymous	 German	 pamphlet	 from	 1568	 sums	 up	 this	 feeling,	arguing	that	 ‘It	 is	certainly	true	and	no	sensible	person	can	doubt	that	the	current	war,	which	at	this	moment	is	being	waged	in	France	and	the	Netherlands,	is	actually	by	the	Pope	designed	and	intended.’10	
																																																								9	M.	R.	Thorp,	 ‘Catholic	 conspiracy	 in	 early	Elizabethan	 foreign	policy’,	The	Sixteenth	
Century	Journal,	15	(1984):	431-448.		10	‘Es	ist	gewiszlich	war	unnd	kan	kein	verstendiger	darann	zweiffeln	/	das	der	jetzige	krieg	/	so	nun	mehr	in	Franckreich	und	Niderland	erzegt	worde[n]	/	eygendlich	dahin	von	 dem	Bapst	 gerichtet	 und	 gemeint	werde’	 Anon.,	Newe	Zeittung	von	Franckreich	
unnd	 Niderlandt.	 Christlichen	 und	 hochwichtige	 gründe	 und	 ursache[n]/	Warumb	 die	
Teutschen	 kriegsleut	 die	 Christen	 inn	 Franckreich	 und	 Niderlandt	 nicht	 verfolgen	
helffen/	 oder	 auff	 einige	 weise	 sich	 zu	 iren	 feinden	 wider	 sie	 gestellen	 sollen.	 Allen	
Ehrlichen,	unnd	Frommen	Teutschen	zu	einem	newen	Jar	geschenckt,	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1568),	f.	2	v.			
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	 Secondly,	advocates	of	the	theory	identified	precise	moments	at	which	 the	 conspirators	 developed	 and	 executed	 their	 plans.11	Some	pointed	 to	 the	 council	 of	 Trent,	 whilst	 others	 saw	 the	 1559	 Peace	 of	Cateau-Cambrésis	 as	 the	 moment	 of	 the	 plot’s	 conception. 12 	After	decades	of	Franco-Habsburg	conflicts,	the	negotiating	parties	at	Cateau-Cambrésis	justified	the	cease	of	longstanding	hostilities	by	emphasising	that	 the	 Peace	 opened	 the	 door	 to	 joint	 action	 against	 the	 Protestant	heresies.13	As	a	result,	subsequent	encounters	between	representatives	of	 the	kings	of	Spain	and	France	were	viewed	with	great	suspicion.	 In	particular,	a	meeting	that	took	place	 in	the	Pyrenees	town	of	Bayonne	in	June	1565	raised	alarm.	A	German	pamphlet	published	anonymously	in	 1569	 formulates	 the	 often-repeated	 accusation	 of	 foul	 play:	 ‘After	this	it	became	known	that	they	[Charles	IX	and	his	entourage]	had	the	intention	 of	 travelling	 to	 Bayonne	 and	 to	 visit	 the	 Queen	 of	 Spain	[Charles’	 sister	 Elisabeth].	 However,	 in	 truth	 they	 misuse	 the	 King’s	youth	and	have	as	goal	the	[Catholic]	alliance,	which	we	fear	from	this	day	 onward.’14	Due	 to	 the	 feared	 Franco-Spanish	 connection	 and	 the	contact	 between	 Alba	 and	 Catherine	 de’	 Medici	 –	 both	 regarded	 as	driving	 forces	 behind	 the	 plot	 –	 Bayonne	 soon	 came	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 a	pivotal	moment	in	the	Conspiracy’s	development.	
																																																								11	C.	P.	Clasen,	The	Palatinate	in	European	History,	1559-1660,	(Oxford:	Basil	Blackwell,	1963):	p.	9.		12	Thorp,	‘Catholic	conspiracy	in	early	Elizabethan	foreign	policy’,	p.	435.		13	L.	 Romier,	 Les	 Origins	 Politiques	 des	 Guerres	 des	 Religion,	 Volume	 II,	 (Geneva:	Slatkine-Megariotis	Reprints,	1974):	pp.	225-293.		14	‘Nach	 disem	werd	 es	 laut	 /	 das	man	nach	Baiona	 zu	 reysen	 /	 und	 die	 königin	 zu	Hispanien	zubesuchen	in	vorhabens.	Aber	 in	der	warheit	war	es	/	da	man	sich	 ihrer	Kön.	Mai.	 jugent	mißbrauchen	/	und	die	verbundtnuß	/	welcher	 furcht	man	heutigs	tags	nach	vor	augen	siehet.’	Anon.,	Frantzösischen	kriegsempörung.	Das	ist	Gründlicher	
Warhafftiger	Bericht/	von	jüngst	verschienenen	ersten	und	andern/	und	jetz	zum	dritten	
mal	 newer	 vorstehender	 kriegsempörung	 in	 Franckreich.	 Darinnen	 angezeigt	 wirdt/	
Auß	 was	 genotdrangten	 hochheblichen	 ursachen/	 die	 newen	 Reformierten	 Religions	
verwanthe/	 (wie	 man	 sie	 nennet)	 widerumb	 gegenwertige	 unvermeidliche	 Defension	
und	Nothwehre	wider	 des	 Cardinals	 von	Lottringen/	und	 seines	Angangs	der	Papisten	
unerhörte	Fridbrüchtige	verfolgung	ƒür	die	handtzunemen	getrungen.	Deßgleichen	was	
er	gestalt	obgedachter	Cardinal	durch	zerrüttung	wachsen	auff	und	zunemmen	gesucht.	
Item/	 Abschrifft	 einer	 Werbung/	 So	 der	 königin	 auß	 Engelandt	 Gesandter/	 bey	 der	
königlichen	 Würden	 in	 Franckreich	 etc.	 gethan.	 Auß	 Frantzösischer	 Sprach	 trewlich	
verdolmetschet,	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1569),	p.	43.	
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	 Thirdly,	the	theory	of	the	Catholic	Conspiracy	was	integrated	in	the	 culture	 of	 anti-Spanish	 and	 anti-Catholic	 sentiment	 that	 already	existed	 in	 Germany,	 France,	 England,	 and	 especially	 the	 Netherlands.	From	 the	1540s,	 stories	 about	 the	Spanish	 Inquisition	and	 its	horrors	not	only	circulated	in	the	Habsburg-controlled	Netherlands	but	also	in	Germany.15	Moreover,	 although	 the	 publication	 in	 England	 of	 large	bodies	 of	 ‘anti-Guise,	 anti-Jesuit,	 antipapal,	 and	 anti-Spanish’	 polemic	only	kicked	off	in	earnest	in	the	1580s,	anti-Spanish	sentiments	already	had	 deep	 roots	 in	 the	 English	 public	 imagination.16	The	 central	 role	attributed	to	Philip	 II	and	Alba	 in	 the	conception	and	execution	of	 the	Conspiracy	thus	came	as	no	surprise	to	European	Protestants.		In	 his	 article	 ‘Security	 politics	 and	 conspiracy	 theories	 in	 the	emerging	 European	 state	 system’,	 Zwierlein	 dissects	 the	 working	 of	conspiracy	theories	in	an	early	modern	context	and	identifies	a	number	of	key	characteristics	that	are	particularly	helpful	for	understanding	the	theory	 of	 the	 Catholic	 Conspiracy.	 The	 first	 useful	 premise	 is	 the	recognition	that	a	credible	theory	needs	to	be	rooted	in	real	and	visible	events:		 [Proponents	 of	 conspiracy	 theories]	 use	 the	 information	 of	 “true”	present	 and/or	 past	 facts	 such	 as	 deeds	 and	movements	 of	 political	actors	 as	 perceived	 in	 their	 newsletters,	 avvisi,	 dispatches	 and	journals,	 draw	 connections	 between	 them,	 interpret	 coincidences	 as	causalities	and	give	a	sense	to	the	whole.	The	political	project	tries	to	predict	possible	outcomes	 from	a	given	starting	situation	 if	one	adds	this	or	that	action	to	it;	it	often	outlines	a	tableau	of	different	possible	futures.	 The	 conspiracy	 theory	 gives	 an	 ex-post	 explanation	 for	 an	event	or	a	deed	showing	a	different	possible	past	 from	the	prevalent	normally	accepted	narrative	of	 that	past.	Often	this	different	possible	past	 is	 also	narrated	 to	make	a	 certain	 (mostly	 threatening)	possible																																																									15	Duke,	Dissident	Identities,	pp.	119-135.		16	L.	 Ferraro	 Parmelee,	 ‘Printers,	 patrons,	 readers,	 and	 spies:	 Importation	 of	 French	propaganda	 in	 late	 Elizabethan	 England’,	 The	 Sixteenth	 Century	 Journal,	 25	 (1994):	853-872,	on	p.	858;	 J.	Eldred,	 ‘”The	 just	will	pay	for	the	sinners”:	English	merchants,	the	 trade	 with	 Spain,	 and	 Elizabethan	 foreign	 policy,	 1563-1585’,	 Journal	 for	 Early	
Modern	Cultural	Studies,	10	(2010):	5-28,	on	p.	7.	
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future	plausible,	so	past	and	future	narratives	go	hand	in	hand.	To	be	plausible,	 the	 conspiracy	 theory	 has	 also	 to	 be	 fed	 by	 a	 good	deal	 of	“true”	and	commonly	accepted	factual	elements.17	This	interplay	between	knowable	and	imagined	realities	-	past,	present,	and	future	-	is	encased	in	a	broader	moral	or	ideological	understanding	of	the	world:		 A	 narrative	 of	 a	 possible	 past	 which	 may	 be	 believed	 becomes	 a	conspiracy	theory	when	it	contains	and	adheres	to	the	moral	judgment	that	the	event	executed	is	a	(shocking,	scandalous)	evil;	necessarily,	a	conspiracy	 theory	 can	 only	 be	 true	 or	 at	 least	 likely	 and	 believable	within	a	given	community	of	values.18		The	 prevalent	 anti-Spanish	 sentiments	 and	 fear	 for	 the	 Inquisition	served	 as	 such	 a	 moral	 underpinning	 for	 the	 theory.	 The	 linking	 of	events	 such	 as	 Bayonne	 with	 the	 Conspiracy	 plus	 the	 existence	 of	 a	framework	 in	 which	 the	 narratives	 of	 the	 Conspiracy	 fitted	 perfectly	greatly	 increased	 their	 persuasiveness.	 These	 deep-seated	 sentiments	together	the	traumatic	events	of	1566	and	1567	go	a	long	way	towards	explaining	both	the	origins	and	the	success	of	the	theory	of	the	Catholic	Conspiracy.	Historians	 have	 debated	 whether	 there	 was	 any	 basis	 to	 the	Conspiracy.19	This	 is	 not	 at	 issue	 here:	 the	 narrative	 of	 the	 Catholic	Conspiracy	and	the	disturbing	events	that	 informed	it	strongly	altered																																																									17	C.	 Zwierlein,	 ‘Security	 politics	 and	 conspiracy	 theories	 in	 the	 emerging	 European	state	system	(15th/16th	c.)’,	Historical	Social	Research,	38	(2013):	65-95,	on	p.	66.		18	Ibid,	p.	71.		19	For	an	argument	for	the	existence	of	the	Catholic	Conspiracy,	see:	N.	M.	Sutherland,	
The	Huguenot	Struggle	for	Recognition,	 (New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	1980):	p.	123.	 Malcolm	 Thorp,	 by	 contrast,	 has	 argued	 that	 the	 origins	 of	 the	 myth	 of	 the	Catholic	 plot	 lie	 in	 a	 combination	 of	 ‘Protestant	 fears	 of	 security’	 and	 ‘Catholic	fantasies:	 Thorp,	 ‘Catholic	 conspiracy	 in	 early	 Elizabethan	 foreign	 policy’,	 p.	 438.	Similarly,	 Alistair	 Duke	 has	 dissected	 the	 origins	 of	 unfounded	 Dutch	 fears	 of	 the	Spanish	Inquisition,	a	central	theme	in	the	narrative	of	the	Conspiracy:	Duke,	Dissident	
Identities,	p.	135.	For	a	discussion	of	 the	origins	of	 the	Black	Legend,	 see:	A.	Gordon	Kinder,	 ‘Creation	 of	 the	 Black	 Legend:	 literary	 contributions	 of	 Spanish	 Protestant	exiles’,	Mediterranean	Studies,	6	(1996):	67-78,	on	p.	67.	
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German	 attitudes	 to	 the	 Wars	 of	 Religion.	 This	 new	 understanding	created	 a	 climate	 in	 which	 a	 number	 of	 German	 Protestant	 princes	deemed	it	necessary	to	take	new	and	far-reaching	steps	to	influence	the	outcome	of	the	conflict	in	France.		
5.3	The	transnational	dimensions	of	religious	conflict		The	 way	 in	 which	 historians	 have	 organised	 their	 research	 strongly	shapes	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 European	 Reformation.	 Though	comparative	 studies	 have	 recently	 been	 conducted,	 the	 German	Reformation,	the	French	Wars	of	Religion,	and	the	Dutch	Revolt	all	have	their	 own	 distinct	 historiographical	 traditions.20	This	 rigid	 separation	does	 not	 reflect	 contemporary	 interpretations	 of	 the	 relationship	between	events	in	France	and	the	Netherlands.	Throughout	the	Wars	of	Religion,	 events	 in	 the	 two	 countries	 were	 explicitly	 linked.	 Already	before	 1566,	 there	 was	 a	 fear	 among	 the	 Catholic	 authorities	 that,	seeing	 the	 similarities	 between	 French	 and	 Dutch	 Calvinists,	 the	Netherlands	 would	 be	 engulfed	 in	 the	 Wars	 of	 Religion.	 As	 early	 as	August	 1560,	 Cardinal	 Antoine	 Perrenot	 de	 Granvelle,	 one	 of	 the	foremost	 Habsburg	 statesmen	 in	 the	 Netherlands,	 feared	 that	 the	religious	 unrest	 in	 France	 would	 soon	 spread	 north:	 ‘The	 religion	[Roman	 Catholicism]	 is	 lost	 in	 all	 parts	 of	 the	 Netherlands:	 it	 is	 a	miracle,	 that	 with	 such	 bad	 neighbours	 and	 the	 example	 of	 France,	there	 still	 has	 not	 been	 any	 agitation	 in	 these	 provinces.’21	When	 the	war	in	France	broke	out	in	1562,	Granvelle	once	again	emphasised	the	danger	of	 the	conflict	 spreading	 to	 the	Low	Countries,	exclaiming	 that																																																									20	H.	van	Nierop,	‘Similar	problems,	different	outcomes:	The	Revolt	of	the	Netherlands	and	 the	Wars	 of	 Religion	 in	 France’,	 in	 K.	 Davids	 and	 J.	 Lucassen	 (eds.),	 A	 Miracle	Mirrored,	 The	 Dutch	 Republic	 in	 European	 Perspective,	 Cambridge,	 Cambridge	University	Press,	1995:	pp.	26-56;	P.	Benedict,	G.	Marnef,	H.	van	Nierop,	and	M.	Venard	(eds.),	 Reformation,	 Revolt	 and	 Civil	 War	 in	 France	 and	 the	 Netherlands	 1555-1585,	(Amsterdam:	Royal	Netherlands	Academy	of	Arts	and	Sciences,	1999).		21	‘La	religion	se	perd	dans	toutes	les	parties	des	Pays-Bas:	c’est	miracle,	qu’avec	de	si	mauvais	voisins	et	l’example	de	la	France,	il	n’y	ait	encore	eu	aucune	émotion	dans	ces	provinces.’	 Antoine	 Perrenot	 de	 Granvelle	 to	 Gonçalo	 Perez,	 9	 August	 1560,	 M.	Gachard	 (ed.),	 Correspondance	 de	 Philippe	 II	 sur	 les	 Affaires	 des	 Pays-Bas,	 Volume	 I,	(Brussels:	Librairie	Ancienne	et	Moderne,	1848):	p.	191.		
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‘there	is	no	one	but	God	who	could	prevent	the	example	of	France	being	imitated	in	this	country.’22		 Protestants	 drew	 similar	 parallels	 between	 France	 and	 the	Netherlands.	The	Habsburg	administration	and	its	critics	shared	a	fear	for	the	danger	of	a	French	scenario	unfolding	in	their	territories.	During	the	 tumultuous	 summer	 of	 1566,	 William	 of	 Orange	 remarked	 in	 a	letter	to	the	dukes	of	Brunswick	and	Cleves,	the	Count	of	Schwartzburg,	and	 the	 Landgrave	 of	 Hesse	 that	 he	 feared	 that	 in	 the	Netherlands	 ‘a	similar	game	might	 just	arise	as	 for	some	years	has	been	 taking	place	with	 our	 neighbours	 in	 France.’23	As	 early	 as	 1563,	 Louis	 of	 Nassau	concluded	 that	 the	outbreak	of	 religiously	motivated	strife	 in	 the	Low	Countries	was	likely	to	lead	to	a	situation	‘worse	than	in	France’.24	Great	 similarities	 can	 also	 be	 detected	 in	 the	 language	 used	 to	describe	the	two	conflicts.	Using	tropes	that	echo	Huguenot	narratives,	the	Cardinal	of	Granvelle	was	regularly	described	as	a	Habsburg	version	of	 the	 Cardinal	 of	 Lorraine,	 complete	 with	 tyrannical	 ambitions,	 the	determination	to	exterminate	the	Reformed	Religion,	and	the	tendency	to	usurp	the	rightful	authority	of	the	native	nobility.	On	7	June	1563,	for	instance,	Louis	of	Nassau	wrote	to	Wilhelm	of	Hesse	that			the	Governess	 [Margaretha	 of	 Parma]	 because	 of	 the	 encouragement	of	 the	 red	hound	 [Granvelle]	has	 recruited	a	number	of	 regiments	of	
knechten,	 without	 the	 judgement	 and	 approval	 of	 the	 lords	 and	 the	council,	 in	my	view	to	act	sharply	and	with	violence	against	 the	poor	Christians,	against	which	the	 lords	of	 these	 lands	have	protested	that	this	 was	 done	 against	 their	 will	 and	 that	 a	 revolt	 throughout	 these	lands	would	follow	such	acts	…	In	short,	the	situation	is	such,	that	this																																																									22	‘il	n’y	a	que	Dieu	qui	pourrait	empêcher	que	l’example	de	la	France	ne	fût	imité	en	ce	pays’	Ibid,	p.	230.		23	‘…	dasz	sich	woll	eben	ein	solichs	spiell	alhier	erheben	möchte	als	von	wenig	jaren	bey	unsern	nachbarren	in	Franckreich	geweszen	…’	William	of	Orange	to	the	Duke	of	Brunswick,	the	Duke	of	Cleve,	the	Count	of	Schwartzburg,	and	the	Landgrave	of	Hesse,	31	 August	 1566,	 G.	 Groen	 van	 Prinsterer,	 Archives	 ou	 Correspondance	 Inédite	
d’Orange-Nassau,	Volume	II,	(Leiden:	Luchtmans,	1835):	p.	262.		24	‘erger	dann	 in	Frankreich’	Louis	of	Nassau	to	Wilhelm	of	Hesse,	26	 July	1563,	P.	 J.	Blok,	Correspondentie	van	en	Betreffende	Lodewijk	van	Nassau	en	Andere	Onuitgegeven	
Documenten,	Verzameld	door	Dr.	P.	J.	Blok,	(Utrecht:	Kemink	en	Zoon,	1887):	p.	10.	
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country,	 if	 God	 does	 not	 prevent	 it,	 in	 the	 same	 way	 as	 France	 will	descend	into	rebellion	and	all	this	because	of	this	red	hat.25		Comparisons	 between	 the	 situation	 in	 France	 and	 the	 Netherlands	continued	 to	 pop	up	 in	 the	 correspondence	 of	 the	German	Protestant	princes	throughout	the	1560s.	In	many	cases,	the	two	are	mentioned	in	one	 breath.	 This	 sense	 was	 reinforced	 by	 the	 tendency	 of	 militant	Calvinists	 from	 both	 countries	 to	 regard	 their	 fates	 as	 intertwined.26	Examples	of	cooperation	between	Huguenots	and	the	Dutch	rebels	are	available	in	abundance.	For	instance,	the	Sea	Beggars,	in	many	ways	the	embodiment	 of	Dutch	 resistance,	 found	 a	 base	 from	which	 to	 operate	not	only	in	England	and	Emden,	but	also	in	the	Huguenot	stronghold	of	La	Rochelle.27	As	the	conflict	unfolded	this	connection	remained	strong,	with	both	sides	offering	each	other	military	support.	Explicit	 connections	 between	 events	 in	 France	 and	 the	Netherlands	 also	 appeared	 in	 German	 print,	 especially	 after	 1566.	 It	was	not	uncommon	to	bundle	news	from	both	countries	together	in	one	pamphlet.28 	Printed	 works	 of	 polemic	 also	 regularly	 discussed	 the	turmoil	in	France	and	the	Low	Countries	together.	A	pamphlet	printed																																																									25	‘…	die	Gubernantin	durch	ahnregung	des	rothen	bluthundes	etzliche	feinlin	knechte	hat	 richten	 lassen	ohn	vonissen	unndt	verwilligung	der	herren	unndt	des	 raths,	der	meinung	 gegen	 disse	 armen	 Christen	mit	 gewalt	 unndt	 aller	 scherpf	 zu	 procediren,	dawidder	 die	 herren	 von	 dissent	 landen	 protestirt,	 das	 disser	 wider	 ihren	 willen	geschehe	unndt,	da	meuterey	 in	dissent	gantzen	 landen	drause	erfolge	…	 In	summa,	die	sachen	lasses	sich	dermassen	ahn,	das	dise	landt,	wo	es	got	nit	verhut,	Franckreich	gleich	inn	eine	afruher	gerathen	mussen	unndt	alles	durch	dissen	rothen	hut.’	Louis	of	Nassau	to	Wilhelm	of	Hesse,	7	June	1563,	Ibid,	p.	9.		26	O.	P.	Grell,	 ‘Merchants	and	ministers:	the	foundation	of	 international	Calvinism’,	 in	A.	Pettegree,	A.	Duke,	and	G.	Lewis	(eds.),	Calvinism	in	Europe,	1540-1620	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1994):	p.	267.		27	P.	J.	van	Herweden,	Het	Verblijf	van	Lodewijk	van	Nassau	in	Frankrijk,	Hugenoten	en	
Geuzen,	 1568-1572,	 (Assen:	 Van	 Gorcum,	 1932):	 pp.	 105-118;	 H.	 G.	 Koenigsberger,	‘The	organization	of	 the	 revolutionary	parties	 in	France	and	 the	Netherlands	during	the	sixteenth	century’,	The	Journal	of	Modern	History,	27	(1955):	pp.	335-351.		28	Anon.,	Newe	Zeitungen/	Ausz	Franckreich	und	Niderlanden/	Von	zwaien	treffenlichen	
Schlachten	 im	 Monat	 November	 diß	 1568.	 Jars	 gehalten/	 Als	 zwischen	 dem	 könig	 in	
Franckreich	und	den	Guisischen	an	einem/	und	dem	könig	von	Navarren/	auch	Printzen	
von	Bourbon	und	Conde	andern	thails.	Deßgleichen	zwischen	dem	Duca	von	Alba	eins/	
un[d]	Herrn	Printze[n]	 von	Uranien/	Nassaw	und	Catzelnbogen/	am	andern	 thail.	Mit	
anderm	 mehr	 so	 sich	 jedem	 ort	 und	 auff	 baiden	 seiten	 zugetragen/	 Warhafftiglich	
beschriben,	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1568).		
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in	1568	aimed	at	‘all	honest	and	pious	Germans’,	for	example,	presented	‘Christian	and	highly	 important	grounds	and	reasons	why	the	German	soldiers	 should	 not	 help	 persecute	 the	 Christians	 in	 France	 and	 the	Netherlands.’ 29 	Throughout	 the	 pamphlet,	 the	 turmoil	 in	 the	 two	countries	 is	 continually	 described	 as	 one	 event	 with	 the	 same	 set	 of	causes	and	the	same	solution.	This	understanding	of	the	connectedness	of	the	conflicts	in	various	countries	not	only	fuelled	the	theories	of	the	Catholic	 Conspiracy,	 but	 also	 made	 the	 plot	 seem	 all	 the	 more	menacing.		
5.4	The	Catholic	Conspiracy	in	French	diplomacy		After	the	flurry	of	diplomatic	activity	that	accompanied	the	Conspiracy	of	Amboise,	 the	Colloquy	of	Poissy,	and	the	outbreak	of	 the	First	War,	contact	with	 France	 died	 down	 somewhat	 during	 the	 years	 1564	 and	1565.	 The	 events	 of	 1566	 and	 1567	 led	 to	 a	 second	 wave	 of	 French	diplomacy	in	the	Empire.	The	atmosphere	of	suspicion	and	conspiracy	that	 characterised	 these	 years	 makes	 this	 phase	 much	 harder	 to	untangle.	It	will	be	demonstrated	below	how	the	theory	of	the	Catholic	Conspiracy	 provoked	 a	 second	 diplomatic	 contest	 between	 French	Catholics	and	Huguenots	in	the	Empire.	In	contrast	with	earlier	activity,	this	 phase	 was	 more	 secretive	 and,	 more	 importantly,	 much	 more	international.	 Whereas	 the	 years	 1560	 to	 1563	 were	 dominated	 by	discussions	 about	 France,	 1566	 to	 1568	 resonated	 with	 talk	 of	 a	European	conflict	that	was	slowly	unfolding.																																																													29	‘Allen	Ehrlichen	unnd	Frommen	Teütschen’	 ‘Christlichen	und	hochwichtige	gründe	und	ursache[n]	/	Warumb	die	Teütschen	kriegsleüt	die	Christen	inn	Franckreich	und	Niderlandt	nich	verfolgen	helffen	…	sollen.’	Anon.,	Newe	Zeittung	von	Franckreich	unnd	
Niderlandt.	 Christlichen	 und	 hochwichtige	 gründe	 und	 ursache[n]/	 Warumb	 die	
Teutschen	 kriegsleut	 die	 Christen	 inn	 Franckreich	 und	 Niderlandt	 nicht	 verfolgen	
helffen/	 oder	 auff	 einige	 weise	 sich	 zu	 iren	 feinden	 wider	 sie	 gestellen	 sollen.	 Allen	
Ehrlichen,	unnd	Frommen	Teutschen	zu	einem	newen	Jar	geschenckt,	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1568),	f.	1	v.	
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5.4.1	A	Protestant	diplomatic	offensive		In	March	1568,	 five	months	 after	 the	Conspiracy	of	Meaux,	Guillaume	Rabot	de	Valènes,	a	French	diplomat	 travelling	 in	Germany,	 remarked	in	a	letter	home	that			 On	 the	 eleventh	 of	 the	 last	 month	 [February]	 the	 Bishop	 of	 Speyer	encountered	 at	 Heidelberg	 my	 lord	 the	 Elector	 Palatine	 with	 a	gentleman	 sent	 by	 the	 Emperor.	 It	 is	 being	 said	 here	 amongst	 some	people	that	his	Majesty	[the	Emperor]	has	sent	the	same	[envoy]	to	the	other	 Protestant	 princes	 in	 particular	 to	 inform	 them	 that	 the	 Pope,	and	 our	 king,	 and	 King	 of	 Spain,	 and	 the	 Italian	 potentates	 have	decided	 to	 overcome	 in	 France	 those	 of	 the	 Religion	 and	 having	established	there	the	Council	of	Trent	to	make	war	on	them.30		This	anecdote	is	illustrative	of	the	way	in	which	rumours	of	the	Catholic	plot	circulated	in	German	aristocratic	circles.	In	the	absence	of	concrete	information,	discussions	of	the	Conspiracy	were	often	based	on	rumour	and	 hearsay.	 In	 this	 case,	 Valènes	 based	 his	 information	 concerning	interaction	 between	 the	 Emperor	 and	 the	 Protestant	 princes	 of	 the	Empire	 partly	 on	 conversation	 with	 the	 Bishop	 of	 Speyer	 and,	 even	more	unconvincingly,	on	 the	claims	of	a	number	of	unspecified	 locals.	As	is	typically	the	case	with	conspiracy	theories,	it	is	hard	to	distinguish	reliable	 from	 unreliable	 information.	 In	 this	 case,	 for	 example,	 the	narrative	 of	 the	 Catholic	 Conspiracy	 is	 consistent	with	 other	 sources,	but	 the	 writer	 curiously	 identifies	 the	 Emperor	 as	 the	 source	 of	 this	information.	This	unusual	element	does	not	return	 in	any	of	 the	other	letters	 or	 reports	 studied	 in	 this	 thesis.	 It	 is	 this	 combination	 of	returning	themes	and	unexpected	additions	that	characterises	much	of	the	correspondence	about	the	Conspiracy.																																																									30	‘Le	 XIe	 du	 passe	 l’Evesque	 de	 Spire	 est	 venu	 trouver	 a	 Heildelberg	 Monsieur	l’Electeur	Palatin	avec	un	seigneur	envoie	de	la	part	de	l’Empereur.	Il	se	dict	icy	entre	quelques	 uns	 que	 sa	 Maieste	 a	 envoie	 de	 mesmes	 aux	 autres	 Princes	 Protestans	 a	chascun	en	particulier	pour	les	advertir	que	la	Pape	nostre	Roy	celuy	d’Espaigne	et	les	Potentats	d’Italie	ont	delibre	estans	venis	a	bout	en	France	de	ceux	de	la	Religion	et	y	ayant	establi	le	Consile	de	Trante	de	leur	faire	la	guerre	…’	Rabot	de	Valènes	to	Pierre	de	la	Vieuville,	3	March	1568,	BNF,	15545,	f.	12-13.	
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This	 makes	 it	 difficult	 to	 discern	 where	 the	 princes	 got	 their	information	about	the	Catholic	plot	from.	In	their	correspondence,	they	often	did	not	speak	about	their	sources	of	information.	In	a	letter	from	May	1567,	 the	 time	at	which	Alba	and	his	 forces	had	 just	begun	 their	journey	north,	 the	princes	 of	 the	Palatinate,	Württemberg,	Hesse,	 and	Baden	simply	speak	of			tidings	 of	 an	 alleged	 Catholic	 alliance,	 which	 on	 the	 initiative	 of	 the	Cardinal	 of	 Lorraine	 has	 been	 established	 between	 the	 Pope,	 the	Emperor,	 the	 kings	 of	 Spain	 and	 Portugal,	 the	 dukes	 of	 Savoy	 and	Bavaria	 and	 their	 relatives	 –they	 also	 want	 to	 involve	 the	 King	 of	France	–	for	the	destruction	of	all	Lutherans	and	Huguenots.31			Especially	 characteristic	 of	 correspondence	 related	 to	 the	 Conspiracy	are	the	words	‘tidings’	and	‘alleged’.	The	princes	in	this	and	many	other	cases	 seem	 either	 unwilling	 or	 unable	 to	 disclose	 the	 origins	 of	 such	reports.	 Interesting	 too	are	 the	discrepancies	 that	can	be	 found	 in	 the	various	reports	of	the	Conspiracy.	In	this	case,	the	Cardinal	of	Lorraine	and	 not	 the	 Pope	 or	 Philip	 II	 is	 identified	 as	 the	 initiator	 of	 the	Conspiracy.	This	might	indicate	that	this	particular	version	of	the	story	originated	 in	 France,	 where	 a	 significant	 body	 polemic	 against	 the	Cardinal	was	being	produced.		Despite	 the	 covert	 and	 shadowy	 nature	 of	 the	 stream	 of	information	about	the	Conspiracy,	it	is	clear	that	these	accounts	formed	part	 of	 a	 concerted	 effort	 by	Protestants	 to	 spread	 the	 theory	widely.	The	best	example	of	the	coordinated	nature	of	this	diplomatic	offensive	is	a	hand-written	document	that	in	1567	circulated	among	Protestants	
																																																								31	‘Es	handelt	sich	um	Nachrichten	von	einem	angeblichen	Katholischen	Bündniß,	das	auf	 Anstiften	 des	 Cardinals	 von	 Lothringen	 zwischen	 dem	 Bapst,	 dem	 Kaiser,	 dem	Königen	von	Spanien	und	Portugal,	den	herzogen	von	Savoyen	und	Bayern	und	ihren	Blutsverwandten	–	auch	den	könig	von	Frankreich	wünschte	man	herein	zuziehen	–	zur	Vernichtung	aller	Lutheraner	und	Hugenotten	abgeschlossen	werden.’	The	princes	of	 the	 Palatinate,	Württemberg,	 Hesse,	 and	 Baden	 to	 the	 Elector	 of	 Saxony,	 30	May	1567,	A.	Kluckhohn	 (ed.),	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen,	Kurfürsten	von	der	Pfalz,	mit	
Verwandten	 Schriftstücken,	 Volume	 II	 (Braunschweig:	 C.A.	 Schwetschte	 und	 Sohn,	1870):	pp.	50-51.		
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throughout	 Europe.32	This	 document	 was	 said	 to	 be	 a	 transcript	 of	 a	meeting	between	Lorraine	and	Granvelle	at	which	the	Catholic	plan	was	further	 developed.	 The	 document	 provided	 an	 extremely	 detailed	insight	 into	 the	 supposed	 plan,	 including	 seventeen	 articles	 that	arranged	for	the	execution	of	the	Conspiracy	throughout	Europe.	These	articles	 included	 marriage	 arrangements	 between	 the	 major	 Catholic	families	of	Europe	 (for	 instance	 the	houses	of	Guise	 and	 the	Bavarian	branch	 of	 the	 Wittelsbachs),	 the	 (re)appointment	 of	 Catholic	individuals	 to	positions	 of	 power,	 and	 the	 expulsion	of	 the	Protestant	aristocracy	 and	 Catholic	 princes	 who	 refused	 to	 cooperate.	 This	document	was	a	 fake	and	 the	agreement	did	not	exist	but	 the	 level	of	detail	 together	 with	 the	 amount	 of	 real	 information	 about	 events	around	 Europe	 included	 in	 the	 text	 made	 it	 very	 persuasive.	 It	 was	evidently	 fabricated	by	 someone	with	access	 to	 the	 latest	 information	about	 European	 developments.	 Moreover,	 through	 networks	 of	correspondence	 the	 text	was	 disseminated	 very	widely.	 The	 text	was	widely	read	at	the	Protestants	courts	of	the	Empire	and	soon	also	came	to	the	attention	of	Catholics.33	The	document,	which	never	appeared	in	print	 and	 whose	 writer	 or	 writers	 are	 unknown,	 became	 one	 of	 the	most	discussed	texts	of	the	late-1560s.		 Though	these	news	reports	and	rumours	circulated	throughout	Protestant	Europe,	many	of	them	clearly	originated	in	the	Netherlands	and	 France.	 Protestants	 in	 these	 countries,	 who	 were	 directly	confronted	with	 the	dangers	of	Catholic	aggression,	developed	a	 large	body	of	anti-Catholic	polemic.	The	stories	that	form	the	backbone	of	the	theory	 of	 the	 Catholic	 Conspiracy	 were	 conspicuous	 in	 the	 public	discourse	 of	 these	 countries.	 Printed	 texts,	 imagery,	 songs,	 and	 even	pageantry,	 for	 instance	 the	 symbolism	 developed	 by	 the	 Beggars,	shaped	and	reflected	the	mood	among	many	Protestants	in	France	and	the	Low	Countries.34	Public	preaching,	which	had	played	a	central	role																																																									32	Zwierlein,	‘Security	politics	and	conspiracy	theories,	pp.	83-84.		33	Ibid,	84.		34	Duke,	Dissident	Identities,	pp.	137-156.	
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in	 sparking	 the	 iconoclasm	 of	 1566,	 also	 reinforced	 the	 sense	 that	Protestants	 were	 locked	 in	 an	 epic	 battle	 with	 the	 idolatrous	 and	violent	 Catholics.35	Between	 1566	 and	 1568,	 this	 type	 of	 polemic	was	much	more	intense	in	France	and	the	Netherlands	than	in	other	parts	of	Europe.	In	England,	stories	of	the	tyrannical	 intentions	of	Philip	II	and	his	Spanish	Inquisition	only	started	to	dominate	public	discourse	in	the	wake	 of	 the	 St	 Bartholomew’s	 Day	 Massacre,	 which	 brought	 large	numbers	of	Huguenot	refugees	to	the	country,	and	in	the	context	of	the	coming	of	the	Spanish	Armada	in	1588.36	Already	embroiled	in	violent	conflict	with	Catholics,	Dutch	and	French	Protestants	were	the	driving	force	 behind	 the	 development	 and	 dissemination	 of	 the	 theory	 of	 the	Catholic	 Conspiracy.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 their	 diplomatic	 initiatives,	 the	theory	 came	 to	 replace	more	 complex	 understandings	 of	 confessional	relations	among	the	German	princes.		
5.4.2	Catholic	denials		Catholic	 potentates	 around	 Europe	 were	 quick	 to	 deny	 their	involvement	 in	 the	Conspiracy.	 The	 fact	 that	 Protestant	 pamphleteers	presented	 the	 story	 of	 the	 Conspiracy	with	 so	much	detail	must	 have	surprised	Catholics,	who	were	supposed	to	be	the	architects	behind	the	plot.	 The	 fabricated	 account	 of	 the	 meeting	 between	 Lorraine	 and	Granvelle	 baffled	 and	 enraged	 many	 Catholic	 princes,	 including	 the	Emperor	 and	 the	 King	 of	 France.	 Catholics	 attempted	 to	 demonstrate	that	the	theory	was	a	fantasy.	Charles	IX	and	Catharine	de	Medici,	keen	to	 protect	 their	 good	 relations	 with	 the	 German	 Lutheran	 princes,	dispatched	 a	 number	 of	 diplomats	 to	 the	 Empire	 to	 counter	 the	Conspiracy	story.37	The	bishop	of	Rennes,	a	protégée	of	Catherine	and																																																									35	P.	 M.	 Crew,	 Calvinist	 Preaching	 and	 Iconoclasm	 in	 the	 Netherlands,	 1544-1569,	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1978):	pp.	140-181.		36	Ferraro	 Parmelee,	 ‘Printers,	 patrons,	 readers,	 and	 spies;	 J.	 Cooper,	 The	 Queen’s	
Agent,	Francis	Walsingham	at	the	Court	of	Elizabeth	I,	(London:	Faber	&	Faber,	2011):	pp.	289-325;			37	Zwierlein,	‘Security	politics	and	conspiracy	theories,	p.	84.		
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one	of	the	French	diplomats	 in	Germany,	was	unequivocal:	he	 insisted	that	 the	 rumours	 were	 ‘complete	 lies’.38	Similarly,	 the	 Württemberg	envoy	 Petrus	 Paulus	 Vergerius	 reported	 back	 from	 the	 French	 court	that	 he	 had	 been	 assured	 that	 ‘His	 Majesty	 has	 no	 intention	 to	undertake	or	initiate	anything	against	the	German	princes	with	the	King	of	 Spain,	 or	 the	 Pope,	 or	 any	 other	 person.’39	The	 need	 to	 deny	 the	existence	 of	 a	 Catholic	 plot	 had	 a	 distinctly	 political	 dimension.	 The	Protestant	 panic	 of	 1567	 and	 1568	 could	 severely	 disrupt	 Franco-German	 relations.	 As	 described	 in	 Chapters	 I	 and	 II,	 these	 ties,	which	had	 been	 cultivated	 for	 decades,	 were	 of	 strategic	 importance	 since	they	 mitigated	 the	 danger	 of	 the	 formation	 of	 an	 international	Protestant	 alliance	 and	 ensured	 French	 access	 to	 the	 Rhineland’s	mercenary	 markets.	 The	 effect	 of	 the	 emphatic	 Catholic	 denials	 was	mixed.	It	is	in	the	nature	of	conspiracy	theories	that	insistent	denials	do	little	 to	 undermine	 the	 conviction	 of	 those	who	 subscribe	 to	 them.	 In	many	ways,	Catholic	denials	confirmed	the	validity	of	the	theory	since	the	secrecy	and	covertness	of	the	Conspiracy	was	a	central	element	of	the	narrative.	Nonetheless,	 for	 those	who	were	not	quite	convinced	of	the	 validity	 of	 the	 theory,	 the	Catholic	 denials	 could	plant	 the	 seed	of	doubt.	
	
5.4.3	Evidence	
	In	 response	 to	 the	 Catholic	 denials,	 proponents	 of	 the	 theory	 of	 the	Catholic	 Conspiracy	 felt	 the	 need	 to	 add	weight	 to	 their	 argument	 by	providing	evidence.	In	the	absence	of	watertight	proof,	Friedrich	III,	the	most	avid	German	promoter	of	 the	narrative,	was	determined	to	seize	every	opportunity	to	expose	the	conspirators.	He	was	particularly	keen	to	 underline	 the	 moments	 at	 which	 the	 Catholic	 conspirators																																																									38	‘eitel	Unwarheit’	August	of	Saxony	to	Friedrich	III,	31	December	1567,	Kluckhohn,	
Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	II,		p.	160.		39	‘Es	hetten	 I.	K.	M.	nie	 in	sin	genomen,	das	sie	etwas	mit	dem	konig	aus	hispanien,	dem	 papst	 und	 eynichem	 menschen	 wider	 die	 Teutschen	 fursten	 anfahren	 oder	anstiften	 wolten	 …’	 Report	 of	 Peter	 Paul	 Vergerius’	 audience	 with	 Charles	 IX,	 14	November	1567,	Ibid,	p.	130.		
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themselves	admitted	their	aggressive	anti-Protestant	agenda.	He	wrote	to	Württemberg	in	November	1567	that	‘indeed	the	Duke	of	Guise	and	his	 followers	 [demonstrated	 in]	 the	horrific	and	pitiful	actions	carried	out	in	Vassy	and	other	places	and	also	in	their	public	writings,	in	which	they	 explained	 themselves	 expressly,	 that	 they	 have	 the	 intention	 to	eradicate	our	true	Christian	religion.’40	When	responding	to	the	theory	of	 the	 Catholic	 Conspiracy,	 the	 Catholic	 leadership	 of	 France	 faced	similar	difficulties	as	during	 the	First	War,	when	 they	 felt	 the	need	 to	present	 contrasting	 narratives	 to	 different	 audiences.	 The	 emphatic	denials	 presented	 above	 lost	 much	 of	 their	 force	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	aggressive	 anti-Protestant	 rhetoric	 that	 was	 dominating	 public	discourse	in	France.	Moreover,	the	popular	violence	against	Huguenots	that	 erupted	 throughout	 France	 together	with	 the	 repressive	 policies	introduced	 in	 the	 Netherlands	 seemed	 to	 confirm	 the	 ferocity	 of	 the	Catholic	wish	 to	exterminate	Protestantism.	Thus	 in	 the	eyes	of	many	Protestants	 the	narrative	was	at	 the	 same	 time	denied	and	 confirmed	by	Catholics.		 These	 statements	 and	 instances	 of	 violence	 by	 themselves	 did	not	 prove	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 coordinated	 plan.	 Therefore,	 the	 Elector	wasted	no	time	in	exploiting	every	scrap	of	news	that	could	indicate	the	workings	of	the	Catholic	Conspiracy.	In	February	1568,	when	the	effects	of	 Alba’s	 rule	 in	 the	 Netherlands	 were	 becoming	 visible,	 he	 wrote	 to	August	of	Saxony:		 In	good	faith	I	cannot	keep	from	you	that	I	have	learned	from	a	certain	and	reliable	source	[that	 the	pope	 intends]	 to	gather	 from	merchants	in	 Italy	 and	 other	 place	 a	 very	 considerably	 sum	 of	 money	 of	 up	 to	900,000	 crowns	 and	 to	 use	 the	 same	 in	 Germany,	 our	 beloved	
																																																								40 	‘…	 und	 zwar	 des	 herzogen	 zu	 Guisa	 sambt	 seines	 anhangs	 daruf	 ervolgte	erschrodliche	 und	 erbarmegliche	 handlung	 zu	 Vassy	 und	 allen	 anderen	 orten,	desgleichen	 iere	 offentliche	 ausschrieben,	 darinnen	 sie	 sich	 austrudenlich	 ercleret,	das	 sie	 umb	 die	 ausrottung	 unserer	 waren	 christlichen	 religion	 zuthun	 were	 …’	Friedrich	III	to	Christoph	of	Würrtemberg,	15	November	1567,	Ibid,	p.	135.		
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fatherland,	to	create	there	a	similar	unrest	and	bloodshed	as	has	been	going	on	in	other	places.41		A	fortnight	later,	Friedrich	also	sent	a	letter	with	the	same	message	to	Wilhelm	 of	Hesse.	 Friedrich	 used	 this	 anecdotal	 evidence	 to	 convince	his	peers	of	the	scale	of	the	Catholic	violence	that	was	about	to	descend	on	Europe.	On	one	occasion,	 ‘three	ships	with	money	and	valuables	…	[intended	 for]	 the	Duke	Alba	 to	 pay	his	 soldiers’	were	 intercepted	 on	the	 Palatinate	 stretch	 of	 the	 Rhine.42	This	 incident	 served	 as	 very	tangible	 evidence	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 Alba’s	 policies	 were	 part	 of	 a	coordinated	international	effort.	The	Elector	made	sure	that	his	German	peers	 were	 aware	 of	 this	 event	 and	 that	 they	 understood	 its	connections	with	the	Catholic	Conspiracy.	For	 proponents	 of	 the	 theory,	 the	 arrival	 of	 Alba	 in	 the	Netherlands	 and	 the	 policies	 he	 implemented	 there	 were	 by	 far	 the	most	convincing	piece	of	evidence	 for	 the	existence	of	 the	Conspiracy.	The	 panic	 caused	 by	 Alba’s	 march	 along	 the	 borders	 of	 France	 and	through	 the	Rhineland	was	 exacerbated	by	 the	way	he	 conducted	 the	business	 of	 government	 when	 he	 arrived	 in	 Brussels.	 The	 backlash	against	Dutch	Protestants	directed	by	Alba	was	a	diplomatic	and	public	relations	 disaster.43 	His	 draconian	 measures,	 such	 as	 the	 infamous	Council	 of	 Troubles	 (created	 in	 September	 1567),	 together	 with	 his	megalomaniac	style	of	government	not	only	alienated	Dutch	Catholics,	but	 also	 handed	 Protestant	 polemicists	 plenty	 of	 ammunition. 44																																																									41	‘Ich	 kan	 auch	 E.	 L.	 in	 freuntlichem	 vertrauen	 nit	 verhalten,	 das	 ich	 in	 gewisser	bestendiger	erfahrung	…	bey	den	Italianischer	und	andern	kauffleuten	ayn	namhaffte	grosse	summa	gelts	und	biss	un	neun	mahl	hundert	tausent	kronen	uffzubringen	und	dieselbige	 in	 das	 deutsch	 und	 unser	 geliebtes	 vatterlandt,	 darinnen	 ayn	 gleyche	unruhe	 und	 blutvergiessen	 wie	 an	 andern	 orten	 zu	 erwerben,	 zu	 verschaffen	 …’	Friedrich	III	to	August	of	Saxony,	19	February	1568,	Ibid,	p.	189.		42	‘grossere	summen	gelts’	 ‘3	Schiffe	mit	Geld	und	kostbaren	waaren	…	dem	Duca	de	Alba	zur	Bezahlung	seines	Kriegvolkes	…’	Friedrich	III	 to	Wilhelm	of	Hesse,	5	March	1568,	Ibid,	193-194.		43	J.	Pollmann,	Catholic	Identity	and	the	Revolt	of	the	Netherlands,	1520-1635,	 (Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2011):	pp.	68-93.		44	Arnade,	Beggars,	Iconoclasts,	and	Civic	Patriots,	pp.	166-211.		
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Especially	the	trial	and	execution	of	the	counts	of	Egmont	and	Hoorne	at	the	hands	of	the	Council	of	Troubles	disturbed	the	Imperial	princes.	In	 their	 eyes,	 the	 executions	 illustrated	 the	 illegality	 of	 Spanish	 rule.	The	two	counts,	both	Catholics	and	knights	of	the	prestigious	Order	of	the	 Golden	 Fleece,	 were	 put	 to	 death	 on	 charges	 of	 treason	 despite	having	remained	loyal	to	their	monarch.45	Moreover,	the	prosecution	of	the	two	counts	broke	both	rules	and	conventions	and	undermined	the	position	of	the	high	nobility.	The	whole	affair	was	in	the	eyes	of	many,	both	 Catholic	 and	 Protestant,	 the	 prime	 example	 of	 the	 tyranny	 and	cruelty	 of	 the	 Duke	 of	 Alba	 and	 the	 regime	 he	 represented.	 After	 the	arrest	 of	 Egmont	 en	 Hoorne	 on	 9	 September,	 Friedrich	 wrote	 to	Emperor	Maximilian,	urging	 intervention,	 that	 ‘the	cause	of	 this	harsh	measure	 is	 unknown	 to	 him,	 since	 Egmont	 has	 never	 altered	 at	 all	 in	religious	 matters,	 and	 has	 always	 served	 the	 King	 with	 loyal	diligence.’46	The	 news	 of	 the	 ‘deplorable’	 execution	 of	 the	 counts	was	met	with	anger	and	disbelief.47	Orange	wrote	that	the	executions	went	‘not	 only	directly	 against	 the	 constitutions	 and	ordinances	 of	 the	 said	Empire,	 but	 also	 against	 all	 justice,	 both	 human	 and	 divine.’48	The	Emperor	was	quick	to	emphasise	that	‘he	had	done	everything	that	was	possible	 to	 do	 to	 prevent	 of	 this	 bloodshed.’49	Egmont	 and	 Hoorne’s	death	 was	 the	 most	 evocative	 example	 of	 Alba’s	 tyranny	 and	 the	clearest	indicator	that	the	Catholic	Conspiracy	did	exist.																																																										45	Ibid,	pp.	188-189.		46	‘die	Ursach	dieser	 schweren	Ungabe	 ist	 ihm	unbewußt,	 indem	Egmont	niemals	 in	Religionssachen	etwas	geändert,	dem	könig	mit	treuem	Fleis	gedient	hat.’	Friedrich	III	to	Emperor	Maximilian,	4	October	1567,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	
Volume	II,	p.	101.		47	‘jamerlich’	Friedrich	III	to	Wilhelm	of	Hesse,	17	June	1568,	Ibid,	p.	222.		48	‘n’est	 pas	 seullement	 directement	 contre	 les	 constitutions	 et	 ordonnances	 du	 dit	Empire,	mais	contre	tout	droitct	devin	et	humain	…’	William	of	Orange	to	Lazarus	von	Schwendi,	19	June	1568,	G.	Groen	van	Prinsterer,	Archives	ou	Correspondance	Inédite	
d’Orange-Nassau,	Volume	III	(Leiden:	Luchtmans,	1836):		pp.	247-248.		49	‘zu	Verhütung	dieses	Blutvergiesens	alles	gethan,	was	zu	thun	möglich	…’	 	Konrad	Marius	 to	 Friedrich	 III,	 29	 June	 1568,	 Kluckhohn,	 Briefe	 Friedrich	 des	 Frommen	 …	
Volume	II,	pp.	225-226.		
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5.5	The	Catholic	Conspiracy	in	print		The	 flare-up	 of	 the	 conflict	 in	 1567	 and	 1569	was	 accompanied	 by	 a	spike	in	the	number	pamphlets	about	France	published	in	the	Empire.	In	 	 1568,	 a	 relatively	 large	 proportion	 of	 printed	 texts	 about	 France	were	 published	 anonymously,	 especially	 compared	 to	 1562.50 	This	anonymity	 fits	within	 the	 atmosphere	 of	 secrecy	 that	 surrounded	 the	narrative	 of	 the	 Catholic	 Conspiracy.	 It	 is	 clear,	 though,	 from	 their	content	 that	 they	were	especially	written	 for	German	audiences.	They	speak	of	France	from	an	outsider’s	perspective	and	in	many	cases	draw	conclusions	 for	 Germany.	 Even	 more	 so	 than	 the	 First	 War	 and	 the	Massacre	of	Vassy,	 the	events	of	1566	and	1567	and	the	theory	of	 the	Catholic	 Conspiracy	 made	 very	 suitable	 topics	 for	 polemics.	 These	pamphlets	 contributed	 heavily	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 an	 atmosphere	 of	apprehension	among	the	Protestants	in	the	Empire.	
	
5.5.1	The	language	of	conspiracy		Between	the	years	1566	and	1569	almost	all	German	pamphlets	about	France	mention	the	Catholic	Conspiracy.	Though	in	some	texts	the	plot	is	mentioned	 only	 briefly,	 the	 routine	 inclusion	 of	 the	 theory	 in	 news	reports	about	France	is	illustrative	of	the	influence	of	the	narrative.	The	types	of	language	used	in	print	to	describe	the	Conspiracy	contributed	directly	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 feeling	 of	 connectedness	 between	Protestants	throughout	Europe.		 First	 of	 all,	 the	 emotive	 language	 that	 is	 used	 in	 almost	 all	pamphlets	 was	 designed	 to	 mitigate	 Lutheran	 hostility	 to	 the	Huguenots,	 which	 had	 been	 evident	 in	 their	 dismissal	 of	 Calvinists’	political	 motives	 and	 religious	 doctrines.	 Most	 publications	 included	descriptions	of	 the	cruelty	of	Catholics	 in	 the	Netherlands	and	France.	By	1566,	complaints	about	the	infringements	of	the	rights	of	Huguenots	were	 of	 less	 importance	 in	 the	 printed	 texts.	 Instead,	 polemicists																																																									50	12	out	of	27	in	1562	and	11	out	of	17	in	1568:	See	Figure	6	in	Chapter	III.		
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described	 a	 struggle	 of	 life	 and	 death.	 A	 1569	 German	 publication	presented	more	than	100	pages	of	anecdotes	and	translated	documents	illustrating	the	ferocity	of	Catholic	aggression	to	prove	that	it	was	their	attention	 ‘to	 exterminate	 all	 Protestants	 in	 the	 Kingdom.’51	A	 much	shorter	 pamphlet	 from	 1568	 described	 how	 in	 France	 the	Huguenots	were	already	 forced	 to	 fight	 in	order	 to	 ‘safe	 their	 life	and	 limbs,	wife	and	children	 from	 the	 cruel	 tyranny	of	 the	persecutor.’52	Images	were	an	 even	 more	 powerful	 means	 of	 painting	 a	 stark	 and	 persuasive	picture	of	events	in	France	and	the	Netherlands.	The	evil	regime	of	the	Duke	of	Alba,	who	was	presented	as	 ‘a	new	Nebuchadnezzar’,	was	the	topic	of	a	significant	body	of	polemical	pamphlets,	ballads,	and	prints.53	The	situation	in	the	Netherlands	provided	a	bleak	insight	into	the	future	of	Protestantism	throughout	Europe	if	the	Catholic	plot	succeeded.	The	graphic	 imagery	 that	was	 being	 produced	 by	 the	 opponents	 of	 Alba’s	regime	 reinforced	 this	 message	 in	 a	 particularly	 distressing	 manner.	One	example	of	this	comes	in	an	engraving	from	1569.	The	captions	are	largely	in	German,	with	the	occasional	translation	in	French,	suggesting	that	 it	 was	 primarily	 intended	 for	 a	 German	 audience.	 The	 print	 in	essence	 provides	 a	 catalogue	 of	 ‘all	 the	 executions	 and	 persecution	committed	 by	 the	 Duke	 of	 Alba	 amongst	 the	 evangelicals	 in	 the																																																									51	‘alle	die	Religions	verwante	in	seinem	Königreich	auszutillgen’	Anon,	Frantzösischen	
kriegsempörung.	 Das	 ist	 Gründlicher	 Warhafftiger	 Bericht/	 von	 jüngst	 verschienenen	
ersten	 und	 andern/	 und	 jetz	 zum	 dritten	mal	 newer	 vorstehender	 kriegsempörung	 in	
Franckreich.	 Darinnen	 angezeigt	 wirdt/	 Auß	 was	 genotdrangten	 hochheblichen	
ursachen/	 die	 newen	 Reformierten	 Religions	 verwanthe/	 (wie	 man	 sie	 nennet)	
widerumb	gegenwertige	unvermeidliche	Defension	und	Nothwehre	wider	des	Cardinals	
von	 Lottringen/	 und	 seines	 Angangs	 der	 Papisten	 unerhörte	 Fridbrüchtige	 verfolgung	
ƒür	 die	 handtzunemen	 getrungen.	 Deßgleichen	 was	 er	 gestalt	 obgedachter	 Cardinal	
durch	 zerrüttung	 wachsen	 auff	 und	 zunemmen	 gesucht.	 Item/	 Abschrifft	 einer	
Werbung/	 So	 der	 königin	 auß	 Engelandt	 Gesandter/	 bey	 der	 königlichen	 Würden	 in	
Franckreich	etc.	gethan.	Auß	Frantzösischer	Sprach	trewlich	verdolmetschet,	 (s.	 l.:	s.	n.,	1569),	p.	50.		52	‘auff	das	sie	ir	leib	und	leben	/	Weib	und	Kinder	von	de	grausammer	Tyranney	der	vervolger	 erretten.’	 Anon.,	 Newe	 Zeittung	 von	 Franckreich	 unnd	 Niderlandt.	
Christlichen	 und	 hochwichtige	 gründe	 und	 ursache[n]/	 Warumb	 die	 Teutschen	
kriegsleut	die	Christen	inn	Franckreich	und	Niderlandt	nicht	verfolgen	helffen/	oder	auff	
einige	 weise	 sich	 zu	 iren	 feinden	 wider	 sie	 gestellen	 sollen.	 Allen	 Ehrlichen,	 unnd	
Frommen	Teutschen	zu	einem	newen	Jar	geschenckt,	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1568),	f.	2	v.		53	Arnade,	Begars,	Iconoclasts,	and	Civic	Patriots,	p.	169;	Israel,	The	Dutch	Republic,	pp.	155-168.		
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Netherlands	 from	 the	 year	 1567	 up	 to	 this	 time.’54	In	 the	 centre	 the	Duke,	 ‘the	 Pope’s	 lieutenant’,	 sits	 on	 a	 throne	 flanked	 by	 the	 devil,	Cardinal	 Granvelle,	 and	 ‘the	 bloody	 and	 murderous	 Spanish	Inquisition.’ 55 	In	 the	 background	 the	 executions	 of	 ‘Christians’	 by	hanging,	burning,	and	beheading	are	visible.56	The	beheading	of	Egmont	and	Hoorne	occupies	a	particularly	prominent	place	in	the	centre	of	the	picture.	 Importantly,	 the	 artist	 explicitly	 links	 Alba’s	 political	 and	religious	 crimes.	 In	 the	 foreground,	 allegorical	 representations	 of	 the	seventeen	provinces	of	 the	Netherlands	sit	kneeling,	chained	 to	Alba’s	throne.	 Behind	 them	 stand	 the	 magistrates	 of	 the	 Netherlands,	 their	‘authority	 changed	 into	 stone	 pillars,	 silent	 and	 languid	 …’ 57 	The	subjugation	of	the	Netherlands	by	the	Duke	of	Alba	was	thus	complete.	Not	only	had	Protestantism	been	violently	rooted	out,	the	once	proudly	independent	 provinces	 had	 also	 lost	 all	 their	 political	 authority.	 The	dual	prospect	and	religious	and	political	coercion	played	a	central	role	in	 the	 narrative	 of	 the	 Catholic	 Conspiracy.	 The	 example	 of	 the	Netherlands,	 proponents	 of	 the	 theory	 argued,	 showed	with	 alarming	clarity	 what	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 Conspiracy	 on	 Protestants	 throughout	Europe	could	be.		
																																																								54 	‘alle	 Execution	 und	 verfolgung	 die	 der	 Duc	 de	 Alba	 gethan	 hat	 under	 die	Evangelisten	im	Niderland	von	Anno	1567	bis	auff	dise	zeit.’	Anon.,	‘De	Troon	van	de	Hertog	van	Alva’,	Rijksmuseum,	Amsterdam,	1569.		55	‘des	Bapsts	lütenant’	‘Die	blütige	morderische	spanische	inquisition’	Ibid.		56	‘Christen’	Ibid.		57	‘Oberkeit	ist	in	steine	seülen	verwandelt,	ist	stumm	und	mat	…’	Ibid.		
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Figure	8,	‘The	throne	of	the	Duke	of	Alba’.58		Occasionally,	descriptions	of	Catholic	violence	were	packaged	in	Biblical	or	even	providential	language.	In	one	anonymous	pamphlet,	the	pope	is	said	to	have	designed	the	Conspiracy	so	‘that	he	can	once	again	erect	his	Pharaonic	Roman	 chair	 in	 the	Temple	of	God,	 so	 that	 sitting	there	he	may	reign	and	tyrannise	…’59	The	Catholic	 leadership	 is	often	likened	 to	 the	archetypal	 tyrants	 from	 the	Old	Testament,	 such	as	 the	Kings	 of	 Babylon	 or	 the	 Egyptian	 Pharaohs,	 who	 subjugated	 God’s	chosen	 people.	 This	 identification	 of	 Protestants	 with	 the	 people	 of	Israel	was	not	new,	but	was	perfectly	suited	for	capturing	the	threat	of	the	Conspiracy	 in	an	 instantly	 recognisable	and	easily	understandable	image.	 In	 one	 pamphlet,	 the	 Conspiracy	 is	 explained	 as	 a	 direct	consequence	 of	 sinfulness	 of	 Europe’s	 Protestants:	 ‘If	 we	 remain																																																									58	Ibid.		59	‘sein	 Pharaonischen	 Römischen	 Stul	 widerumb	 in	 dem	 Tempel	 Gottes	 forthin	auffrichten	/	 alda	 sitzen	/	 regieren	und	Tyrraniseren	möge	…’	Anon.,	Newe	Zeittung	
von	 Franckreich	 unnd	 Niderlandt.	 Christlichen	 und	 hochwichtige	 gründe	 und	
ursache[n]/	 Warumb	 die	 Teutschen	 kriegsleut	 die	 Christen	 inn	 Franckreich	 und	
Niderlandt	nicht	verfolgen	helffen/	oder	auff	einige	weise	sich	zu	iren	feinden	wider	sie	
gestellen	 sollen.	 Allen	 Ehrlichen,	 unnd	 Frommen	 Teutschen	 zu	 einem	 newen	 Jar	
geschenckt,	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1568),	f.	2	v.		
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obstinate	and	do	not	abandon	our	sins	and	instead	heavily	offend	God,	the	Lord	will	shorten	our	days.’60		 This	 providential	 language,	 however,	was	 relatively	 rare.	Much	more	 common	 was	 the	 use	 of	 the	 language	 of	 conspiracy.	 An	anonymous	pamphlet	entirely	devoted	to	alerting	German	audiences	to	the	dangers	of	the	Conspiracy	explained	how	the	Catholics:		 diligently	 wanted	 to	 deny	 and	 hide	 and	 twist	 the	 Conspiracy	 and	alliance	between	the	Pope	in	Rome,	the	King	of	Spain,	and	also	France	and	 his	 other	 followers	 recently	 created	 in	 Bayonne	 for	 the	destruction	 and	 extermination	 of	 the	 true	 Christian	 religion	 and	 for	the	implementation	and	consolidation	of	the	Antichristian	and	popish	idolatry	and	tyranny.61			By	drawing	the	readers’	attention	to	the	equivocation	and	scheming	of	those	 involved	 in	 the	 Conspiracy,	 the	 anonymous	 writers	 of	 these	pamphlets	 at	 once	 increased	 the	 plausibility	 of	 the	 theory	 and	undermined	Catholic	denials.	 Emphasising	 the	 secrecy	of	 the	plot,	 the	pamphlets	 provided	 a	 unique	 insight	 in	 its	 clandestine	workings.	One	publication	from	1568	claimed	to	contain	the	text	of	two	writings	that	by	 chance	 had	 ended	 up	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 French	 Protestants	 and	 that	proved	the	existence	of	the	Conspiracy.62	Another	celebrated	Friedrich	
																																																								60	‘Aber	wenn	wir	harneckig	bleiben	/	nit	ablassen	von	unnsern	sünden	/	unnd	Gott	gröblich	 erzürnen	 /	 so	 will	 der	 Herr	 die	 tage	 verkürtzen’	 Anon.,	 Newe	 Zeitung/	
Warhafftige	Newe	 Zeitung/	 vonn	 siben	 Stetten/	welche	mit	 dem	Volck/	 und	 alles	was	
darinn	 war/	 in	 den	 Grentzen	 von	 Franckreich/	 versunckenn	 unnd	 undergangenn,	(Augsburg:	Hanz	Zimmerman,	1566),	f.	2	r.		61	Das	 nemblichen	 wie	 hoch	 unnd	 fleissig	 man	 biß	 anher	 die	 Conspiration	 un[d]	bündtnuß	 zo	 zwischen	 dem	 Bapst	 zu	 Rom	 /	 dem	 könig	 zu	 Hispanien	 /	 auch	Franckrych	 unnd	 anderm	 ihrem	 anhang	 kurtz	 verrückter	 zeit	 zu	 ausrütung	 und	vertilgung	der	Wahren	Chritlichen	Religion	und	dagegen	zu	pflantzung	und	bestätung	der	 Antichristlichen	 Bäptischen	 abgötterey	 und	 Tyranney	 zu	 Baiona	 uffgericht	 /	 …	verneinen	und	verbergen	und	berbogen	hat	wöllen.’	Anon.,	Kurtzer	warhaffter	un[d]	
Grundtlicher	Bericht/	von	der	Baptischen	Conspiration	und	Bündtnuß/	auch	derselbigen	
jetzigen	 kriegsexpedition	 in	 Franckrych	 und	 Brabanct	 sampt	 deren	 ursachen.	 Zu	
Christlicher	getrūwer	Warning	der	Frommen	Tütschen/	so	sich	deßwegen	in	dienst	und	
bestallung	und	geringes	zergeugkliches	guts	und	gelts	willen	begeben	und	inlassend,	 (s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1568),	p.	2.		62	Anon.,	 Abdruck	 Zweier	 Nidergeworffener	 Schreiben/	 daraus	 zuersehen/	 mit	 was	
geschwinden	Practicken	die	Papisten	inn	Franckreich	umbgangen/	wider	die	Herrn	vom	
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III	 as	 the	exposer	of	 the	plot.	 It	described	how	advisors	of	Condé	had	‘twice	been	in	Germany	with	the	Elector	Palatine,	from	whom	they	had	learned	much	about	the	popish	Conspiracy	and	attack.’63	Finally,	 the	 transnational	 nature	 of	 the	 plot	 was	 often	emphasised.	The	majority	of	the	pamphlets	studied	here	discussed	both	the	situation	in	France	and	the	Netherlands.	The	outbreak	of	unrest	in	the	 Netherlands	 was	 universally	 represented	 as	 an	 escalation	 of	 the	French	 conflict.	 During	 this	 new	 phase,	 it	 was	 argued,	 the	 Catholics	stepped	 up	 their	 game	 and	 constructed	 new	 strategies	 to	 root	 out	Protestantism.	 This	 sense	 of	 a	 second	 phase	 of	 increased	 Catholic	aggression	 is	 articulated	 clearly	 in	 yet	 another	 anonymous	 pamphlet	form	1568.	The	writer	described	how	Huguenots	defended	themselves	‘with	the	same	valour	and	steadfastness	against	the	new	practices	and	attacks	of	the	Guise	that	the	Cardinal	of	Lorraine	recently	has	arranged	together	with	the	 foreigners,	since	without	 them	they	will	not	achieve	the	 suppression	and	endless	destruction	of	 this	 kingdom.’64	According	to	 this	 narrative,	 the	 French	 Catholic	 party,	 led	 by	 the	 Guise,	 had	realised	 during	 the	 First	 War	 that	 the	 Protestants	 were	 not	 easily	supressed.	Therefore,	they	had	used	the	respite	provided	by	the	Peace	of	Amboise	to	covertly	construct	an	international	alliance	to	aid	them	in	their	 cause.	 The	 conclusions	 to	 be	 drawn	 from	 this	 assessment	 were	
																																																																																																																																													
Adel/	unnd	andere	so	sich	der	Reformation	der	Religion	in	Franckreich	gebrauchen,	 (s.	l.:	s.	n.	1568).		63	‘zweymal	in	Deutschlandt	beim	Pfaltzgragen	Churfürsten	gewesen	/	von	welchen	er	viel	des	königes	und	der	Papisten	heimligkeit	und	anschlege	verstonden.’	F.	Hotman	and	 A.	 Osiander,	 Newe	 Zeitung	 aus	 Franckreich/	 welche	 sich	 mit	 dem	 Pritzen	 von	
Conde/	unnd	dem	Könige	in	Franckreich	newlich	zugetragen/	etc.,	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1568),	f.	4	r.		64 	‘…mit	 gleicher	 dapfferkeit	 und	 standhafftigkeit	 /	 den	 newen	 Pracktiken	 und	anschlegen	 dere	 von	 Guise	 /	 so	 newlicher	 zeit	 der	 Cardinal	 von	 Lottringen	 durch	heimliche	verstendnus	/	so	er	mit	den	auslendischen	hat	/	auff	die	dan	bracht	/	die	sonst	anderstwohin	nicht	/	dann	zu	unterdruckung	und	endlichen	verderben	dieses	Königreichs	 gereichen.’	 Anon.,	 Warhafftige	 Beschreibung	 des	 Gesprechs/	 so	 sich	
zwischen	dem	Durchleuchtigsten	und	Hochgebornen	Fürsten	von	Conde/	und	denen	von	
der	 Königlichen	 Maiestat	 in	 Franckreich	 darzu	 verordneten	 Herren/	 begeben.	 Darin	
auch	die	ursachen/	warumb	itzgemelter	Fürst	von	Conde	und	seine	mitverwandte/	zur	
wehr	 gegriffen/	 angezeigt	 warden.	 Sampt	 des	 Königs	 aus	 Franckreich	 Patenten	 und	
erklerung/	 belangende	 die	 Richter	 von	 Diener	 der	 Justitien/	 und	 ire	 Religion.	 Aus	
Frantzösischer	Sprach	verdeutschet,	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1568),	f.	8	v.		
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obvious:	Protestants	throughout	Europe	needed	to	cooperate	to	stand	a	change	against	the	coordinated	attack	that	awaited	them.	To	underline	this	 point,	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 conspirators	 tried	 to	 divide	 their	 victims	against	each	other	was	often	voiced.	One	pamphleteer	wrote	 that	 ‘the	aforementioned	allies	do	not	know	how	to	pull	down	and	subjugate	the	combative	German	nation	 in	another	way	but	by	 letting	Germans	spill	German	blood.’65	These	 three	 types	 of	 language,	 present	 in	 most	 German	pamphlets	about	the	Catholic	Conspiracy,	together	created	a	new	mood	among	 the	 Protestants	 of	 the	 Empire.	 The	 emotive	 language	 that	characterised	 the	 pamphlets	 of	 1568	 made	 discussions	 about	 France	more	 urgent	 and	 immediate	 to	 German	 concerns	 than	 they	 had	 been	during	the	First	War.	The	focus	on	the	secrecy	of	the	Conspiracy	and	the	idea	 that	 the	 plot	 was	 slowly	 unfolding	 out	 of	 the	 sight	 of	 the	Protestants	 increased	 the	 feeling	 that	 something	 needed	 to	 be	 done.	Finally,	the	pamphlets	contributed	heavily	to	the	belief	that	the	Empire	would	 not	 to	 be	 spared	 by	 the	 Catholics.	 The	 theory	 of	 the	 Catholic	Conspiracy	 in	 many	 ways	 internationalised	 local	 anti-Catholic	sentiments	 and	 provided	 a	 common	 narrative	 framework	 which	envisaged	clear	confessional	divisions.	 In	 this	way	 it	brought	 together	the	 diverse	 Protestant	 family	 against	 a	 shared	 enemy.	 Their	 shared	anxieties	 and	 fears	 for	 imminent	 Catholic	 aggression	 reinforced	 the	feeling	that	the	Reformation	and	its	consequences	transcended	borders.	
	
5.6	The	Catholic	Conspiracy	in	Germany		The	realisation	that	events	 in	France	and	the	Low	Countries	were	two	manifestations	 of	 the	 same	 international	 struggle	 led	 some	 German	princes	 to	 conclude	 that	 there	was	 no	 reason	why	 the	 violence	 could																																																									65	‘Weil	ubgedachte	Bundtgenossen	die	streitbare	Teutsche	Nation	uff	andere	weg	nit	zuschwechen	 und	 underzutrucken	 wüssendt	 /	 dann	 das	 sie	 /	 Tütsch	 blut	 mit	Tütschen	 vergiessen	möchten’	 Anon.,	Kurtzer	warhaffter	un[d]	Grundtlicher	Bericht/	
von	 der	 Baptischen	 Conspiration	 und	 Bündtnuß/	 auch	 derselbigen	 jetzigen	
kriegsexpedition	 in	 Franckrych	 und	 Brabanct	 sampt	 deren	 ursachen.	 Zu	 Christlicher	
getrūwer	Warning	der	Frommen	Tütschen/	so	 sich	deßwegen	 in	dienst	und	bestallung	
und	 geringes	 zergeugkliches	 guts	 und	 gelts	 willen	 begeben	 und	 inlassend,	 (s.	 l.:	 s.	 n.,	1568),	p.	5.	
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not	 spread	 into	 Germany.	 The	 porous	 border	 regions	 separating	 the	Empire	 from	 France	 and	 the	 Low	 Countries	 was	 already	 home	 to	 a	growing	 number	 of	 Reformed	 Protestants,	 whose	 numbers	 were	swelled	 by	 the	 arrival	 of	 refugees.	 Therefore,	 it	 was	 feared	 that	 the	violence	between	Catholics	and	Calvinists	 that	played	a	central	 role	 is	provoking	 the	 two	 conflicts	might	 also	 erupt	 in	 the	 Rhineland.	 In	 the	Autumn	of	1567	Friedrich	III	warned	Wilhelm	of	Hesse	that	‘what	up	to	now	has	been	going	on	and	has	been	done	in	the	Netherlands	and	is	still	going	on,	that	the	same	also	in	France	…	has	been	undertaken,	that	from	there	without	 doubt	 it	will	 also	 affect	 others	 and	we,	 the	 princes	 and	other	German	estates,	who	oppose	popery	and	its	horrors	and	idolatry,	will	 not	 be	 the	 last	…’66	Similarly,	William	 of	 Orange	 emphasised	 in	 a	letter	to	August	of	Saxony	‘that	the	current	pitiful	and	dangerous	unrest	…	 not	 only	 in	 France	 and	 the	 Netherlands	 …	 but	 …	 could	 cause	 the	entirety	 of	 Christendom	 …	 universal	 irreversible	 detriment	 and	damage.’67	Although	Orange	of	course	had	obvious	personal	reasons	for	describing	 the	 conflict	 in	 the	Netherlands	as	 an	event	of	 international	significance,	it	is	nonetheless	clear	that	there	was	a	sense	amongst	the	princes	that	the	French	Wars	of	Religion	and	the	Dutch	Revolt	were	not	simply	domestic	events.	They	were	 in	the	eyes	of	many	contemporary	observers	part	of	a	larger	European	struggle.	The	prospect	 of	 this	 type	of	 violence	 spilling	 over	 from	France	and	 the	Netherlands	 into	Germany	was	 of	 course	 a	 cause	 for	 concern	amongst	the	Imperial	princes.	The	question	was,	however,	how	likely	it	was	 that	 such	 a	 scenario	would	unfold.	 For	 Friedrich	 and	others	who	ardently	believed	 in	 the	Catholic	Conspiracy	 this	was	only	a	matter	of																																																									66	‘…	was	bißhero	in	den	Niederlanden	furgangen	und	getrieben	worden	und	noch,	das	sollichs	auch	in	Frankreich	…	ins	werf	gericht	werden,	von	dannen	es	sonder	zweifel	auch	an	andere	gerathen	und	wir	die	chur-	und	fursten	auch	andere	stende	Teutscher	nation,	so	dem	bapstumb,	seinen	greuweln	und	abgöttereyen	widersprechen,	nicht	die	letsten	 sein	 möchten	 …’	 Friedrich	 III	 to	 Wilhelm	 of	 Hesse,	 16	 October	 1567,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	II,	p.	105.		67 	‘…	 das	 die	 ytzwherende	 erbärmliche	 und	 gefhärliche	 unruwe	 …	 nicht	 alleyn	Franckreich	und	die	Niederlände	…	die	gantze	Christenheit	…	zu	eynem	allgemeynen	unwiederspringlichem	nachteyl	und	schaden	möchte	gereichen	…’	William	of	Orange	to	 August	 of	 Saxony,	 30	 December	 1567,	 Groen	 van	 Prinsterer,	 Archives	 ou	
Correspondance	…	Volume	III,		p.	142.		
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time.	 After	 all,	 the	 plot	 was	 essentially	 international	 in	 scope	 and	intended	 to	 reverse	 the	 fortunes	 of	 the	 Protestant	 Reformation	throughout	 Europe.	 ‘Germany	 has	 never	 been	 in	 greater	 danger	 than	now’,	 the	 Palatinate	 academic	 Christoph	 von	 Ehem	 wrote	 in	 August	1568,	 ‘since	 also	 the	 foreign	 potentates,	 the	 Pope,	 Spain,	 and	 France	have	never	been	so	united	in	their	intention	to	exterminate	the	religion	with	force	as	now.’68	The	fear	was	that	the	success	of	Catholic	violence	in	the	Netherlands	and	France	would	cause	a	domino	effect	that	would	engulf	Protestant	Europe.	Friedrich	feared	‘that	because	of	the	Spanish	dominance	 in	 the	 Netherlands	 also	 its	 neighbours,	 and	 especially	Germany,	are	being	put	at	 risk.’69	The	princes	were	also	concerned	by	the	 outcomes	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 Trent.	 As	 illustrated	 above,	 many	Protestants	 considered	 the	 Council	 to	 be	 nerve	 centre	 of	 the	 Catholic	Conspiracy.	 At	 the	 1566	Diet	 of	 Augsburg,	 the	 Catholic	 princes	 of	 the	Empire	ratified	the	decrees	of	Trent,	alarming	their	Protestant	peers.	A	letter	 written	 in	 July	 1567	 to	 August	 of	 Saxony	 illustrates	 that	 these	fears	 were	 widely	 shared.	 The	 letter,	 which	 was	 not	 only	 signed	 by	Friedrich	 III,	 but	 also	 by	 Christoph	 of	 Württemberg	 and	 Philibert	 of	Baden,	posed	a	pressing	question:	 ‘…	because	already	the	execution	of	the	godless	Council	of	Trent	has	started	all	too	much	in	the	Netherlands,	…	what	then	will	prevent	that	…through	incitement	by	the	pope	and	his	followers	 the	 Germans	 may	 encounter	 and	 experience	 the	 same?’70	Judging	 by	 the	 frequency	with	which	 he	wrote	 letters	 on	 this	 precise	topic	in	1567	and	1568,	Friedrich	was	not	convinced	that	all	his	peers	were	 sufficiently	 appreciative	 of	 the	 urgency	 of	 the	 situation.	 For																																																									68 	‘Deutschland	 is	 niet	 in	 grösere	 Gefahr	 gestanden	 als	 jezt.	 So	 sind	 auch	 die	ausländischen	 Potentaten,	 Papst,	 Spanien	 und	 Frankreich	 nie	 so	 einig	 gewesen,	 die	Religion	mit	Gewalt	auszurotten,	als	jezt.	Christoph	von	Ehem	to	Dr	Craco,	29	August	1568,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	II,	p.	239.		69	‘…	das	durch	den	spanischen	Uebermath	in	den	Niderlanden	auch	die	Nachbarn	und	besonders	 Deutschland	 geführdet	 werden	 …’	 Friedrich	 III	 to	 August	 of	 Saxony,	 26	March	1568,	Ibid,	p.	208.		70	‘Und	 dieweil	 leyder	 nur	 zuvil	 albereyt	 die	 execution	 des	 gottlosen	 Trientischen	Concilii	 in	der	Niederlanden	auch	angestellet	…	was	wolle	dann	hinder	…	Deutschen	ein	gleiches	durch	ansiftung	des	babst	und	seinen	anhangs	begegnen	und	widerfahren	möchte?’	The	princes	of	 the	Palatinate,	Württemberg,	Hesse,	and	Baden	to	August	of	Saxony,	17	July	1567,	Ibid,	p.	69.		
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instance,	 in	 June	1567	he	warned	 the	Catholic	Archbishop	of	Mainz	of	the	chaos	that	could	befall	the	Empire:	‘…	that	some	of	the	estates	of	the	Holy	Roman	Empire	want	 to	 put	 in	 place	 the	 decrees	 of	 the	 so-called	Tridentine	 Council.	 This	 will	 disrupt	 both	 the	 religious	 and	 secular	peace	and	next	expose	the	neighbouring	estate	to	grave	danger.’71	And	again	in	July	of	the	same	year:	‘That	not	only	the	foreign	potentates	but	also	some	princes	inside	the	Empire	have	the	intention	to	execute	and	implement	 the	 so-called	 Council	 of	 Trent	 and	 also	 to	 commence	 the	unchristian	bloodletting.’	72		Occasionally,	 news	 and	 rumours	 surfaced	 that	 seemed	 to	confirm	 the	 workings	 of	 the	 Conspiracy	 within	 the	 borders	 of	 the	Empire.	Friedrich	used	these	reports	to	lend	weight	to	his	warnings.	In	February	1568	he	wrote	 to	August	 of	 Saxony,	who	proved	difficult	 to	convince,	alerting	him	to			reports	 that	 have	 recently	 arrived	 from	many	 places	 that	 place	 [the	existence	of]	the	popish	alliance	more	and	more	beyond	doubt	and	it	is	strongly	to	be	feared	that	also	many	clergymen	in	Germany	are	part	of	the	 popish	 confederation	 or	 at	 least	 support	 it.	 For	 instance,	 it	 has	recently	become	known	that	the	Bishop	of	Rennes	and	Ludwig	of	Bar	[also	known	as	Seigneur	de	Lus]	have	raised	money	in	Bamberg.73																																																											71 	‘…	 daß	 von	 etlichen	 dem	 h.	 Reich	 zugehörige	 Ständen	 des	 Tridentinischen	vermeinten	Concils	Decreta	ins	werf	zu	richten	unternommen	werden	wolle.	Dadurch	werde	 fowohl	 der	 Religions-	 als	 der	 Proganfriede	 zerstört	 und	 zunächtst	 den	benachbarten	 Ständen	 die	 gröste	 Gefahr	 bereitet	 werden.’	 Friedrich	 III	 to	 Heinrich	Riedesel,	June	1567,	Ibid,	p.	56.		72	‘…	das	nit	allain	die	auslendische	potentate	sonder	auch	etliche	fursten	im	heiligen	reich	zu	erequirung	und	volnstredung	des	vermeinten	Trientischen	concilii	und	also	zu	 unchristen	 blutvergiessen	 anzuheßen	 understanden	 …’	 Friedrich	 III	 to	 the	Archbishop	of	Mainz,	30	July	1567,	Ibid,	p.	77.		73	‘Neuerdings	 von	 manchen	 Orten	 eingetroffene	 Nachrichten	 stellen	 dase	 bewuste	päpistliche	 Bündnis	 immer	mehr	 außer	 Zweifel	 und	 ist	 sehr	 zu	 fürchten,	 daß	 auch	manche	 Geistliche	 in	 Deutschland	 zur	 päpistliche	 Conföderation	 gehören	 oder	dieselbe	wenigsten	unterstüzen.	So	hat	E.	jüngst	erfahren,	das	der	Bischof	von	Rennes	und	 Ludwig	 von	 Bar	 besonders	 in	 Bamberg	 Geld	 gesammelt	 haben.’	 Friedrich	 to	August	 of	 Saxony,	 2	 February	 1568,	 Ibid,	 pp.	 184-185.	 For	 more	 information	 on	Ludwig	 of	 Bar	 see	 B.	 Nicollier-de	 Weck,	 Hubert	 Languet	 (1518-1581),	 Un	 Réseau	
Politique	Internationale	de	Melanchthon	à	Guillaume	d’Orange,	 (Geneva:	Droz,	 1995):	p.	151.		
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Other	princes	too	on	occasion	became	aware	of	reports	that	seemed	to	support	 the	 theory	 of	 the	 Catholic	 Conspiracy	 and	 its	 impact	 on	Germany.	With	evident	alarm,	Wilhelm	of	Hesse	shared	with	Friedrich	that	 he	 learned	 ‘that	 the	 aforementioned	 Duke	 [Albrecht	 of	 Bavaria]	intends	to	organise	a	general	visitation	conducted	by	the	Jesuits,	which	will	 not	 be	 unlike	 the	 Dutch	 Inquisition.	 May	 our	 Lord	 God	 change	everything	 for	 the	 better.’74 	Reports	 of	 this	 nature	 underlined	 the	seriousness	of	the	situation.	They	indicated	that	the	implementation	of	the	 Catholic	 Conspiracy	 in	 Germany	 was	 closer	 than	 it	 seemed.	Therefore,	 they	were	 a	 catalyst	 for	 the	more	 interventionist	 stance	 of	many	Protestant	princes	in	the	years	1567-9.			
5.6.1	The	responses	of	the	Protestant	princes	
	It	is	clear	that	the	German	princes	themselves	did	much	to	spread	of	the	theory.	Their	habit	of	mutually	sharing	news	ensured	 that	rumours	of	the	 Conspiracy	 were	 often	 topical	 in	 their	 letters.	 Unsurprisingly,	Friedrich	III	was	the	catalyst	behind	the	dissemination	of	the	narrative.	Between	1567	and	1569	his	correspondence	was	dominated	by	talk	of	the	Conspiracy.	He	showed	no	trace	of	doubt.	His	efforts	were	therefore	aimed	 at	 convincing	 his	 more	 sceptical	 peers	 of	 the	 urgency	 of	 the	situation.	 Although	 Friedrich’s	 interpretation	 of	 the	 unrest	 in	 France	had	always	put	emphasis	on	the	malice	of	Catholics,	it	was	the	situation	in	 the	 Netherlands	 that	 underscored	 in	 his	 mind	 the	 transnational	nature	 of	 Catholic	 aggression.	 One	 of	 the	 earliest	 mentions	 of	 the	Conspiracy	 dates	 from	 November	 1566,	 only	 months	 after	 the	iconoclastic	 riots	 in	 the	 Netherlands,	 when	 Friedrich	 wrote	 Johann	Wilhelm	of	Saxe-Weimar	 to	convince	him	 ‘that	 [Catholic	aggression	 in	the	Netherlands	is]	a	general	conspiracy	and	practice,	aimed	against	the	true	Christian	religion	and	its	followers,	[taking	place]	in	other	places	in																																																									74	‘…	 das	 der	 gedachter	 herzog	 [Albrecht	 zu	 Bayern]	 im	 werk	 stehe,	 eine	 general-visitation	durch	die	 Jesuiten	verzunehmen,	die	der	Niderlendischen	 inquisition	nicht	fast	ungemes	sein	solle.	Gott	der	her	wolle	alle	ding	zum	besten	wenden.’	Wilhelm	of	Hesse	to	Friedrich	III,	19	December	1569,	Ibid,	p.	372.		
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the	 Empire	 as	well	 as	 in	 the	 Netherlands,	 where	 is	 will	 start	 but	 not	end.’75	This	 was	 the	 first	 of	 a	 stream	 of	 correspondence	 revolving	around	the	Elector	Palatine	that	made	the	Catholic	Conspiracy	the	most	pressing	issue	in	German	Protestant	circles.		The	 fact	 that	 the	Catholic	 Conspiracy	was	 the	 on	 the	 lips	 of	 all	the	 Protestant	 princes	 did	 not	 go	 unnoticed	 in	 France.	 Ludwig	 of	 Bar	reported	back	to	Catherine	de’	Medici	in	the	Summer	of	1567	that			[the	 Landgrave	 of	Hesse]	 has	 not	 only	 heard	 of	 certain	murders	 and	injustices	 that	 have	 taken	place	 in	 some	 towns	…	but	 also	 reports	…	that	say	that	there	is	[an	alliance]	between	the	King,	the	King	of	Spain,	the	 Pope	 and	 other	 potentates,	 who	 tend	 all	 the	 time	 towards	 the	oppression	of	the	princes	…	in	France	and	the	Low	Countries.76			The	 Frenchman’s	 report	 is	 further	 evidence	 that	 the	 fear	 for	 the	Conspiracy	 had	 rooted	 fairly	 deeply	 amongst	 the	 Protestant	 princes,	and	not	just	in	the	Reformed	Palatinate.	With	the	increasing	acceptance	of	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 plot	 came	 a	 growing	 sense	 that	 something	needed	to	be	done.	The	instinct	of	those	princes	who	subscribed	to	the	theory	was	 to	underline	 the	 importance	of	 cooperation.	The	efforts	 to	formalise	 such	 cooperation	 give	 an	 insight	 into	 the	 attitudes	 of	 the	various	 different	 princes.	 Friedrich	 III’s	 position	 is	 particularly	 clear,	and	 the	 diplomatic	 reports	 reveal	 that	 the	 Landgraves	 of	 Hesse	 too	bought	 into	 the	 narrative	 of	 the	 Catholic	 plot.	Moreover,	 Christoph	 of	Württemberg	 and	 Margrave	 Philibert	 of	 Baden	 were	 sufficiently	concerned	 that	 they	 too	 felt	 the	 need	 to	 coordinate	 a	 collective																																																									75	‘…das	 es	 ein	 gemaine	 conspiration	 und	 praktik,	 so	wider	 die	 christlichen	wahren	religion	und	derselben	anghengere,	sowel	anderer	orten	im	reich,	als	in	Niderlanden,	do	 es	 izo	 den	 anfang	 haben	 solle,	 aber	 nit	 dabei	 bleiben	wirdet	…’	 	 Friedrich	 III	 to	Johann	 Wilhelm	 of	 Saxe-Weimar,	 3	 November	 1566,	 A.	 Kluckhohn	 (ed.),	 Briefe	
Friedrich	 des	 Frommen,	 Kurfürsten	 von	 der	 Pfalz,	 mit	 Verwandten	 Schriftstücken,	
Volume	I	(Braunschweig,	C.A.	Schwetschte	und	Sohn,	1868):	p.	708.		76	‘Luy	[landgrave	de	Hesse]	ayant	faict	entendra	non	seullement	quelques	meurtas	et	injustice	 qui	 sont	 advenus	 en	 quelques	 villes	 beaucoup	 plus	 grands	 et	 oppressifs	…	mais	aussi	les	intelligence	…:	quil	dissent	ester	entre	le	Roy,	le	Roy	despaigne,	le	pape	et	 aultre	 potentats,	 qui	 tendent	 touts	 …	 le	 tempt	 a	 l’oppression	 des	 princes	 …	 de	France	et	du	Pays	Bas	…’	Ludwig	of	bar	to	Catherine	de’	Medici,	7	August	1568,	BNF,	15608,	f.	174-176.		
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response.	 In	 July	 1567,	 Palatinate,	Württemberg,	 and	 Baden	 together	wrote	to	August	of	Saxony	to	persuade	him	to	subscribe:			 it	 is	 considered	 very	 necessary	 that,	 when	 faced	with	 such	 a	 shared	danger	and	for	the	sake	of	the	maintenance	of	peace	and	quiet	and	the	unity	 of	 our	 beloved	 fatherland,	 everyone	 puts	 their	minds	 together	and	one	more	time	[takes	part	in]	a	common	meeting	of	all	estates	of	the	Augsburg	Confession	or	their	councils	…77			The	Elector	 of	 Saxony	was	 the	 recipient	 of	many	of	 the	 above	quoted	letters.	 As	 one	 of	 only	 three	 Protestant	 electors,	 August	 was	 a	particularly	 important	 player.	 The	 Elector,	 however,	 could	 not	 be	persuaded.	 August’s	 deafness	 to	 the	 narrative	 of	 the	 Catholic	Conspiracy	is	partly	explained	by	geography.	Very	broadly	speaking,	an	east-west	 divide	 can	 be	 detected	 in	 the	 popularity	 of	 the	 narrative.	Whereas	the	princes	of	the	Palatinate,	Württemberg,	Hesse,	and	Baden,	all	 in	 the	 western	 half	 of	 the	 Empire,	 were	 very	 concerned,	 the	Protestant	princes	of	Brandenburg,	Saxony,	and	Saxe-Weimar	were	not	so	distressed.	The	proximity	of	 the	western	regions	 to	France	and	 the	Low	Countries,	and,	more	importantly,	the	route	taken	by	Alba	and	his	forces	was	a	key	factor	determining	their	response.	Their	geographical	location	 ensured	 that	Württemberg,	 Hesse,	 Baden,	 and	 the	 Palatinate	were	 amongst	 the	 first	 to	 come	 in	 contact	 with	 news,	 rumours,	pamphlets,	 and	exiles	 from	France	and	 the	Netherlands	as	well	as	 the	first	to	suffer	from	a	potential	spilling	over	of	the	violence.	This	strongly	increased	the	sense	of	urgency	amongst	the	princes	of	the	Rhineland.	A	second	explanation	for	August’s	reluctance	to	accept	the	existence	of	a	Catholic	plot	can	be	found	in	his	religious	and	political	position.78	Like	his	kinsman	Johann	Wilhelm	of	Saxe-Weimar,	the	Elector	was	a	Gnesio-																																																								77	‘…	wird	 fur	 sehr	 nöttig	 erachten,	 das	man	 in	 so	 allgemeyner	 gefahr	 zu	 erhaltung	fridens	ruhe	und	eynigkeyt	unsers	geliebten	vatterlands	mehr	allerseits	die	gemütter	zusamen	 gethan	 und	 nachmalen	 einer	 gemeinen	 zusamenkunft	 aller	 der	 A.	 C.	verwandten	stenden	oder	dero	rethe	…’	The	princes	of	 the	Palatinate,	Württemberg,	Hesse,	and	Baden	 to	August	of	Saxony,	17	 July	1567,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	
Frommen	…	Volume	II,	p.	70.		78	Clasen,	The	Palatinate	in	European	History,	p.	11.		
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Lutheran	 and	 resistant	 to	 seeing	Dutch	 and	French	Protestants	 as	 his	coreligionists.	Moreover,	 he	maintained	 strong	 ties	with	 the	 Emperor	and	 the	Duke	of	Bavaria,	who	were	both	 accused	 in	 the	pamphlets	 of	complicity	 in	 the	 Conspiracy,	 making	 it	 particularly	 difficult	 for	 the	Duke	to	accept	the	theory.		 Despite	 sharing	 a	 general	 appreciation	 of	 the	 acuteness	 of	 the	situation,	 the	 princes	 of	 the	 Rhineland	 all	 had	 their	 own	 ideas	 about	how	best	to	approach	the	problem.	Christoph	of	Württemberg	was	keen	to	 build	 upon	 his	 strong	 connections	 with	 the	 French	 court.	 In	 their	struggle	 with	 the	 Catholic	 powers	 of	 Europe,	 Christoph	 argued,	 the	Protestant	princes	needed	a	strong	ally.	As	they	had	done	in	the	1550s,	the	 German	 Protestants	 should	 rely	 on	 France	 as	 a	 buffer	 against	Habsburg	aggression.	In	March	1567	he	wrote	to	Friedrich:			 Seeing	 that	 peace	 has	 been	made	 between	 the	 Imperial	Majesty	 and	the	Turks,	and	in	case	that	His	Majesty	shall	ally	himself	with	the	pope,	Spain,	and	other	lords	in	Italy	with	as	aim	the	destruction	of	the	Word	of	God,	first	in	Brabant	and	then	in	France,	and	thereafter	in	Germany,	therefore	 it	 seems	 good	 that	 the	 estates	 of	 the	 Augsburg	 Confession	create	 an	 alliance	 or	 confederation	 with	 the	 King	 of	 France,	 since	through	 it	 the	 poor	 Christians	 in	 France	 and	 Brabant	 as	 well	 as	 in	Germany	may	be	protected	and	safeguarded	…79		On	 the	 17th	 of	 July	 1567,	 Friedrich	 of	 the	 Palatinate,	 Christoph	 of	Württemberg,	 and	Philibert	 of	Baden	met	 at	Maulbronn,	 just	 north	 of	Stuttgart,	 ‘to	 contemplate	 the	 constantly	 threatening	 and	 growing	
																																																								79	‘…	dieweil	ain	 friden	zwischen	der	Kay.	Mt.	und	dem	Turken	gemacht	seie,	und	 in	dem	 werf,	 das	 I.	 M.	 sich	 met	 dem	 papst,	 Hispanien,	 auch	 andern	 herrn	 in	 Italia	verbinden	 solle	 zu	 ausrottung	 des	 wort	 Gottes	 erstlich	 in	 Brabant	 und	 dann	Frankreich,	volgends	 in	Teutschland,	 so	sehe	 ine	 fur	gut	an,	das	die	U.	G.	verwandte	stende	ain	bundnuß	und	conföderation	mit	seinem	herrn	dem	konig	von	Frankreich	gemacht	 hetten,	 damit	 die	 arme	 christen	 sowol	 in	 Frankreich,	 Brabant,	 als	Teutschland	geschukt	und	geschirmbt	möchten	werden	…’	Christoph	of	Württemberg	to	Friedrich	 III,	1	March	1567,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	II,	pp.	8-9.		
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foreign	and	domestic	war	making	and	dangerous	practises.’80	There,	the	three	 decided	 that	 ‘better	 cooperation	 between	 the	 princes’	 was	necessary.	Moreover,	 they	advocated	an	 ‘understanding’	with	the	King	of	France,	promising	the	support	of	German	troops	if	the	King	declared	‘not	to	let	himself	be	exploited	in	religious	and	other	matter,	namely	the	execution	of	the	Tridentine	Council	against	the	evangelical	princes,	and	also	 not	 to	 introduce	 the	 same	 Council	 in	 France.’ 81 	German	interpretations	 of	 the	 role	 of	 Charles	 IX	 in	 the	 Conspiracy	 are	particularly	 interesting.	 The	 King	 is	 never	 mentioned	 among	 the	instigators	of	the	plot.	Rather,	as	in	1562,	it	was	feared	that	the	militant	Catholics	 at	 court,	 especially	 the	 Guise,	 would	 manipulate	 the	 young	King,	 whose	 predecessors	 had	 been	 allies	 of	 the	 German	 Protestants,	into	taking	part	in	the	scheme.	The	reinforcing	of	the	ties	between	the	Protestant	princes	of	the	Empire	was	intended	to	deflect	the	danger	of	a	Catholic	attack.	However,	as	will	become	clear,	 it	proved	very	difficult	to	 coordinate	 a	 joint	 response	 that	 was	 more	 concrete	 than	 these	general	formulations	of	intend.	
	
5.6.2	The	consequences	for	German	attitudes	to	the	French	Wars	of	
Religion	
	In	1565	an	unnamed	member	of	the	Guise	party	remarked	that	 ‘friend	and	foe	used	to	be	separated	by	the	borders	of	countries	and	kingdoms:	one	used	to	call	himself	 Italian,	German,	French,	Spanish,	English,	etc..	Now	 one	 must	 be	 called	 Catholic	 or	 heretic.’82	Although	 this	 is	 an																																																									80	‘In	 Betrachtung	 des	 immer	 bedrohlicher	 anwachsenden	 aus-	 und	 inlandischen	kriegsgewerbes	 und	 der	 gefährluchen	 Practiken	 …’	 Report	 of	 the	 meeting	 at	Maulbronn,	17	July	1567,	Ibid,	pp.	66-67.		81	‘Verständnis’	‘sich	nicht	in	Religions-	und	andere	Sachen,	namentlich	mit	Execution	des	Tridentischen	Concils	gegen	die	evangelischen	Fürsten	verhezen	zu	lassen,	 jenes	Concil	auch	nicht	in	Frankreich	zu	erequiren	…’	Report	of	the	meeting	at	Maulbronn,	17	July	1567,	Ibid,	p.	67.		82	‘Freund	und	Feind	schiefen	sich	ehemals	nach	den	Grenzen	der	Landschaften	und	Königreichen:	man	nannte	such	Italiener,	Deutscher,	Franzose,	Spanier,	Engländer	usf.	Heute	muß	es	heißen:	Katholiken	und	Ketzer	…’	A.	Wirsching,	 ‘Konfessionalisierung	der	 Aussenpolitik:	 Die	 Kurpfalz	 und	 der	 Beginn	 der	 Französischen	 Religionskriege	(1559-1562)’,	Historische	Jahrbuch,	106	(1986):	333-360.	
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observation	 from	 a	 Catholic	 perspective,	 it	 does	 poignantly	 illustrate	the	mood	of	 the	second	half	of	 the	sixteenth	century.	The	story	of	 the	Catholic	Conspiracy	had	a	 transformative	effect	on	 this	mood.	Though	the	 fragmentation	 of	 Europe’s	 confessional	 landscape	 had	 not	disappeared	 overnight,	 the	 theory	 of	 the	 Conspiracy	 ensured	 that	 a	simple	Protestant-Catholic	opposition	increasingly	often	overshadowed	inter-Protestant	tensions.	It	was	the	perceived	indiscriminate	targeting	of	‘the	Protestant	heresy’	by	the	Catholic	powers,	rather	than	a	sense	of	Protestant	 solidarity,	 that	 was	 the	 main	 catalyst	 of	 this	 change	 in	perspective.	 The	 instinct	 of	 Württemberg,	 Baden,	 and	 the	 Elector	Palatine	is	telling.	The	magnitude	of	the	danger	predicted	by	the	theory	of	the	Catholic	Conspiracy	made	the	princes	realise	that	this	was	not	a	crisis	that	they	could	contain	by	themselves.		The	 crisis	 of	 the	 Catholic	 Conspiracy	 introduced	 a	 new	perspective	on	the	wars	in	France.	Whereas	before,	the	princes	viewed	the	 conflict	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 what	 they	 considered	 right	 for	France,	 now	 it	 seemed	 that	 the	 fortunes	 of	 the	 Huguenots	 and	 the	German	 Protestants	 were	 more	 than	 ever	 intertwined.	 In	 their	discussions	of	the	First	War,	the	princes	considered	the	compatibility	of	their	religion	with	that	of	the	Huguenots,	the	justifiability	of	resisting	a	monarch,	 and	 the	possibility	of	 restoring	peace	and	harmony	 through	religious	 or	 constitutional	 rapprochement.	 Though	 these	 discussions	did	 not	 entirely	 disappear,	 they	 became	 largely	 overshadowed	by	 the	princes’	 much	 more	 urgent	 concern	 for	 their	 own	 self-preservation.	This	shift	in	priorities	was	in	the	first	place	caused	by	the	concept	of	the	domino	 effect,	 which	 was	 a	 central	 element	 of	 the	 narrative	 of	 the	Catholic	 Conspiracy.	 It	 was	 not	 only	 the	 sense	 that	 Protestants	throughout	Europe	shared	 the	 same	predicament,	but	particularly	 the	idea	 that	 the	Catholic	powers	hoped	 to	crush	Protestantism	region	by	region,	 starting	 in	 France	 and	 the	 Netherlands,	 that	 was	 cause	 for	alarm.	 Moreover,	 this	 understanding	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 Catholic	aggression	 also	 put	 the	 princes	 under	 considerable	 pressure.	 If	something	were	to	be	done	about	the	danger	of	the	Catholic	plot,	it	had	to	be	done	before	the	Huguenots	 in	France	and	the	Dutch	rebels	were	
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defeated.	 In	1567	 the	prospects	of	both	 these	groups	 looked	bleak.	 In	the	Netherlands,	Alba’s	resolute	and	violent	response	had	crushed	the	optimism	of	the	previous	summer	and	in	France	the	uneasy	peace	had	turned	 into	 open	 warfare.83	The	 calls	 for	 actions	 could	 no	 longer	 be	ignored.	
	
5.7	An	international	Protestant	alliance		Between	 1567	 and	 1570,	 various	 attempts	 were	 made	 to	 create	 an	international	 Protestant	 alliance	 to	 counter	 this	 threat.	 As	 Hugues	Daussy	demonstrates,	the	first	initiatives	towards	concrete	cooperation	between	Protestant	powers	were	undertaken	by	Huguenot	diplomats,	who	 from	 September	 1567	 onwards	 ‘again	 criss-crossed	 Europe	looking	for	support.’84	Once	again,	they	found	in	the	Palatine	their	most	receptive	 audience,	 making	 Heidelberg	 ‘the	 principal	 centre	 of	Huguenot	diplomacy.’85	In	a	letter	to	Friedrich	III	written	in	July	1569,	the	 Palatinate	 councillor	 Christopher	 von	 Ehem	 clearly	 presented	 the	reasons	why	the	Palatinate	thought	that	the	German	Protestant	princes	should	 take	 part	 in	 an	 international	 protestant	 alliance,	 especially	involving	England:		The	alliance	with	England	is	beneficial	and	necessary	for	the	following	reasons.	First,	that	the	oppressed	Christians	in	France	can	receive	help	…	Moreover,	the	alliance	is	necessary	for	the	sake	of	the	Netherlands,	since	because	of	it	the	country	can	be	helped	and	the	Duke	of	Alba	can	be	 driven	 out	 of	 the	 same	 …	 Thirdly,	 the	 alliance	 is	 necessary,	beneficial,	 and	 good	 since	because	of	 it	Germany	will	 not	 be	without	England	when	 the	kings	of	 Spain	 and	France	 after	 a	 victory	over	 the	Huguenots,	with	help	of	the	pope	and	the	alliance	of	his	followers,	will																																																									83	R.	J.	Knecht,	The	French	Wars	of	Religion,	1559-1598,	(London:	Longman,	1996):	pp.	39-40.		84	‘sillonnent	à	nouveau	 l’Europe,	en	quête	de	soutien.’	H.	Daussy,	Le	Parti	Huguenot,	
Chronique	d’une	Désillusion	(1557-1572),	(Geneva:	Droz,	2014):	p.	678.		85	‘centre	principal	de	la	diplomatie	huguenote.’	ibid,	p.	689.		
		 258	
make	war	 on	 the	German	princes	…	 Finally,	many	 are	 aware	 of	 how	much	 is	 being	 done	 to	 make	 Germany	 a	 monarchy,	 or	 to	 divide	 the	same	amongst	the	potentates;	when	all	efforts	are	still	aimed	towards	this,	such	an	alliance	is	very	necessary	to	prevent	it	and	to	protect	the	German	liberties.86		A	domino	effect	is	clearly	visible	in	Ehem’s	analysis	of	the	benefits	of	an	alliance.	Of	course,	the	Reformed	Palatinate	was	keen	to	see	its	French	and	 Dutch	 coreligionists	 relieved	 from	 Catholic	 oppression.	 However,	Ehem	 put	 extra	 emphasis	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 alliance	 for	Germany,	which	was	in	danger	of	being	isolated	from	its	potential	allies.	Germany’s	 predicament	 was	 both	 religious	 and	 secular.	 Returning	 to	the	 classic	 trope	 of	 the	 infringement	 of	 German	 liberties,	 he	 asserted	that	the	Protestant	princes	were	not	only	at	risk	of	losing	their	religious	prerogatives,	but	their	independent	political	authority	as	well.	As	 principal	 driving	 force	 behind	 the	 Protestant	 alliance,	Friedrich	in	1568	set	out	to	make	it	a	reality.	The	plans	drawn	up	by	the	Elector	were	 certainly	 not	 lacking	 in	 ambition.	His	 detailed	 proposals	reveal	that	he	hoped	to	create	an	alliance	‘that	could	count	on	an	army	composed	 of	 9000	 horse	 and	 75	 regiments	 of	 landsknechts.’87	Also	 in	terms	of	participation,	Friedrich	was	ambitious.	He	hoped	 to	enlist	all	the	Empire’s	Protestant	magnates,	including	the	reluctant	princes	in	the	East.	 Most	 importantly,	 Elizabeth	 I’s	 England	 was	 to	 become	 an	important	 player	 in	 the	 alliance.	 During	 the	 secretive	 negotiation																																																									86	‘Auch	folgenden	Gründen	ist	das	Verständnis	mit	England	nüzlich	und	nothwendig.	Einmal,	damit	den	beträngten	Christen	in	Frankreich	Hülfe	zu	Theil	würde	…	Sodann	sei	das	Verständnis	der	Niederlande	wegen	nöthig,	damit	denselben	geholfen	und	der	Herzog	von	Alba	daselbst	vertrieben	werde	…	Drittens	ware	des	Verständnis	nöthig,	nüzlich	 und	 gut,	 damit	 nicht	 Deutschland,	 wenn	 die	 könige	 von	 Spanien	 und	Frankreich	 nach	 einem	 Sieg	 über	 die	Huguenotten,	mit	Hülfe	 des	 Paptes	 uns	 seines	Anhangs	kraft	gemachten	Bündnisses,	die	deutschen	Fürsten	bekriegen	würden,	ohne	Hülfe	 von	 England,	 unterliege	 …	 Zuletst	 ist	 männiglich	 bewust,	 wie	 viel	 verher	practicirt	worden,	eine	Monarchie	aus	Deutschland	zu	machen	oder	daselbe	zwischen	den	 Potentaten	 zu	 theilen;	 wenn	 den	 alle	 Auschläge	 noch	 dahin	 gerichtet,	 ist	 zur	Abwehr	 dessen	 und	 zur	 Erhaltung	 der	 deutschen	 libertät	 solche	 Verständnis	 hoch	nöthig.’	Christoph	von	Ehem	to	Friedrich	III,	17	July	1569,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	
des	Frommen	…	Volume	II,	pp.	348-349.		87	‘pourrait	 compter	 sur	 une	 armée	 compose	 de	 9	 000	 reitres	 et	 75	 régiments	 de	lansquenets.’	Daussy,	Le	Parti	Huguenot,	p.	699.		
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process,	 the	 scholar	 Immanuel	 Tremellius	 acted	 as	 a	 mediator.	 The	professor	 of	 Old	 Testament	 studies	 at	 Heidelberg	 University	 was	 an	ideal	go-between,	due	to	the	years	he	spent	in	England	as	professor	at	the	University	of	Cambridge	and	the	contacts	he	had	built	up	during	this	period. 88 	The	 biblical	 language	 employed	 in	 Tremellius’	correspondence	concerning	the	alliance	 illustrates	 its	religious	nature.	The	 proposed	 alliance	 between	Elizabeth	 and	 ‘all	 the	German	princes	who	 escaped	 the	 Babylonian	 whore’	 was	 described	 as	 ‘a	 legitimate	defence	 against	 the	 unjust	 violence	 of	 the	 Antichrist	 and	 his	accomplices’	 intended	 to	 avert	 ‘the	 tragedy	 of	 the	 extirpation	 of	 the	Gospel	and	the	pious	…’89	It	is	very	questionable,	however,	whether	this	was	the	right	tone	with	 which	 to	 pitch	 to	 Elizabeth.	 Although	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 proposed	alliance	would	be	their	shared	Protestantism	and,	crucially,	their	shared	antipathy	 against	 the	Catholic	 powers,	 the	 flourishing	of	 the	 ‘Truth	of	the	 Gospel’	 in	 Europe	 was	 not	 Elizabeth’s	 primary	 political	 concern.	Moreover,	 Elizabeth’s	 caution	 not	 to	 get	 involved	 too	 openly	 was	 a	theme	of	her	foreign	policy	in	relation	to	the	French	Wars	of	Religion,	as	was	 her	 reluctance	 to	 spend	 big	 on	 continental	 ventures.	 90 		 For	England,	 choosing	 sides	was	 likely	 to	 increase	 rather	 than	 reduce	 the	danger	 of	 a	 Catholic	 attack	 by	 antagonising	 Spain	 and	 disturbing	 its	already	 complicated	 relationship	with	 the	French	 crown.	 In	1568	and	1569,	 Elizabeth’s	 position	 was	 much	 less	 precarious	 than	 that	 of	 the	Protestants	 of	 the	 Rhineland.	 Separated	 from	 the	 turbulence	 on	 the	continent	 by	 the	 Channel,	 and	 less	 troubled	 by	 Scotland	 after	 the																																																									88	A.	 Hamilton,	 ‘Tremellius,	 (Joannes)	 Immanuel	(1510–1580)’,	Oxford	 Dictionary	 of	
National	 Biography,	 (Oxford:	 Oxford	 University	 Press,	 2004):	[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/27694,	accessed	25	April	2015].	
 89	‘…	 omnibus	 principibus	 Germanicae	 qui	 a	 babylonica	 meretrice	 defecerunt	 …’	‘legitimam	defensionem	contra	iniustam	vim	Antichristi	et	suorum	complicium	…’	 ‘…	tragaediam	 ad	 extirpationem	 evangelii	 piorumque	 …’	 Secret	 report	 of	 Immanual	Tremellius’	mission	in	England,	8	April	1568,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	
…	Volume	II,	pp.	211-212.		90	E.	I.	Kouri,	England	and	the	Attempts	to	Form	a	Protestant	Alliance	in	the	Late	1560s:	
a	Case	Study	in	European	Diplomacy,	(Helsinki:	Suomalainen	Tiedeakatemia,	1981):	p.	62.		
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abdication	 of	 the	 Catholic	 Mary	 Stuart,	 it	 is	 not	 difficult	 to	 see	 why,	despite	pressure	at	home	and	abroad,	Elizabeth	and	her	administration	did	not	wholeheartedly	embrace	the	idea	of	an	international	Protestant	alliance.		 The	culmination	of	the	attempts	to	form	an	international	alliance	was	 a	 conference	held	 at	Erfurt	 in	 September	1569,	 at	which	 twenty-one	 Protestant	 princes	 and	 a	 Huguenot	 diplomat	were	 present.91	The	conference,	however,	proved	to	be	a	disappointment	for	Friedrich	and	the	 other	 princes	who	 favoured	 an	 alliance.	 The	 problem	was	 not	 an	unwillingness	to	cooperate	in	the	face	of	a	collective	threat.	The	princes	present	declared	that:		 It	 is	 considered	 of	 the	 greatest	 necessity	 that	 Protestant	 princes	 and	estates	together	closely	observe	the	doings	of	the	pope	and	help	each	other	in	case	of	emergency.	…	Moreover,	the	same	message	should	be	conveyed	 to	 the	 coreligionists	 abroad,	 such	 as	 the	 monarchs	 of	Denmark,	 Sweden,	 England,	 and	 the	 Swiss	 and	 with	 the	 same	 to	maintain	 a	 neighbourly	 correspondence	 in	 the	 interest	 of	 the	protection	of	the	religious	and	secular	peace	…	With	as	goal	to	prevent	…	 that	 one	 coreligionists	 after	 the	 other	 will	 be	 attacked	 and	destroyed.92		The	formation	of	a	formal	alliance	that	also	included	the	Huguenots	and	the	 Dutch	 Calvinists	 was	 a	 step	 too	 far	 for	 a	 number	 of	 influential	princes.	Especially	the	delegations	from	Brandenburg	and	Saxony	were	adamant	 that	 such	an	affiliation	was	out	of	 the	question.	They	argued	that	 Reformed	 Protestants	 could	 in	 no	 way	 be	 regarded	 as	 the																																																									91	Daussy,	Le	Parti	Huguenot,	p.	702.		92	‘Für	 hohe	 Nothdurf	wurde	 gehalten,	 das	 sämmtliche	 protestantische	 Fürsten	 und	Stände	auf	die	Praktiken	des	Papstes	achten	und	einander	in	Falle	der	Noth	die	hand	bieten	 sollten	 …	 Die	 gleiche	 Mittheilung	 sei	 ferner	 die	 ausländischen	Religionsverwandten	 wie	 der	 Krone	 Dänemark,	 Schweden,	 England	 un	 den	Schweizern	 zu	 machen	 und	 mit	 diesen	 behufs	 Erhaltung	 des	 Religions-	 und	Profanfriedens	nachburliche	Correspondenz	zu	halten	…	Um	endlich	zu	verhüten,	daß	…	ein	religionsverwandter	Stand	nach	dem	andere	angriffen	und	vernichtet	werde	…’	Declaration	of	the	princes	at	Erfurt,	1569,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	
Volume	II,	pp.	289-290.		
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Lutherans’	coreligionists.93	Moreover,	 they	suspected	 that	 the	 troubles	in	 France	 and	 the	Netherlands	were	 for	 a	 large	 part	 the	 result	 of	 the	political	 ambitions	 of	 the	 Protestants.	 Once	 again	 the	 political	 and	religious	landscape	of	Europe	proved	much	more	complicated	than	the	rhetoric	presented.	Rather	than	an	epic	struggle	between	the	forces	of	the	 Gospel	 and	 the	 legions	 of	 the	 Antichrist,	 the	 Erfurt	meeting	 once	again	 underlined	 the	 antagonism	 within	 the	 Protestant	 camp.	 The	differences	 between	 the	 various	 forms	 of	 Protestantism	 again	 proved	insurmountable	 and	 as	 a	 result	 dreams	 of	 a	 universal	 alliance	 were	stillborn.	
	
5.8	Conclusion		The	 Reformation	 and	 its	 consequences	 were	 phenomena	 that	transcended	 borders.	 The	 reality	 of	 the	 international	 dimension	 of	religious	 strife	 in	 the	 mid-sixteenth	 century	 is	 reflected	 much	 more	strongly	 in	 the	 commentaries	 of	 contemporaries	 than	 in	 its	historiography.	 The	 outbreak	 of	 unrest	 and	 open	 conflict	 in	 the	Netherlands	in	the	summer	of	1566	in	the	eyes	of	many	contemporaries	confirmed	 their	 impression	 of	 the	 Europe-wide	 impact	 of	 religious	violence.			 The	Wonderjaar	 set	 in	 motion	 a	 series	 of	 events	 that	 further	underlined	the	connectedness	of	religious	strive	in	different	countries.	The	 journey	 of	 Alba	 and	 a	 large	 army	 along	 the	 Spanish	 Road	was	 a	cause	 for	 concern	 in	 both	 France	 and	 the	 Rhineland.	 In	 France,	 it	provoked	 the	Protestant	 coup	d’état	 at	Meaux.	During	 the	 subsequent	turmoil	the	idea	of	a	Catholic	Conspiracy	was	developed.	The	narrative	circulated	 around	 Protestant	 Europe	 and	 in	 1568	 saw	 a	 peak	 in	 its	popularity.	The	escalation	of	violence	in	the	Netherlands	and	the	heavy-handed	 response	 of	 the	 new	 regent,	 the	 Duke	 of	 Alba,	 provided	 a	horrific	 foreshadowing	of	what	was	 to	 follow	 if	 the	plot	 succeeded.	 In	particular	 the	 execution	of	 the	 counts	of	Egmont	 and	Hoorne	was	 the																																																									93	Daussy,	 Le	 Parti	 Huguenot	 …:	 p.	 703;	 Kouri,	 England	 and	 the	 Attempts	 to	 Form	 a	
Protestant	Alliance,	pp.	137-164.	
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cause	of	consternation	amongst	the	German	princes,	fearing	not	only	an	attack	on	their	religion	but	also	the	undermining	of	 their	 independent	princely	powers.	News	of	the	chaos	in	France	and	the	Netherlands,	was	accompanied	 by	 Protestant	 diplomats	 presenting	 German	 audiences	with	 an	 interpretive	 framework	 in	 which	 to	 place	 these	 reports.	Anonymously	printed	polemical	texts	and	images	did	much	to	increase	a	sense	of	urgency	amongst	those	who	subscribed	to	the	theory.	The	 Protestant	 princes	 themselves	 contributed	 directly	 to	 the	spread	of	the	theory.	Amongst	them,	Friedrich	III	was	the	most	active	in	promoting	the	narrative.	Other	Protestant	princes	of	the	western	half	of	the	Empire	 too	seemed	to	have	at	 least	accepted	 the	possibility	of	 the	truthfulness	of	the	theory.	In	the	east,	 far	removed	from	Spanish	Road	and	 the	 hotbeds	 of	 religiously	motivated	 violence,	 the	mood	 amongst	the	princes	was	much	more	sceptical.	In	 light	of	 the	 increasingly	 transnational	nature	of	 the	threat	of	violence	a	renewed	effort	was	made	at	formulating	a	common	response.	The	 princes	 of	 the	 Rhineland	 generally	 agreed	 that	 this	 was	 an	international	 problem	 warranting	 an	 international	 response.	 On	 the	initiative	 of	 the	 Elector	 Palatine	 and	 the	 Huguenots,	 attempts	 were	made	 to	 form	an	ambitious	 international	Protestant	alliance	 including	the	 Scandinavian	monarchs	 and	 the	 Queen	 of	 England	 as	 well	 as	 the	Huguenots	 and	 the	 German	 princes.	 Despite	 these	 intentions	 the	alliance	never	materialised.	The	main	obstacle	blocking	 the	 formation	of	 such	 a	 comprehensive	 confederacy	 was	 the	 tension	 between	Lutherans	and	Reformed	Protestants.	A	significant	and	influential	group	of	 Lutheran	 princes	 argued	 that	 there	 was	 no	 common	 confessional	ground	 for	such	an	alliance	and,	 following	 from	that,	 that	 the	struggle	that	 was	 taking	 place	 in	 France	 and	 the	 Low	 Countries	 was	 not	 a	confrontation	between	the	‘true	religion’	and	idolatry.	The	 theory	 of	 the	 Catholic	 Conspiracy	 had	 a	 transformative	effect	 on	 German	 perspectives	 on	 the	 French	Wars	 of	 Religion.	 More	than	ever,	the	princes	perceived	the	conflict	in	France	as	an	event	that	had	direct	and	potentially	catastrophic	effects	on	their	own	territories.	No	 longer	 was	 involvement	 discussed	 in	 terms	 of	 confessional	
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solidarity,	 or	 the	 need	 to	 uphold	 peace,	 stability,	 and	 the	 social	 and	political	 order.	 The	 idea	 of	 the	 domino	 effect	 directly	 linked	 the	fortunes	of	Protestantism	 in	France,	 the	Netherlands,	 and	 the	Empire.	The	 Protestant	 princes	 of	 the	 Rhineland	 now	 had	 a	 distinctly	 self-centred	reason	to	work	towards	a	resolution	in	France	that	benefitted	the	 Huguenots.	 Intervention	 had	 become	 a	 form	 of	 self-defence.	 The	next	 chapter	will	 focus	 on	 five	 occasions	 at	 which	 Protestant	 princes	intervened	militarily	in	the	French	Wars	of	Religion.	
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VI.		 German	military	campaigns	in	France		Historians	 of	 the	 French	 Wars	 of	 Religion	 have	 long	 recognised	 the	importance	 of	 German	 military	 involvement	 in	 the	 conflict.	 Their	interest,	 however,	 has	 largely	 focussed	 on	 the	 impact	 of	 this	involvement	 on	 France.	When	 the	motives	 of	 the	 German	 princes	 are	discussed,	 the	 analysis	 is	 often	 somewhat	 simplistic	 and	 does	 not	 do	justice	 to	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 political,	 religious,	 and	 intellectual	context	 in	which	the	decisions	to	engage	militarily	 in	the	French	Wars	of	 Religion	 were	 made.1	The	 use	 of	 force	 was	 not	 the	 most	 obvious	option	for	the	German	princes,	which	is	 illustrated	by	the	fact	that	the	first	German	campaign	was	only	launched	in	1567,	five	years	after	the	initial	 outbreak	 of	 the	 conflict.	 This	 chapter	 concentrates	 on	 five	military	 campaigns	 launched	 from	 the	 Empire	 in	 1567	 and	 1568.	Though	 all	 were	 undertaken	 by	 Protestant	 princes,	 two	 operations	were	 launched	in	support	of	 the	royal	army	and	against	 the	Huguenot	forces.	 Before	 focussing	 on	 these	 campaigns	 in	 detail,	 the	 failure	 of	diplomacy,	the	preferred	means	of	influencing	events	in	France,	will	be	addressed.	 In	 addition,	we	will	 examine	 the	 justifications	 for	military	intervention,	 and	 highlight	 the	 practical	 and	 moral	 problems	encountered.	 Next,	 the	 campaigns	 of	 William	 of	 Orange,	 Louis	 of	Nassau,	 Wolfgang	 of	 Zweibrücken,	 Johann	 Wilhelm	 of	 Saxe-Weimar,	and	Philipert	of	Baden,	all	launched	in	1567	and	1568,	will	be	studied	in	detail.	When	discussing	 these	 campaigns,	 the	 focus	will	 not	 be	on	 the	military	or	logistical	side	of	the	story.	Rather,	I	will	attempt	to	uncover	the	 motivations	 and	 justifications	 behind	 these	 campaigns.	 Attention	will	also	be	given	to	the	reactions	of	their	peers,	both	in	France	and	the	Empire,	 and	 to	 the	 political,	 financial,	 and	 social	 consequences	 of	 the	campaigns.	 I	 will	 demonstrate	 how	 decisions	 to	 intervene	 in	 France	were	 shaped	 by	 a	 complex	mix	 of	 factors,	 including	 the	 protagonists’	religious	 beliefs,	 their	 ties	 to	 the	 French	 crown,	 their	 international																																																									1	See	 the	 introduction	 for	 an	 extensive	 discussion	 of	 the	 historiography	 of	 German	intervention	in	the	French	Wars	of	Religion.	
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outlook,	 and	 their	 own	 understanding	 of	 their	 identity	 as	 noblemen.	This	 mix	 of	 influences	 suggests	 that	 each	 decision	 to	 act	 was	 highly	individual.	Though	the	princes	saw	themselves	as	members	of	large	and	seemingly	 uniform	 confessional	 groups,	 their	 own	 personal	 beliefs	shaped	 their	 receptiveness	 to	 French	 propaganda	 and	 led	 them	 to	pursue	different	agendas	with	regards	to	France.		
6.1	The	failure	of	diplomacy		Throughout	 the	 1560s,	 there	 was	 persistent	 German	 diplomatic	engagement	 with	 French	 affairs.	 In	 diplomatic	 correspondence	 the	longstanding	 ties	 between	 the	 Valois	 and	 the	 German	 princes	 were	celebrated	 in	 flowery	 language.	 For	 instance,	 in	 a	 letter	 to	 Charles	 IX,	Wilhelm	of	Hesse	expressed	his	hopes	‘for	the	stable	continuation	of	the	friendship	that	now	for	a	good	time	…	has	existed	between	Your	Royal	Majesty’s	praiseworthy	forefathers	the	kings	of	France	and	this	princely	house	 of	 Hesse.’2	The	 French	 monarchy	 too	 hoped	 that	 the	 mutual	goodwill	 built	 up	 over	 decades	 would	 prove	 helpful	 for	 keeping	 the	Protestant	 German	 princes	 and	 the	 Huguenots	 apart.	 Catherine	 de’	Medici,	 for	 instance,	 invoked	 ‘the	 constancy	 and	 sincerity	 of	 this	affection’	between	the	French	crown	and	the	princes	of	 the	Rhineland	and	 expressed	 her	 intention	 to	 ‘augment	 this	 …	 shared	 and	 perfect	amity.’3		 However,	 the	German	princes	were	not	afraid	 to	make	 forceful	comments	 about	 events	 in	 France.	 The	 landgraves	 of	 Hesse,	 for	example,	 repeatedly	 exhorted	 and	 criticised	 the	 French	 crown	
																																																								2	‘…	zue	bestendiger	continuation	der	feundschafft	die	nun	ein	guete	zait	…	zwischen	E.	 Kon.	 Matt.	 loblichen	 voralten	 koningen	 zue	 Frankreich	 unnd	 diesem	 fürstlichen	haus	 Hessenn	 gewesen	 …’	 Wilhelm	 of	 Hesse	 to	 Charles	 IX,	 17	 August	 1568,	 BNF,	15608:	f.	168.		3	‘…	 la	 constance	 et	 sincérité	 de	 l’affection	 …’	 ‘…augmenter	 ceste	 …	 commune	 et	parfaicte	amytié	…’	Catherine	de’	Medici	to	the	princes	of	the	Palatinate,	Zweibrücken,	Württemberg,	 Hesse,	 and	 Baden,	 November	 1566,	 H.	 de	 la	 Ferrière,	 Lettres	 de	
Catherine	 de	Médicis,	 Volume	 II:	 1563-1566,	 (Paris:	 Imprimerie	 Nationale,	 1885):	 p.	397.		
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concerning	 the	 persecution	 of	 Protestants.4	In	 order	 to	 increase	 the	strength	 of	 their	 message,	 the	 princes	 of	 the	 Rhineland	 cooperated,	presenting	 their	 opinions	 to	 the	 King	 of	 France	 together	 in	 jointly-written	 letters.	 The	 archive	 of	 the	Dukes	 of	Württemberg	 in	 Stuttgart	houses	 a	 number	 of	 documents	 related	 to	 such	 collective	 attempts	 to	influence	 events	 in	 France.5	A	 draft	 letter	 from	 1563,	 written	 by	 the	Lutheran	princes	Wolfgang	of	Zweibrücken,	Christoph	of	Württemberg,	Philipp	of	Hesse,	and	Karl	of	Baden-Durlach,	was	addressed	to	Charles	IX.	 They	 expressed	 their	 ‘pitiful	 and	 loyal	 disposition	 towards	 Your	Majesty’	 at	 having	 heard	 all	 the	 news	 of	 ‘the	 damnable	 and	 internal	destruction	and	bloodletting	in	Your	Majesty’s	kingdom.’6	Interestingly,	the	 princes	 continued	 by	 expressing	 support	 for	 Condé’s	 case.	 They	wrote	that	‘the	Prince	of	Condé,	and	also	his	supporters,	only	intend	to	uphold	 Your	 Majesty’s	 reputation	 and	 authority	 and	 also	 to	 save	 the	poor	 oppressed	 innocent	 Christians	 …’7	Recognising	 the	 fact	 ‘that	 the	truth	 of	 God’s	 Word	 is	 suppressed	 and	 persecuted	 with	 terrible	bloodletting’	as	the	cause	of	the	war,	the	princes	urged	that	‘peace	both	in	 religious	 and	 secular	 things’	 should	 ‘strictly	 be	 maintained.’8	This	letter	 is	 only	 one	 example	 of	 a	 number	 of	 collective	 attempts	 by	 the	Protestant	princes	to	apply	diplomatic	pressure	on	the	French	king.	The	 message	 presented	 by	 the	 princes	 echoed	 the	 Huguenot	justifications	for	war	that	were	already	well	known.	Rather	than	calling	for	 concrete	measures	 to	 solve	 the	 problems	 in	 France,	 the	 collective	diplomatic	 efforts	 represented	 a	 rather	 vague	 consensus	 amongst	 the																																																									4	G.	Menk,	 ‘Landgraf	Wilhelm	IV.	von	Hessen-Kassel,	Franz	Hotman	und	die	hessisch-französischen	 Beziehungen	 vor	 und	 nach	 der	 Bartholomaüsnacht’,	 Zeitschrift	 des	
Vereins	für	Hessische	Geschichte	und	Landeskunde,	88	(1980):	55-82.		5	The	princes	of	Württemberg,	Zweibrücken,	Hesse,	and	Baden-Durlach	to	Charles	IX	(draft),	1563,	HStASt,	A	71	Bü	920,	42.		6	‘mittleidelich	treuherzig	gemüet’	‘Die	verderbliche	unnd	innerliche	zerruttung	unnd	blutt	vergiessen	euer	Khon.	Würd.	Königreichs’	Ibid.		7 	‘dem	 prinzen	 vonn	 Conde,	 auch	 seinen	 mitverwanndten	 furgenommen,	 allain	zuerhaltung	E.	Kon.	W.	reputation	unnd	authoritet	auch	rettung	der	armen	betrengten	unschuldigen	Christen	…’	Ibid.		8	‘…	 das	 die	…	warhait	 gottlichs	wortts	 undergedrucket	 unnd	mit	 erschreckenlichen	blutvergiessen	 vervollgt	 wordden	 ist	 …’	 	 ‘…	 fried	 so	 woll	 inn	 Religion	 alls	 prophan	sachenn	…	vestiglich	gehanndhabt	…’	Ibid.	
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Protestant	princes	 that	was	 rarely	more	precise	 than	a	general	 call	 to	end	 religious	 persecution.	 Concrete	 ideas	 about	 the	way	 in	which	 the	problems	could	be	solved,	as	discussed	in	a	previous	chapter,	can	rarely	be	 found	 in	 these	 collective	 letters.	 Maintaining	 the	 edicts	 of	pacification	 had	 proved	 difficult	 and	 Charles	 IX	 and	 Catherine	 de’	Medici	did	not	need	to	be	reminded	of	the	undesirability	of	the	unrest	in	their	country.	But	the	admonitions	of	the	German	princes	were	not,	at	least	at	this	time,	reinforced	by	the	threat	of	military	intervention.		The	 frequency	 and	 persistence	 of	 the	 German	 princes’	diplomatic	 efforts	 indicates	 that	 this	 was	 their	 preferred	 method	 of	influencing	events	in	France.	However,	reflecting	on	the	effects	of	their	attempts,	 it	 must	 be	 concluded	 that	 they	 were	 not	 very	 successful.	Although	 German	 appeals	 for	 the	 restoration	 of	 peace	 and	 stability	were	 addressed	 to	 both	 Catholics	 and	 Huguenots,	 they	 had	 no	discernible	 impact	on	either.	The	 failure	of	German	diplomacy	opened	up	the	debate	on	military	intervention.		
6.2	The	idea	of	military	intervention		Although	the	idea	of	intervention	was	raised	as	early	as	1563,	the	first	campaigns	were	not	launched	until	four	years	later.	The	reason	for	this	German	 hesitation	 was	 that	 the	 prospect	 of	 getting	 involved	 in	 the	violence	 in	France	was	 fraught	with	difficulty.	 In	order	to	undertake	a	successful	 campaign,	 a	 number	 of	 practical	 problems	 had	 to	 be	overcome,	 ranging	 from	 issues	of	 finance	 to	 logistics.	The	grounds	 for	war	 also	needed	 careful	 preparation	unless	 the	 fine	balance	of	 power	created	by	the	Peace	of	Augsburg	was	unsettled	and	relationships	with	Catholic	princes	imperilled.	Launching	a	campaign	from	the	Rhineland,	a	 patchwork	 of	 Catholic	 and	 Protestant	 states	 and	 cities,	 was	particularly	 complicated.	 The	 raising	 of	 thousands	 of	 soldiers	 for	 the	Wars	in	France	was	likely	to	create	confessional	friction.	Once	an	army	was	 assembled,	 it	 would	 have	 to	 be	 moved	 across	 the	 lands	 of	neighbouring	 princes	 to	 reach	 France.	 The	 delicate	 diplomatic	repercussions	of	 such	 a	 venture	 can	be	 seen	 in	Casimir’s	negotiations	
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with	 the	 Duke	 of	 Lorraine	 in	 1567.	 Requesting	 permission	 to	 ‘pass	through	the	Duke’s	lands’,	Casimir	promised	to	pay	for	any	goods	taken	by	 his	 troops	 and	 that	 the	 Duke’s	 ‘subjects	 as	 much	 as	 possible	 will	remain	 untouched.’9	Especially	 the	 phrase	 ‘as	 much	 as	 possible’	 is	indicative	 of	 the	 difficulty	 of	 regulating	 contact	 between	 soldiers	 and	civilians.	Finally,	an	invasion	from	the	Rhineland	was	likely	to	move	the	theatre	of	war	closer	to	the	Imperial	border.	The	undesirable	effects	of	the	exploits	of	a	nearby	army,	even	one	led	by	an	allied	commander,	is	illustrated	by	a	comment	made	by	Andelot	to	Friedrich:	‘He	[Aumale]	is	not	entirely	in	control	of	his	troops,	since	they	have	not	been	paid	for	a	long	 time,	 and	 therefore	 he	 has	 to	 overlook	 that	 they	 plunder	 in	 the	German	 lands.’10	Looting	 was	 a	 common	 way	 for	 sixteenth-century	armies	to	supply	themselves.	As	a	result,	the	proximity	of	an	army	could	wreak	havoc	in	the	surrounding	countryside,	towns,	and	villages.11	It	was	 also	 feared	 that	 German	military	 involvement	 in	 France	could	 have	 international	 repercussions.	 A	 number	 of	 German	 princes	feared	that	such	an	undertaking	was	likely	to	provoke	the	wrath	of	the	Catholic	powers	of	Europe,	and	especially	the	monarchs	of	France	and	Spain.	Reflecting	on	Casimir’s	mission	in	1567,	the	Catholic	Albrecht	of	Bavaria	in	a	letter	to	Christoph	of	Württemberg	warned	of	‘the	dangers	of	this	undertaking	…	namely	that	they	will	not	only	provoke	the	King	of	France,	 but	 also	 of	 Spain.’12	These	 fears	 were	 shared	 by	 Wilhelm	 of	Hesse,	who	argued	that																																																										9	‘den	 herzogs	 land	 berühren’	 ‘die	 Unterthanen	 so	 viel	 immer	möglich	 verschont	 …	werden	 sollen.’	 Johann	 Casimir	 to	 the	 Duke	 of	 Lorraine,	 26	 November	 1567,	 A.	Kluckhohn	 (ed.),	 Briefe	 Friedrich	 des	 Frommen,	 Kurfürsten	 von	 der	 Pfalz,	 mit	
Verwandten	 Schriftstücken,	 Volume	 II,	 (Braunschweig:	 C.	 A.	 Schwetschte	 und	 Sohn,	1870):	p.	146.		10	‘Er	sey	aber	seins	kriegvolks	nit	mechtig	durchaus,	weil	sie	in	langer	zeit	nit	bezalt.	also	das	er	durch	die	finger	sehen	müß,	das	sie	im	Teutschen	land	sollen	plündern	…’	Friedrich	III	to	Wilhelm	of	Hesse,	24	February	1569,	Ibid,	p.	296.		11	J.	 B.	 Wood,	 ‘The	 impact	 of	 the	 Wars	 of	 Religion:	 a	 view	 of	 France	 in	 1581’,	 The	
Sixteenth	Century	Journal,	15	(1984):	131-168.		12	‘die	 Gefahren	 des	 unternehmens	 …	 namentlich	 darauf	 hinweisen,	 daß	 sie	 nicht	allein	 den	 könig	 von	 Frankreich,	 sondern	 auch	 den	 von	 Spanien	 auf	 sich	 laden	würden.’	 Albrecht	 of	 Bavaria	 to	 Christoph	 of	 Württemberg,	 13	 December	 1567,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	II,	p.	153.		
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	it	 is	 above	 all	 also	 important	 to	 consider	 how	 severely	 France	 and	Spain	will	 be	 offended	 and	 how	 close	 the	 Lower	 Palatinate	 is	 to	 the	aforementioned	crowns	of	France	and	the	Netherlands	and	that	once,	and	especially	since	the	case	of	the	Huguenots	is	built	on	stilts,	a	grave	vengeance	may	be	planned	and	you	as	an	innocent	may	be	pulled	into	the	bath	with	them13			These	unusual	metaphors	not	only	reveal	apprehension	on	the	part	of	Wilhelm	about	the	possibility	of	being	sucked	into	the	conflict,	but	also	about	the	chances	of	winning	such	a	war.	Even	Friedrich	III,	famed	for	his	almost	unconditional	support	for	the	Reformed	cause,	shared	these	fears,	 at	 least	 before	 1566.	 Though	 he	 wholeheartedly	 supported	 his	son’s	 endeavour	 in	 1567,	 the	 Elector	 Palatine	 was	 in	 1563	 still	 very	apprehensive	 about	 the	 idea	 of	 German	 military	 involvement	 in	 the	Wars	 of	 Religion.	 In	 a	 letter	 to	Wolfgang	 of	 Zweibrücken	 from	March	1563,	Friedrich	urged	the	Duke	to	give	up	his	plan	to	take	an	army	into	France.14		 The	 abovementioned	 concerns	 are	 mostly	 practical.	 However,	there	were	also	moral	objections	raised	against	military	intervention.	In	1563,	Wolfgang	of	Zweibrücken	was	one	of	the	first	to	openly	consider	invading	France.	 In	reaction	to	these	plans,	Christoph	of	Württemberg	wrote	Wolfgang	a	frank	letter,	arguing	against	active	intervention	in	the	war	 in	 France.	 Christoph	 opened	 his	 letter	 by	 urging	 Wolfgang	 ‘to	consider	…	whether	[he]	can	plan	and	wage	such	a	large	and	dangerous	war	with	 a	 clear	 conscience	 before	God’,	 before	 continuing	 to	 answer	this	 question	 in	 the	negative:	 ‘if	 a	war	 is	 no	 godly	 and	orderly	war	…	then	it	 is	 impossible,	 that	one	can	 justify	the	adversities	of	war	before																																																									13	‘Darzegen	aber	ist	vornemblich	…	auch	wol	zu	betrachten,	wie	hart	Frankreich	und	Spanien	offendirt	und	wie	nahe	die	under	Pfalz	an	gedachter	cronen	Frankreich	und	den	Niederlanden	gelegen	und	das	einmal	und	sonderlich	dieweil	izo	der	Huguenotten	sach	 uff	 stelzen	 stehn	 soll,	 ein	 gravis	 vindicta	 vorgenommen	 und	 du	 als	 ein	unschuldiger	 ins	 bad	 gezogen	 werden	 kontest.’	 Wilhelm	 of	 Hesse	 to	 Ludwig	 of	 the	Palatinate,	19	October	1569,	Ibid,	p.	366.		14	Friedrich	 III	 to	 Wolfgang	 of	 Zweibrücken,	 24	 March	 1568,	 A.	 Kluckhohn,	 Briefe	
Friedrich	 des	 Frommen,	 Kurfürsten	 von	 der	 Pfalz,	 mit	 Verwandten	 Schriftstücken,	
Volume	I,	(Braunschweig:	C.	A	Schwetschke	und	Sohn,	1868):	pp.	379-389.		
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God’,	 and	 since	 the	war	 in	 France	 is	waged	 ‘against	 the	 public	 order’,	taking	 part	 in	 it	 is	 not	 justifiable. 15 	To	 reinforce	 what	 was	 a	quintessentially	Lutheran	argument,	Christoph	quoted	extensively	from	Scripture:	‘he	that	passeth	by	and	medleth	with	the	strife	that	belongeth	not	 unto	him,	 is	 as	 one	 that	 taketh	 a	 dog	by	 the	 ears.’16	More	 sinister	was	the	reference	to	the	story	of	the	Jehoshaphat	and	Ahab,	the	kings	of	Judah	 and	 Israel,	 who	 despite	 the	 warnings	 of	 the	 prophet	 Michaiah	decided	to	go	to	war	together,	leading,	as	was	predicted,	to	the	death	of	the	 King	 of	 Israel. 17 	Christoph,	 as	 well	 as	 other	 opponents	 of	intervention,	 considered	 the	war	 in	France	 too	morally	 compromising	to	justify	German	intervention.	Although	there	was	some	sympathy	for	the	 Huguenots,	 this	 was	 overridden	 by	 suspicion	 of	 their	 political	motivations.	 Furthermore,	 as	 long	 as	 the	 conflict	 did	 not	 spread	 into	Germany,	 it	 was	 still	 possible	 to	 stand	 aside	 and	 observe	 it	 from	 a	position	 of	 safety.	 Württemberg	 also	 argued	 that	 intervention	 would	merely	stir	up	Europe’s	Catholic	powers	and	provoke	retaliation.18		 A	final	argument	against	German	military	intervention	in	France	came	from	an	unexpected	quarter.	Gaspard	de	Coligny	was	very	uneasy	about	 the	 idea	 of	 soliciting	 German	 military	 support	 in	 1562.	 At	 the	national	 synod	 of	 the	 French	 Reformed	 churches,	 he	 voiced	 strong	opposition:	‘Almost	all	concluded	that	it	was	necessary	to	ask	a	prompt	and	 sufficient	 succour	 from	 German	 princes.	 The	 Admiral,	 however,	altered	the	decision,	saying	that	he	would	rather	die	than	consent	to	let	those	 of	 Religion	 be	 the	 first	 to	 bring	 foreign	 forces	 into	 France.’19	Coligny’s	fear	was	not	unjustified.	Relying	on	German	military	support																																																									15	‘wol	zubedencken	…	ob	E.	L.	sollichen	grossen	weittleuffigen	unnd	hochgefarlichen	krieg	mit	 guettem	 gewisse	 vor	 Gott	 dem	 herr,	 fürmenem	 unnd	 füren	möge’	 ‘da	 ain	krieg	 kain	 ordenlicher	 göttlicher	 krieg	 ist	 …	 das	 es	 unmüglich,	 das	 er	 des	 kriegs	onlüsst	 vor	 Gott	 verantworten	 …	 khan’	 Christoph	 of	 Württemberg	 to	 Wolfgang	 of	Zweibrücken,	April	1563,	HStASt,	A	71	Bü	917,	29.		16	Proverbs	26:17	(1599	English	translation	of	the	Geneva	Bible).		17	2	Chronicles	18	and	19	(1599	English	translation	of	the	Geneva	Bible).		18 	M.	 Langsteiner,	 Für	 Land	 und	 Lutherum:	 die	 Politik	 Herzog	 Christoph	 von	
Württemberg	(1550-1568),	(Cologne:	Böhlau	Verlag,	2008):	p.	384		19	J.	 Shimizu,	 Conflict	 of	 Loyalties,	 Politics	 and	 Religion	 in	 the	 Career	 of	 Gaspard	 de	
Coligny,	Admiral	of	France,	1519-1572,	(Geneva:	Droz,	1970):	pp.	87-88.	
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could	undermine	the	Huguenot	claims	that	they	were	merely	interested	in	protecting	their	rights	and	those	of	the	King	of	France	and	their	claim	to	 be	 the	 true	 patriotic	 party	 against	 the	 Guise.	 Despite	 these	 earlier	reservations,	the	years	1567	to	1569	saw	five	German-led	campaigns	in	France.	Considering	the	opposition	at	home	and	abroad,	these	ventures	required	careful	planning	and	justification.		
6.3	Johann	Casimir		In	 the	 autumn	 of	 1567,	 Johann	 Casimir,	 son	 of	 the	 Elector	 Palatine,	became	the	first	German	prince	to	prepare	for	military	intervention	in	France.	 Like	 his	 father,	 Casimir	 was	 an	 ardent	 supporter	 of	 the	Huguenot	cause.	Nonetheless,	some	important	questions	remain	about	his	motives,	 in	 particular	why	 he	 should	 have	waited	 until	 1567	 and	remained	aloof	in	1562-3.	For	Bernard	Vogler:		 The	 Palatine	 interventions	 in	 the	 affairs	 of	 France	were	 the	work	 of	two	surprisingly	dissimilar	characters,	and	yet	very	representative	of	the	sixteenth	century,	at	once	austere	and	brutal:	the	Elector	Friedrich	III,	 called	 the	 Pious,	 ardent	 disciple	 of	 reform,	 and	 his	 son	 Johann	Casimir,	bad	boy	and	jolly	fellow,	in	search	of	adventure	…20			This	 interpretation	 of	 Casimir’s	 motives,	 which	 contrasts	 his	 playboy	image	with	the	austerity	of	his	father,	is	far	too	simplistic	and	suggests	that	active	commitment	to	the	Reformed	cause	was	shaped	by	personal	habits	 and	 lifestyle.	 Whatever	 his	 personal	 qualities,	 Casimir’s	continued	commitment	 to	 furthering	Reformed	Protestantism	through	political	alliances	and	military	action	suggests	 that	he	was	 looking	 for	
																																																								20	‘Les	 interventions	 palatines	 dans	 les	 affaires	 françaises	 seront	 l’oeuvre	 de	 deux	personnages	 étonnamment	 dissemblables,	 et	 pourtant	 si	 representatives	 de	 ce	 XVIe	siècle	 à	 la	 fois	 austere	 et	 brutal:	 l’Electeur	 Fréderic	 III,	 surnommé	 le	 Pieux,	 ardent	disciple	 de	 la	 Réforme,	 et	 son	 fils	 Jean-Casimir,	 mauvais	 garçon	 et	 joyeux	 drille	 en	quête	 d’aventures	 …’	 B.	 Vogler,	 ‘Le	 role	 des	 Électeurs	 Palatins	 dans	 les	 Guerres	 de	Religion	en	France	(1559-1592)’,	Cahiers	d’Histoire,	10	(1965):	51-85,	on	p.	54.		
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more	than	adventure.21	Vogler	fails	to	explain	why	Friedrich,	despite	his	initial	 opposition	 to	military	 intervention	 in	 France,	 once	 his	 son	 had	made	 the	 decision	 to	 go	 did	 not	 disown	 him,	 but	 instead	 gave	 his	blessing.	Elsewhere,	the	news	of	Casimir’s	campaign	provoked	significant	hostility,	not	only	among	Catholics	in	and	outside	the	Empire,	but	also	from	German	Lutherans.	The	Emperor	Maximilian	II	reminded	Casimir	that	his	campaign	broke	 ‘the	 laws	of	 the	Empire’	and	was	opposed	by	‘most	 princes’.22	The	 extent	 of	 the	 Protestant	 princes’	 opposition	 to	Casimir	 became	 apparent	 at	 the	 Kurfürstentag	 held	 in	 January	 and	February	1568	in	Fulda.	At	the	gathering,	the	Palatinate	delegation	was	‘attacked	vigorously’	over	the	issue	of	Casimir’s	meddling	in	the	war.23	A	combination	of	the	questionability	of	the	Huguenots’	motives	and	the	fear	that	the	conflict	would	spill	over	into	the	Empire	was	cause	for	the	Protestant	princes	to	protest	strongly	against	Casimir’s	invasion.		 In	order	to	counter	these	criticisms,	Casimir	and	his	father	were	forced	 to	 formulate	 clear	 justifications.	 Religion	 formed	 the	 core	 of	these	 justifications.	 At	 Fulda,	 Friedrich	 ensured	 his	 peers	 ‘that	 the	business	 of	 Duke	 Johann	 Casimir	 was	 only	 being	 undertaken	 for	 the	prevention	 of	 the	 slaughter	 of	 the	 innocent	 Christians.’24	In	 reply	 to	Emperor	 Maximilian,	 Casimir	 wrote	 the	 Emperor	 that	 he	 had	 three	motives:	 ‘against	 the	 pitiful	 oppression	 and	 the	 threatening	extermination	 of	 the	 confessors	 of	 the	 true	 Christian	 religion,	 for	 the	restoration	of	 the	authority	of	 the	earlier	adopted	peace	edict	and	 for	
																																																								21	J.	Raitt,	‘The	Elector	John	Casimir,	Queen	Elizabeth	and	the	Protestant	League’,	in	D.	Visser	 (ed.),	Controversy	and	Conciliation,	The	Reformation	and	 the	Palatinate,	 1559-
1583,	(Allison	Park:	Pickwick	Publications,	1986):	pp.	117-145.		22	‘Reichsgesez’	‘den	meisten	Fürsten’	Emperor	Maximilian	to	Friedrich	III	and	Johann	Casimir,	20	November	1567,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	II,	p.	142.		23	‘heftig	 angezogen’	 Report	 from	 the	 Kurfüstentag	 at	 Fulda,	 January	 and	 February	1568,	Ibid,	p.	174.		24 	‘das	 nämlich	 die	 Gewerbe	 herzog	 Johann	 Casimir’s	 einzig	 zur	 Verhütung	unschuldigen	christlichen	Blutvergießens	…	vorgenommen	würden.’	Ibid,	p.	174.		
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the	creation	of	a	religious	peace.’25	Casimir	was	keen	to	emphasise	his	respect	for	the	authority	of	the	Catholic	King	of	France.		 These	 arguments	 sound	 very	 familiar.	 In	 fact,	 they	 almost	directly	echo	the	words	of	the	Huguenot	envoys	and	the	pro-Huguenot	pamphlets	published	in	the	Empire,	which	indicates	the	success	of	the	Huguenots’	 diplomatic	 efforts	 towards	 the	 Palatinate.	 The	 connection	between	 these	 diplomatic	 efforts	 and	 Casimir’s	 campaign	 was	 made	clear	 in	 two	 letters.	The	 first	was	a	report	by	 the	Bishop	of	Rennes	 to	Charles	IX,	written	in	October	1567:		 I	have	arrived	at	this	court	of	the	Elector	Palatine,	where	I	have	found	that	the	Prince	of	Condé	has	had	his	men	for	more	than	six	weeks,	who	have	concluded	and	arranged	the	levying	of	4500	Reiters	…	the	leader	and	colonel	is	Duke	Johann	Casimir,	second	son	of	the	said	Elector	…26		The	Bishop	of	Rennes’	 report	 gives	us	 an	 insight	 into	 the	 central	 role	played	by	Condé’s	envoys	 in	 initiating	and	organising	 this	mission.	To	Rennes’s	discomfort,	 the	Huguenot	message	had	been	so	successful	as	to	 spur	 the	 Elector	 and	 his	 son	 into	 far-reaching	 action.	 The	 second	document,	a	joint	letter	sent	by	Friedrich	and	Casimir	to	the	Emperor’s	envoy,	shows	how	the	Huguenots’	message	was	received.	In	this	letter,	father	 and	 son	 explained	 how	 they	 weighed	 both	 the	 Royal	 and	 the	Huguenot	interpretations	of	the	Wars.	They	heard		 what	 the	 envoy	 of	 Condé	 argued	 against	 the	 testimony	 of	 the	 Royal	envoys,	especially	the	unreliable	Lignerolles,	and	concluded	that	it	was	
																																																								25	‘…	 gegen	die	 jämmerliche	Verfolgung	und	die	 drohende	Ausrottung	der	Bekenner	des	 wahren	 christlichen	 religion,	 zur	 Wiederherstellung	 der	 Auhorität	 des	 früher	erlassenen	 Pacificationsedict	 und	 zur	 Erlangung	 eines	 Religionsfriedens	 …’	 Johann	Casimir	to	Emperor	Maximilian,	17	November	1567,	Ibid,	p.	141.		26	‘Je	suis	venu	iusques	en	ceste	court	de	l’Electeur	Palatin	ou	J’ay	treuve	que	le	prince	de	conde	avoit	ses	gens	 il	y	a	plus	de	six	semaines	qui	ont	conclud	et	accorde	d’une	levee	 de	 quatre	 mil	 cinq	 cent	 Reistres	 …	 le	 chef	 et	 Coulonnel	 est	 le	 Duc	 Johann	Casimirs,	 second	 filz	 dudict	 Electeur	 …’	 The	 Bishop	 of	 Rennes	 to	 Charles	 IX,	 30	October	1567,	BNF,	15918:	f.	19.		
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not	a	matter	of	a	rebellion.	All	the	blame	was	to	be	put	on	the	Cardinal	of	Lorraine,	who	persecuted	the	Christians	lamentably	…27		The	success	of	Huguenot	diplomacy	in	the	Palatinate	is	no	surprise.	We	have	already	seen	that	 the	Elector	was	 the	primary	spokesperson	and	advocate	 for	 their	 cause	 in	 the	 Empire.	 Nor	 is	 it	 unexpected	 that	 this	message	was	the	foundation	for	Palatinate	military	involvement	in	the	Wars	 of	 Religion.	 There	 is	 nothing	 here	 to	 suggest	 that	 Casimir’s	decision	 to	 intervene	 was	 based	 on	 anything	 other	 than	 religious	conviction.	Why,	then,	did	he	not	intervene	sooner?	Various	historians	have	acknowledged	Friedrich’s	changing	attitude	to	the	idea	of	military	intervention.	 Henry	 Cohn	 remarked	 that	 ‘after	 initial	 hesitation	 until	1566,	Frederick	III	was	never	in	doubt	about	the	justice	of	military	aid	for	the	threatened	Protestants’	adding,	though,	that	he	‘wished	to	avoid	both	 imperial	 stricture	 and	 isolation	 from	 the	 Lutheran	 princes.’28	Vogler	 too	 noticed	 that	 ‘in	 1567,	 Friedrich	 III	 radically	 changed	 his	attitude.’29	The	reason	for	Friedrich’s	change	of	heart	 is	not	to	be	found	in	France,	 but	 in	 the	 Netherlands.	 The	 intervention	 of	 Alba	 changed	everything,	 as	 it	 seemed	 to	 confirm	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 Catholic	Conspiracy.	 In	 letters	 to	 the	 German	 Protestant	 princes,	 the	 link	between	 the	 Catholic	 plot	 and	 Casimir’s	 decision	 to	 invade	 was	repeatedly	 emphasised.	 A	 diplomat	 from	 the	 Palatinate,	 for	 instance,	told	 the	 Landgrave	 of	 Hesse	 that	 the	 campaign	was	 intended	 for	 ‘the	saving	 of	 many	 thousands	 of	 Christians	 from	 the	 bloodbath	 that	 the	pope	and	his	party	have	 caused’,	 adding	 that	 ‘the	 irons	 in	France	 and																																																									27	‘…	was	 der	 Gesandte	 Condé’s	 entgegen	 den	 Aussagen	 der	 Königlichen	 Gesandten,	besonders	des	verdächtigen	Lignerolles,	vorgebracht,	und	constatirt,	daß	es	sich	um	keine	Rebellion	handle.	Alle	Schuld	wird	auf	den	Cardinal	von	Lothringen	geschehen,	welcher	die	Christen	 jämmerlich	verfolge	…’	Friedrich	 III	 and	 Johann	Casimir	 to	 the	Emperor’s	 envoy,	 6	 December	 1567,	 Kluckhohn,	 Briefe	 Friedrich	 des	 Frommen	 …	
Volume	II,	p.	149.		28	H.	J.	Cohn,	‘The	territorial	princes	in	Germany’s	second	Reformation,	1559-1622’,	in	M.	Prestwich,	International	Calvinism,	1541-1715,	(Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1985):	p.	153.		29	Vogler,	‘Le	role	des	Électeurs	Palatins,	p.	59.	
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the	Netherlands	clash	together	…	and	that	one	should	offer	each	other	support.’	 30 	Also	 Friedrich	 himself,	 in	 a	 letter	 to	 Christoph	 of	Württemberg,	linked	the	Conspiracy	and	Casimir’s	campaign:			 …	 that	we	 now	 cannot	 keep	Duke	 Johann	Casimir	 from	his	 intention	with	 any	 possible	 decree	 …	 [since]	 he	 strongly	 pities	 the	 oppressed	Christians	 in	 the	 Kingdom	 of	 France	 as	 our	 coreligionists	 [and]	therefore	to	prevent	that	the	pope,	who	implements	his	will	in	France,	the	 Netherlands,	 and	 other	 places,	 finally	 attempts	 to	 subject	 us	Germans	in	the	same	fashion.31		The	 narrative	 of	 the	 Catholic	 Conspiracy,	 which	 was	 promoted	vigorously	 by	 Friedrich	 and	 Casimir,	 made	 intervention	 in	 France	 a	matter	 of	 urgency.	Without	 decisive	 action,	 Protestants	 in	 France,	 the	Netherlands,	and	eventually	also	Germany	would	be	overrun.	A	 second	 wave	 of	 criticism	 of	 Casimir’s	 intervention	 naturally	came	from	French	Catholics.	Before	Casmir’s	army	departed,	the	Bishop	of	 Rennes	 tried	 to	 forestall	 its	 departure.	 Rennes	 directly	 evoked	 the	bond	 between	 France	 and	 the	 Palatinate,	 and	 in	 particular	 the	 debt	owed	by	the	Protestant	German	princes	to	the	King	for	his	support	for	their	cause	in	1552:		…	these	causes	should	be	sufficient	in	itself	to	move	the	heart	of	both	the	Prince	Electors	and	the	others	of	the	Holy	Roman	Empire,	that	also	the	 foreign	 princes	 have	 received	 plenty	 of	 benefits	 from	 the	 said	crown	…	my	lord	the	prince	Casimir	in	particular	has	plenty	of	reason																																																									30	‘die	Erretung	vieler	 tausend	Christen	aus	dem	Blutbade,	das	 ihnen	von	dem	Papst	und	seinem	hausen	angerichtet’		'daß	die	Gloden	in	Frankreich	und	den	Niederlanden	zusammen	 schlagen	 …	 und	 daß	 man	 einander	 die	 hand	 sein	 biete.’	 W.	 Buleger	 to	Wilhelm	 of	 Hesse,	 11	 November	 1567,	 N.	 Japikse	 (ed.),	 Correspondentie	 van	Willem	
den	Eerste,	Prins	van	Oranje	(The	Hague:	Martinus	Nijhoff,	1934):	pp.	126-127		31	‘…	das	wir	mit	einichem	gueten	fueg	gedachten	unserer	sone	herzog	Johann	Casimir	von	 seinem	 fürnemen	 nunmer	 nit	 wol	 abhalten	 können	 …	 das	 billich	 mit	 den	betrangten	 christen	 in	 der	 cron	 Frankreich	 als	 unserer	 mitgliedern	 ain	 herzlichs	mitleiden	 zu	 haben	 …	 darumben	 die	 fürsorg	 getragen,	 do	 der	 babst	 sein	 willen	 in	Frankreich,	 Niderland	 und	 andern	 orten	 erlangt,	 er	 zuletst	 auch	 sein	 heil	 und	practisen	 an	 uns	 Teutschen	 gleichergestalt	 zuversuchen	 sich	 understeen	 mechte.’		Friedrich	 III	 to	 Christoph	 of	 Württemberg,	 15	 November	 1567,	 Kluckhohn,	 Briefe	
Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	II,	p.	134		
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that	press	him	 incessantly	and	 rightly	 [to	 refrain	 from	acting	against	the	King	of	France].32			This	was	a	powerful	argument	 that	needed	to	be	countered.	To	do	so,	Casimir	presented	himself	as	a	bringer	of	peace	and	stability	and,	more	importantly,	as	the	king’s	 loyal	servant.	Casimir	parried	accusations	of	sedition	 by	 arguing	 that	 he	 was	 preserving	 royal	 power,	 claiming	 ‘to	serve	for	the	glory	of	God,	a	good	and	perpetual	peace,	the	royal	dignity	of	his	realm,	and	the	poor	oppressed	Christians	…’33	For	 Casimir,	 the	 edicts	 of	 toleration	 provided	 the	 glue	 holding	these	twin	ambitions	together.	 In	a	 long	letter	to	Charles	IX	written	in	September	1568	he	lamented	the	continuous	breaking	of	the	edicts:			I	 assure	your	majesty,	 sire,	 that	 there	 is	no	prince	 in	 this	world	who	regrets	more	such	calamities	 in	your	kingdom	and	who	desires	more	to	 see	 your	majesty	 obeyed	 according	 to	 the	 edicts	…	 since	we	 have	heard	 to	 our	 great	 regret	 from	 this	 country	 at	 this	 time	 for	 a	 while	news	 of	 horrible	 massacres,	 murders,	 inhumane	 acts,	 and	 other	enormous	deeds,	which	daily	have	been	ordered	against	your	edicts.34			For	Casimir,	reinstating	and	expanding	the	religious	freedoms	granted	to	the	Huguenots	 in	the	edicts	was	the	only	way	to	create	 ‘a	good	and	lasting	 peace.’35	He	 once	 again	 restated	 his	 commitment	 to	 ‘…	 the	singular	 pretext	 of	 religion’,	 expressing	 the	 hope	 ‘that	 it	 may	 be																																																									32	‘que	ces	causes	soient	soufficantes	de	soy	pour	esmouvoir	le	Coeur	tant	des	Princes	Electeurs	et	autres	du	Sainct	Empire	qu’ausi	des	Princes	estrangieres	que	en	ont	recue	beaucoup	 de	 bien	 de	 ladicte	 Courronne	 …	 	 mondict	 seigneurs	 le	 Prince	 Casimir	 a	beaucoup	de	raisons	en	particulier	qui	le	pressent	inessament	et	iustement	…’	Bishop	of	Rennes	to	Friedrich	III,	7	November	1567,	BNF,	15918,	f.	52-58.		33	‘…	server	a	la	gloire	de	dieu	et	a	une	paix	et	bien	perpetuel	de	la	dignité	royalle	de	son	royaulme	et	des	pauvres	Chrestienes	oppressé	…’	BNF,	15544:	f.	232-233.	34	‘J’assure	vre	Mate,	(sire),	qu’il	n’y	a	Prince	en	ce	Monde	qui	regretted	tant	la	Calamité	de	vre	Royaume	&	qui	desire	plus	voir	vre	Mate	obeye	selon	ses	Editz	…	comme	nous	entendons	 à	 grand	 regret	 en	 ce	 Pais	 de	 iour	 à	 autre,	 nouvelles	 des	 horribles	massacres,	 meurtres,	 inhumanités	 &	 autres	 actes	 enormes	 qui	 se	 commedant	iournellement	contre	voz	Editz	…’	 Johann	Casimir	to	Charles	IX,	29	September	1568,	BNF,	15608:	f.	225.		35	‘…	bonne	et	ferme	paix	…’	Johann	Casimir	to	Pierre	de	la	Vieuville,	4	January	1568,	BNF,	15544:	f.	11.		
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exercised	freely	in	the	Kingdom	of	France,	with	the	conservation	and	…	safety	…	of	the	honour	of	the	subjects	following	the	Reformed	Religion	…’36	This,	according	to	Casimir,	was	the	only	way	‘to	preserve	the	crown	of	 France	 from	an	 extreme	and	 total	 ruin	…’37	This	 argument	was	not	well	received	at	the	French	court.	The	efforts	of	French	royal	diplomats	were	 aimed	 at	 persuading	 Casimir	 that	 the	 King	 was	 not	 benefiting	from	his	 intervention.	 Pierre	 de	 la	 Vieuville,	 for	 instance,	 in	 February	1568	 reminded	 Casimir	 that	 ‘the	 king	 does	 not	 prevent	 his	 subjects	from	 living	 in	 liberty	 as	 he	 has	 declared	 many	 times	 …’38	Since	 the	Huguenots	 were	 not	 being	 oppressed,	 as	 Casimir	 claimed,	 the	justifiability	of	his	campaign	was	open	to	question.		
6.4	William	of	Orange	and	Louis	of	Nassau		The	second	German	campaign	was	launched	by	William	of	Orange	and	his	brother	Louis	of	Nassau	in	1568.	Though	the	venture	was	in	the	first	place	 a	 response	 to	 the	 situation	 Orange	 found	 himself	 in	 –	 he	 was	outlawed	by	the	Council	of	Troubles	and	was	in	danger	of	losing	all	his	power	and	influence	in	the	Netherlands	-	the	campaign	was	also	firmly	built	on	ideological	foundations.	The	text	of	the	treaty	agreed	between	Orange,	 Condé,	 and	 Coligny	 in	 August	 1568	 provides	 the	 best	 insight	into	 Orange’s	 motivations	 and	 justifications	 at	 the	 start	 of	 the	 Third	War:	 	We	 therefore,	 considering	 these	 things,	 to	 overcome	 these	disadvantages	 and	 to	 counter	 the	 designs	 of	 the	 aforementioned	counsellors	[most	notably	Lorraine,	Granvelle,	and	Alba],	after	having	attentively	pondered	 these	 things	and	recognised	 that	 their	 intention																																																									36	‘…	 le	 seul	 pretext	 de	 la	 religion,	 pour	 y	 avoir	 exercise	 libre	 par	 le	 Royaulme	 de	France,	 avec	 le	 conservation	et	…	seurete	de	…	honneurs	des	Subjects	de	 la	 religion	reforme	…’	Ibid,	f.	11.		37		‘…	et	pour	preserver	la	couronne	de	France	d’une	extreme	et	totalle	ruyne	…’	Ibid,	f.	11.		38	‘le	Roy	n’empesche	point	ses	sujects	de	vivre	en	liberté	comme	il	a	beaucoup	de	fois	declaré.’	Pierre	de	la	Vieuville	to	Johann	Casimir,	7	February	1568,	Ibid,	f.	194.		
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is	 to	 exterminate	 the	 true	 religion	 and	 also	 the	 nobility	 and	 other	people	of	good	pedigree,	without	whom	kings	cannot	be	maintained	in	their	kingdoms,	hoping	under	this	pretext	to	establish	their	tyrannies	over	all	and	to	increase	their	domination,	have,	both	for	ourselves	and	in	name	of	the	nobility,	…	promised	with	the	faith	of	princes	and	good	men	to	pursue	…	the	glory	of	God,	the	profit	and	service	of	our	kings,	and	 the	 public	 good,	 and	 the	 freedom	 of	 religion,	 without	which	we	cannot	live	in	peace;	and	because	this	cannot	be	carried	out,	because	of	the	great	powers	of	our	adversaries,	but	through	a	true	understanding	and	 Christian	 alliance,	 we	 have	 at	 this	 occasion	 promised	 to	 aid,	promote,	and	secure	each	other	…39		This	 text	 is	 a	 culmination	 of	 the	 various	 modes	 of	 justification	developed	 in	 the	 previous	 decade.	 First	 of	 all,	 it	 contains	 elements	 of	Calvinist	resistance	 theory.	 It	emphasises	 that	passive	resistance	 is	no	longer	a	viable	option	since	the	pressure	on	those	of	‘the	true	religion’	has	become	so	severe.40	Thus,	as	magistrates	with	their	own	God-given	authority	 and	 responsibilities	 (‘without	 whom	 kings	 cannot	 be	maintained	 in	 their	 kingdoms’),	 Orange,	 Condé,	 and	 Coligny	 have	 the	duty	to	resist.41	Secondly,	the	text	has	a	Ciceronian	dimension.	Harking	back	 to	 Condé	 justification	 six	 years	 earlier,	 it	 argues	 that	 their	‘adversaries’	 (among	 others,	 Alba	 and	 the	 Guise)	 intend	 to	 seriously	
																																																								39 	‘Nous	 doncques	 consydérants	 ces	 choses,	 pour	 obvier	 à	 ces	 inconvéniens	 et	retrancher	 les	 desseings	 des	 susdicts	 conseilliers,	 après	 avoir	 meurement	 pesé	 les	affaires	 et	 cognu	 que	 leurs	 intention	 est	 d’exterminer	 la	 vraye	 religion	 et	 aussy	 la	noblesse	et	autres	gens	de	bien,	sans	lesquels	les	Roys	ne	peuvent	estre	maintenus	en	leurs	Royaulmes,	espérant	sur	 le	prétext	de	cela	establir	 leurs	Tyrannies	par	 tout	et	agrandir	leur	dominations,	avons,	tant	pour	nous	que	au	nom	de	la	Noblesse	…	promis	en	foy	des	Princes	et	d’hommes	de	bien	de	pourchasser	…	la	gloir	de	Dieu,	le	proficts	et	service	de	nos	Roys,	et	le	bien	publicq,	et	la	liberté	de	la	religion,	sans	laquelle	nous	ne	pouvons	vivre	en	paix;	et	pour	ce	que	cela	ne	se	peult	affectuer,	à	cause	des	grandes	forces	de	noz	adversaires,	que	par	une	vray	intelligence	et	alliance	Christienne,	avons	à	ceste	occasion	promis	de	nous	ayder,	 favoriser	et	secourir	 l’ung	à	 l’autre	…’	Treaty	between	Orange,	Condé,	and	Coligny,	August	1568,	G.	Groen	van	Prinsteren,	Archives	
ou	 Correspondance	 Inédite	 de	 la	 Maison	 d’Orange-Nassau,	 Volume	 III,	 1567-1572,	(Leiden:	S.	&	J.	Luchtmans,	1836):	pp.	284-285.		40	‘la	vraye	religion’	Ibid,	pp.	284-285.		41	‘sans	 lesquels	 les	 Roys	 ne	 peuvent	 estre	maintenus	 en	 leurs	 Royaulmes’	 Ibid,	 pp.	284-285.		
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disrupt	and	destroy	the	balance	of	power	in	the	commonwealth.42	They	plan	to	 ‘exterminate	…	the	nobility	and	other	people	of	good	pedigree’	and	to	‘establish	their	tyrannies’.43	In	doing	so,	these	enemies	usurp	the	power	 of	monarchs,	 severely	 damage	 the	 rights	 and	 privileges	 of	 the	nobility,	and	place	their	own	interest	above	the	common	good.	Finally,	the	text	makes	references	to	the	Catholic	Conspiracy.	The	covert	nature	of	Catholic	intentions	is	underlined	by	claiming	that	these	only	became	clear	after	they	were	‘pondered	attentively’.44		However,	 the	 most	 important	 foundation	 of	 Orange’s	 first	campaign	in	France	is	only	implicitly	present	in	the	text.	Orange,	Condé,	and	 Coligny	 in	 their	 treaty	 make	 no	 distinction	 whatsoever	 between	events	 in	 France	 and	 the	 Netherlands.	 This	 recognition	 of	 the	transnational	 nature	 of	 their	 shared	 struggle	 underpinned	 the	cooperation.	 The	 treaty	 demanded	 significant	 investment	 and	 risk-taking	 without	 the	 guarantee	 that	 there	 would	 be	 an	 opportunity	 at	which	the	other	party	could	reciprocate.	After	peace	had	been	agreed	in	France	in	1570,	Coligny	demonstrated	a	great	determination	to	fulfil	his	side	of	the	agreement,	despite	the	great	risks	and	small	reward	that	this	was	 likely	 to	 bring.45	These	 actions	 were	 primarily	 inspired	 by	 the	conviction	 that	 the	 conflicts	 in	 France	 and	 the	 Netherlands	 were	intertwined.	 Louis	 of	 Nassau’s	 central	 role	 in	 this	 campaign	 further	underlines	 these	 theoretical	 underpinnings.	 In	 many	 ways	 the	embodiment	 of	 the	 interconnectedness	 of	 Europe’s	 religious	 conflicts,	Louis	 demonstrated	 his	 international	 outlook	 through	 his	 continued	efforts	to	coordinate	 international	cooperation	between	Protestants	 in	France,	the	Low	Countries,	England,	and	Germany.46	
																																																								42	‘adversaires’	Ibid,	pp.	284-285.		43	d’exterminer	…	la	noblesse	et	autres	gens	de	bien’	Ibid,	pp.	284-285.		44	‘meurement	pesé’	Ibid,	pp.	284-285.		45	N.	M.	Sutherland,	The	Massacre	of	St	Bartholomew	and	the	European	Conflict,	1559-
1572,	(London:	Macmillan,	1973):	pp.	302-303.		46	P.	J.	van	Herweden,	Het	Verblijf	van	Lodewijk	van	Nassau	in	Frankrijk,	Hugenoten	en	
Geuzen,	1568-1572,	(Assen:	Van	Gorcum,	1932):	pp.	82-104.	
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The	 chance	 to	prove	his	 sincerity	 came	 two	months	 later	when	Orange	led	an	army,	largely	consisting	of	German	mercenary	troops,	into	Brabant.	The	expectation	was	that	the	invasion	would	be	the	cue	for	the	towns	 and	 cities	 of	 the	 Low	 Countries	 to	 expel	 the	 loyalist	 leadership	and	 join	 the	 revolt.	 In	 the	 event,	 the	 expedition	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 a	disaster.	Barely	any	support	from	within	the	Netherlands	came	and	Alba	refused	to	meet	Orange	in	battle.	Without	help	and	lacking	‘all	necessary	provisions’,	Orange	decided	 instead	 to	attempt	 to	ease	 the	 ‘unbearable	suffering	 of	 the	 poor	 besieged	 Christians	 in	 France’.47	In	 December	 he	led	 his	 unwilling	 army	 into	 Picardy	 in	 the	 hope	 of	 joining	 forces	with	Condé.	 According	 to	 Louis	 of	 Nassau,	 ‘the	 French	 have	 requested	 and	asked	 my	 lord	 the	 Prince	 …’	 to	 intervene,	 in	 accordance	 with	 ‘the	established	treaty.’48		 The	 presence	 of	 Orange’s	 forces	 in	 France	 led	 to	 an	 uneasy	diplomatic	exchange	between	the	Prince	and	the	crown.	The	tone	of	the	negotiations,	 conducted	 by	 Marshal	 Artus	 de	 Cossé-Brissac,	 was	surprisingly	 courteous.	 Although	 Cossé	 reminded	 Orange	 that	 his	troops	 ‘burn	mills	and	barns	and	pillage	the	subjects’,	he	also	attested	that	the	King	‘doubts	that	[Orange]	wants	to	undertake	anything	against	the	 position	 of	 the	 said	 sire	 my	 master	 and	 to	 the	 damage	 of	 his	subjects.’49	Orange	 on	 his	 part,	 although	 he	 exclaimed	 that	 he	 did	 not	fear	the	royal	army	‘since	God,	who	gives	victories,	…	has	no	regard	for	numbers’,	 lacked	 a	 clear	military	 objective.50	When	 this	 campaign	 too	threatened	 to	 end	 in	 failure,	 he	 offered	 the	 King	 his	 services	 as	 a	mediator	between	the	monarchy	and	the	Huguenots.	This	plan	failed	to																																																									47	‘aller	 nöttigen	 proviant’	 ‘das	 unleidlich	 Elendt	 der	 armen	 betrangten	 Christen	 in	Franckreich’.		Ibid,	p.	24.		48	‘die	Franzosen	bey	mein	hern	dem	Pritzen	angesucht	und	gebetten’	 ‘der	ufgerichte	vertrag’	 Johann	 of	 Nassau	 to	 an	 unnamed	 recipient,	 25	 December	 1568,	 Groen	 van	Prinsterer,	Archives	ou	Correspondance	Inédite	…	Volume	III,	p.	306.		49	‘faire	brusler	des	moulins,	granges,	saccaiger	les	subjects’	‘doubte	que	vous	veuillez	entreprendre	 chose	 contre	 l’estat	 du	 dict	 Sr	 mon	 maître	 et	 au	 dommaige	 de	 ses	subjects.’	 Report	 of	 the	 negotiation	 between	 Artus	 de	 Cossé-Brissac	 and	William	 of	Orange,	December	1568,	Ibid,	pp.	313-314.		50	‘car	Dieu,	qui	donne	 les	victoires,	…	n’a	aucune	regard	au	nombre’	Herweden,	Het	
Verblijf	van	Lodewijk	van	Nassau	in	Frankrijk,	p.	25.		
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materialise	 and	 Orange,	 who	 was	 quickly	 running	 out	 of	 the	 funds	necessary	 to	 pay	 his	 troops,	 was	 forced	 to	 pull	 back	 to	 Strasbourg,	where	 he	 had	 considerable	 difficulties	 to	 disband	 his	 disgruntled	 and	underpaid	forces.51		
6.5	Wolfgang	of	Zweibrücken		The	 third	 German	 expedition	 in	 France,	 conducted	 by	 Wolfgang	 of	Zweibrücken	 in	 1569,	 has	 traditionally	 been	 dismissed	 as	 a	 vanity	project	 led	 by	 an	 adventure-loving	 nobleman.	 Bernard	 Vogler,	 for	instance,	 described	 the	 count	 as	 ‘an	 adventurer	 without	 political	ideas’. 52 	This	 is	 an	 incorrect	 interpretation	 as	 Wolfgang	 of	Zweibrücken’s	 correspondence	 from	 the	 1560s	 suggests	 that	 he	 had	well	 informed	 and	 sometimes	 even	 original	 ideas	 about	 the	 French	Wars	of	Religion,	its	causes,	and	its	possible	solutions.	His	position	was	relatively	 complex	 and	 a	number	of	 seemingly	 contradictory	 episodes	from	 his	 life	 have	 made	 him	 susceptible	 to	 accusations	 of	 hypocrisy.	However,	a	closer	 look	at	his	 life,	character,	and	 ideas	reveals	 that	his	actions	 throughout	 the	 1560s	 are	 entirely	 consistent	 with	 his	ideological	outlook.	Rather	 than	 being	 an	 opportunist,	 Wolfgang	 in	 his	correspondence	 shows	 himself	 to	 be	 ideologically	 committed	 to	 the	idea	 of	 international	 Protestantism.	 This	 went	 hand	 in	 hand	 with	reform	at	home.	He	commissioned	a	new	church	order	for	his	county	in	1557	 (for	 which	 he	 consulted	 Melanchthon	 and	 Brenz),	 organised	visitations,	 and	 was	 directly	 involved	 in	 the	 crafting	 of	 edifying	literature	 designed	 to	 serve	 as	moral	 guidance	 for	 his	 subjects.53	One	pamphlet	 warned	 against	 ‘unchristian	 blaspheming,	 cursing,	 and	swearing’.	 Another	 attacked	 the	 ‘damned	 and	 seductive	 sect’	 of	 the																																																									51	Ibid,	pp.	20-45.		52	‘un	adventurier	sans	idées	politiques’	Vogler,	‘Le	role	des	Électeurs	Palatins,	p.	62.		53	Wolfgang	of	Zweibrücken	to	Christoph	of	Württemberg,	21	August	1557,	HStASt,	A	71	Bü	856,	30.		
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Anabaptists.54	In	a	 letter	to	Christoph	of	Württemberg	from	June	1560	Wolfgang	 gives	 an	 insight	 into	 his	 personal	 commitment	 to	 the	Lutheran	 faith:	 ‘I	 have	 liberated	 myself	 from	 the	 Babylonians,	 and	moved	 to	 the	 true	 [interpretation	of	 the]	Gospel’	adding	 that	 ‘God	has	been	so	gracious	with	me,	since	he	made	from	a	Saul	a	Paul.’55		As	a	Lutheran,	Wolgang	was	hostile	 to	Reformed	Protestantism	and	was	strongly	opposed	to	Friedrich	III’s	conversion.	Nonetheless,	as	early	 as	 1560	 he	 spoke	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 Huguenots	 in	 France.	Contrasting	 strongly	 with	 the	 usual	 respectful	 language	 used	 to	describe	the	monarchs	of	France,	Wolfgang	spoke	with	barely	disguised	disdain	 of	 the	 King’s	 role	 in	 the	 persecution	 of	 the	 Huguenots.	 On	having	 heard	 of	 an	 illness	 that	 plagued	 Francis	 II	 in	 1560,	 Wolfgang	remarked	that	it	was	clearly	‘a	punishment	by	God	…	since	he	[Francis]	against	 the	 Word	 of	 God	 and	 the	 poor	 Christian,	 has	 instituted	 a	tyranny.’56	This	providential	understanding	of	the	situation	the	French	Protestants	and	of	the	role	of	French	Catholics	in	their	persecutions	was	partly	 the	 work	 of	 Huguenot	 propaganda,	 but	 his	 own	 beliefs	 and	character	 also	 made	 the	 count	 more	 receptive	 for	 further	 Huguenot	polemic.	Throughout	 the	 1560s,	 Wolfgang	 looked	 favourably	 upon	 the	Huguenots.	 He	 downplayed	 the	 differences	 between	 the	 two	 creeds	and,	 though	 strongly	 committed	 to	 the	Augsburg	Confession,	 believed	that	 these	 differences	 could	 be	 bridged.57	In	 a	 letter	 to	 Christoph	 of	Württemberg	 written	 in	 September	 1563,	 he	 discussed	 the	 relation	between	 Lutheranism	 and	 Reformed	 Protestantism.	 Wolfgang	 was																																																									54	‘das	 unchristlichen	 Gottslestern,	 schweren	 und	 fluchen’	 ‘verdambten	 verfürischen	Sect’	HStASt,	A	71	Bü	856,	33.		55	‘Ich	mich	von	der	Babilonishen	…	erlöst,	unnd	dem	rhainen	Evangelio	begeben’	 ‘…	Gott	…	der	so	gnediglich	mit	mir	gethan,	 Inn	dem	er	aus	ainem	Saulo	ainem	Paulum	gemacht	…’	Wolfgang	of	Zweibrücken	 to	Christoph	of	Württemberg,	1560,	HStASt,	A	71	Bü	883,	148.		56	‘straff	Gottes	…	dieweill	er	wider	das	Göttlich	wortt,	und	die	armen	Christen,	…	aine	…	 tyranny	 sieen	 that.’	 Wolfgang	 of	 Zweibrücken	 to	 Christoph	 of	 Württemberg,	 13	Febuary	1560,	HStASt,	A	71	Bü	878,	126.		57	J.	 Ney,	 ‘Pfalzgraf	 Wolfgang,	 Herzog	 von	 Zweibrücken	 und	 Neuburg’,	 Schriften	 des	
Vereins	für	Reformationsgeschichte,	29	(1911):	1-124,	on	p.	75.		
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aware	 ‘that	 our	 Christian	 opinions	 are	 condemned	 and	 dismissed	publicly	by	their	ministers’.58	But	instead	of	denouncing	the	doctrines	of	the	 Huguenots,	 he	 ‘in	 a	 friendly	 manner	 asked	 and	 admonished	 the	ministers	 of	 the	 churches	 in	 France	…	 to	 abolish	 such	 a	practice	 [and	instead	to	make	sure]	that	the	confession	of	the	French	churches	from	now	 on	 in	 all	 articles	 and	 especially	 in	 the	 …	 articles	 of	 the	 Lord’s	Supper	and	predestination	[follow]	the	beatifying	Word	of	God	and	our	Christian	 Augsburg	 Confession.’ 59 	Believing	 that	 the	 Huguenots’	erroneous	 interpretation	 of	 Scripture	 was	 the	 product	 of	 mistakes	rather	than	malice,	he	hoped	that	the	situation	could	be	rectified	if	the	Huguenots	‘in	all	articles	will	be	instructed	of	the	true	foundation	of	our	Christian	 doctrines	 …’60	For	 this	 reason	 he	 was	 more	 credulous	 in	regards	 to	 Huguenot	 propaganda.	 The	 intensity	 of	 his	 religious	conviction	 and	 his	 direct	 involvement	 in	 the	 Reformation	 of	 his	territories	 led	 Wolfgang	 to	 develop	 distinct	 religious	 ideas	independently	of	his	court	preachers	and	 theologians.	His	unorthodox	understanding	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 Lutherans	 and	 Reformed	Protestants	 is	 a	 good	 example	 of	 this	 mindset.	 This	 independent	attitude	put	him	on	a	collision	course	with	some	influential	Lutherans.	His	 own	 court	 preacher,	 Tileman	 Heßhus,	 was	 particularly	 critical,	questioning	the	Huguenots’	religion	and	motives.61	Wolfgang	was	 a	man	of	 action.	As	discussed	above,	 he	was	 the	first	of	the	Protestant	princes	who	considered	militarily	intervention	in	France.	According	to	the	Allgemeine	Deutsche	Biographie,	the	Duke	also																																																									58 	‘das	 unsere	 Christliche	 mainung	 also	 offentlich	 vonn	 Iren	 kirchen	 dienern	 …	verdammet	 unnd	 verworffen	 würde’	 Wolfgang	 of	 Zweibrücken	 to	 Christoph	 of	Württemberg,	22	September	1563,	HStASt,	A	71	Bü	920,	62.		59	‘Beten	 und	 vermanten	 wir	 freuntlich	 solchs	 bei	 den	 dienner	 der	 …	 kirchen	 inn	Franckreich	 …	 abzuschaffen	 …	 das	 der	 Französisch	 kirchen	 confession	 hinfuro	 inn	allen	 articuln	 sonderlich	 aber	 inn	 dem	 …	 articulo	 de	 coena	 domini	 &	 de	
preadestinatione	 dem	 seligmachenden	 wortt	 Gottes	 und	 unserer	 Christlichen	Augspurgisch	Confession	….’,	Wolfgang	of	Zweibrücken	to	Christoph	of	Württemberg,	22	September	1563,	HStASt,	A	71	Bü	920,	62.		60	‘in	 allen	 articuln	 des	 rechten	 waren	 fundaments	 unnseren	 Christlichen	 Lehre	möchten	underwissen	…’	Wolfgang	of	Zweibrücken	to	Christoph	of	Württemberg,	29	April	1561,	HStASt,	A	71	Bü	895.		61	Ney,	‘Pfalzgraf	Wolfgang,	p.	80.	
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worked	 together	with	 the	 famous	mercenary	and	adventurer	Wilhelm	von	 Grumbach,	 who	 in	 the	 summer	 of	 1564	 planned	 to	 capture	 the	Bishop	 of	 Metz	 and	 the	 Cardinal	 of	 Lorraine.	 This	 story,	 however,	 is	shrouded	in	mystery,	as	there	is	no	clear	evidence	to	indicate	that	this	plot	 even	 existed.	 Another	 example	 of	 Wolfgang’s	 activity	 on	 the	international	 political	 stage	 was	 his	 association	 with	 Philip	 II.	 On	 1	October	1565	the	Duke	entered	the	service	of	the	King	of	Spain	for	the	duration	 of	 three	 years	 in	 exchange	 for	 an	 annual	 pension	 of	 4500	Guilders.	 Although	 the	 terms	 of	 his	 contract	 stipulated	 that	Wolfgang	would	 not	 be	 used	 against	 the	 Emperor,	 the	 Imperial	 princes,	 or	 the	Augsburg	 Confession,	 this	 association	 has	 cemented	 Wolfgang’s	reputation	 among	 historians	 as	 an	 adventurer	 and	 opportunist.	 This	assessment	of	his	character,	however,	is	not	accurate.	In	1565,	Philip’s	reputation	 was	 not	 yet	 tainted	 by	 the	 narrative	 of	 the	 Catholic	Conspiracy	and	the	King	still	enjoyed	the	loyalty	of	the	high	nobility	of	the	Netherlands,	including	William	of	Orange.	Moreover,	Wolfgang	was	neither	 the	 first	 nor	 the	 last	 German	 prince	 to	 enter	 the	 service	 of	 a	foreign	Catholic	monarch.	 Christoph	of	Württemberg,	 Johann	Wilhelm	of	 Saxe-Weimar,	 and	 Philibert	 of	 Baden	 all	 had	 similar	 arrangements	with	the	King	of	France.	Wolfgang’s	contract	with	Philip	 II	would	thus	not	have	raised	too	many	eyebrows	in	1565.	The	outbreak	of	violence	in	the	Netherlands,	however,	complicated	this	relationship.	During	the	summer	 of	 1566,	 Wolfgang	 was	 still	 inclined	 to	 stand	 by	 Philip,	believing,	 as	 many	 did	 of	 his	 Lutheran	 peers,	 that	 the	 unrest	 in	 the	Netherlands	 was	 the	 responsibility	 of	 unruly	 and	 iconoclastic	 mobs.	After	 the	 execution	 of	 Egmont	 and	 Hoorne,	 Wolfgang	 changed	 his	position.	He	refused	Alba’s	request	to	send	2000	Reiters	and	broke	his	association	 with	 Philip.	 Wolfgang’s	 biographer,	 Julius	 Ney,	 estimated	that	‘what	happened	in	the	Netherlands	and	France	completely	opened	Wolfgang’s	 eyes.’ 62 	He	 interpreted	 the	 violence	 of	 1567	 as	 the	vindication	 of	 the	 Huguenot	 explanation	 of	 the	 causes	 of	 the	 French	Wars	 of	 Religion.	 According	 to	 Ney,	 the	 execution	 of	 Egmont	 and																																																									62	Ibid,	pp.	75-76.		
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Hoorne	played	a	crucial	role	in	persuading	Wolfgang	of	the	truth	of	the	Huguenot	narrative.	Despite	 the	 controversy	 of	 some	 of	 his	 views	 and	 actions,	Wolfgang’s	campaign	enjoyed	much	broader	support	 in	Germany	than	the	others.	His	status	as	 leader	of	a	respectable,	magisterial	and,	more	importantly,	 Lutheran	 Reformation	 helped	 in	 winning	 the	 backing	 of	significant	numbers	of	German	Lutherans.	In	addition,	the	threat	of	the	Catholic	Conspiracy	had	altered	 the	mood	amongst	Protestant	 to	such	an	 extent	 that	 intervention	 in	 France	 was	 increasingly	 seen	 as	necessary	and	 legitimate.	William	of	Orange	and	Louis	of	Nassau,	who	after	 the	 disastrous	 end	 of	 their	 own	 campaign	 had	 retreated	 to	 the	Rhineland,	 were	 amongst	 the	 first	 to	 lend	 their	 support.	 The	 two	brothers	played	a	 central	 role	 in	Wolfgang’s	 campaign	and	because	of	their	military	experience	assumed	the	de	facto	military	command	of	the	German	 troops.	 Elizabeth	 I	 was	 another	 influential	 supporter,	 partly	financing	the	mission.	Other	sources	of	money	were	also	available.	Odet	de	 Châtillon	 reportedly	 provided	 ‘150,000	 crowns’,	 adding	 to	 ‘the	money	of	 the	merchants	of	Hamburg	who	presented	100,000	écus	 for	the	payment	of	the	men	of	the	Duke	of	Zweibrücken.’63	In	January	1569	Wolfgang	moved	 through	 the	Franche-Comté	 into	France	with	20,000	men.64	Wolfgang,	 however,	 did	 not	 live	 to	 see	 the	 completion	 of	 his	campaign,	since	he	died	of	 illness	and	exhaustion	 four	days	before	his	forces	met	up	with	the	Huguenot	army.65	Let	us	now	turn	to	the	way	in	which	the	mission	was	portrayed	and	interpreted	by	contemporaries.	Wolfgang,	like	Casimir,	was	keen	to	emphasise	his	respect	for	the	king’s	authority.	Before	he	entered	France	on	 the	23rd	 of	April,	 he	wrote	 to	Charles	 IX	 explaining	 that	he	had	no																																																									63	‘hundert	 und	 funfzig	 tausend	 kronen’	Henry	Killigrew	 to	 Christoph	 von	Ehem,	 11	May	 1569,	 Kluckhohn,	 Briefe	 Friedrich	 des	 Frommen	 …	 Volume	 II	 …:	 p.	 321;	Anonymous	 letter	 from	England,	 28	April	 1569,	 ‘de	 l’argent	 des	marchants,	 ceux	de	Hambourg	 luy	 present	 100	 mille	 escus	 d’or	 pour	 payer	 les	 gens	 du	 Duc	 des	 deux	Ponts.’		BNF,	15549,	f.	138.		64	T.	A.	Brady,	German	Histories	in	the	Age	of	the	Reformations,	1400-1650,	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2009):	pp.	238-239.		65	Herweden,	Het	Verblijf	van	Lodewijk	van	Nassau	in	Frankrijk,	pp.	54-58.		
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intention	to	harm	the	King,	whom	he	hoped	to	serve	one	day,	but	that	he	 acted	 out	 of	 compassion	 for	 the	 French	 Protestants. 66 	After	Wolfgang’s	death,	his	heroic	 commitment	 to	 the	Protestant	 cause	was	emphasised.	His	elaborate	grave	monument	 in	the	Schlosskirche	 in	the	Palatinate	 town	 of	 Meisenheim	 portrays	 Wolfgang	 in	 full	 armour	kneeling	underneath	a	crucifix,	clearly	visualising	the	prince’s	devotion	to	 his	 religion	 and	 his	 willingness	 to	 defend	 it,	 even	 with	 his	 life.67	Wolfgang’s	 principal	 ally,	 the	 Prince	 of	 Orange,	 too	 made	 much	 of	Wolfgang’s	 sacrifice	 in	 service	 of	 Protestantism	 in	 France,	 the	Netherlands,	and	the	Empire:		Your	Grace	as	the	most	knowledgeable	Prince	Elector	graciously	has	to	appreciate	what	burdensome	and	irreversible	service	he	has	done	not	only	 for	 the	poor	Christians	 in	 this	 country	of	France,	but	also	 in	 the	Netherlands	 and	 other	 countries,	 in	 which	 the	Word	 of	 God	 already	has	been	planted	so	extensively	and	truly	and	where	people	are	being	deprived	 of	 religion;	 and	 especially	 also	 [to	 prevent]	 the	 danger,	misery,	and	woes	that	in	our	beloved	fatherland	of	the	German	nation	as	a	consequence	of	this	may	arrive	since	the	entire	war,	as	you	know,	has	 been	 started	 and	 is	 being	 waged	 with	 no	 other	 goal	 but	 the	extermination	of	our	common	religion	and	liberties.68		
																																																								66	Ibid,	p.	52.		67 	K.	 Malisch,	 ‘Pfalzgraf	 Wolfgang	 von	 Zweibrücken	 und	 Neuburg	 und	 die	französischen	 Hugenotten’,	 France-Bayern:	 Bayern	 und	 Frankreich:	 Wege	 und	
Begegnungen,	 1000	 Jahre	 Bayerischen-Französische	 Beziehungen,	 France-Bavière;	
Allers	et	Retours,	1000	Ans	de	Relations	Franco-Bavaroises,	(Paris:	Biro,	2006):	pp.	110-115.		68	‘…	 so	 haben	 E.	 G..	 als	 der	 hochverständige	 Churfurst,	 gnedig	 zuermessen,	 in	 was	beschwerliche	und	unwiederbringliche	dhienstbarkeit	nit	allein	die	armen	Christen	in	dieszem	Frankreich,	auch	in	den	nieder	und	andern	landen,	darin	Gottes	wortt	berritz	so	weitt	und	rein	gepflantzet,	gebracht	und	der	Religion	beraubt	wurden,	sondern	was	auch	unserm	geliebtem	vatterlande	deutscher	nation	vor	gemeine	gefahr,	jammer	und	elende	darausz	endtsthen	mochte,	dieweill	dieszer	gantzen	krieg,	wie	E.	G.	wiszen,	su	nichts	 anderm	als	 anstilgung	unser	 gemeiner	Relligion	und	 freiheiten	 angefangen	 is	und	 gefurt	 wirt.’	 William	 of	 Orange	 to	 August	 of	 Saxony,	 19	 July	 1569,	 P.	 J.	 Blok,	
Correspondentie	 van	 en	 Betreffende	 Lodewijk	 van	 Nassau	 en	 Andere	 Onuitgegeven	
Documenten,	Verzameld	door	Dr.	P.	J.	Blok,	(Utrecht:	Kemink	en	Zoon,	1887):	p.	80.		
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This	 interpretation	of	Wolfgang’s	mission	contrasts	 strongly	with	 that	of	 Vogler,	 who	 tends	 to	 rely	 on	 hostile	 sources.	 For	 example,	 in	 the	correspondence	between	Charles	 IX	and	 the	Duke	of	Aumale,	younger	brother	of	the	Duke	of	Guise,	 it	 is	suggested	that	Wolfgang’s	campaign	was	primarily	motivated	by	 the	prospect	of	personal	gain	and	 that	he	could	 not	 only	 easily	 be	 dissuaded	 from	 carrying	 it	 through,	 but	 ‘that	the	Duke	of	Zweibrücken	will	quit	the	party	of	the	princes	and	join	that	of	the	King’	when	he	was	offered	‘a	fat	pension.’69	The	stark	dichotomy	between	Protestant	and	Catholic	 interpretations	of	 the	purpose	of	 the	mission	is	telling.	The	idea	that	Wolfgang’s	services	could	be	bought	fits	in	 the	 tradition	 of	 describing	 the	 Huguenots	 and	 their	 supporters	 as	self-serving	 rebels	 striving	 for	 their	 own	 political	 and	 financial	betterment.	This	Catholic	interpretation,	however,	does	not	correspond	to	 the	 reality	 of	 Wolfgang’s	 mission,	 which	 was	 launched	 with	 the	financial	 backing	 of	 a	 number	 of	 Protestant	 parties	 to	 support	 their	coreligionists	 in	 France	 and	 to	 prevent	 the	 Catholics	 from	 tipping	 the	confessional	balance	of	power	in	Europe	in	their	favour.		
6.6	Johann	Wilhelm	of	Saxe-Weimar		The	 fourth	 and	 most	 controversial	 German	 campaign	 in	 France	 was	undertaken	 in	 1568	 by	 Johann	 Wilhelm	 of	 Saxe-Weimar.	 The	 Duke’s	decision	to	serve	as	a	captain	in	the	army	of	the	Catholic	king	put	him	on	a	 collision	 course	 with	 his	 Protestant	 peers	 who	 supported	 the	Huguenots.	 Unsurprisingly,	 the	 Duke	 of	 Saxe-Weimar	 has	 not	 always	been	 treated	kindly	 in	 the	historiography.	Gregor	Richter,	 for	 instance,	though	 acknowledging	 Johann	 Wilhelm’s	 ideological	 opposition	 to	Reformed	 Protestantism,	 describes	 the	 Duke	 as	 an	 opportunist	primarily	 interested	 in	 furthering	 his	 ‘concrete	 political	 interests.’70																																																									69	‘que	le	Duc	des	deux	Ponts	quittera	le	party	des	Princes	pour	prendre	celuy	de	Roy’	‘une	grosse	pension’,	Charles	IX	to	the	Duke	of	Anjou,	20	December	1568,	BNF,	15548:	f.	149.		70	G.	 Richter,	 ‘Württemberg	 und	 der	 Kriegzeug	 des	 Herzogs	 Johann	 Wilhelm	 von	Sachsen	 nach	 Frankreich	 im	 Jahr	 1568’,	 Zeitschrift	 für	 Württembergische	
Landesgeschichte,	26	(1967):	p.	254.	
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However,	the	sincerity	of	Johann	Wilhelm’s	Lutheran	beliefs	should	not	be	underestimated.	The	foundations	for	the	expedition	of	 Johann	Wilhelm	were	 laid	in	 late	1557,	more	 than	a	decade	before	 it	 took	place.	At	 this	 time,	 the	eve	 of	 the	 conclusion	 of	 the	wars	 between	 France	 and	 the	Habsburgs,	Henry	II	was	recruiting	German	noblemen	to	fight	for	the	French	cause.	On	 16	 December	 1557,	 the	 King	 approached	 Johann	Wilhelm	 and	 his	relative	 Johann	 Friedrich,	 Duke	 of	 Saxony,	 with	 a	 proposal. 71 	In	exchange	 for	 an	 annual	 pension,	 the	 two	 dukes	 would	 recruit	 and	command	 regiments	 of	 Pistoliers	 (German	 light	 cavalry)	 for	 the	French.72	In	 early	 1558,	 a	 treaty	was	 agreed	 on	 the	 condition	 that	 the	troops	would	not	be	used	against	 the	Holy	Roman	Empire	or	 the	 ‘true	Christian	religion	of	[the]	Augsburg	Confession	and	its	members’.73	That	same	year,	Johann	Wilhelm	was	first	called	upon	to	fulfil	his	part	of	the	bargain.	 Briefly,	 the	 duke	 and	 his	 regiment	 formed	 part	 of	 the	 French	army,	 until	 the	 Peace	 of	 Cateau-Cambrésis	 ended	 the	 demand	 for	German	troops	in	France.74	Over	the	next	decade,	 Johann	Wilhelm	kept	receiving	 a	 French	 pension.	 To	 mitigate	 the	 controversy	 of	 this	connection	he	published	a	pamphlet	in	1558	in	which	he	explained	the	conditions	of	his	service.75																																																										71	Barthold,	Deutschland	und	die	Hugenotten,	pp.	221-284.		72	K.	Hahn,	Herzog	Johann	Wilhelm	von	Weimar	und	Seine	Beziehungen	zu	Frankreich,	(Jena:	Gustav	Fischer,	1907):	pp.	41-96.		73	‘die	Ware/	Christliche	Religion/	unserer	Augspurgischen	Confession	und	derselben	verwandte’	 Johann	 Wilhelm	 of	 Saxe-Weimar,	 Ausschreiben.	 Des	 Durchlauchtigen	
Hochgebornen	Fürsten	unnd	Herrn,	Herrn	Johans	Wilhelmen	Hertzogen	zu	Sachssen.	An	
seiner	F.	G.	Getrewe	Landschafft	 von	Prelaten,	Graffen,	Herrn,	Ritterschafft	und	Stedte,	
Seiner	 F.	 G.	 jtzigen	 zugs	 in	 Franckreich,	 unnd	warumb	die	Könnigliche	Wirde	 doselbst	
Seine	 F.	 G.	 Auff	 sonderbare	 benentliche	 ausziehunge	 unnd	 vorbehaltunge	 derselben	
Dienstbestallunge,	auch	Ehren	unnd	Glimpffs	wegen	nicht	vorlassen	können	(Weimar:	s.	n.,	1568):	p.	3.		74	Hahn,	Herzog	Johann	Wilhelm	von	Weimar,	pp.	41-96.		75	Anon.,	Warhaftiger	 Abdruck	 des	 Durchleuchten	 Hochgebornen	 Fürsten	 und	 Herrn/	
Herrn	 Johann	 Wilhelm/	 Herzogen	 zu	 Sachsen/	 Landgraffen	 in	 Döringen/	 und	
Marggraffen	zu	Meissern/	ausgegangene	Schreibens/	am	Dato	im	feltlager	bey	Amiens/	
den	27.	Septembris	negst	vorschinē/	an	etzliche	Chur	ūn	 	Fürsten	des	Heiligen	Reichs/	
darinnen	S.	F.	G.	ursachen	anzeigen/	Welcher	halben	sie	sich	in	des	konigs	zu	Frankreich	
kriegs	und	dienstbestestellung	begeben/	und	sich	daneben	ausdrücklich	erkleren/	Das	S.	
F.	 G.	 gemüt	 und	 vorhaben	 nicht	 sey/	 einigen	 des	 heiligen	 Reich	 Deutscher	 Nation	
		 289	
Johann	 Wilhelm’s	 French	 pension	 brought	 far-reaching	obligations.	The	Duke	of	Anjou	made	these	explicit	in	a	letter	to	Johann	Wilhelm	from	February	1568:	‘I	beg	that	you	make	haste	in	your	journey	to	France	with	your	forces	in	order	to	oppose	the	troops	of	Casimir	that	want	to	advance	into	this	kingdom,	pillaging	and	burning	everything.’76	In	a	 letter	written	 two	weeks	earlier,	Catherine	de’	Medici	appealed	 to	the	 longstanding	 connection	 between	 France	 and	 Weimar	 and	emphasised	the	justness	of	the	King’s	cause:		 My	cousin,	my	lord	the	King,	my	son,	has	sent	you	the	lord	of	Loubière	to	 make	 you	 understand	 what	 the	 cause	 is	 for	 which	 you	 are	 being	used	 and	 this	 first	 levy	 that	 is	 conducted	 in	 Germany	 for	 his	 service	and	to	ask	you	to	raise	around	4000	pistoliers	on	horseback,	which	he	hopes	will	enter	his	service	before	this	spring	if	the	affairs	drag	out	for	a	 longer	 time,	 assuring	 you	 that	 your	 good	 conduct	 will	 be	 of	 great	benefit	for	his	kingdom	…77		Johann	Wilhelm	replied	using	the	language	of	friendship	and	loyalty.	In	his	letters	to	Charles	IX	he	spoke	of	‘the	devotion	that	I	have	always	had	to	the	good	of	serving	your	majesty	...’78	Johann	Wilhelm	felt	the	urge	to																																																																																																																																														
einverleibten	Standt/	durch	S.	F.	G.	oder	die	Iren	zubeschwerē/	noch	solchs	zuthun	den	
Iren	wissentlich	 zu	 gestatten.	Daraus	 dann	 zubefinden/	 das	 S.	 F.	 G.	 und	 den	 Iren/	mit	
dem	 ausgesprengtem	 geschrey/	 als	 solten	 S.	 F.	 G.	 in	 izigem	 vorstehenden	 Abzug/	 das	
geurlaubte	 französische	kriegsvolck	an	sich	ziehen/	und	damit	 inn	Deutschland/	Krieg	
und	unruhe	anrichten	wollen/	ungütlich	geschicht/	Und	das	sölchs	engweder	durch	S.	F.	
G.	missgünstige	oder	 sonst	unruhige	 leut/	die	zu	kriegs	entbörung	 lust	haben/	und	die	
Herrn	gerne	in	einander	herzen	wolten/	ausgebreitet	wirdt,	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1558).		76	‘le	prie	de	haster	sa	venue	avec	ses	trouppes	pour	s’opposer	aux	troupes	du	Casimir	qui	 veulent	 s’advancer	 dans	 le	 Royaume	 pillant	 et	 bruslant	 par	 tout.’	 The	 Duke	 of	Anjou	to	Johann	Wilhelm	of	Saxe-Weimar,	3	February	1568,	BNF,	15544:	f.	171.		77	‘Mon	cousin,	le	Roy	monsieur	mon	filz	vous	envoye	le	sieur	de	Loubeyre	pour	voes	fair	 entendre	 qui	 a	 esté	 cause	 qu’il	 ne	 vous	 a	 employé	 en	 ceste	 première	 levée	 que	s’este	 faicte	 en	 Allemaigne	 pour	 son	 service	 et	 vous	 prie	 tenir	 prestz	 quatre	 mil	chevaulx	pistolliers,	 lesquelz	il	espère	faire	venir	à	son	service	avant	ce	printemps	si	les	 choses	 tirent	 en	 plus	 grande	 longneur,	 s’assurent	 que	 vostre	 personne	 et	 vostre	bonne	conduicte	seront	d’ung	grand	fruict	à	son	royaume	…’	Catherine	de’	Medici	 to	Jean-Philippe	 of	 Salm,	 16	 January	 1568,	 H.	 de	 la	 Ferrière,	 Lettres	 de	 Catherine	 de	
Médicis,	Volume	III:	1567-1570,	(Paris:	Imprimerie	Nationale,	1887):	p.	335.		78	‘la	 devotion	 que	 J’ay	 tousioure	 porter	 au	 bien	 de	 service	 de	 vre	 Mate	 …’	 Johann	Wilhelm	of	Saxe-Weimar	to	Charles	IX,	June	1568,	BNF,	15546:	f.	214.		
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stress	 that	 he	was	 fulfilling	 his	 obligations.	 For	 instance,	 he	wrote	 to	Catherine	 that	 he	 ‘hoped	 …	 that	 His	 Majesty	 has	 without	 doubt	recognised	enough	the	devotion	that	I	bare	to	the	good	of	the	crown	of	France.’79			 However,	 the	 suggestion	 that	 Johann	 Wilhelm’s	 mission	 was	built	exclusively	on	non-religious	foundations,	whether	for	the	prospect	of	 financial	 gain	 or	 a	 sense	 of	 loyalty	 to	 the	 monarchy	 of	 France,	 is	incorrect.	 He	 entered	 the	 conflict	 with	 a	 clear	 conscience.	 Johann	Wilhelm’s	 Gnesio-Lutheran	 orthodoxy	 and	 his	 strong	 opposition	 to	Reformed	Protestantism	were	part	of	his	identity	and	contributed	to	his	sense	 of	 righteousness.	 However,	 it	 brought	 him	 into	 a	 conflict	 with	Friedrich	 III	 that	 arose	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	mission.	 The	 Elector	argued	that	Johann	Wilhelm’s	actions	constituted	a	fratricidal	attack	on	his	 coreligionists	 and	 would	 lead	 not	 only	 to	 the	 destruction	 of	 the	Huguenots,	 but	 also	 to	 the	 downfall	 of	 Protestantism	 throughout	Europe.	Friedrich	went	as	far	as	to	argue	that	the	differences	between	the	German	Lutherans	and	the	Huguenots	were	purely	cosmetic:			 Although	 the	 Christian	 Reformed	 churches	 in	 France	 just	 in	 the	outward	 ceremonies	 are	 not	 completely	 like	 us,	 it	 is	 much	 more	important	 to	keep	a	careful	eye	on	the	most	 important	point,	namely	that	 the	 poor	 Christians	 will	 be	 entirely	 relieved	 from	 the	 yoke	 of	Antichristendom,	the	wretched	popery,	and	that	the	bloodletting	of	the	poor	Christians	will	be	stopped	and	prevented.80		By	 serving	 in	 the	 Catholic	 army	 in	 France,	 Friedrich	 argued,	 Johann	Wilhelm	 was	 complicit	 in	 the	 crimes	 against	 his	 fellow	 Protestants.																																																									79	‘…	espera	…	que	vtre	Mate	ayant	sans	doubte	suffisant	…	cougnueu	la	devotion	que	je	porte	 au	 bien	 …	 de	 la	 chouronne	 de	 France	 …’	 Johann	Wilhelm	 of	 Saxe-Weimar	 to	Catherine	de’	Medici,	June	1568,	BNF,	15546:	f.	215.		80	‘obschon	 die	 christliche	 reformirte	 kirchen	 in	 Frankreich	 sich	 nicht	 eben	 in	 den	außerlichen	 Ceremonien	 mit	 den	 unsern	 durchaus	 vergleichen	 möchten,	 sondern	vielmehr	 die	 hauptsach,	 das	 nämlich	 die	 armen	 Christen	 vom	 Joch	 des	Antichristenthums,	 des	 leidigen	 Papstthums,	 einst	 gänzlich	 entledigt	 und	 das	Blutvergießen	 armen	 Christen	 abgewendet	 und	 verhütet,	 in	 gutter	 gewahrsamer	Achtung	 zu	 haben	 …’	 Friedrich	 III	 to	 Johann	 Wilhelm	 of	 Saxe-Weimar,	 25	 January	1568,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	II,	p.	179.		
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Friedrich	 also	 appealed	 to	 August	 of	 Saxony	 to	 persuade	 Johann	Wilhelm	 to	 abandon	 his	 plans. 81 	Through	 his	 daughter	 Dorothea	Susanna,	 who	 was	 married	 to	 Johann	 Wilhelm,	 Friedrich	 hoped	 to	exercise	influence.	He	wrote	to	his	daughter	in	February	1568:			 I	cannot	believe	that	my	beloved	son,	your	beloved	lord,	lets	himself	be	persuaded	and	 incited	by	 the	abovementioned	pope	 to	 let	himself	be	used	 against	 the	 poor	 Christians	 and	 coreligionists	 and	 that	 he	 has	released	such	a	public	declaration	against	the	Prince	of	Condé	…82			Friedrich	 initially	 assumed	 that	 Johann	 Wilhelm	 was	 misguided.	 He	wrote	 to	Dorothea	Susanna	 in	December	1567,	asking	her	 to	help	her	husband	 see	 that	 he	was	 being	misled	 by	 ‘the	Bishop	 of	Rennes,	who	presents	 himself	 as	 one	 of	 the	 envoys	 of	 the	King	 of	 France.’83	In	 line	with	Huguenot	interpretations,	Friedrich	assumed	that	Rennes	instead	worked	 for	 the	 King’s	 ‘evil	 councillors’	 who	 were	 furthering	 an	aggressive	Catholic	agenda.	Friedrich’s	tone	toughened,	however,	when	two	 months	 later,	 Johann	 Wilhelm	 still	 had	 not	 abandoned	 his	expedition,	 fuming	 that	 ‘only	 for	 those	 who	 are	 willingly	 blind,	 it	remains	hidden,	what	the	Pope	and	his	adherents,	who	control	the	King	of	 France,	 …	 intend	 to	 achieve,	 namely	 …	 the	 extermination	 of	 the	Religion.’84		 Of	 course	 Johann	 Wilhelm	 disagreed	 strongly.	 He	 denied	vehemently	 that	 he	 ‘let	 himself	 be	 used	 against	 the	 true	 Christian	
																																																								81	Friedrich	III	to	August	of	Saxony,	30	December	1567,	Ibid,	p.	159.		82	‘Ich	 kan	 mich	 auch	 nit	 genugsam	 verwandern,	 das	 mayn	 freuntlicher	 liber	 sone,	deyn	geliebter	herr,	sich	von	dem	obgemelten	pfaffen	dahin	bereden	und	uffwiegeln	lassen,	das	er	sich	wider	die	arme	Christen	und	religionsverwandte	gebrauchen	und	ayn	solches	ausschreyben	wider	den	prinzen	von	Condé	lest	ausgehen’	Friedrich	III	to	Dorothea	Susanna,	1	February	1568,	Ibid,	p.	183.		83	‘dem	bischoff	zu	Rennes,	der	vor	aynen	des	konigs	von	Frankreychs	gesandter	sich	dorgegeben’	Friedrich	III	to	Dorothea	Susanna,	29	December	1567,	Ibid,	p.	156.		84	‘nur	denen,	die	muthwillig	blind	sein	wollen,	verborgen	bleibe,	was	der	Papst	und	sein	Anhang,	 die	den	könig	 von	Frankreich	beherschen,	…	beabsichtigen,	 nämlich	…	die	Vertilgung	der	Religion.’	Friedrich	to	Johann	Wilhelm	of	Saxe-Weimar,	1	February	1568,	Ibid,	pp.	181-182.		
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religion	of	 the	Augsburg	Confession.’85	Moreover,	 in	 the	pamphlet	 that	he	had	published	to	justify	his	actions	the	Duke	presented	a	very	strong	argument	 against	 the	 Elector	 Palatine’s	 narrative.	 Johann	 Wilhelm	argued	 ‘that	 it	 is	purely	a	 rebellion	…,	which	has	been	put	 in	place	by	the	 subjects	 against	 the	 authority	 established	 by	 God.’ 86 	Similar	language	 appears	 over	 and	 again	 in	 the	 documents	 related	 to	 his	campaign.	 To	 Charles	 IX,	 Johann	Wilhelm	declared	 that	 his	 intentions	were	to	‘secure	your	crown’	by	‘suppressing	the	rebels.’87	Moreover,	the	Duke	contrasted	his	attempts	to	 ‘create	order’	with	the	chaos	that	had	enveloped	 France	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 Huguenots’	 actions.88	Although	these	 statements	 appear	 secular,	 based	 on	 ideas	 concerning	 the	justifiability	of	resistance	and	the	authority	of	the	King,	they	are	firmly	rooted	 in	 religious	 beliefs.	 The	 Duchy	 of	 Weimar	 was	 a	 bastion	 of	Gnesio-Lutheran	 thought.	 Characterised	 by	 a	 particularly	 narrow	interpretation	of	Lutheran	orthodoxy,	 this	vision	 left	 little	or	no	room	for	deviating	doctrines	or	liturgical	practices.	It	was	particularly	hostile	to	 Reformed	 Protestantism.	 In	 Weimar,	 therefore,	 the	 idea	 that	 the	Huguenots	 should	 be	 seen	 as	 the	 Lutherans’	 coreligionists	 was	preposterous.	 Instead,	discussions	of	 the	Huguenots’	 religion	 focussed	
																																																								85	‘wider	 die	 wahre	 christliche	 Religion	 der	 A.	 C.	 gebrauchen	 lasse.’	 Friedrich	 III	 to	Johann	Wilhelm	of	Saxe-Weimar,	1	February	1568,	Ibid,	pp.	181-182.		86	‘Wiewol	wir	 nun	 vermercken/	Dass	 jetziger	 zeyt	 hin	 und	wider/	 bey	 hohes	 unnd	nidrigen	 Standes	Geistlichen	und	Weltlichen	Personen/	 im	Reich	Deutscher	Nation/	auch	 bey	 den	 Verwandten	 unserer	 waren/	 Christlichen	 Religion/	 Dessgleichen	 bey	unsern	 selbst	 unterthanen/	 und	 zugehörigen/	 von	 allerhand	 ungleicher	meinunge/	jetzigen	 Frantzöschischen	Kriegs	 empörunge/	 Sonderlich	 aber	 davon	 geredet	wird/	Ob	es	…	umb	die	Christliche	Religion/	und	derselben	vertrückunge/	zu	thun	sey/	So	können	wir	 doch	 demselben	 keinen	 glauben	 zusetzen/	…	 So	 haben	wir	 doch/	 auss	dem	 bericht/	 welche	 uns	 die	 Kön.	 W.	 derwegen	 thun/	 und	 darüber	 auss	 etzlichen	vielen	 Mandaten/	 die	 ire	 Kön.	 Wirde/	 unter	 entstandener	 unruhe…	 unnd	 denn	 …	aussruffen	 lassen/	 Die	 uns	 in	 Französischer/	 und	 dann	 in	 die	 deutsche	 Sprach	 …	zukommen	 …	 vernommen/	 dass	 es	 ein	 lauter	 Rebellion	 …	 sey/	 Welche	 von	 den	unterthanen/	gegen	ire	von	Gott	geordente	Obrigkeit/	…	angestellet	wirdet/’	 Johann	Wilhelm	von	Sachsen	Weimar,	Ausschreiben,	p.	4.		87	‘secourir	 sa	 couronne	 et	 la	 maintenir’	 ‘reprimer	 les	 Rebelles’	 Johann	 Wilhelm	 of	Saxe-Weimar	to	Charles	IX,	10	January	1568,	BNF,	15544:	f.	49-50.		88	‘donner	ordre’	 Johann	Wilhelm	of	 Saxe-Weimar	 to	Charles	 IX,	 11	December	1567,	BNF,	15918:	f.	110.		
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on	 the	 seditiousness	 and	 rebelliousness	 that	 they	 considered	 an	essential	component	of	Reformed	Protestantism.		In	light	of	the	perceived	dangers	of	Reformed	Protestantism,	the	decision	to	support	the	Catholic	and,	in	Weimar’s	eyes,	royalist	party	is	understandable.	 In	 Saxony,	 the	 Gnesio-Lutheran	 princes	 maintained	unusually	 good	 relations	 with	 the	 Catholic	 Emperors,	 which	 was	reflected	in	the	Saxons’	conservative	attitudes	and	respect	for	the	Peace	of	 Augsburg.	 Cooperation	 with	 Catholics	 was	 thus	 not	 unusual	 for	Weimar’s	 ruling	 family.	 Johann	Wilhelm	 had	 a	 similar	 attitude	 to	 the	French	Catholics.	He	responded	positively	to	the	conciliatory	 language	used	by	the	Cardinal	of	Lorraine	in	1560-1.	When	in	the	spring	of	1562,	the	 duke	 received	 a	 number	 of	 letters	 from	 the	 Huguenot	 camp,	blackening	 the	 reputation	 of	 the	 Guise	 and	 blaming	 them	 for	 the	violence	 in	 France,	 Johann	Wilhelm	was	 outraged.89	Johann	Wilhelm’s	religious	 outlook	 thus	 made	 him	 entirely	 unreceptive	 for	 Huguenot	propaganda.	 In	 this	 case,	 it	 even	 backfired,	 cementing	 the	 idea	 that	Condé	 and	 his	 adherents	 were	 troublemakers	 who	 were	 willing	 to	tarnish	the	reputation	of	others	 in	order	to	realise	their	own	personal	ambitions.	 Far	 from	being	motivated	by	material	 concerns,	 supported	by	cynical	and	insincere	justifications,	Johann	Wilhelm’s	campaign	was	firmly	rooted	in	both	his	understanding	of	his	obligations	to	the	King	of	France	and	his	perspective	on	the	nature	of	Reformed	Protestantism.		 The	 fact	 that	 Johann	 Wilhelm	 did	 not	 conduct	 his	 mission	exclusively	 for	 reasons	 of	 personal	 gain	 or	 profit	 is	 illustrated	 by	 the	damage	it	did	to	his	standing	amongst	his	Protestant	peers.	Friedrich	III	was	unequivocal:	 ‘therefore	I	do	not	want	to	regard	him	as	a	friend.’90	In	another	letter	to	Dorothea	Susanne,	the	Elector	lamented	the	effects	of	this	rupture	in	relations	on	his	chances	to	see	his	daughter:	‘I	cannot	write	you	how	heavy	it	weighs	on	my	mind	that	you	(on	your	journey	to	
																																																								89	Hahn,	Herzog	Johann	Wilhelm	von	Weimar,	pp.	96-129.		90	‘also	ich	inen	nit	vor	aynen	freund	wolt	halten.’	Friedrich	III	to	Dorothea	Susanna,	1	February	1568,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	II,	p.	183		
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France)	passed	me	by	so	closely	and	I	could	not	meet	with	you.’91	On	his	return	to	Germany,	the	Duke	of	Saxe-Weimar	still	felt	the	effects	of	the	campaign	on	his	reputation.	The	controversy	surrounding	 the	mission	contributed	to	the	process	of	gradual	alienation	from	the	other	princes	of	 the	Empire,	which	 in	 turn	 contributed	 the	 loss	 and	break-up	of	his	territories.92	Even	 after	 his	 return,	 Friedrich	 continued	 his	 efforts	 to	blacken	 the	 reputation	 of	 the	 Duke	 of	 Saxe-Weimar.	 He	 wrote	 to	 the	Emperor	 in	May	1568	 ‘that	a	 large	number	of	 the	Duke’s	cavalry	have	been	 enlisted	 by	 the	 Duke	 of	 Alba.’93	In	 doing	 so,	 Friedrich	 implicitly	implicated	 Johann	 Wilhelm	 in	 the	 actions	 of	 Alba,	 which	 were	 the	subject	 of	 so	 much	 vivid	 and	 frightening	 propaganda	 in	 the	 Empire.	Wilhelm	 probably	 predicted	 this	 backlash	 since	 he	 already	acknowledged	 in	 the	pamphlet	he	published	before	his	 campaign	 that	the	 conflict	 in	 France	 was	 by	 many	 German	 Protestants	 erroneously	believed	to	be	‘about	the	Christian	religion	and	its	suppression.’94	Johann	Wilhelm’s	 orthodox	 interpretation	 of	 Lutheranism	 was	also	cause	 for	his	decline	and	eventual	downfall.	 In	 the	years	after	his	campaign,	 the	 Duke	 became	 heavily	 involved	 in	 a	 theological	 dispute	between	 his	 own	 theologians,	 who	 supported	 the	 purist	 Flacian	theology,	 and	 those	 of	 August	 of	 Saxony,	 who	 they	 deemed	 to	 be	deviating	 from	 Lutheran	 orthodoxy.	 His	 stubborn	 insistence	 in	supporting	 these	 controversial	 theologians	 provoked	 fierce	 criticism	among	 the	 Protestant	 princes.	 A	 number	 of	 these	 princes	(Brandenburg,	 Holstein,	 Ludwig	 of	 Württemberg,	 Hesse,	 and	 Karl	 of	Baden)	 gathered	 at	Heidelberg	 in	 1570	 and	 urged	 Johann	Wilhelm	 to	put	 an	 end	 to	 ‘the	 harassing	 of	 his	 quarrelsome	 theologians,	 who	
																																																								91	‘Ich	kann	dir	nicht	schreiben,	wie	schwer	es	mir	zu	Gemüth	gegangen,	das	ihr	(auf	dem	Zug	nach	Frankreich)	 so	nahe	an	mich	vorübergezogen	und	 ich	Euch	nicht	hab	sollen	ansprechen.’	Friedrich	III	to	Dorothea	Susanna,	15	May	1568,	Ibid,	pp.	219-220.		92	T.	Kleine,	‘Johann	Wilhelm’	Neue	Deutsche	Biography,	10	(1974):	pp.	530-531.		93	‘das	 von	 des	 herzogs	 [Johann	 Wilhelm]	 Reutern	 eine	 gute	 Anzahl	 sich	 für	 den	Herzog	 von	 Alba	 habe	 anwergen	 lassen	…’	 Friedrich	 III	 to	 Emperor	Maximilian,	 22	May	1568,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	II,	p.	220.		94	‘…	 umb	 die	 Christliche	 Religion/	 und	 derselben	 vertrückunge/	 zu	 thun	 sey	 …’		Johann	Wilhelm	von	Sachsen	Weimar,	Aussschreiben,	p.	4.	
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through	their	vilifying	and	damning	create	so	much	evil.’95	The	Emperor	too	 felt	 the	 need	 to	 intervene	 in	 this	 crisis.	 He	 admonished	 Johann	Wilhelm	 to	 ‘completely	 halt	 such	 arguments	 and	 unnecessary	disputations	 about	 religion	 in	 your	 schools	 and	 pulpits.’ 96 	The	combination	 of	 his	 unpopular	 campaign	 in	 1568	 and	 this	 theological	crisis	 in	 1570	 cost	 Johann	 Wilhelm	 dearly.	 In	 1570,	 the	 two	 sons	 of	Johann	Wilhelm’s	older	brother,	Johann	Friedrich	II,	 laid	claim	to	their	father’s	 patrimony.	 Having	 alienated	 the	 Emperor	 and	 the	 powerful	Elector	 of	 Saxony,	 Johann	 Wilhelm	 had	 no	 chance	 of	 winning	 the	dispute.	In	the	1572	Division	of	Erfurt	he	was	forced	to	surrender	most	of	his	 territories,	which	were	divided	amongst	his	nephews.97	The	fact	that	 in	 the	 end,	 Johann	Wilhelm’s	 troops	were	never	used	against	 the	Huguenots,	added	to	the	scale	of	this	personal	disaster.	By	the	time	his	regiment,	slowed	down	by	the	difficulties	of	travelling	long	distances	in	winter,	 had	 reached	 France,	 the	 Peace	 of	 Longjumeau	 had	 been	concluded.98		The	 case	 of	 Johann	 Wilhelm	 points	 to	 the	 costs	 of	 putting	conscience	above	expediency.	His	ill-judgement	left	him	isolated	in	the	Empire	and	led	to	his	political	and	personal	demise.	This	is	far	from	the	traditional	 explanations	 of	 his	 actions,	 which	 stress	 his	 calculated	attempts	to	gain	wealth	and	influence	in	risky	adventures.	The	common	theme	 underpinning	 both	 his	 campaign	 in	 France	 and	 his	 theological	militancy	 in	 1570	was	 his	 strong	 commitment	 to	 a	 particularly	 strict	and	 orthodox	 branch	 of	 Lutheranism.	 This	 set	 of	 beliefs	 included	 an	unusually	 aggressive	 disposition	 towards	 ‘sectarian’	 types	 of	Protestantism,	 such	as	Philippism	and	Reformed	Protestantism.	These																																																									95 	‘dem	 Treiben	 seiner	 zanksüchtigen	 Theologen,	 die	 durch	 ihr	 Schmähren	 und	Verdammen	 so	 groses	 Unheil	 anrichten	 …’	 The	 princes	 of	 Brandenburg,	 Holstein,	Württemberg,	 Hesse,	 and	 Baden	 to	 Johann	Wilhelm	 of	 Saxe-Weimar,	 10	 June	 1570,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	II,	p.	397.		96	‘alle	 solche	 unnöttige	 Disputationes	 in	 Religions	 Sachen,	 bey	 dero	 Schulen	 unnd	Cantzlen	genzlich	abstellen.’	Emperor	Maximilian	to	Johann	Wilhelm	of	Saxe-Weimar,	20	July	1570,	ThHStA	Fürstenhaus,	A195,	f.	150-151.		97	Kleine,	‘Johann	Wilhelm’,	pp.	530-531.		98	Hahn,	Herzog	Johann	Wilhelm	von	Weimar,	pp.	130-174.		
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beliefs	had	a	political	dimension,	showing	that	we	divorce	religion	and	politics	 at	 our	 peril.	 While	 emphasising	 his	 own	 devotion	 to	 the	Emperor	and	the	King	of	France,	 Johann	Wilhelm	accused	other	forms	of	 Protestantism	 of	 disobedience.	 This	 combination	 of	 Lutheran	 zeal	and	 devotion	 to	 the	 French	 monarchy	 goes	 a	 long	 way	 towards	explaining	Johann	Wilhelm’s	campaign	in	1568.	 		
6.7	Philibert	of	Baden		The	final	campaign	discussed	in	this	chapter	is	also	the	most	difficult	to	explain.	Philibert	of	Baden’s	decision	to	enlist	in	the	army	of	the	King	of	France	was	the	result	of	a	sudden	change	of	heart	in	late	1567,	an	event	that	 is	 shrouded	 in	 mystery.	 The	 Margrave	 himself,	 though	 an	important	 Protestant	 prince	 of	 the	 Empire,	 was	 rather	 isolated	 from	many	 of	 his	 Protestant	 peers.	 Raised	 for	 a	 while	 at	 the	 courts	 of	 the	Emperor	 and	 the	 Duke	 of	 Bavaria,	 Philibert	 received	 a	 Catholic	upbringing	 and	 education.99	Nonetheless,	 on	 reaching	 maturity	 (and	thus	gaining	full	control	over	his	patrimony),	the	Margrave	converted	to	Lutheranism.	This	unusual	background	led	Philibert	to	develop	a	form	of	 Lutheranism	 with	 distinct	 characteristics:	 he	 was	 not	 only	exceptionally	hostile	to	Reformed	Protestantism,	but	also	continued	to	regard	Catholicism,	the	religion	of	his	youth,	highly.	This	is	reflected	in	the	way	he	led	the	reformation	of	his	margraviate.	He	was	generous	for	his	 Catholic	 subjects	 and	 left	 the	 Cistercian	 nunnery	 at	 Lichtenthal	untouched	throughout	his	rule.100		 During	the	1560s,	Philibert	was	certainly	not	at	the	forefront	of	German	 efforts	 to	 influence	 events	 in	 France.	 In	 comparison	 to	Württemberg,	Hesse,	Zweibrücken	and	especially	 the	Elector	Palatine,	Baden’s	 contribution	 seems	 meagre.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 Margrave	appears	occasionally	in	the	sources	when	collective	action	in	relation	to																																																									99	A.	Krieger,	 ‘Philibert,	Markgraf	von	Baden-Baden’,	Allgemeine	Deutsche	Biographie,	25	(1887):	739-741.		100	Ibid,	pp.	739-741.		
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France	was	 taken.	For	 instance,	he	was	one	of	 the	 contributors	 to	 the	100,000	 florins	 raised	 by	 Andelot	 in	 1562.101	Similarly,	 his	 signature	appears	under	a	letter	warning	against	the	dangers	of	the	Catholic	plot	in	1567,	and	he	was	present	at	Maulbronn,	where	in	the	same	year	the	Conspiracy	 was	 discussed. 102 	In	 contrast	 with	 some	 of	 his	 peers,	Philibert’s	voice	is	hardly	audible.	Though	he	without	doubt	developed	his	 own	perspective	 on	 the	 French	Wars	 of	Religion,	 he	 did	not	 often	share	 this	perspective	with	his	peers,	at	 least	not	before	1567.	 In	 that	year	 the	Margrave	 first	 joined	 Johann	Casimir’s	 force	before	 changing	sides	and	fighting	for	the	King	of	France.	The	reasons	for	this	change	of	heart	 are	 discussed	 at	 length,	 both	 by	 Philibert	 himself	 and	 by	 the	French	Catholic	leadership.	In	a	letter	to	Charles	IX,	Philibert	claimed	to	have	been	tricked	into	joining	Casimir’s	army:		 Sire,	having	had	a	great	desire	as	a	young	prince	to	see	the	world	and	to	follow	and	do	service	and	aid	foreign	potentates	and	to	show	them,	principally	your	majesty,	my	affection	and	if	they	require	in	their	hour	of	 need,	 to	 secure	 them	 with	 a	 good	 band	 and	 number	 of	 well-equipped	cavalrymen.	And	…	that	already	my	brother	and	cousin	 the	Duke	Johann	Casimir,	son	of	the	Count	Palatine,	has	…	asked	me	to	be	the	 commander	 of	 1500	 mounted	 pistoliers,	 assuring	 me	 that	 they	would	not	be	used	against	your	majesty	but	for	the	conservation	of		…	the	 crown,	 with	 the	 promise	 of	 showing	 me	 letters	 that	 are	 clearly	signed	by	your	hand,	 [showing]	 thus	 that	 it	 is	your	will	 to	undertake	this	levy	for	this	purpose.	For	this	reason	I	have	accompanied	him	only	with	 some	 gentlemen	 of	 my	 house	 until	 the	 border	 of	 my	 country,	where	 I	have	recognised	that	 this	 levy	 is	against	your	majesty	…	And	having	such	a	great	desire	to	do	humble	service	to	your	majesty	I	am	
																																																								101	Friedrich	 III	 and	Christoph	of	Württemberg	 to	Philip	of	Hesse,	9	August	1562,	A.	Kluckhohn	 (ed.),	 Briefe	 Friedrich	 des	 Frommen,	 Kurfürsten	 von	 der	 Pfalz,	 mit	
Verwandten	 Schriftstücken,	 Volume	 I	 (Braunschweig,	 C.A.	 Schwetschte	 und	 Sohn,	1868):	p.	326.		102	The	princes	of	the	Palatinate,	Württemberg,	Hesse,	and	Baden	to	August	of	Saxony,		Kluckhohn,	 Briefe	 Friedrich	 des	 Frommen	 …	 Volume	 II,	 pp.	 51-52;	 Report	 from	 the	meeting	at	Maulbronn,	17	July	1567,	Ibid,	66-67.		
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well	disposed	to	accord	with	my	cousins	and	friends	the	Rhinegraves	who	are	in	your	service	…103		This	statement	is	interesting	for	a	number	of	reasons.	Firstly,	 it	claims	that	 Casimir	 attempted	 to	 persuade	 people	 of	 the	 justifiability	 of	 his	campaign	 through	 lies	 and	 deceit.	 Secondly,	 it	 introduces	 an	 element	that	in	the	justifications	of	his	peers	plays	little	or	no	part.	In	this	letter	and	 others,	 the	Margrave	makes	much	 of	 his	 long-standing	 dream	 to	serve	 a	 foreign	 prince.	 This	 sentiment	 is	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 almost	 all	evidence	 concerning	Philibert’s	 campaign.	 In	another	 letter	 to	Charles	IX,	 for	 instance,	 he	 again	 wrote	 that	 he	 had	 ‘always	 had	 the	 strong	desire	to	serve	your	majesty.’104	The	question	is,	however,	whether	this	deep-seated	desire	was	 the	direct	 cause	of	 the	Margrave’s	decision	 to	change	sides	in	December	1567.	Albert	Krieger,	the	author	of	the	entry	on	 Philibert	 in	 the	 1887	 Allgemeine	Deutsche	 Biographie,	 suggests	 an	alternative	option.	He	speculates	that	influential	Catholics	who	played	a	central	 role	 in	 Philibert’s	 upbringing,	 namely	 his	mother	 Franziska	 of	Luxembourg	and	Albrecht	of	Bavaria,	persuaded	him	to	change	sides.105	However,	 Krieger	 presents	 no	 evidence	 to	 support	 this.	 A	 second	possibility	 is	 that	 the	Margrave’s	 change	of	 heart	was	 inspired	by	 the	offer	of	a	royal	pension.	Philibert	was	definitely	paid	for	his	services	to	the	 crown	 of	 France,	 but	 that	 does	 not	 necessarily	mean	 that	money																																																									103	‘Sire,	Ayant	grand	envie	comme	Jeune	Prince	de	veoir	le	monde	et	suivre	en	faisant	server	 et	 plaisir	 les	 Potentats	 estrengiers	 et	 leur	monstrer	 prinsipalement	 a	 vostre	Maieste	 mon	 affection	 et	 sil	 besoing	 estoit	 en	 leur	 necessite	 les	 seccurir	 avec	 une	bonne	troppe	et	quantite	de	gens	de	Chevaulx	bien	equippez.	Et	…	que	deja	mon	frere	et	cousin	le	Duc	Jean	Casimir	filz	du	Comte	Palatin	avoit	capitule	avec	moy	pour	estre	chief	de	XVc	Chevaulx	pistoliers	massurant	que	 ce	nestoit	par	 contre	vostre	Maieste	mais	pour	la	conservation	…	de	sa	courronne	avec	promesse	de	mon	monstrer	lettres	expressementes	 signes	 de	 vostre	main	 que	 ainsi	 estoit	 vostre	 volunte	 de	 fair	 ceste	levee	 en	 tel	 fin.	 Voila	 pourquoy	 je	 la	 accompaignue	 seulement	 avec	 quelques	gentilhommes	de	ma	maison	iusques	la	frontir	de	mon	pays,	la	ou	j’a	cogneu	que	ceste	levee	 estoit	 contre	 vostre	 maieste	 …	 Et	 ayant	 si	 grande	 envie	 de	 faire	 treshumble	service	 a	 vostre	Maieste	 j’a	 bien	 voulu	 accorder	 a	mes	 cousins	 et	 amys	 les	 Comtes	Reingraves	estant	en	vostre	service	…’	Philibert	of	Baden	to	Charles	IX,	31	December	1567,	BNF,	15918:	f.	138.		104	‘E.	Kon.	Würd	…	selbst	zudienen	allezeit	begirigs	lust	gehabt.’	Philibert	of	Baden	to	Charles	IX,	31	December	1567,	Ibid,	f.	136.		105	A.	Krieger,	‘Philibert,	Markgraf	von	Baden-Baden’,	Allgemeine	Deutsche	Biographie,	25	(1887):	739-741.		
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was	the	primary	motive.	There	 is	no	evidence	for	this,	other	than	that	he	 changed	 sides.	 This	 is	 supported	by	 the	 relatively	 large	number	of	letters	sent	by	Philibert	first	to	the	King’s	lieutenant	Vieuville	and	later	to	 the	 King	 himself,	 in	 which	 he	 requests	 to	 enter	 royal	 service	 and	apologises	for	briefly	and	unwittingly	backing	the	King’s	enemies.	Also	letters	 sent	between	key	players	 in	 the	Catholic	party	 seem	 to	hint	 at	the	fact	that	Philibert	changed	sides	on	his	own	initiative.	For	instance,	Vieuville	wrote	to	Anjou	on	9	January	1568	‘that	the	Marquis	of	Baden,	has	 left	 the	 Duke	 Johann	 Casimir	 with	 two	 hundred	 cavalry	with	 the	intention	of	serving	his	majesty	…’106	His	choice	of	words	is	significant.	In	this	private	letter	between	leaders	of	the	same	party	Vieuville	could	easily	have	written	that	they	had	persuaded	or	even	paid	the	Margrave	to	 switch	 sides.	 Catherine	de’	Medici	 too	 suggests	 that	Philibert	made	the	decision	at	his	own	volition.	She	wrote	to	the	Rhinegrave	that			 the	 King,	 my	 lord	 my	 son,	 and	 I	 are	 very	 content	 to	 learn	 that	 my	cousin	the	marquis	of	Baden	does	not	want	in	any	way	to	support	his	enemies	and	when	he	had	learned	the	truth	behind	the	troubles	…	he	rather	wanted	to	do	service	to	the	King,	my	lord	my	son,	which	he	will	never	 forget,	 and	 the	 goodwill	 that	 he	 has	 shown	 to	 this	 kingdom	clearly	shows	that	he	wants	to	follow	his	predecessors	who	for	a	good	time	have	been	such	good	friends	and	allies	of	this	crown’107			Although	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 prove	 the	 absence	 of	 pressures	 put	 on	Philibert	 by	 his	 entourage,	 or	 that	 money	 did	 not	 play	 a	 role	 in	 his	decision,	 the	 sincerity	 of	 these	 statements	 should	 nonetheless	 be	considered.	As	discussed	in	the	first	chapter,	the	French	monarchy	was																																																									106	‘et	que	le	Marquis	de	Baden,	s’est	retiré	d’avec	le	Duc	Jean	Casimir	avec	deux	cens	chevaux	dans	le	dessein	de	servir	sa	Majesté.’	Pierre	de	Vieuville	to	the	Duke	of	Anjou,	9	January	1568,	BNF,	15544:	f.	36.		107	‘le	Roy	monsieur	mon	filz	et	moy	avons	recue	grand	contantement	d’entendre	que	mon	cousin	le	marquis	de	Bade	n’ayt	voulu	en	aucune	façon	secourir	ses	ennemys	et	qu’ayant	 cougnu	 la	 verité	 des	 troubles	 …	 il	 ayt	 mieulx	 aymé	 faire	 service	 au	 Roy	monsieur	 mon	 filz,	 ce	 qu’il	 n’oublira	 jamais,	 et	 la	 bonne	 volunté	 qu’il	 a	 faicte	 au	royaume	monstre	bien	qu’il	veut	succéder	à	ses	prédécesseurs,	qui	ont	esté	de	bons	temps	si	bons	amys	et	alyés	de	ceste	couronne.’	Catherine	de’	Medici	to	Jean-Philippe	of	Salm,	16	January	1568,	Ferrière,	Lettres	de	Catherine	de	Médicis,	Volume	III,	p.	335.		
		 300	
a	great	source	of	patronage	for	the	nobility	of	the	Rhineland.	Serving	in	the	 entourage	 of	 a	 French	 king	 was	 certainly	 not	 uncommon	 and	brought	 prestige.	 Christoph	 of	 Württemberg	 and	 Johann	 Wilhelm	 of	Saxe-Weimar’s	role	in	the	French	military	have	already	been	discussed,	as	has	 the	 longstanding	 service	of	 Jean-Philippe,	 count	of	 Salm,	better	known	as	the	Rhinegrave,	another	Protestant	German	in	service	of	the	King	 of	 France.	 Moreover,	 serving	 a	 foreign	 prince	militarily	 brought	obvious	 benefits.	 Though	 the	 chances	 of	 financial	 betterment	 were	dubious	at	best	 (see	 the	 section	below),	 it	 allowed	aristocrats	 to	 fulfil	the	martial	 role	 that	 was	 still	 central	 to	 their	 noble	 identity.	 Baden’s	claim	 that	 he	 ‘always	 had	 the	 heart	 to	 see	 the	world	 [and]	 to	 employ	[him]self	 in	 the	 secure	 service	 of	 renowned	 potentates	 abroad’	illustrates	how	such	service	not	only	provided	an	opportunity	to	escape	the	humdrum	of	everyday	life,	but	also	to	make	a	name	in	the	entourage	of	 a	 ‘renowned’	 prince.108	This,	 however,	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 service	was	 incompatible	 with	 conscience	 in	 Philibert’s	 mission.	 Philibert’s	religious	outlook,	which	is	not	dissimilar	to	Johann	Wilhelm’s,	explains	this	 position.	 Having	 come	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 the	 Huguenots’	insistence	that	they	were	the	real	advocates	of	the	King’s	interests	was	false,	 Philibert,	 strongly	 aware	 of	 that	 the	 power	 of	 magistrates	 was	divinely	 ordained,	 could	 do	 no	 other.	 His	 precise	 religious	 position	ensured	that	when	presented	with	contrasting	narratives,	 the	Catholic	interpretation	easily	trumped	the	Huguenot	message.		 This	 is	 certainly	 the	 impression	 that	 the	 Margrave	 wanted	 to	make	publicly.	The	strongly	moral	tone	of	the	public	face	of	his	mission	contrasts	 somewhat	with	 the	message	 in	 his	 private	 correspondence.	This	 is	 partly	 the	 result	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 his	 public	 justification	 was	written	 in	 cooperation	 with	 four	 other	 Lutheran	 German	 noblemen	fighting	 in	 the	 army	 of	 the	 King	 of	 France	 (the	 Rhinegrave	 and	 the	
																																																								108	‘ayant	…	tousiours	heu	 le	coeur	de	veoir	 le	monde	…	m’employer	pour	 le	secours	service	 des	 potentats	 renommes	 estrangiers	 …’	 Philibert	 of	 Baden	 to	 Pierre	 de	Vieuville,	10	December	1567,	BNF,		15543:	f.	73.		
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Counts	 of	 Leiningen-Westerburg,	 Betstein,	 and	 Diez). 109 	In	 their	collective	 pamphlet,	which	was	 printed	 in	 Latin,	 French,	 and	German,	the	 five	 noblemen	 made	 much	 of	 the	 Huguenots’	 disobedience,	explicitly	linking	their	religious	and	political	identities:		 that	now	again	for	the	third	time	…	the	disobedient	subjects	…	against	all	equity	and	natural	justice	…	under	the	pretext	of	the	damnable	and	godless	 religion	 of	 the	 Calvinist	 sects,	 deny	 and	 destroy	 their	 King’s	Majesty	 and	 in	 the	 end	 aim	 to	 take	 away	 the	 royal	 crown	 from	 his	head,	which	has	been	granted	to	him	by	the	Almighty,	…	But	according	to	the	Augsburg	Confession	and	the	Christian	religion,	we	cannot	at	all	recognise	this	as	a	godly	religion,	since	after	all	in	the	Holy	Scripture	of	the	 Lord	 is	 written	 that	 one	 should	 always	 obey	 and	 honour	 the	magistrate	/	and	if	the	magistrate	abuses	his	power,	the	wroth	of	God	will	be	brought	home	[Romans	12:19],	and	not	that	of	the	subjects	…110		The	 similarities	 between	 the	 positions	 of	 Johann	 Wilhelm	 of	 Saxe-Weimar	and	Philibert	of	Baden	are	clear.	Putting	a	strong	emphasis	on	the	Christian	duty	 of	 obeying	 the	magistrate,	 the	 two	princes	were	 of	the	opinion	that	the	Huguenots’	opposition	to	their	monarch	was	more	than	 a	 political	 offense.	 This	 position	 also	 impacted	 on	 Baden’s	seemingly-secular	 motives.	 The	 success	 of	 his	 desire	 to	 build	 up	 his	reputation	hinged	on	his	association	with	a	prince	whose	authority	was	legitimate	 and	 actions	 justifiable.	 Philibert’s	 actions	 in	 late	 1567	 and	early	 1568	 are	 entirely	 consistent	 with	 his	 religious	 outlook	 and	 his	understanding	 of	 his	 role	 as	 prince.	 Unlike	 Johann	Wilhelm,	 Philibert																																																									109 	C.	 Zwierlein,	 Discorso	 und	 Lex	 Dei,	 Die	 Entstehung	 neuer	 Denkrahmen	 in	 16.	
Jahrhundert	 und	 die	 Wahrnehmung	 der	 Französischen	 Religionskriege	 in	 Italien	 und	
Deutschland,	(Göttingen:	Vandenbroeck	&	Ruprecht,	2003):	pp.	676-677.		110	‘daß	nu	mehr	 zum	dritten	mal	 […	die]	 ungehorsame	underthanen	 […]	wider	 alle	billicheit	 unn	 naturliche	 rechten	 …	 dieselb	 im	 schein	 der	 verfürischen	 unn	 gotlose	Religion	der	Calvinischen	Secten	/	ir	Kün.	Mai.	zuversagen	/	zuvertilgen	/	unn	endtlich	von	 seinem	 Haupt	 die	 Küniglichen	 Kron	 abzunemmen	 /	 welche	 ime	 von	 Gott	 dem	allmechtigen	 gegont	 /	 […]	 Daß	 aber	 solches	 der	 Augspurgischen	 Confession	 /	 und	Christlichen	glauben	gemeß	/	können	wir	solchen	gantz	und	gar	nit	für	ein	Gotselige	Religion	 erkennen	 /	 dieweil	 doch	 inn	 der	 heiligen	 Schrifft	 /	 von	 got	 dem	 Herren	vermeldt	wirdt	/	daß	man	der	Oberkeit	in	allwege	soll	gehorsam	sein	unn	sie	ehren	/	unnd	ob	schon	die	Oberkeit	sich	mißbraucht	/	so	soll	die	raach	Gott	haimgestellt	sein	[Rm	12,	19]	/	unnd	nit	den	underthanen	/	…’	Ibid,	pp.	676-677.		
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did	get	 the	chance	 to	prove	his	worth	on	 the	battlefield.	He	 fell	at	 the	battle	of	Montcontour	on	3	October	1569,	a	fact	that	was	recognised	in	amongst	others	a	German	pamphlet	from	1570	and	an	Italian	engraving	from	1569.111		
	Figure	 9,	 Detail	 of	 an	 engraving	 of	 the	 Battle	 of	 Montcontour,	 showing	Philibert	of	Baden	at	the	head	of	1000	German	reiters.112		
6.8	The	role	of	money		Many	of	the	German	princes	fighting	in	France	in	the	late	1560s	were,	of	 course,	 ‘mercenary	 captains’	 fighting	 for	 pay.113	However,	 I	 have	attempted	to	demonstrate	that	social,	political,	and	especially	religious	reasons	 played	 a	 central	 role	 in	 motivating	 the	 princes	 to	 involve	themselves	 militarily	 in	 the	 French	 Wars	 of	 Religion.	 This	 view	 is	reinforced	 when	 looking	 at	 the	 financial	 dimensions	 of	 the	 German	missions.	 Rather	 than	 bringing	 wealth,	 the	 financial	 prospects	 of	 the	campaigns	 were	 uncertain	 at	 best	 and	 ruinous	 at	 worst.	 Though	 the	Huguenot	 leadership	 promised	 that	 the	 German	 princes	 would	 be	compensated	(technically	they	employed	German	princes	to	levy	troops	on	 their	 behalf),	 they	 did	 not	 have	 the	 funds	 to	 do	 so	 themselves.	 A	chronic	lack	of	money	was	a	common	feature	of	both	the	Huguenot	and	Catholic	parties.	The	Huguenots	were	 for	a	 large	part	reliant	on	 funds																																																									111	Anon.,	 Summarischen	 und	 Kurtze	 doch	 warhafftige	 anzeig	 unnd	 erklärung/	 als	
dessen/	 so	 sich	 hin	 und	 wider	 in	 Franckreich/	 zwischen	 dem	 königischen	 un[d]	
Hugenotischen	kriegsvolck/	seid	der	grausamen	Schlacht	die	 jüngst	abgelauffenen	 jars	
beschen/	 biß	 in	 jetzigen	 noch	 werenden	 Monat	 Januarii/	 des	 gegenwürtigen	 der	
mindernzal	 sibentzigsten	 jars/	mit	einnem[m]ungen	der	Stett/	auch	scharmützeln	und	
anderm	mehr	zugetragen	und	verlossen	hat,	(Cologne:	Jacobus	Weiß,	1570).		112	Anon.,	‘Die	Schlacht	bei	Moncontour’,	(Universitätsbibliothek,	Salzburg,	1569).		113	‘söldnerführer’	Zwierlein,	Discorso	und	Lex	Dei,	p.	676.	
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raised	 abroad,	 for	 instance	 amongst	 the	 German	 princes.	 In	 order	 to	fulfil	 their	 financial	 promises,	 the	Huguenot	 leadership	 had	 to	 ensure	that	 compensation	 was	 arranged	 in	 the	 peace	 treaty	 accorded	 at	 the	end	of	the	Third	War.	This	compensation,	however,	did	not	nearly	cover	the	 expenses	 incurred	 by	 the	 princes.	 Though	 Casimir	 was	 offered	compensation	by	the	crown	of	France,	to	be	paid	in	three	instalments,	the	 ‘leader	 of	 the	 Huguenots	 still	 owed	 him	 50,000	 francs.’114	The	archives	of	 the	Bibliotheque	Nationale	de	France	 in	Paris	house	a	 large	number	 of	 documents	 chronicling	 the	 crown’s	 very	 difficult	negotiations	with	Casimir	and	Johann	Wilhelm.115	These	 letters	clearly	demonstrate	 that	 it	 was	 very	 difficult	 if	 not	 impossible	 to	 actually	collect	 the	 payments	 promised.	 After	 returning	 to	 Germany,	 Johann	Wilhelm	 found	 himself	 in	 danger	 of	 losing	 his	 lands	 and	 income,	prompting	the	Duke	to	demand	the	payments	and	the	house	in	France	that	 he	 was	 promised	 by	 the	 King.116	It	 is	 not	 entirely	 clear	 whether	these	payments	were	ever	made,	but	the	fact	that	Johann	Wilhelm	had	to	fight	for	his	money	is	telling.	This	inability	to	pay	the	German	princes	is	no	isolated	incident.	The	French	crown	regularly	failed	to	fulfil	their	financial	 obligations.	 The	 cost	 of	 war	 in	 the	 sixteenth	 century	outweighed	 the	 income	 of	 the	 crown	 by	 so	 much	 that	 it	 was	 almost	impossible	to	keep	an	army	in	the	field	for	more	than	a	few	months.117	This	 imbalance	 between	 royal	 and	 noble	 revenues	 and	 the	 cost	 of	waging	 war	 to	 a	 large	 extent	 shaped	 the	 military	 dimension	 of	 the	French	Wars	of	Religion,	with	major	military	 campaigns	 ending	when	armies	 of	 mercenary	 soldiers	 fell	 apart	 when	 their	 wages	 were	 no	
																																																								114	‘blieben	die	Führer	der	Hugenotten	…	50	000	Franken	schuldig	…’	Friedrich	III	to	Wilhelm	of	Hesse,	13	April	1568,	Kluckhohn,	Briefe	Friedrich	des	Frommen	…	Volume	
II,	p.	216.		115	Amongst	others,	BNF,	15546:	f.	77,	f.	192;	15551:	f.	115;	15608:	f.	38,	f.	44,	f.	79,	f.	81,	f.	95,	f.	100,	f.	129.		116	Ernest	de	Mandelslo	to	Charles	IX,	6	October	1569,	BNF,	15550:	f.	63-64.		117	J.	 B.	 Wood,	 The	 King’s	 Army,	 Warfare,	 Soldiers,	 and	 Society	 during	 the	 Wars	 of	
Religion	 in	 France,	 1562-1576,	 (Cambridge:	 Cambridge	 University	 Press,	 1996):	 pp.	275-300.		
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longer	paid.118	It	is	not	surprising	then	that	despite	the	French	efforts	to	provide	 compensation,	 the	 German	 princes	 themselves	 bore	 much	 of	the	 costs	 of	 their	 campaigns.	 Friedrich	 III	 ‘devoted	 considerable	financial	 resources	 to	 aiding	 the	 expeditions	 of	 his	 son	 Joh[an]n	Casimir,	 and	 William	 of	 Orange’,	 ‘very	 little’	 of	 which	 was	reimbursed.119	William	of	Orange	 and	Louis	 of	Nassau	 after	 their	 first	campaign	 in	 France	 faced	 acute	danger	 after	 they	 failed	 to	 collect	 the	funds	 to	 pay	 their	 troops	 their	 promised	 wages.	 The	 brothers	 were	forced	 to	 flee	 their	 troops,	 camped	 near	 Strasbourg,	 hidden	 in	 a	barge.120	This	incident	shows	that	the	levying	of	a	mercenary	army	was	not	without	risks,	since	the	German	princes	leading	these	forces	could	be	 held	 accountable	 by	 their	 troops	 when	 payment	 was	 not	forthcoming.	 The	 ‘great	 financial	 sacrifices’	 made	 by	 the	 princes	supporting	 fighting	 in	 France	 underline	 that	 their	 missions	 were	 not	undertaken	solely	with	the	prospect	of	profit	in	mind.121		
6.9	Conclusion		The	 differences	 between	 the	 five	 campaigns	 discussed	 in	 this	 chapter	have	 never	 been	 properly	 explained	 in	 the	 historiography.	 Though	 it	has	 been	 acknowledged	 that	 the	 German	 princes	 and	 their	 troops	played	 an	 important	 role	 on	 the	 battlefields	 of	 the	 French	 Wars	 of	Religion,	 the	 variety	 of	 the	 reasons	 behind	 these	 interventions	 are	rarely	discussed.	With	the	exception	of	the	Palatinate	campaign	led	by	Johann	 Casimir,	 there	 were	 no	 clear	 confessional	 ties	 that	 created	obvious	links	to	the	parties	in	France.	Johann	Wilhelm’s	and	Philibert’s	campaigns	 in	 support	 of	 the	 Catholic	 King	 of	 France	 are	 obvious	examples	 of	 the	 way	 in	 which	 this	 German	 involvement	 defies	 the																																																									118	J.	B.	Wood,	 ‘The	royal	army	during	the	early	Wars	of	Religion’,	 in	M.	P.	Holt	(ed.),	
Society	and	Institutions	in	Early	Modern	France,	(Athens	GA:	The	University	of	Georgia	Press,	1991):	pp.	1-35.		119	Cohn,	‘The	territorial	princes	in	Germany’s	second	Reformation’,	p.	153.		120	Herweden,	Het	Verblijf	van	Lodewijk	van	Nassau	in	Frankrijk,	pp.	42-43.		121	Vogler,	‘Le	role	des	Électeurs	Palatins’,	p.	61.	
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traditional	 religious	 narrative	 of	 the	 Wars.	 The	 alliance	 between	 the	Lutheran	Wolfgang	 of	 Zweibrücken	 and	 the	 Reformed	Huguenots	 too	provokes	questions.	Moreover,	the	timing	of	the	missions	is	difficult	to	explain	at	 first	sight.	Why	did	the	German	princes	choose	to	intervene	in	 the	 Second	 and	Third	Wars	whilst	 refraining	 from	doing	 so	 during	the	First?	What	had	changed	between	1562	and	1567	that	caused	this	changed	 in	attitude?	The	explanations	provided	by	 the	historiography	until	now	do	not	answer	these	questions	in	a	satisfactory	manner.	The	German	princes	are	regularly	described	as	mercenary	captains,	selling	their	 services	 to	 the	 warring	 parties	 in	 France.	 Bernard	 Vogler	 and	others	have	characterised	the	same	princes	as	opportunist	adventurers,	devoid	 of	 ideological	 commitments	 or	 ideas	 about	 the	 political	dimensions	 of	 the	 conflict.	 A	 closer	 look	 at	 the	 evidence,	 however,	shows	that	this	assessment	is	incorrect.		 Firstly,	 the	 practical	 and	 ideological	 problems	 faced	 when	conducting	 a	 campaign	were	 so	 great	 that	 it	 is	 very	 unlikely	 that	 the	princes	 could	 have	 expected	 to	 benefit	 much	 from	 their	 efforts.	 The	disturbance	caused	by	raising	and	moving	troops	in	the	Rhineland	and	the	 moral	 implications	 of	 fighting	 for	 a	 cause	 seen	 by	 many	 as	illegitimate	was	 likely	 to	 severely	disturb	 relations	 inside	 the	Empire.	Moreover,	the	endemic	difficulties	of	financing	warfare	meant	that	any	prospect	of	 financial	 rewards	was	unlikely.	 In	 fact,	all	German	princes	fighting	 in	France	had	 to	make	 financial	 sacrifices	 to	do	so.	Moreover,	Wolfgang	of	 Zweibrücken	and	Philibert	of	Baden	paid	with	 their	 lives	and	 Johann	Wilhelm	 of	 Saxe-Weimar	 lost	most	 of	 his	 patrimony	 as	 a	result	of	his	actions	in	France.		 Instead,	I	argue	that	the	origins	of	the	campaigns	need	to	be	seen	in	the	context	of	the	princes’	understanding	of	their	own	religious	and	political	 identities	 –	 these	alone	 shaped	 their	 attitudes	 to	 the	Wars	of	Religion.	The	confessional	dimension	of	Casimir’s	mission	was	the	most	straightforward.	 He	 and	 his	 father	 had	 been	 ardent	 advocates	 of	 the	Huguenot	 cause	 since	 1562.	Moreover,	 the	 Palatinate	 had	 throughout	the	 Wars	 been	 the	 epicentre	 of	 Huguenot	 diplomatic	 efforts	 in	 the	Empire.	 The	 impact	 of	 this	 diplomacy	 is	 illustrated	 by	 justifications	
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behind	 Casimir’s	 campaign,	 which	 almost	 directly	 echo	 the	 Huguenot	message.	 The	 compatibility	 of	 Casimir’s	 beliefs	 with	 those	 of	 the	Huguenots	made	him	very	receptive	to	the	narratives	presented	to	him	by	 Huguenot	 diplomats	 and	 propagandists.	 However,	 despite	 their	shared	interpretation	of	the	Wars	of	Religion,	the	decision	to	intervene	militarily	was	not	 uncomplicated.	During	 the	First	War,	 Friedrich	had	objected	strongly	 to	 the	 idea	of	 intervention.	His	support	 for	his	son’s	campaign	 in	 1567	 was	 thus	 a	 significant	 U-turn.	 The	 reason	 for	 this	change	 of	 heart	 should	 entirely	 be	 sought	 in	 the	 rising	 fear	 for	 the	Catholic	 Conspiracy.	 Much	more	 than	 in	 1562,	 Friedrich	 and	 Casimir	were	 strongly	 aware	 of	 the	 predicament	 that	 they	 shared	 with	 the	Huguenots.	This	not	only	made	intervening	in	France	necessary	for	the	sake	 of	 the	 Palatinate,	 but	 also	 reinforced	 a	 sense	 of	 transnational	confessional	solidarity.		 The	feeling	that	they	were	facing	a	shared	threat	also	lay	at	the	foundation	of	William	of	Orange	and	Louis	of	Nassau’s	 two	campaigns	in	 France.	 Though	 William	 and	 Louis	 are	 now	 often	 regarded	 as	champions	 of	 Reformed	 Protestantism,	 their	 religious	 identity	 was	more	complex,	especially	in	1567-8.	The	Prince	of	Orange	only	(openly)	converted	 to	 Calvinism	 in	 1573	 and	 his	 brother	 was	 a	 famously	undogmatic	 evangelical	 committed	 to	 promoting	 cooperation	 and	reconciliation	between	the	various	types	of	Protestantism.	Despite	the	confessional	differences	between	himself	and	the	Huguenot	leadership,	Orange’s	own	struggle	in	many	ways	closely	mirrored	that	of	Condé	and	Coligny.	In	Orange’s	eyes,	the	bloody	persecution	of	Protestants	was	but	a	 symptom	 of	 the	wider	 problem	 of	 the	 usurpation	 of	 the	 traditional	rights	and	privileges	of	the	nobility.	The	aggression	of	militant	Catholics	such	as	Alba	and	the	Guise	was	explained	as	an	assault	on	the	balance	of	power	 in	 the	 Low	 Countries	 and	 France	 as	well	 as	 on	 Protestantism.	Religious	 and	 constitutional	 concerns	 are	 thus	 closely	 intertwined	 in	Orange’s	 justification	 for	 intervention.	Moreover,	 not	 unlike	 Friedrich	and	 Casimir,	 William	 and	 Louis	 too	 believed	 that	 this	 was	 an	international	problem	in	need	of	an	international	solution.	The	Catholic	
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Conspiracy	 too	 played	 a	 role	 in	 shaping	Orange’s	 perspective,	 though	not	quite	as	explicitly	as	in	the	case	of	Friedrich	and	Casimir.		 The	motivations	 behind	 the	 third	German	mission,	 initiated	 by	Wolfgang	 of	 Zweibrücken,	 hinged	 almost	 entirely	 on	 the	 question	 of	whether	 Lutherans	 and	 Reformed	 Protestants	 should	 be	 seen	 as	coreligionists.	 In	 this	 debate,	 the	 Duke	 of	 Zweibrücken	 defended	 a	rather	unusual	position.	Of	all	the	German	Lutheran	princes,	he	was	the	most	 adamant	 that	 the	 religious	 differences	 between	 Huguenots	 and	Lutherans	could	be	overcome.	Though	very	aware	of	the	doctrinal	and	liturgical	 differences	 between	 the	 two	 confessions,	 Wolfgang	 was	willing	 to	 look	 favourably	on	 the	French	Protestants,	arguing	 that	 this	dichotomy	 was	 the	 result	 of	 mistakes	 and	 misinformation.	 Wolfgang	was	 unusual	 too	 as	 the	 earliest	 advocate	 of	 military	 intervention	 in	France	 amongst	 the	 German	 princes.	 His	 intentions	 to	 launch	 a	campaign	 in	 1563	 led	 to	 a	 severe	 rebuke	 from	 Christoph	 of	Württemberg.	In	1569,	however,	the	mood	had	changed	sufficiently	as	a	result	of	the	narrative	of	the	Catholic	Conspiracy	to	guarantee	Wolfgang	support	 from	a	range	of	sponsors,	 including	William	of	Orange,	Queen	Elizabeth	I,	and	various	German	Lutherans.	Though	fear	of	the	Catholic	Conspiracy	 is	 likely	 to	 have	 inspired	 this	more	 favourable	 climate	 for	intervention,	Wolfgang’s	earlier	attempt	to	launch	a	campaign	indicates	that	he	was	primarily	driven	by	a	sense	of	Protestant	solidarity.		 Religion	also	played	an	important	role	in	the	campaign	of	Johann	Wilhelm	 of	 Saxe-Weimar.	 Although	 the	 immediate	 catalyst	 was	 the	decade-long	pension	that	Johann	Wilhelm	had	been	receiving	from	the	French	 crown,	 the	 campaign	 too	 had	 to	 be	 explained	 in	moral	 terms.	These	justifications,	articulated	both	in	private	correspondence	and	in	a	widely	distributed	pamphlet,	were	entirely	consistent	with	 the	Duke’s	religious	 beliefs.	 Considering	 himself	 a	 champion	 of	 Lutheran	orthodoxy	 (or	Gnesio-Lutheranism),	 the	Duke	was	particularly	hostile	to	 Reformed	 Protestantism.	 This	 hostility	 made	 that	 Johann	Wilhelm	was	not	at	all	receptive	to	the	same	Huguenot	message	that	persuaded	Casimir	 and	Wolfgang.	Moreover,	 the	 idea	 that	worldly	 authority	was	divinely	 ordained	 formed	 a	 central	 element	 of	 his	 religious	 outlook.	
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Emphasising	the	contrasts	between	his	own	respect	for	this	God-given	authority	 and	 the	 rebelliousness	 of	 the	 Huguenots,	 Johann	Wilhelm’s	support	 for	 the	 King	 of	 France,	 who	 in	 his	 eyes	 was	 facing	 a	reprehensible	 rebellion,	 was	 entirely	 compatible	 with	 his	 religious	position.	 The	 Duke’s	 commitment	 to	 his	 ideals	 eventually	 led	 to	 his	downfall.	 Not	 only	 the	 campaign	 in	 France,	 but	 also	 his	 support	 for	purist	 Flacian	 theology	 provoked	 fierce	 criticism	 from	 some	 of	 his	Lutheran	 peers	 and	 from	 the	 Emperor,	 eventually	 leading	 to	 Johann	Wilhelm	losing	most	of	his	territories.		 Of	 the	 five	missions	 discussed	 in	 this	 chapter,	 the	 campaign	 of	Philibert	 of	 Baden	 was	 the	 most	 ambiguous.	 The	 explanation	 for	 his	decision	 to	 change	 sides	 provided	 by	 Philibert	 himself	 centres	 on	 the	question	 of	 authority.	 Evoking	 a	 youthful	 spirit	 of	 adventurism,	 the	Margrave	 repeatedly	 reiterated	 his	 longstanding	 desire	 to	 serve	 an	illustrious	 foreign	 potentate.	 The	 condition	 for	 this	 support,	 however,	hinges	on	the	legitimacy	of	the	cause	of	the	potentate	in	question.	In	his	letters,	Philibert	expressed	his	horror	at	discovering	 that	he	had	been	conned	 into	 believing	 that	 the	 Huguenots	 and	 not	 the	 Catholics	represented	the	interests	of	the	King	of	France.	This	discovery,	Philibert	claimed,	was	the	reason	for	changing	sides.	Whether	this	is	entirely	true	is	difficult	to	verify.	However,	this	explanation	is	not	inconsistent	with	the	 Margrave’s	 confessional	 identity.	 Raised	 at	 the	 Catholic	 courts	 of	Vienna	 and	 Bavaria,	 Philibert,	 despite	 his	 conversion	 to	 Lutheranism,	maintained	 strong	 relationships	 with	 the	 Empire’s	 Catholic	 nobility.	Moreover,	 he	 was	 said	 to	 be	 particularly	 hostile	 to	 Reformed	Protestantism.	This	Lutheran	orthodoxy,	 resembling	 Johann	Wilhelm’s	religious	 position,	 is	 illustrated	 in	 the	 pamphlet	 produced	 to	 justify	Philibert’s	mission.	In	this	pamphlet	a	reference	to	the	Bible	is	used	to	proof	that	the	Huguenots’	opposition	to	the	King	was	an	abomination	in	the	eyes	of	God.		 Rather	than	being	motivated	by	the	prospect	of	financial	gain	or	the	 urge	 for	 adventure,	 all	 five	 campaigns	were	 thus	 underpinned	 by	their	 protagonists’	 distinct	 perspectives	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 French	Wars	 of	 Religion	 and	 on	 the	 role	 of	 religion	 in	 these	 conflicts.	 Going	
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beyond	the	simple	narrative	of	 the	Wars	as	a	conflict	pitting	Catholics	versus	 Protestants,	 a	 closer	 investigation	 into	 the	 individual	confessional	and	ideological	identities	of	the	princes	demonstrates	that	these	were	entirely	consistent	with	the	justifications	of	their	missions.	The	 fact	 that	 the	 exact	 and	 often-unique	 constitution	 of	 an	 individual	prince’s	beliefs	was	 the	deciding	 factor	 that	determined	his	actions	 in	relations	to	France	contradicts	many	of	the	traditional	narratives	of	the	French	 Wars	 of	 Religion.	 The	 language	 used	 to	 describe	 sixteenth-century	 events	 often	 focuses	 on	 large	 blocks	 or	 groups	 of	 people.	Discussions	 range	 from	 crude	 Catholic-Protestant	 opposition	 to	 the	slightly	more	nuanced	labelling	of	individuals	as	for	instance	politiques,	
moyenneurs,	 or	 ultra-Catholics.	 The	 historiography	 of	Confessionalisation,	 which	 studies	 the	 formation	 of	 more	 or	 less	uniform	 religious	 groups,	 has	 contributed	 to	 this	 interpretive	framework.	Discussions	about	the	workings	of	propaganda	and	polemic	have	similarly	focussed	too	much	on	target	groups.	Despite	their	shared	Lutheranism,	 the	 reception	 of	 Huguenot	 narratives	 among	 the	Protestant	princes	was	to	a	very	 large	extent	determined	by	 the	exact	beliefs	 held	 by	 the	 individual	 prince.	 Of	 course	 it	 is	 very	 difficult	 for	historians	 to	 study	 the	 individual	 reception	 of	 news,	 polemic,	 and	propaganda	 among	 the	wider	 population.	 Therefore,	 the	 study	 of	 the	Protestant	 princes,	 who	 through	 their	 correspondence	 provided	 a	unique	 insight	 into	 their	 ideas	 and	 convictions,	 is	 very	 helpful	 in	enhancing	our	understanding	of	this	process.			 Of	 course	 confessional	blocks	played	an	 increasingly	 important	role	as	 the	sixteenth	century	progressed.	Nonetheless,	an	overreliance	on	 the	 supposed	 ideological	 uniformity	 of	 these	 groups	 has	 led	historians	 such	 as	 Vogler	 to	 dismiss	 the	 ideological	 dimension	 of	 the	campaigns	discussed	above.	Only	by	appreciating	the	individuality	and	complexity	of	ideology	and	religious	belief	is	it	possible	to	make	sense	of	 the	sometimes-surprising	decisions	made	by	 the	Protestant	princes	of	the	Holy	Roman	Empire	during	the	French	Wars	of	Religion.	
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Conclusion		In	 this	 thesis,	 I	 have	 looked	 at	 the	 French	 Wars	 of	 Religion	 from	 a	transnational	angle.	I	have	explored	the	ways	in	which	the	French	Wars	of	 Religion	 were	 explained,	 debated,	 and	 understood	 among	 the	Protestant	 aristocracy	 of	 the	 Holy	 Roman	 Empire.	 Presenting	 a	comprehensive	 picture,	 I	 have	 discussed	 the	 variety	 of	 factors	 that	shaped	 German	 interpretations	 and	 demonstrated	 how	 these	interpretations	 changed	 as	 a	 result	 of	 developments	 in	 France,	Germany,	 and	 beyond.	 Moreover,	 I	 have	 shown	 how	 these	 different	understandings	 lay	at	 the	basis	of	German	involvement	 in	the	Wars	of	Religion,	 inspiring	a	variety	of	 individual	 interpretations	of	 the	nature	of	the	conflict.			The	first	factor	shaping	German	aristocratic	attitudes	towards	the	Wars	of	 Religion	 was	 their	 conceptual	 understanding	 of	 the	 border	separating	them	from	France.	The	use	of	modern	national	borders	as	a	convenient	 way	 to	 define	 the	 scope	 of	 research	 projects	 has	overshadowed	the	ambiguity	of	the	regions	on	the	boundaries	between	France	and	the	Empire.	This	reading	of	the	French	Wars	of	Religion	as	a	national	story	suffers	from	serious	flaws.	It	was	not	even	entirely	clear	where	 the	boundaries	of	France	and	the	Empire	were,	especially	after	the	 annexation	 of	 the	 Trois-Évêchés	 by	 Henry	 II,	 provoking	 debates	about	 where	 the	 ‘natural	 borders’	 of	 France	 should	 lie.	 A	 similar	argument	 can	be	made	about	national	 identity.	Though	 terms	 such	as	‘German’	 and	 ‘French’	 were	 used	 with	 increasing	 frequency,	 this	terminology	was	 fluid	 and	used	without	 any	 consistency.	 In	humanist	circles	 interest	 in	 Tacitus’s	 Germania	 provoked	 debates	 about	 the	existence	 of	 a	 German	 nature,	 inherited	 from	 the	 peoples	 that	historically	 inhabited	 the	 territories	 of	 the	 Empire.	 Though	 this	 trend	contributed	 to	 the	 tentative	 formation	 of	 a	 sense	 of	 Germanness,	 this	did	not	necessarily	increase	a	feeling	of	separation	between	France	and	
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Germany.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 Henry	 II	 was	 only	 one	 of	 many	commentators	who	 accentuated	 the	 shared	Germanic	 and	Carolingian	ancestry	of	both	France	and	 the	Empire.	Language,	another	 important	shaper	 of	 national	 identity,	 does	 not	 provide	much	more	 clarity.	 The	Rhineland,	 and	 especially	 its	major	 urban	 centres	 such	 as	 Strasbourg,	was	multilingual	and	home	to	large	numbers	of	migrants.	Moreover,	in	many	cases,	political	entities	straddled	language	boundaries.		 Most	 of	 the	 German	 princes	 studied	 in	 this	 thesis	 embody	 the	connectedness	 of	 France	 and	 the	 Rhineland.	 Building	 on	 the	transnational	 ties	 cultivated	 by	 their	 families,	 the	 internationality	 of	their	outlook	was	reinforced	in	their	formative	years.	They	were	often	educated	abroad	or	at	least	in	a	cosmopolitan	environment.	Spending	a	significant	 part	 of	 their	 youth	 at	 the	 courts	 in	 Paris	 or	 Brussels	 or	 at	university	 in	 France	 helped	 young	 noblemen	 to	 establish	 social	 ties	with	 peers	 from	 across	 Europe.	 These	 educational	 practices	 also	ensured	that	multilingualism	was	more	norm	than	exception	among	the	Rhineland’s	aristocracy.	Proficiency	in	French	and	Latin	were	common,	facilitating	 easy	 interaction	 with	 peers	 abroad.	 Moreover,	 the	 French	monarchy	 provided	 opportunities	 for	 patronage	 for	 the	 Empire’s	nobility.	Christoph	of	Württemberg	and	Jean	Philippe	of	Salm	served	in	the	 French	 army	 during	 the	 1550s	 and	 the	 Duke	 of	 Saxe-Weimar	received	 a	 French	 pension	 for	more	 than	 a	 decade.	 The	 international	outlook	encouraged	by	their	education	and	their	ties	with	French	peers	formed	an	 important	part	of	 the	 identity	of	 the	princes	studied	 in	this	thesis.	 The	 princes	 believed	 themselves	 to	 be	 members	 of	 an	international	 aristocratic	 elite.	 This	 membership	 was	 expressed	 in	visual	 statements,	 such	 as	 art,	 architecture,	 and	 fashion.	 The	consequence	of	the	permeability	of	the	Franco-German	border	was	that	there	was	no	natural	separation	between	domestic	and	 foreign	 issues.	There	was	 no	 sense	 that	 the	 violence	 that	 erupted	 in	 1562	would	 be	confined	to	France	or	that	the	troubles	of	France	were	not	the	concern	of	Germany.	On	the	contrary,	the	German	princes	were	from	the	outset	of	the	conflict	invested	in	finding	a	solution.	Consequently,	any	inaction	was	 not	 the	 result	 of	 a	 natural	 or	 logical	 separation	 or	 distance	 from	
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French	 affairs,	which	 is	 often	 assumed	 in	 the	 existing	 historiography,	but	the	product	of	a	conscious	decision-making	process.		Confessional	categories	too	should	be	carefully	interrogated.	Categories	such	 as	 Catholic	 and	 Protestant,	 Lutheran	 and	 Calvinist,	 are	 very	important,	but	 the	1560s	was	 the	crucible	when	 these	 identities	were	being	 formed.	 They	 therefore	 need	 to	 be	 applied	 with	 care.	 The	consequence	 of	 the	 rigid	 application	 of	 these	 categories	 is	 that	historians	 have	 misinterpreted	 German	 involvement	 in	 the	 French	Wars	 of	 Religion.	 Since	 the	 activity	 of	 the	 German	 princes	 does	 not	match	the	existing	expectations	of	how	Catholics,	Reformed	Protestant,	or	 Lutherans	 should	 have	 behaved,	 historians	 have	 concluded	 that	religion	was	 not	 the	 driving	 force	 behind	 their	 actions.	 In	 concluding	this,	 they	 have	 ignored	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 European	 confessional	landscape.	 In	 recent	 decades	 historians,	 such	 as	 Mario	 Turchetti	 and	Thierry	 Wanegffelen,	 have	 challenged	 this	 sense	 of	 confessional	uniformity.	 They	 and	 others	 have	 pointed	 towards	 the	 variety	 of	religious	positions	existing	in	sixteenth-century	Europe.	The	Rhineland	is	 an	 excellent	 example	 of	 the	 ambiguities	 of	 the	 early	 modern	confessional	 landscape.	 Home	 to	 a	 large	 variety	 of	 different	confessional	 groups	 from	 the	 Empire	 and	 beyond,	 the	 region	was	 the	location	 of	 both	 violent	 clashes,	 but	 also	 of	 co-existence,	 of	 fierce	debates,	 but	 also	 of	 experiments	 in	 getting	 along.	 Strasbourg	 and	 its	region,	as	well	as	Heidelberg	were	a	melting	pot	for	all	sorts	of	religious	ideas.	 The	clarity	 that	 the	Peace	of	Augsburg	seemed	to	have	brought	to	 the	 confessional	 landscape	 of	 the	 Holy	 Roman	 Empire	 was	undermined	 when	 less	 than	 a	 decade	 after	 the	 Peace’s	 creation	 the	Elector	Palatine	 converted	 to	Reformed	Protestantism.	His	 conversion	did	 not	 only	 call	 into	 question	 the	 legal	 status	 of	 Reformed	Protestantism	 –	 excluded	 from	 the	 Peace	 of	 Augsburg	 –	 but	 also	challenged	 prevalent	 Lutheran	 understandings	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 the	Palatinate’s	 new	 religion.	 Contrary	 to	 the	 common	 perception	 of	Reformed	Protestantism,	the	conversion	of	the	Palatinate	did	not	bring	
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sedition	or	social	unrest,	but	followed	the	same	pattern	as	the	orderly	princely	 Reformations	 presided	 over	 by	 Friedrich’s	 Lutheran	 peers.	More	importantly,	the	debates	provoked	by	Friedrich’s	conversion	gave	questions	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 various	Protestant	 confessions	 a	 new	 relevance.	 These	 debates	 were	 part	 of	longstanding	 disputes	 within	 Lutheranism	 about	 the	 definition	 of	orthodoxy	 and	 about	 which	 parts	 of	 doctrine	 and	 liturgy	 were	
adiaphora	and	which	were	essential.	Friedrich	passionately	argued	that	despite	 some	 theological	 differences	 Lutherans	 and	 Reformed	Protestants	were	coreligionists.	These	debates,	and	especially	 the	role	played	by	Friedrich,	had	a	strong	impact	on	German	understandings	of	the	Wars	of	Religion	in	France.	The	question	of	whether	the	Huguenots	could	 be	 regarded	 as	 the	 German	 Lutherans’	 coreligionists	 to	 a	 large	extent	 determined	 whether	 their	 cause	 could	 be	 seen	 as	 legitimate.	Moreover,	 suspicions	 about	 the	 seditious	 nature	 of	 the	 Huguenots’	religion	 also	 had	 the	 potential	 of	 disrupting	 transnational	 Protestant	cooperation.	Therefore,	 the	question	of	France	was	directly	 integrated	into	 both	 the	 dispute	 between	 Gnesio-Lutherans	 and	 Philippists	 and	into	the	controversy	about	the	Palatinate’s	conversion.	This	integration	of	 French	 and	 German	 affairs	 is	 fundamental	 to	 the	 formation	 of	German	understandings	of	the	Wars	of	Religion.	The	separation	of	one	from	 the	 other,	 for	 instance	 the	 study	 of	 French	 propaganda	without	reference	to	the	German	context,	has	led	to	distorted	interpretations.	After	his	conversion,	Friedrich	became	the	most	ardent	advocate	of	the	Huguenots	among	the	German	princes.	He	tirelessly	championed	their	cause,	putting	moral	pressure	on	his	Protestant	peers	to	intervene	on	the	Huguenots’	behalf.	He	emphatically	downplayed	the	differences	between	German	and	French	Protestants,	 brushing	over	 controversial	theological	 issues	 such	 as	 disagreement	 over	 the	 nature	 of	 the	Eucharist.	Friedrich’s	arguments	could	also	be	 found	in	the	many	pro-Huguenot	pamphlets	published	in	German.	These	often-polemical	texts	painted	 a	 stark	 picture	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 conflict,	 emphasising	 the	cruelty	of	French	Catholics,	and	heavily	criticised	any	Lutheran-Catholic	cooperation.	 Some	 Lutheran	 princes	 adopted	 a	 similar	 position.	
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Wolfgang	of	Zweibrücken	also	argued	that	doctrinal	disagreements	did	not	remove	the	ties	of	solidarity	that	bound	Huguenots	and	Lutherans.	Wolfgang	differed	 in	 opinion	with	his	 friend	 and	mentor	Christoph	of	Württemberg,	who	was	less	positive	about	the	compatibility	of	the	two	confessions	and	instead	urged	the	Huguenots	to	embrace	Lutheranism	as	 a	 condition	 for	 German	 support.	 Other	 Lutherans,	 who	 chose	 a	narrower	 definition	 of	 orthodoxy,	 rejected	 Friedrich’s	 arguments	completely.	These	debates	about	orthodoxy,	confessional	reconciliation,	and	 the	 compatibility	 of	 the	 various	 branches	 of	 Protestantism	 cast	 a	long	 shadow	over	 the	 question	 of	 France.	 The	 role	 of	 Germans	 in	 the	French	 Wars	 of	 Religion	 can	 therefore	 never	 be	 fully	 understood	without	extensive	reference	to	the	religious	situation	inside	the	Empire.		Throughout	the	Wars	of	Religion,	German	audiences,	and	especially	the	Protestant	 princes,	 were	 subjected	 to	 intense	 French	 diplomatic	 and	propaganda	campaigns.	French	narratives	about	the	nature	of	the	Wars	of	 Religion	 reached	 Germany	 primarily	 through	 two	 avenues:	diplomacy	and	printed	propaganda.	Ambassadors	from	the	two	warring	parties	 were	 almost	 continuously	 present	 in	 Germany,	 touring	 the	courts	of	the	Protestant	princes.	Important	players	in	France	were	also	in	 contact	 with	 their	 German	 peers	 through	 correspondence.	 At	 the	same	time,	printed	pamphlets	of	varying	length	and	sophistication	were	published	 in	 Germany.	 These	 texts	 reached	 much	 larger	 audiences,	were	 often	 published	 anonymously,	 and	were	 not	 conditioned	 by	 the	conventions	of	diplomatic	practice.	There	 were	 great	 contrasts	 not	 only	 between	 Catholic	 and	Reformed	 readings	 of	 the	 conflict,	 but	 also	 between	 Huguenot	narratives	 intended	 for	 different	 audiences.	 The	 protestations	 and	manifestoes	 published	 in	 name	 of	 the	 Prince	 of	 Condé	 formed	 the	backbone	of	the	Huguenot	leadership’s	diplomatic	efforts	in	the	Empire.	The	 language	of	 these	protestations	was	 carefully	measured,	 avoiding	overtly	 religious	 language	 and	 instead	 emphasising	 their	 legal	 and	constitutional	 grievances,	 such	 as	 the	 usurpation	 of	 their	 legitimate	position	by	the	Guise	and	the	breaking	of	the	Edict	of	January.	There	is	
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evidence	 that	 religious	 language	played	 a	more	prominent	 role	 in	 the	efforts	 of	 Huguenot	 diplomats,	 such	 as	 d’Andelot,	 who	 travelled	 the	Lutheran	 courts	 in	 Germany	 appealing	 for	 international	 Protestant	solidarity.	 The	 tone	 of	 pro-Huguenot	 pamphlets	 published	 in	 German	often	differed	strongly	from	the	composed	and	legalistic	language	used	by	Condé.	They	instead	explained	the	conflict	in	explicitly	religious	and	sometimes	 even	 eschatological	 terms	 and	 intended	 to	 appeal	 to	 the	emotions	of	the	reader.	Catholic	narratives,	by	contrast,	played	directly	to	Lutheran	suspicions	of	the	disorderliness	of	Reformed	Protestantism	by	persistently	describing	the	actions	of	the	Huguenots	as	a	rebellion.	In	both	pamphlets	and	correspondence,	Condé	and	his	party	were	accused	of	 pursuing	 hidden	 private	 agendas,	 of	 using	 religion	 as	 a	 pretext	 to	hide	 their	 seditious	 ambitions,	 and	 even	 of	 aiming	 to	 overthrow	 the	monarchy.	In	this	French	polemic,	religious	and	political	motives	were	clearly	separated.	This	dichotomy	was	artificial	and	served	a	rhetorical	purpose.	The	 contrasts	 between	 these	 competing	 narratives	 did	 not	 go	unnoticed	 and	 caused	 confusion	 among	 the	 German	 princes.	 In	 the	process	 of	 making	 sense	 of	 these	 contrasts,	 they	 built	 on	 their	 own	ideas	 and	 experiences.	 In	 particular,	 the	 reception	 of	 these	interpretations	 in	 Germany	 was	 strongly	 influenced	 by	 the	compatibility	of	French	justifications	with	ideas	about	the	legitimacy	of	resistance	 that	 had	 been	 developed	 in	 the	 Empire.	 The	 foundation	 of	early	modern	ideas	about	the	legitimacy	of	resisting	monarchs	was	laid	centuries	earlier	 in	 the	 frequent	conflicts	between	the	aristocracy	and	kings	of	late	Medieval	Europe.	This	tradition	was	not	lost	in	the	mists	of	time.	On	the	contrary,	 the	 ‘longstanding	 liberties	and	privileges’	of	 the	nobility	were	treasured	and	frequently	invoked.	The	religious	conflicts	that	broke	out	in	the	Empire	as	a	result	of	the	Reformation	gave	a	new	dimension	 to	 tensions	between	Emperor	 and	 Imperial	princes.	 In	 this	context,	new	ideas	about	the	justifiability	of	resistance	were	developed.	These	new	 theories	were	necessary	 since	 the	 bone	 of	 contention	was	now	 for	 the	 first	 time	 religion.	 The	 two	 most	 important	 theories	developed	 in	 this	 context,	 the	 Saxon	 ‘private	 law	 theory’	 and	 the	
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‘constitutionalist	 theory’	 from	Hesse,	 emphasised	 the	 conditionality	of	Imperial	and	monarchical	rule	and	argued	that	the	breaking	of	the	most	important	condition	–	the	protection	and	promotion	of	the	true	religion	–	warranted	resistance.	The	princes	studied	in	this	thesis	were	strongly	invested	 in	 these	 theories	 since	 they	 themselves,	 or	 their	 families,	played	a	central	role	in	their	creation.	These	German	understandings	of	the	 legitimacy	 of	 resistance,	 therefore,	 formed	 the	 context	 in	 which	French	 narratives	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 Wars	 of	 Religion	 were	interpreted.		In	 response	 to	 the	 news,	 polemic,	 and	 calls	 for	 support	 coming	 from	France,	the	German	Protestant	princes	developed	their	own	ideas	about	the	best	way	of	solving	the	disputes	in	France.	These	ideas	were	shaped	by	both	the	narratives	presented	to	them	by	the	warring	parties,	and	by	their	 own	 experiences	 of	 dealing	with	 religious	 and	 political	 disputes	inside	the	Empire.	Crucially,	 in	response	to	contrasting	interpretations	and	 the	 accusations	 of	 covert	 agendas	 the	 German	 solutions	 on	 the	whole	aimed	to	address	 the	religious	 troubles	whilst	safeguarding	 the	political	order	and	the	authority	of	the	monarch.	Moreover,	these	ideas	were	 changed,	 reconsidered,	 or	 abandoned	 when	 they	 proved	impossible	to	implement.		 The	first	and	by	far	most	desirable	solution	in	German	eyes	was	religious	 reconciliation	 along	 Lutheran	 lines.	 A	 religiously	 diverse	society	 was	 almost	 universally	 regarded	 as	 undesirable	 or	 even	dangerous.	Strongly	committed	to	the	promotion	of	‘the	religion	of	the	Augsburg	 Confession’,	 the	 princes	 recognised	 that	 their	 confession	occupied	 the	 theological	 middle	 ground	 between	 Catholicism	 and	Reformed	Protestantism.	This	ideal	quickly	turned	into	policy	when	the	Lutheran	 princes,	with	 Christoph	 of	Württemberg	 as	 a	 leading	 figure,	decided	 to	send	Lutheran	 texts,	 including	 the	Augsburg	Confession,	 to	France,	to	dispatch	a	theological	embassy	to	the	Colloquy	of	Poissy,	and	to	 put	 significant	 diplomatic	 pressure	 on	 French	 leaders	 to	 adopt	 the	Lutheran	religion.	With	the	benefit	of	hindsight	this	policy	seems	naïve,	but	in	promoting	religious	reconciliation	they	joined	an	important	and	
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vocal	 group	 of	 Frenchmen,	 including	 Gallican	 and	 reform-minded	Catholics,	 who	 advocated	 a	 similar	 conciliatory	 agenda.	 Moreover,	religious	reconciliation	was	in	the	early	1560s	also	French	royal	policy,	which	was	most	clearly	manifested	in	the	Colloquy	of	Poissy.		 However,	as	 the	1560s	progressed	 it	became	 increasingly	clear	that	 reconciliation,	 especially	 along	 Lutheran	 lines,	 was	 unattainable.	Not	 surprisingly,	 the	German	princes	 looked	 to	 their	own	experiences	of	dealing	with	religious	plurality	in	the	Empire	when	formulating	new	solutions	 for	France.	The	Peace	of	Augsburg,	 rather	 than	allowing	 the	existence	of	a	 religiously-diverse	society,	 sought	uniformity	 in	smaller	units.	In	line	with	Augsburg,	German	suggestions	for	France	placed	the	aristocracy	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 solution,	 allowing	 them	 significant	religious	freedoms.	The	situation	in	France	too,	contributed	strongly	to	the	 popularity	 of	 this	 solution.	 Between	 1563	 and	 1566,	 the	 time	 at	which	 this	 proposal	 was	 most	 forcefully	 put	 forward,	 the	 Edict	 of	Amboise	was	in	place	in	France.	Amboise	shifted	the	focus	of	Huguenot	activity	from	the	urban	to	the	seigneurial,	making	the	households	of	the	aristocracy	 the	 focal	 point	 for	 French	 Protestants.	 Once	 again,	 the	interplay	between	French	and	German	influences	is	evident.		 Though	 religious	 tolerance	 was	 widely	 regarded	 as	 a	 negative	concept,	calls	for	some	form	of	tolerance	were	increasingly	often	heard	during	 the	 late-1560s.	The	 advocates	 of	 tolerance	 can	be	divided	 into	those	 few	who	made	 a	moral	 case	 for	 tolerance	 and	 those	 for	whom	tolerant	 policy	 was	 a	 means	 rather	 than	 a	 goal	 in	 itself.	 The	 Elector	Palatine	 in	 his	 zeal	 for	 the	 Huguenot	 cause	 advocated	 their	 complete	religious	 freedom.	Convinced	of	 the	 truth	of	 the	Reformed	religion,	he	expected	that	 it,	undeterred	by	Catholic	persecution,	would	flourish	in	France.	 The	 less	 zealous	 William	 of	 Orange	 also	 famously	 advocated	religious	tolerance.	The	policy	of	religievrede	he	aimed	to	 introduce	 in	the	 Netherlands	 in	 the	 1570s	 was	 foreshadowed	 by	 attempts	 to	implement	a	similar	policy	in	his	French	principality	of	Orange.		 Finally,	peace	could	of	course	also	be	achieved	by	 the	defeat	of	either	 of	 the	 warring	 parties.	 In	 line	 with	 his	 Gnesio-Lutheran	perspective	 and	 echoing	 Catholic	 explanations	 of	 the	 conflict,	 Johann	
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Wilhelm	 of	 Saxe-Weimar	 regarded	 the	 Huguenot	 cause	 as	 a	 political	rebellion	 that	 needed	 to	 be	 crushed.	 Though	 hoping	 for	 a	 Lutheran	future	 for	 France,	 Johann	 Wilhelm	 supported	 the	 French	 Catholic	monarchy	and	therefore	strongly	opposed	any	German	support	for	the	Huguenot	 party.	 All	 proposed	 solutions	 were	 thus	 clearly	 shaped	 by	both	 the	 news	 and	 propaganda	 received	 from	 France	 and	 by	 the	German	 princes’	 own	 experiences	 and	 convictions.	 This	 mix	 of	influences	together	led	to	the	formation	of	individual	interpretations	of	the	 conflict	 in	 France	 and	 its	 possible	 solutions.	 Too	 strong	 a	historiographical	 focus	 on	 confessional	 and	 ideological	 blocks	 has	overshadowed	 this	 individuality.	 By	 studying	 all	 of	 these	 influences	together	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 seemingly	 surprising	divergence	 in	opinions	about	 the	 future	of	France	 that	could	be	 found	among	‘those	of	the	Augsburg	Confession’.		German	understandings	of	the	French	Wars	of	Religion	were	shaken	by	the	events	of	1566	and	1567,	which	not	only	reignited	the	violence	 in	France,	but	also	plunged	the	Netherlands	into	chaos.	In	the	summer	of	1566	longstanding	tensions	between	the	population	of	the	Netherlands	and	the	Habsburg	regime	boiled	over,	 leading	to	a	summer	marked	by	iconoclastic	riots.	In	response	to	this	break-down	of	order,	the	infamous	Duke	 of	 Alba	 was	 dispatched	 to	 the	 Netherlands.	 With	 his	 army	 he	travelled	 along	 the	 Franco-Imperial	 border,	 causing	 panic	 amongst	Protestants	 on	 both	 sides.	 Alarmed	 by	 the	 proximity	 of	 Alba	 and	 his	forces,	the	Huguenot	leadership	embarked	upon	the	Surprise	of	Meaux,	a	 pre-emptive	 strike	 intended	 to	 secure	 the	King.	 The	 Surprise	 led	 to	the	outbreak	of	the	Second	War	of	Religion.	It	 is	 clear	 from	 both	 correspondence	 and	 from	 pamphlets	 that	events	 in	 the	 Netherlands	 and	 France	 were	 widely	 seen	 amongst	Germans	 as	 directly	 linked,	 or	 even	 as	 part	 of	 the	 same	 struggle.	Moreover,	 these	 events	 seemed	 to	 confirm	 the	 theory	 of	 the	international	Catholic	Conspiracy,	 said	 to	have	been	masterminded	by	the	Catholic	powers	of	Europe,	including	Alba	and	Catherine	de’	Medici.	What	was	unfolding	just	across	the	border,	it	was	argued,	was	only	the	
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first	 steps	 in	 a	 larger	 plan	 that	 would	 soon	 endanger	 Protestants	throughout	 Europe.	 The	 years	 1566	 and	 1567	 saw	 a	 surge	 in	 the	number	 of	 German	 pamphlets	 about	 the	 Conspiracy.	 Moreover,	 with	Friedrich	 as	 most	 vocal	 promoter	 of	 the	 theory,	 talk	 of	 the	 Catholic	Conspiracy	 started	 to	 dominate	 the	 correspondence	 of	 the	 princes	studied	in	this	thesis.	The	Wonderjaar	and	the	escalation	of	violence	in	France	and	the	Low	Countries	it	provoked	was	a	turning	point	in	German	perceptions	of	 the	Wars	 of	 Religion.	Whereas	 before,	most	 princes	 studied	 in	 this	thesis	 refused	 completely	 to	buy	 into	 the	 stark	French	narratives	 and	aimed	 to	 play	 a	 conciliatory	 role,	 a	 sense	 of	 fear	 for	 international	escalation	 amongst	 some	 princes	 now	 overshadowed	 more	 nuanced	assessments	of	the	nature	of	the	conflict.	The	instinct	of	the	Protestants	of	 the	 Rhineland	 was	 to	 seek	 safety	 in	 numbers.	 Between	 1567	 and	1570	 they	 attempted	 to	 form	 defensive	 alliances,	 both	 among	 the	German	princes	and	internationally.	The	aim	was	to	include	Protestant	princes	and	monarchs	from	across	Europe,	most	importantly,	Elizabeth	I	 of	 England.	 The	 pursuit	 of	 such	 a	 broad	 Protestant	 alliance	 was	 a	radical	departure	 from	the	attitude	 the	German	princes	had	displayed	before	 1566.	 Whereas	 debates	 about	 France	 were	 characterised	previously	by	intricate	discussions	about	the	nature	of	the	relationship	between	the	various	branches	of	Protestantism,	about	the	legitimacy	of	resistance,	and	the	best	way	of	restoring	peace,	these	misgivings	about	doctrinal	purity	or	legal	justifiability	were	forgotten	in	the	face	of	such	an	 acute	predicament.	 This	 change	was	directly	 brought	 about	 by	 the	outbreak	 of	 violence	 in	 the	 Netherlands.	 The	 years	 1566	 and	 1567	clearly	 show	 the	 interplay	 between	 theoretical	 and	 theological	foundations	of	German	understandings	of	the	Wars	of	Religion	and	the	impact	of	events	as	they	unfolded.	This	interplay	ensured	that	German	attitudes	were	 ever	 shifting.	 By	 the	 end	 of	 the	 decade,	 the	mood	 had	changed	sufficiently	to	open	the	door	to	military	intervention	in	France.		The	culmination	of	a	decade	of	diplomatic	interaction	and	debate	about	the	nature	of	the	conflicts	in	France	and	its	best	solution	was	a	series	of	
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military	 interventions	 launched	from	the	Empire.	The	 lack	of	clear-cut	confessional	 connections	 underpinning	 these	 campaigns	 has	 led	historians	to	conclude	that	these	were	for	the	most	part	motivated	by	a	desire	 for	wealth	and	 fame	or	a	 taste	 for	 adventure.	 In	particular,	 the	decision	of	the	Lutheran	Johann	Wilhelm	of	Saxe-Weimar	and	Philibert	of	Baden	to	serve	 in	 the	army	of	 the	Catholic	King	of	France	has	been	explained	as	simply	an	attempt	to	make	money.	This	conclusion	is	the	result	 of	 a	 lack	 of	 understanding	 of	 the	 political,	 intellectual,	 and	religious	 context	 in	which	German	decisions	 to	 intervene	were	made.	Moreover,	the	tendency	to	think	too	much	in	terms	of	groups,	assuming	homogeneity,	has	overshadowed	the	diversity	of	opinion	that	could	be	found	within	 these	groups.	 I	 instead	argue	 that	 all	 five	 campaigns	are	entirely	 consistent	 with	 the	 positions	 the	 princes	 had	 taken	 in	 the	debates	of	the	previous	decade.		 The	 cost,	 both	 financially	 and	 diplomatically,	 of	 intervening	 on	behalf	 of	 either	 of	 the	warring	parties	was	 significant	 and	 so	was	 the	damage	a	military	campaign	could	do	to	the	Rhineland.	For	this	reason,	the	 idea	 of	 military	 intervention	 was	 almost	 universally	 unpopular,	even	 if	 the	 justifiability	 of	 such	 a	 venture	was	 not	 always	 called	 into	question.	However,	the	dramatic	change	of	the	tone	of	the	debate	after	1566	opened	the	door	for	military	intervention.	In	face	of	the	perceived	danger	 of	 the	Catholic	 Conspiracy,	 Friedrich	 III	 and	his	Reformed	 son	Johann	 Casimir	 threw	 caution	 to	 the	 wind	 in	 order	 to	 put	 military	muscle	 behind	 the	 cause	 they	 had	 been	 supporting,	 morally	 and	financially,	 for	 years.	 Though	 questions	 have	 been	 posed	 about	 the	motives	of	Casimir,	his	decision	to	lead	an	army	into	France	in	1567	is	entirely	consistent	with	his	religious	identity,	opinion	of	the	Huguenots,	and	 with	 the	 mood	 that	 dominated	 discussions	 about	 France	 at	 that	particular	time.	The	Lutheran	Wolfgang	of	Zweibrücken	has	also	been	dismissed	in	 the	 historiography	 as	 a	 mere	 adventurer	 lacking	 political	 ideas.	However,	his	devotion	 to	 the	Reformation	of	his	 territories,	as	well	as	his	 rich	 correspondence	with	 Christoph	 of	Württemberg,	 gives	 a	 very	different	 impression.	Wolfgang	 clearly	 formulated	 his	 ideas	 about	 the	
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relationship	 between	 Lutheranism	 and	 the	 religion	 of	 the	 Huguenots	and,	though	he	hoped	and	expected	that	they	in	the	future	would	adopt	Lutheran	doctrine,	he	regarded	French	Protestants	as	his	coreligionists.	He	was	 also	 among	 the	 earliest	 advocates	 of	 intervention,	 prompting	Christoph	to	write	extensively	against	the	notion	of	a	military	campaign	into	 France.	 Again,	 the	 climate	 had	 changed	 enough	 in	 1569	 to	 allow	Wolfgang	 to	 launch	 his	 campaign	 with	 significant	 backing	 from	Lutherans	in	Germany.		 Most	 controversial	 of	 all,	 however,	 were	 the	 campaigns	 of	Johann	Wilhelm	of	 Saxe-Weimar	and	Philibert	of	Baden.	At	 first	 sight,	Johann	Wilhelm’s	 motives	 seem	 straightforward.	 The	 Duke	 had	 been	receiving	 a	 French	 pension	 for	 years	when	 in	 1568	 he	was	 asked	 by	Catherine	 de’	 Medici	 to	 fulfil	 his	 side	 of	 the	 bargain.	 However,	 this	campaign	 could	 not	 only	 easily	 have	 been	 avoided	 –	 Johann	Wilhelm	faced	 fierce	 opposition	 from	 his	 subjects,	 Protestant	 peers,	 and	 the	Emperor	–	but	also	proved	to	be	his	ruin.	In	this	light,	the	compatibility	of	 Johann	 Wilhelm’s	 strongly	 developed	 and	 clearly	 formulated	religious	 ideas	 with	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 campaign	 is	 a	 better	 way	 of	explaining	 his	 motives.	 A	 champion	 of	 Gnesio-Lutheranism,	 Johann	Wilhelm	was	 fiercely	against	 the	notion	 that	Lutherans	and	Reformed	Protestants	could	be	seen	as	coreligionists.	Instead	he	highlighted	both	the	heresy	and	sedition	of	the	Huguenots,	leading	him	to	conclude	that	they	needed	to	be	crushed.		 Historiographical	misunderstandings	of	German	involvement	 in	France	 are	 not	 the	 product	 of	 a	 lack	 of	 interest,	 but	 rather	 of	 the	tendency	 to	 think	 in	 national	 rather	 than	 transnational	 terms.	 For	historians	 of	 the	 French	 Wars	 of	 Religion,	 German	 intervention	 has	almost	 exclusively	 been	 studied	 from	 a	 French	 perspective.	 For	historians	 of	 the	 German	 Reformation,	 and	 confessionalisation	 in	particular,	 the	 German	 princes’	 French	 interests	 are	 but	 a	 side	 story.	Only	 by	 marrying	 both	 historiographical	 traditions	 can	 German	attitudes	 towards	 the	Wars	of	Religion	be	understood.	 They	were	 the	product	 both	 of	 influences	 from	 France	 and	 of	 the	 religious,	 cultural,	and	intellectual	climate	inside	the	Empire.		
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	The	 conclusions	 of	 my	 research	 have	 implications	 beyond	 the	 direct	topic	of	this	thesis.	Firstly,	the	findings	of	this	thesis	have	an	impact	on	our	 understanding	 of	 the	 process	 of	 confessionalisation.	 The	confessionalisation	thesis	as	developed	since	the	1980s	has	put	a	strong	emphasis	on	the	process	of	creating	more	or	less	homogenous,	or	even	uniform,	 confessional	 groups.	 This	 is	 not	 surprising	 since	 the	 tools	 of	confessionalisation,	 such	 as	 catechisms,	 written	 confessions,	 and	 the	creation	of	 standardised	 school	 curricula,	 all	 lend	 themselves	well	 for	the	 formation	 of	 such	 confessional	 homogeneity	 and	 uniformity.	Though	 historians	 have	 highlighted	 the	 failures	 of	 the	 process	 of	confession	 building,	 for	 instance	 by	 demonstrating	 the	 lack	 of	knowledge	of	key	theological	concepts	among	the	rural	population,	they	have	 so	 far	 failed	 to	 recognise	 the	 diversity	 of	 opinion	 on	 important	topics	 that	 could	 be	 found	 among	 individuals	who	 saw	 themselves	 as	members	of	 the	same	confessional	group.	 In	the	debates	about	France	that	 took	 place	 among	 the	 German	 aristocracy,	 these	 disagreements	surfaced.	At	first	glance,	confessional	uniformity	can	be	expected	more	from	the	German	Lutheran	princes	than	from	most	other	groups.	They	were	 themselves	 responsible	 for,	 and	 committed	 to,	 the	 creation	 of	confessional	uniformity,	played	a	central	role	in	the	creation	of	church	orders,	 and	 consciously	 subscribed	 to	 the	 Augsburg	 Confession.	Moreover,	they	regarded	this	text	as	central	to	their	identity,	referring	to	themselves	as	the	‘Princes	of	the	Augsburg	Confession’.	Nonetheless,	they	struggled	to	reach	a	consensus	about	the	nature	of	the	conflict	 in	France,	 and	 particularly	 their	 relation	 with	 the	 Huguenots.	 These	contrasting	 positions	 were	 the	 consequence	 of	 seemingly	 subtle	differences	 in	 interpretation	 of	 Lutheran	 orthodoxy,	 but	 yet	 had	 far	reaching	 consequences	 for	 the	 cause	 of	 the	 Wars	 of	 Religion.	 The	interpretive	 framework	 presented	 by	 the	 confessionalisation	 thesis	makes	us	blind	to	this	individuality	of	belief.	The	study	of	the	collective	has	 thus	 led	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 caricature	 of	 inter-confessional	relations	during	 the	sixteenth	century.	A	more	sophisticated	approach	to	this	topic	is	warranted.	This	approach	needs	to	focus	on	the	variety	
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of	 components	 that	 collectively	 formed	 individual	 confessional	identities.	As	 I	 have	demonstrated,	 these	 components	 include	not	 just	theology	 as	 captured	 in	 catechisms	 and	 school	 curricula,	 but	 also	concrete	 life	 experiences	 and	 news	 and	 rumours	 of	 events	 further	afield.	 The	 second	 broad	 conclusion	 of	 this	 thesis	 pertains	 to	 the	workings	 of	 propaganda,	 polemics,	 and	 justifications	 of	 violent	resistance.	Though	 these	have	been	 studied	extensively,	 the	 focus	has	overwhelmingly	 been	 on	 the	 various	 modes	 of	 persuasion	 employed	during	 the	 Reformation,	 from	 pamphlets	 to	 hymns	 and	 sermons	 to	visual	culture.	In	this	thesis	I	have	demonstrated	the	ways	in	which	the	reception	 of	 such	 polemic	 was	 conditioned	 by	 prior-held	 ideas	 and	convictions.	 The	 intensity	 of	 French	 diplomacy	 and	 propaganda	ensured	 that	 the	German	princes	were	 all	 familiar	with	 the	 variety	of	French	 interpretations	 of	 the	 conflict.	 This	 was	 reinforced	 by	 the	practice	 of	 sharing	 news	 and	 information	 through	 peer	 networks.	Despite	 this	 intense	 exposure	 to	 French	 narratives	 about	 the	Wars,	 a	variety	of	different	responses	can	be	found	among	the	princes.	 Johann	Wilhelm	 of	 Saxe-Weimar’s	 complete	 rejection	 of	 the	 Huguenot	narratives,	 for	 instance	 contrasts	 strongly	 with	 Wolfgang	 of	Zweibrücken’s	 almost	 complete	 appropriation	 of	 these	 same	arguments.	 Between	 these	 two	 extremes	 we	 find	 Christoph	 of	Württemberg,	 at	 once	 sympathetic	 towards	 the	Huguenots’	 cause	 and	protective	 of	 French	 royal	 authority.	 These	 three	 princes	 were	 all	Lutherans,	 all	 the	 leaders	 of	 the	 princely	 reformations	 of	 their	territories,	all	 committed	 to	 the	doctrines	of	 the	Augsburg	Confession,	and	all	unhappy	about	the	conversion	of	Friedrich	III.	Nonetheless,	they	disagreed	 about	 their	 religion’s	 relationship	 with	 the	 Huguenots	 and	about	 the	 possibility	 of	 future	 doctrinal	 rapprochement	 between	 the	two	 confessions.	 These	 differences	 were	 subtle,	 but	 yet	 had	 great	consequences	for	the	reception	of	French	narratives.	Johann	Wilhelm’s	emphatic	 rejection	 of	 all	 doctrine	 that	 deviated	 from	 the	 original	Augsburg	Confession	ensured	that	Huguenot	diplomacy	was	doomed	to	fail	 in	Weimar.	Wolfgang’s	more	positive	 outlook,	 and	his	 expectation	
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that	 the	Huguenots	could	be	persuaded	 to	adopt	Lutheran	doctrine	 in	the	future,	meant	that	Zweibrücken	was	fertile	ground	for	the	message.	The	success	of	propaganda	was	 thus	conditioned	by	 the	precise	set	of	ideas	already	held	by	the	audience.	Building	on	this	observation,	it	has	to	 be	 concluded	 that	 the	 study	 of	 the	 Reformation’s	 large	 body	 of	polemical	texts	and	images	is	incomplete	without	close	attention	to	the	precise	confessional	and	ideological	make-up	of	its	audiences.	Thirdly,	 this	 thesis	 contributes	 to	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	workings	of	 transnational	 information	 transfer.	The	emerging	 interest	in	 transnational	 history	 has	 opened	 up	 avenues	 for	 investigation	 into	the	streams	of	 information	crossing	Europe’s	borders.	Historians	have	studied	pamphlets,	news	reports,	and	the	stories	of	the	many	migrants	that	 travelled	 the	continent	 in	 the	sixteenth	century.	This,	however,	 is	not	 just	 a	 story	 of	 the	 logistics	 of	 information	 transfer.	 Information	travelling	 across	 political,	 cultural,	 and	 linguistic	 boundaries	 was	 not	left	 unaffected	 by	 this	 process.	 It	 was	 subjected	 to	 translation,	interpretation,	 and	 appropriation.	 Ideas	 crossing	 or	 transcending	borders	 were	 tweaked,	 twisted,	 and	 shaped	 to	 fit	 regional,	 local,	familial,	 or	 even	 personal	 contexts.	 This	 study	 of	 the	 reception	 of	information	 about	 the	 French	 Wars	 of	 Religion	 among	 the	 German	Protestants	has	shown	the	ways	in	which	this	information	was	treated	and	 transformed.	French	pamphlets	were	 translated,	but	also	adapted	to	 suit	 the	 particular	 context	 in	 which	 they	 were	 published.	 For	instance,	 pro-Huguenot	 pamphlets	 not	 only	 restated	 much	 of	 the	polemics	 that	 formed	 the	 core	 of	 their	 propaganda	 aimed	 at	 French	audiences,	but	also	made	clear	concessions	to	the	Lutherans	they	were	targeting.	 In	 doing	 so	 they	 downplayed	 doctrinal	 differences	 and	emphasised	 their	 shared	 Christianity.	 Similarly,	 some	 pamphlets	strongly	hinted	at	the	composure	and	orderliness	of	the	Huguenot	party	and	thereby	addressed	German	suspicions	of	the	sedition	of	Reformed	Protestants.	 Besides	 pamphlets,	 private	 correspondence	 was	 an	important	means	through	which	news	from	France	was	disseminated	in	Germany.	 Narratives	 about	 France	 were	 shared	 through	 the	 German	aristocratic	peer	networks,	but	never	without	the	addition	of	qualifying	
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remarks	 or	 assessments.	 Impressions	 from	 France	 were	 frequently	placed	 in	a	German	context,	 linked	 to	events	 in	 the	Low	Countries,	 or	used	 as	 a	 tool	 for	 shaping	 debates	 already	 taking	 place	 among	 the	princes.	This	 layer	of	 interpretation	contributed	 to	shaping	responses,	pushing	one	interpretation	over	the	other.	The	problems	of	translation	too	 played	 an	 important	 role.	 The	 Duke	 of	 Württemberg’s	 envoys	 in	France	 struggled	 with	 their	 inability	 to	 speak	 directly	 to	 Navarre,	Coligny,	 or	 de’	 Medici,	 relying	 on	 interpreters	 to	 communicate	 their	master’s	already	complicated	message.	The	 tracking	of	 this	process	of	information	 transfer	 across	 borders	 is	 central	 to	 the	 methodology	developed	by	transnational	historians.	Local	events	and	the	ideas	they	generated	 simultaneously	 became	 part	 of	 concerns	 that	 transcended	the	 localities.	 Only	 through	 adopting	 a	 transnational	 approach	 is	 it	possible	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 this	 interplay	 between	 local,	 national,	 and	transnational	 influences.	 Since	 the	 historiography	 of	 both	 the	 French	Wars	of	Religion	and	the	Reformation	in	Germany	has	overwhelmingly	focussed	on	the	national	and,	more	so,	on	the	local,	our	understanding	of	 both	 is	 incomplete.	 	 In	 this	 thesis	 I	 have	 attempted	 to	 redress	 this	imbalance	by	demonstrating	how	information	about	France	profoundly	influenced	 German	 attitudes	 to	 major	 questions	 (for	 instance	 about	interconfessional	relations	or	the	concept	of	tolerance)	and	visa	versa.	Adopting	 a	 transnational	 approach	 is	 thus	 not	 only	 relevant	 for	 the	study	of	European	history,	but	also	for	national	and	even	local	history.	The	 interpreted	 frameworks	 of	 global,	 transnational,	 and	 connected	history	that	is	largely	being	developed	in	the	context	of	modern	history	needs	to	be	applied	more	consistently	to	the	sixteenth	century.	 In	this	thesis	 I	 have	 shown	 the	 fruits	of	 such	an	approach	and	demonstrated	how	 it	 can	 lead	 to	 surprising	 new	 insights	 into	 the	 formation	 of	individual	confessional	identities.		Finally,	 this	 thesis	 has	 opened	 up	 further	 questions	 that	 could	 not	 be	answered	within	the	time	and	word	limit	of	this	research	project.	In	this	thesis,	 I	 have	 focussed	on	 the	 aristocracy.	Not	 only	were	 they	heavily	invested	in	the	affairs	of	France	for	the	reasons	highlighted	in	Chapter	I,	
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but	they	also	left	extensive	bodies	of	correspondence.	This	makes	them	the	 ideal	 case	 study	 for	 investigating	 German	 understandings	 of	 the	French	Wars	of	Religion.	However,	I	have	also	touched	upon	the	many	pamphlets	 about	 France	 published	 in	 German.	 These	 were	 aimed	 at	larger	audiences.	The	question	thus	remains:	how	did	they	understand	the	nature	of	Wars	of	Religion	 in	France?	Were	 their	attitudes	shaped	by	similar	 factors?	Secondly,	 the	choice	to	 limit	 the	thesis	to	the	years	1552-1572	has	 left	questions	about	 the	 longevity	of	German	attitudes	towards	 France.	 What	 was	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 St	 Bartholomew	 Day’s	Massacre?	 Were	 there	 generational	 differences	 in	 German	 attitudes	towards	France?	Did	German	 interest	 in	 France	 tail	 off	 as	 the	 conflict	dragged	on?	Why	was	German	military	 involvement	 largely	 limited	 to	the	 years	 1567-1569?	 I	 hope	 to	 be	 able	 to	 answer	 some	 of	 these	questions	in	the	future.	
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A	195:		 f.	 61-72,	 f.	 73-78,	 f.	 150-151,	 f.	 179-194,	 f.	185.			
Printed	Primary	Sources:	
	Anon.,	Abtruck	aines	Briefs	den	die	burger	un[d]	einwoner	zu	Roan	den	
25	Octobris	in	disem	Tausent	fünfhundert	un[d]	zwai	und	sechtzigsten	Jar	
in	der	belegerung	an	die	Königin	zu	Franckreich	haben	geschriben,	 (s.	 l.:	s.	n.,	1562).		Anon.,	 Abdruck	 des	 Durchlauchtigen/	 Hochgebornen	 Fürsten	 und	
Herren/	Herrn	 Johans	Wilhelmen/	Herzogen	 zu	 Sachssen/	 etc.	 auff	 und	
abforderung/	des	Schlosses	Grimmenstein/	und	Stadt	Gotha/	sampt	aller	
seiner	F.	G.	Lehenleuten/	geschwornen	Unterthanen	und	Verwanten/	So	
itziger	zeit	sich	darinnen	enthalten,	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1567).		Anon.,	Abdruck	 Zweier	Nidergeworffener	 Schreiben/	daraus	 zuersehen/	
mit	 was	 geschwinden	 Practicken	 die	 Papisten	 inn	 Franckreich	
umbgangen/	 wider	 die	 Herrn	 vom	 Adel/	 unnd	 andere	 so	 sich	 der	
Reformation	der	Religion	in	Franckreich	gebrauchen,	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1568).		Anon.,	 Andere	 Erclärung	 des	 Hertzogen	 von	 Conde/	 in	 welche	 die	
anfänger	 und	 ursächer	 diser	 jetzigen	 empörung	 in	 disem	 Königreich	
Franckreich	 offenbaret:	 und	 was	 irem	 F.	 G.	 bißher	 zu	 hin[n]legung	
derselben	 fürzunemen	 gebürt	 hat/	 un[d]	 noch	 gebüren	 will/	 angezaigt	
wird,	Heidelberg,	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1562).		Anon.,	Apologia/	darin	Königlicher	Maiestat	zu	Franckreich	gut	gerucht	
verstendinge	 und	 verantwort	 würt/	 von	 synem	 seiner	 getrewen/	 wider	
der	Keyserlichen	lügen	hasstigen/schentlichen	verleumbdung/	damit	irer	
Ma.	 zugemessen/	 sie	 habe	 der	 Türcken	 kriegsvolck/	 die	 Christenheyt	
anzugriffen/	und	zubekriegen/	bewegt,	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1552).		
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Anon.,	Articul	Durch	der	Königin	von	Navarren/	und	der	Herren	Printzen	
von	 Navarren/	 und	 Conde	 abgeordnete	 Rätheder	 Kön.	 Würd.	 in	
Franckreich	 diß	 70.	 Jars	 underthenigst	 uberraicht.	 Sampt	 dero	 kön.	W.	
gegenantwort/	mit	 angelelften	 kurtzen	 erinnerungen/	warumb	auff	 die	
fürgeschlagene	Artickel	der	frid	nit	ervolget	ist,	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1570).		Anon.,	 Auszschreiben	 des	 Printzen	 von	 Conde/	 Darinnen	 erkleret/	 auß	
was	ursachen	und	gerechtigkeiten	 Ire	F.	G.	nach	dem	tödtlichen	abgang	
des	 Königs	 von	 Navarren/	 sich	 der	 Regierung	 der	 Königlichen	 Kron	
Franckreich/	neben	der	Königin/	so	lang	die	königliche	Würde	daselbst	in	
minderjerigem	Alter/	anzunemen	un[d]	zuuncerwinden	habe,	 (s.	 l.:	 s.	n.,	1563).		Anon.,	 Brußkets	 Bedencken	 ann	 der	 könig	 inn	 Franckreich	 vonn	
gegenwertigen	 burgerlichen	 kriegsempörungen/	 so	 von	 wegen	 der	
Religion	 in	 Franckreich	 widerum	 entstanden	 etc.	 Ausz	 sprach	
verteutschet,	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1568).		Anon.,	 Catechismus	 der	 evangelischen	 Kirchen	 in	 Frankreich,	(Heidelberg:	s.	n.,	1563).		Anon.,	 Confession	 oder	 Bekan[n]tnuß	 des	 Glaubens	 der	 evangelische[n]	
kirchen	 in	 Franckreich/	 der	 Königlichen	wirden	 dasselbst/	 sampt	 einer	
Supplication	ubergeben,	(Heidelberg:	s.	n.,	1563).		Anon.,	 Confession/	 oder	 Bekan[n]tnuß	 des	 Glaubens	 in	 gemain	 und	
ainhelliglich	 von	 den	 kirchen	 so	 hin[n]	 und	 wider	 in	 Franckreich	
zerstrouwet/	 nach	 dem	 lautern	 rainen	 Evangelio	 unsers	 Herzen	 Jesu	
Christi	zuleben	begeren/	gestellt/	un[d]	 sampt	ainer	Supplication	der	K.	
M.	 übergeben.	 Ausz	 Frantzösischer	 sprach	 ietzt	 neüwlich	 in	 Teütsch	
bracht,	(Heidelberg:	Ludwig	Lück,	1662).		Anon.,	 Confutation,	 Gründlicher	 und	 ausfürlicher	 Beweis/	 aus	 Gottes	
Wort/	 der	 Veter	 schrifften/	 Doctor	 Luthers	 Büchern/	 Catechismo/	
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kirchengefangen/	unnd	Collecten/	Augspurgischer	Confession/	Apologia/	
Schmalkaldischen	 Artikeln/	 Fürstlicher	 Sechsischer	 Confutation/	 unnd	
andern	 standthafftigen	 Argumenten.	 Das	 Victorini	 Strigelii	 Declaration	
durch	welche	die	 vorhin	wolbestalte	Thüringische	 kirchen	 verirret/	und	
verwirret/	 falsch	 verfürisch	 und	 verwerfflich.	 Auff	 Christliche	
verordnung/	 des	 Durchlauchtigen	 Hochgebornen	 Fürsten	 und	 Herrn/	
Herrn	 Johans	 Wilhelmen/	 Hertzogen	 zu	 Sachssen	 Landgragen	 in	
Düringen/	und	Marggraven	zu	Meissen/	etc.	gestellet,	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1567).		Anon.,	 Corpus	 Doctrinae	 Christianae,	 Das	 ist	 Summa	 der	 Christlichen	
lere/	aus	den	Schrifften	der	Propheten	und	Aposteln/	sein	Kurtz/	rundt/	
und	 gründlich	 D.	 Martinum	 Lutherum	 sonderlich/	 und	 andere	 dieser	
Lande	Lerer	zusamen	gefasset.	Die	dieselbige	in	unser	von	Gottes	gnaden	
Johans	Wilhelm/	Hertzogen	zu	Sachssen/	Landgraffen	in	Thüringen/	und	
Marggraffen	 zu	 Meissen/	 Fürstenthumen	 und	 Landen/	 durch	 Gottes	
gnade	eintrichtig	bekant	und	geleret	wird,	(Jena:	Donatum	Kirchtzenhau,	1571).		Anon.,	Der	Königin	zu	Engeland	Außschreiben/	darinnen	sie	die	ursachen	
anzaiget/	warumb	sie	etliche	irer	underthanen	auffgebracht/	ire	und	ires	
vilgeliebten	 Brüders	 Carols	 des	 Neündten/	 Königs	 in	 Franckreich/	
underthanen	damit	zubeschützen,	(Frankfurt:	Ludwig	Lück,	1563).		Anon.,	 Des	 Prin[n]tzen	 von	 Conde	 gesanten	 Herrn	 Honorat	 vonn	
Chastellirs	 bericht/	 des	 itzigen	 in	 Franckreich	 abermals	 enstandene[n]	
kriegs/	So	er	dem	Durchleuchtigste[n]	Hochgebornen	Fürsten	und	Herrn/	
Herrn	 Friederichen	 Pfalzgraven	 bey	 Rhein/	 des	 Heiligen	 Römischen	
Reichs	Ertztruchsessen	un[d]	Churfürste[n]/	Herzoge[n]	in	Bayern	etc.	in	
personlicher	 gegewert	 des	 königlichen	 würde	 in	 Franckreich	 gesanten/	
Herrn	 von	 Lansacs/	 erstlich	 müntlich	 gethan/	 und	 hernacher	 ihren	
Churfürstlichen	 Gnaden	 in	 schrifte[n]/	 auff	 gnedigst	 erfordere[n]/	
ubergeben	den	4	Decembris	Anno	1567,	Auß	Französicher	sprach	trewlich	
verteutschet,	(Heidelberg:	Agricola,	1568).		
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Anon.,	Edict	und	Erclerung/	von	der	Königlichen	würden	in	Franckreich/	
CAROLO	 dem	 IX.	 ausgegangen/	 von	 wegen	 der	 friedtshandlung	 und	
hinlegung	der	netbörungen	so	in	gemeltem	königreich	entstanden,	1563.	
Edict	 und	 Erklärung	 des	 Durchleuchtigen	 und	 Christlichen	 Fürsten	 und	
Herrn/	Herrn	Carlen	den	Neundten	dieses	namens,	könig	in	Franckreich/	
Von	 wegen	 der	 fridshandlung/	 und	 hinlegung	 der	 Empörung/	 so	
gegenwertige	 zeit	 zwischen	 seiner	 königlichen	 Würden	 und	 dem	
hochgebornen	 Pritzen	 von	 Conde	 sampt	 seinen	 mitverwanten	 wider	 in	
gemeltem	königreichs	entstanden	und	eingerissen,	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1568).		Anon.,	 Edictum	 der	 entstandenen	 Empörung	 halben	 in	 Franckreich,	 So	
den	28.	Marcii	diß	68.	Jars	zu	Pariß/	und	hernach	den	3.	Apprilis	zu	Mötz	
Publiciert	worden	 ist/	 ungeverlichen	 nachvolgenden	 Inhalts,	 (s.	 l.:	 s.	 n.,	1568).	
	Anon.,	 Een	 Nieu	 Geusen	 Lieden	 Boecxken/	 Waerinne	 Begrepen	 is/	 den	
Ganstschen	 Handel	 der	 Nederlandtscher	 Gheschiedenissen/	 dees	
Voorleden	 Jaeren	 tot	 noch	 toe	 Ghedragen/	 Eensdeels	 Onderwylen	 in	
Druck	Uitghegaen/	Eensdeels	nu	nieu	By-ghevoecht	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1581).	
	Anon.,	Erclärung	un[d]	Schreiben	der	Herzogen	von	Guise/	Connestabels	
und	 Marschalcks	 von	 sanct	 Andre/	 dem	 König	 und	 der	 Königin	 in	
Franckreich	gethan/jetzige	kriegsrüstung/	und	wie	derselben	zuhelffen/	
belangend’,	Heidelberg,	Ludwig	aus	der	Wetterau,	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1562).		Anon.,	 Erzelung	 was	 sich	 nach	 des	 Königs	 von	 Navarren	 thod	 in	 der	
friedshandlung	 in	 königreich	 Franckreich	 zugetragen	 hat.	 im	 Monat	
December,	Anno	M.D.LXII.,	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1563).		Anon.,	Frantzösischen	kriegsempörung.	Das	ist	Gründlicher	Warhafftiger	
Bericht/	 von	 jüngst	 verschienenen	 ersten	 und	 andern/	 und	 jetz	 zum	
dritten	 mal	 newer	 vorstehender	 kriegsempörung	 in	 Franckreich.	
Darinnen	 angezeigt	 wirdt/	 Auß	 was	 genotdrangten	 hochheblichen	
ursachen/	 die	 newen	 Reformierten	 Religions	 verwanthe/	 (wie	 man	 sie	
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nennet)	 widerumb	 gegenwertige	 unvermeidliche	 Defension	 und	
Nothwehre	wider	des	Cardinals	von	Lottringen/	und	seines	Angangs	der	
Papisten	 unerhörte	 Fridbrüchtige	 verfolgung	 ƒür	 die	 handtzunemen	
getrungen.	 Deßgleichen	 was	 er	 gestalt	 obgedachter	 Cardinal	 durch	
zerrüttung	wachsen	auff	 und	 zunemmen	gesucht.	 Item/	Abschrifft	 einer	
Werbung/	So	der	königin	auß	Engelandt	Gesandter/	bey	der	königlichen	
Würden	 in	Franckreich	 etc.	 gethan.	Auß	Frantzösischer	 Sprach	 trewlich	
verdolmetschet,	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1559).		Anon.,	 Friefhandlung	 in	 Franckreich.	 Warhafftige	 beschreibung	 des	
Edicts	unnd	befehls	des	königs	ausz	Franckreich/	uber	den	Vertrag	un[d]	
hinlegung	der	zwispalt	und	zerrüttung	derselbigen	königreich/	etc.	Ausz	
dem	 Frantzösischen	 Exemplar	 trewlich	 verteutscht,	 (Langingen,	Emmanuel	Seltzer:	1570).		Anon.,	 Gebett	 die	 in	 des	 Härzogen	 von	 Conde	 Veldleger	 in	 Franckreich	
gehalten	 und	 nach	 gelegenheyt	 der	 zeit	 gerichtet	 warden,	 (s.	 l.:	 s.	 n.,	1562).		Anon.,	 Libertas	 Sendtschrifften	 des	 Königlichen	 Maiestat	 ze	 Frankreich	
etc.	 An	 die	 Chur	 und	 Fürsten,	 Stende	 und	 Stett	 des	 Heiligen	 Römischen	
Reichs	Teutscher	Nation,	darinn	sie	sich	ytziger	Kriegsrüstung	halben	uffs	
kürzest	erkleret,	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1552).		Anon.,	Kurze	beschreibung	des	Aufflauffs/	so	sich	newlich	in	Franckreich	
zu	 Ambosen/	 wider	 deren	 von	 Guysze	 Regierung/	 von	 dem	
Frantzösischen	Adel	in	dem	Mertzen/	des	yetzlauffenden	sechsigsten	jars	
erhaben	 hatt.	 Darbey	 aycg	 angeschenckt/	 Das	 offentlich	 auszschreiben	
beider	 Königreich	 Engellandt/	 und	 Franckreich	 gemelter	 von	 Guyss	
Regierung	betreffende,	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1560).		Anon.,	 Kurtzer	 warhaffter	 un[d]	 Grundtlicher	 Bericht/	 von	 der	
Baptischen	 Conspiration	 und	 Bündtnuß/	 auch	 derselbigen	 jetzigen	
kriegsexpedition	 in	Franckrych	und	Brabanct	 sampt	deren	ursachen.	 Zu	
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Christlicher	getrūwer	Warning	der	Frommen	Tütschen/	so	sich	deßwegen	
in	 dienst	 und	 bestallung	 und	 geringes	 zergeugkliches	 guts	 und	 gelts	
willen	begeben	und	inlassend,	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1568).		Anon.,	 Mittel	 und	 weg/	 durch	 welche	 gegenwertige	 Empörung	 inn	
Franckreych	 könne	 verglichen	 unnd	 hingelegt	 werden/	 von	 dem	
Durleüchtigen	 hochgebornen	 Fürsten	 unnd	Herren/	Herren	 Ludwig	 von	
Borbon/	 Herren	 von	 Conde/	 dem	 König	 und	 Königin	 inn	 Franckreich	
fürgeschlagen,	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1562).		Anon.,	Neüwe	Zeittung/	Von	der	Schlacht	 so	der	Hörtzog	von	Condes	 in	
Franckreich,	mit	dem	Hörtzogen	von	Guiß	gethan/	wie	es	 ist	ergangen/	
auch	 wie	 der	 Frantzösisch	 Adel	 und	 grossen	 Herren	 auff	 beiden	 seiten	
umbkommen	unnd	gefangen	worden	seind/	auch	wie	der	Hörtzogen	von	
Guiß	erschossen	und	umkomen	ist/	etc.,	(Strabourg:	Peter	Hug,	1563).		Anon.,	 Newe	 warhafftige	 Zeitung	 aus	 Franckreich,	 Nemlich	 das	 Edict	
unnd	Erklerung	des	Durchleuchtigen	und	Christlichen	Fürsten	und	Herrn/	
Herrn	 Carlen	 des	 Namens	 des	 9.	 Von	 Wegen	 der	 fridshandlung	 und	
hinlegung	 de	 Empöru[n]g	 so	 gegenwertige	 zeit	 zwüschen	 seiner	
königlichen	 würden	 und	 dem	 hochgebornen	 Printzen	 von	 Conde	 sampt	
seinen	 mitverwanten	 wider	 in	 gemeltem	 königreich	 entstanden	 und	
eingrissen,	Auß	dem	französichen	trewlich	und	fleissig	verdolmetscht,	 (s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1568).		Anon.,	Newe	Zeitung	aus	Franckreich/	welche	 sich	mit	dem	Pritzen	von	
Conde/	unnd	dem	Könige	in	Franckreich	newlich	zugetragen/	etc.,	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1568).		Anon.,	Newe	Zeitungen/	Ausz	Franckreich	und	Niderlanden/	Von	zwaien	
treffenlichen	Schlachten	im	Monat	November	diß	1568.	Jars	gehalten/	Als	
zwischen	 dem	 könig	 in	 Franckreich	 und	 den	 Guisischen	 an	 einem/	 und	
dem	könig	von	Navarren/	auch	Printzen	von	Bourbon	und	Conde	andern	
thails.	 Deßgleichen	 zwischen	 dem	 Duca	 von	 Alba	 eins/	 un[d]	 Herrn	
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Printze[n]	von	Uranien/	Nassaw	und	Catzelnbogen/	am	andern	thail.	Mit	
anderm	 mehr	 so	 sich	 jedem	 ort	 und	 auff	 baiden	 seiten	 zugetragen/	
Warhafftiglich	beschriben,	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1568).		Anon.,	Newe	Zeittung	von	Franckreich	unnd	Niderlandt.	Christlichen	und	
hochwichtige	gründe	und	ursache[n]/	Warumb	die	Teutschen	kriegsleut	
die	Christen	inn	Franckreich	und	Niderlandt	nicht	verfolgen	helffen/	oder	
auff	 einige	 weise	 sich	 zu	 iren	 feinden	 wider	 sie	 gestellen	 sollen.	 Allen	
Ehrlichen,	unnd	Frommen	Teutschen	zu	einem	newen	Jar	geschenckt,	 (s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1568).		Anon.,	 Newe	 Zeitung/	 Warhafftige	 Newe	 Zeitung/	 vonn	 siben	 Stetten/	
welche	mit	 dem	Volck/	 und	alles	was	 darinn	war/	 in	 den	Grentzen	 von	
Franckreich/	 versunckenn	 unnd	 undergangenn,	 (Augsburg:	 Hans	Zimmermann,	1566).		Anon.,	Ordnung	 der	 Evangelischen	Kirchen	 in	 Franckreich/	 so	 gehalten	
wird/	im	Gemeinen	Gebet/	Reichung	der	Sacrament/	Einsegnen	der	Ehe/	
Besuchung	 der	 Krancken/	 Und	 Christlichem	 Catechismo,	 (Heidelberg:	Johannes	Mayer,	1563).		Anon.,	 Pfalzgrave	 Friederichs	 Churfürsten/	 etc.	 auffgerichte	 Christliche	
Policey	Ordnung,	(Heidelberg:	Mayer,	1565).		Anon.,	 Protocoll	 Des	 gesprechs	 zwischen	 den	 Pfaltzischen	 und	
Wirtenbergischen	 Theologen/	 im	 April	 des	 1564	 Jars	 zu	 Maulbrun	
gehalten.	 Aller	 dings	 dem	 Originali	 gleichlautend/	 ohn	 zusatz	 und	
abbruch	getrewlich	von	dem	Wirtembergischen	Theologen/	so	gedachten	
Colloquio	beygewonet/	in	Truck	verfertigt,	(Tübingen:	s.	n.,	1565).		Anon.,	 Relation	 und	 Bericht	 des	 Cardinals	 von	 Chastillon	 was	 sich	
zwüschen	der	königlichen	Würden	in	Franckreich	Verordneten	auch	ihme	
und	 anderen	 von	 wegen	 des	 Printzen	 von	 Conde	 abgesanten/	 der	
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verströsten	 unnd	 hernacher	 zerschlagnen	 friedshandlung	 halben	 inn	
newligkeit	verlauffen	etc.,	(Heidelberg:	Agricola,	1568).		Anon.,	 Summarischen	 und	 Kurtze	 doch	 warhafftige	 anzeig	 unnd	
erklärung/	 als	 dessen/	 so	 sich	 hin	 und	wider	 in	 Franckreich/	 zwischen	
dem	 königischen	 un[d]	 Hugenotischen	 kriegsvolck/	 seid	 der	 grausamen	
Schlacht	 die	 jüngst	 abgelauffenen	 jars	 beschen/	 biß	 in	 jetzigen	 noch	
werenden	 Monat	 Januarii/	 des	 gegenwürtigen	 der	 mindernzal	
sibentzigsten	 jars/	 mit	 einnem[m]ungen	 der	 Stett/	 auch	 scharmützeln	
und	 anderm	 mehr	 zugetragen	 und	 verlossen	 hat,	 (Cologne:	 Jacobus	Weiß,	1570).		Anon.,	 Supplication	 Carolo	 dem	 Neundten/	 König	 in	 Kranckreich/	 am	
neundten	 Tag	 des	 Brachmonats/	 dises	 Ein	 und	 sechzigsten	 Jars	
ubergeben/	von	den	geordneten	der	Christlichen	versam[m]lung/	so	hin	
und	 wider	 durch	 gantz	 Franckreich	 zerstreuet/	 un[d]	 nach	 dem	
Evangelion	 unders	 Herzen	 Jesu	 Christi	 zuleben	 begeren,	 (Nuremberg:	Christoff	Heußler,	1561).		Anon.,	 Suplication	 der	 Catholischen	 vom	 Adel	 in	 der	 Cron	 Franckreich	
and	iren	Kunig	Carolo	dem	neundten	etc.	in	disem	einundsechtzigsten	Jar	
ubergeben,	(Dillingen:	Mayer,	1561).		Anon.,	 Verantworttung	 für	 die	 Konigklich	 Mayestet	 von	 Franckreich	
wider	 derselben	 Rebellen	 Schrift/	 ihr	 Mayestet	 vollkom[m]ens	 Alter	
belangend,	 Auß	 dem	 Frantzösischen	 inns	 Teutsch	 gebracht,	 (s.	 l.:	 s.	 n.,	1561).		Anon.,	Warhafftige	 Beschreibung	 des	 Gesprechs/	 so	 sich	 zwischen	 dem	
Durchleuchtigsten	und	Hochgebornen	Fürsten	von	Conde/	und	denen	von	
der	 Königlichen	 Maiestat	 in	 Franckreich	 darzu	 verordneten	 Herren/	
begeben.	Darin	auch	die	ursachen/	warumb	itzgemelter	Fürst	von	Conde	
und	 seine	mitverwandte/	 zur	wehr	gegriffen/	angezeigt	warden.	 Sampt	
des	 Königs	 aus	 Franckreich	 Patenten	 und	 erklerung/	 belangende	 die	
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Richter	 von	 Diener	 der	 Justitien/	 und	 ire	 Religion.	 Aus	 Frantzösischer	
Sprach	verdeutschet,	(s.	l.:	s.	n.,	1568).		Anon.,	Warhafftiger	 bericht	 von	 der	 schlacht/	 so	 auff	 den	 XIII.	 Merzen	
1569	 durch	 küniglichen	 würde	 auß	 Franckreich	 brüder	 zwischen	 dem	
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